Motivation & Contribution

Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia for over a quarter century despite economic mismanagement, corruption, and a disastrous war in Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, Putin’s rule was often seen as exemplifying modern autocracy, maintaining one-man rule while employing less overt mechanisms of social control, such as propaganda and regularly held, albeit controlled, uncompetitive elections. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, however, Putin’s authoritarianism has intensified, especially as opponents of the war are imprisoned, terrorized, driven into exile, or worse. As such, Russia’s “modern” autocracy, which relies less on force than on presenting a message to society of an all-capable state and leader, has transformed into a highly personalized form of harsh authoritarianism. At the same time, many average Russians do genuinely support Putin — especially given his emphasis on order in society and restoring Russian greatness — and view the regime as legitimate and responsive. Often, however, analysts of contemporary Russia in the West tend to focus more on those Russians who oppose Putin’s autocracy than on those who support it and why they do. 

In her “Review Article: Why Does Putinism Endure? Dialoguing With the Dictator,” Kathryn Stoner tackles this question through a critical analysis mainly of Hannah Chapman’s Dialogue with the Dictator: Authoritarian Legitimation and Information Management in Putin’s Russia. The analysis is complemented by insights from four other recently published books on authoritarianism and Russia. For Stoner, Chapman’s central contribution lies in showing how a seemingly ridiculous exercise in state propaganda — the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin TV call-in show — is in fact an important way of legitimizing Putin’s rule, providing his regime with information about social preferences and sources of dissatisfaction while affording citizens with the feeling that their complaints are being heard and even resolved live and on TV. Gaining information about citizens would otherwise be difficult in such an unfree society, where individual preferences that may be critical of Putin’s rule are often concealed or deliberately falsified to avoid punishment by the regime. The reader learns that even hegemonic dictators must be perceived by citizens to be a good listener. 

The Functions of ‘Participatory Technologies’

The conceptual foundation of Chapman’s analysis lies in what she terms ‘participatory technologies’ (PTs), which allow citizens to interact with authoritarian regimes “directly and in a positive manner.” Observers tend to dismiss PTs, which are often low-technology formats like TV shows or radio programs, as ‘spin’ or mere propaganda. In Russia, however, Putin uses PTs not only to control what information reaches citizens, but also to enhance his legitimacy and appear more accountable. Although PTs are limited and highly individualized — for example, more often than not ignoring collective demands — they are direct.

Participatory technologies differ from autocrats’ sham, window-dressing elections, where the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Instead, they permit citizens to engage with and provide input to the autocrat on specific issues. They also provide information to the regime about the performance of lower-level agents, such as governors or regional politicians, given that citizens are often concerned with local, day-to-day problems. By involving these lower-level agents, autocrats can deflect responsibility for governance problems away from themselves. Finally, PTs provide value to those who participate in them, giving them a sense of political efficacy. At the same time, however, PTs may expose embarrassing governmental dysfunctions. Indeed, the resolution of local problems – like fixing potholes on a local road – should not require direct citizen engagement with powerful national-level leaders. Furthermore, PTs run the risk of being overused and being seen as performative and fake by citizens.
 

Tuning into Direct Line

Stoner’s review article discusses Chapman’s analysis of one PT in particular, namely the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin call-in show. Direct Line began in 2001, organized by the Kremlin and broadcast on state-owned and pro-regime media. The audience and the questions posed are selected in advance. During the broadcast — which is one of the most watched events in Russia, perhaps because of compulsion from employers — Putin conveys to the audience that Russia is doing well, but that he is not satisfied, is working tirelessly, and wants to hear citizens’ concerns. Putin does not merely listen but acts to solve their concerns, for example, keeping a folder of issues raised by ordinary Russians and bringing these issues to the attention of regional governors. He has even forwarded questions directly to regional governors on air, which also serves to deflect responsibility away from himself. 

Methodology

Stoner describes the multiple survey experiments and interviews Chapman conducted in exploring whether Direct Line matters to ordinary Russians. Some of the interviewees seem to know that Direct Line is staged; yet they nonetheless find it compelling that Putin is not afraid to answer their sometimes uncomfortable questions. The goal of the survey experiments is to try to ascertain how prompts that (do not) mention Direct Line affect respondents’ evaluations of Putin. In other words, Direct Line is the ‘treatment,’ which participants in the ‘control’ group do not receive. One experiment only varies whether or not Putin heard about a problem on Direct Line. Another varies this as well as whether or not Putin resolved the problem. In both experiments, respondents whose prompts included mention of Direct Line evaluated Putin more favorably, although Stoner notes that the statistical effects of this are small. In another experiment, the mention of Direct Line leads respondents to believe there are greater opportunities to express their opinions and demands. Finally, a fourth experiment finds that respondents who support (oppose) Putin gave him higher (lower) evaluations when Direct Line was mentioned, hinting at how Direct Line might serve as a source of polarization in Russia.
 

