Violence
-

Gunn SIEPR Building, Koret-Taube Conference Center

Open to Stanford students only.

Encina Hall West, Room 408
Stanford, CA 94305-6044

(650) 723-0649
0
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Political Science
lisa_blaydes_108_vert_final.jpg

Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018) and Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Date Label
Lisa Blaydes
Lubna Al-Kazi
Panel Discussions
0
Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow, 2023-24
uribe_headshot_-_andres_uribe.jpg

Andres Uribe is a scholar of democracy, governance, and political violence. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2023. His book project, "Coercion and Capture in Democratic Politics," examines how armed non-state groups seek to influence the democratic process. Through quantitative, computational, and archival analysis of rebel, paramilitary, and criminal groups in Latin America, he identifies the conditions that lead these actors to intervene in electoral politics, the structural forces that determine whether they succeed or fail, and the consequences of these interventions for democratic institutions and policy outcomes. Other projects explore processes of modern state-building, governance by non-state actors, and the political strategies of anti-democratic politicians. His research has been published in the Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Presidential Studies Quarterly.

Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.



Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)
Full Profile


Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Michael McFaul Headshot

Michael McFaul

Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Full Profile


Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

Woman smiling

Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
Full Profile


The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

Man smiling

Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
Full Profile

Understanding Russia and the War in Ukraine

For more commentary and analysis from FSI scholars about the war in Ukraine and events in Russia, follow the link to our resources page, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’

Read More

Michael McFaul moderates a panel with Oleksiy Honcharuk, Serhiy Leshchenko, Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova on the one-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
News

Ukraine’s Fight for Democracy, One Year In

To commemorate the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian leaders joined a panel hosted by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies to express their hopes for victory and their gratitude for Western support.
Ukraine’s Fight for Democracy, One Year In
Hero Image
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Getty
All News button
1
Subtitle

Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer insight on what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may signal about Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

Date Label
Paragraphs

How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion's rituals are at odds with the other religion (e.g. sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) explains the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. I provide support for this argument by (1) analyzing riot data across 100 years of Hindu-Muslim riots, (2) exploring individual-level surveys responses on holidays, and (3) describing the way different holiday rituals play a role in violence. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that riot entrepreneurs use to incite religious violence.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
CDDRL Working Papers
Authors
Feyaad Allie
Paragraphs
ISIS in Iraq: The Social and Psychological Foundations of Terror

This study follows the human side of ISIS’s amazing rise and fall in Iraq. It does not do this as a battle-by-battle history of the group, but rather explores how common Iraqis viewed the group, interacted with the group, joined the group, fought in the group, and ultimately suffered under its brutal rule. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: What factors conditioned public support and opposition toward ISIS in Iraq? Why did some Iraqis move from passive support for the group to actively participating in the group’s activities, including fighting? This study uses a social psychological approach to understand the trajectory of ISIS in Iraq. The book argues that ISIS derived support from how it was perceived to either meet or threaten basic human needs for individual Iraqis. The three basic human needs in question are the physical needs for security and sustenance and the psychological need for a feeling of individual significance. Our analysis is based on a unique array of public opinion data from surveys, focus groups, and in-depth face-to-face interviews with forty detained ISIS foot soldiers and four senior leaders to explain why some Iraqis came to join and acquiesce to ISIS while others opposed it, why ISIS lost the hearts and minds of Iraqi Sunni Arabs, and how this contributed decidedly to its battlefield defeats.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Subtitle

This book explores the social and psychological factors behind how ISIS was able to rise in Iraq, control most of it, and why most of that population eventually turned on it.

Authors
Michele Gelfand
Book Publisher
Oxford University Press
Authors
Nora Sulots
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to join Freedom House and a coalition of nearly 500 experts, organizations, dignitaries, and heads of state calling on the international community to strengthen its support for Iranian pro-democracy protesters.

A joint statement on the Freedom House website reads as follows:

Iranians have taken to the streets in rebellion.  The vanguard are young women, but they have been joined by men and people of all ages.  With breathtaking courage and unarmed, they have kept coming, even as the regime has shot, hanged, tortured, blinded, raped, beaten, and arrested many thousands. 

The spark was mandatory hijab, but the target of the uprising is the whole theocratic system.  Their slogan is Woman, Life, Freedom.  The goal they chant is “Azadi, Azadi, A-za-di,” meaning “Freedom, Freedom, Freedom.” 

Their victory would mean deliverance from a regime that denies free elections, free speech, due process of law, and personal autonomy in matters as simple as the choice of clothing. 

Victory would mean even more than that.  The end of the Islamic Republic’s system of misogyny would constitute a global landmark in the long march toward a world in which women are treated equally. 

The triumph of freedom in Iran could renew the global tide of democratization that was so strong in the latter twentieth century but has ebbed in the face