Limitations

Stoner highlights an important puzzle about whether participatory technologies like Direct Line can, in fact, provide credible information to Putin’s regime. For example, questions are pre-screened to exclude subjects that could threaten the regime. Additionally, those who call in are already likely to be more supportive of or sympathetic to the regime. It would thus seem that Putin has better mechanisms for gathering credible information, such as through the Kremlin’s surveillance system, than through a PT like Direct Line, as Chapman claims. As such, Direct Line’s value appears primarily rhetorical, as opposed to informational — the regime is merely performing an exercise in responding to easy problems that can be resolved quickly by Putin, or inane questions about things like Putin’s favorite books.

Stoner’s review article notes her concerns regarding the generalizability of Chapman’s findings. First of all, it would be challenging to draw conclusions from the survey experiments, given that they concern a single group of people who were surveyed a decade ago (2015-2016). Relatedly, and in light of the war in Ukraine, Chapman’s analysis of PTs seems dated, as Putin has resorted far more often to severely punishing opposition (real and imagined) to his regime, rather than cajoling and coercing society with participatory technologies like his call-in show. Indeed, the show was cancelled in 2022 without explanation, but presumably to avoid difficult questions about the devastation wrought that autumn on the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. Nonetheless, Stoner notes that there is now a burgeoning literature that helps us better understand how, in normal times, autocrats effectively utilize the media and other technologies to build support and legitimate their rule, while providing citizens with a sense that they can influence politics, when in reality, they cannot.

Argument & Key Findings

Data & Methods

OutRush is based on four waves of surveys. The report focuses on wave 4, conducted between July and November 2024. The nearly 8600 emigrants surveyed in wave 4 include prior respondents (i.e., to waves 1-3), those recruited through OutRush media partners like Telegram news channels, recipients of the link from friends, those who found the survey through social media, and emigrants who left Russia during an earlier period (2014-21). The survey work is complemented by interviews that add context and capture migrants’ lived experiences. Although survey respondents are not drawn at random, the study population is likely to be representative because Russian migrants across various demographics, such as gender, age, and education level, use social media or consume Telegram news.

The bulk of the report dives into specific issues:

Integration Into and Work Within Host Countries: One of the most comprehensive sections presents data on respondents’ experiences integrating socially, occupationally, and otherwise. Emigrants’ economic stability has improved, and reports of discrimination have declined. Meanwhile, legal instability, such as difficulties opening bank accounts or being granted asylum, has improved slightly but remains a significant concern. By contrast, trust in their host country governments has declined, mainly driven by concerns about political persecution and bureaucratic hurdles. Yet, processes of social integration appear to be increasingly successful: majorities of respondents are learning local languages, have a high level of trust in the host population, are engaged in local politics, and have three or more local acquaintances, despite primarily socializing with other Russians. Finally, the subjective well-being of migrants is improving.

In terms of occupation, a plurality of migrants work in information technology, about a fifth work in the sphere of arts, education, and media, and a small but growing number plan to start their own businesses. Emigrants have found entrepreneurship challenging due to factors such as high taxes and complex bureaucracies in their host countries.
 

Secondary Migration: Perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of migration is its transient nature, as many individuals do not remain in the place where they first arrive. Indeed, over a fifth of respondents changed their country of residence, and nearly a third plan to do so within the next year. This is largely driven by discrimination or legal instability in their initial host countries. Serbia has become a key destination for secondary migration, attracting about a fifth of those who have left their initial destination. Much of this has to do with Serbia’s low levels of discrimination and its growing Russian-speaking community. 

Connections With and Plans to Return to Russia: Very few emigrants have returned or plan to do so in the short term. Of those who consider returning a possibility, doing so would largely depend upon military conscription becoming less likely and democratic reforms becoming more likely; as it stands, however, both of these scenarios appear quite distant. More than four out of five emigrants actively consume independent Russian media and stay in regular contact with their friends and family back home. Meanwhile, around two out of five consume English news, and about a quarter consume local media. Only a very small number are totally disengaged from politics or rely on Russian state propaganda. Yet large numbers of migrants fear persecution from the Russian government and their host states alike, especially given that many of their new homes are autocracies.

Political and Civic Activism: There continues to be high political interest in Russia. More than two out of five emigrants cast votes in the 2024 Russian presidential election. At the same time, overt political activism has declined, perhaps because of migrants’ perceived need to assimilate or because other challenges of migrant life have taken precedence. As mentioned above, large numbers are interested in the politics of their host countries. One of the most interesting findings concerns the large number of migrants — around three out of five — who are interested in the climate crisis. Their global focus overshadows their focus on environmental challenges specific to Russia or their host countries.

Implications & Prescriptions

The authors draw a number of conclusions from their interpretation of the survey data. Most centrally, Russian migrants are likely to remain in their host countries, that is, unless Russia undertakes meaningful change to its militarized, authoritarian status quo. As Russia pays a steep price, host countries gain considerably from one of the largest brain drains since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the authors call on host countries to rectify sources of legal and economic instability, including simplifying the process of legal emigration, encouraging entrepreneurship, and helping workers adapt to new labor markets. These prescriptions would not only ease the hardships faced by migrants but also create benefits for host countries.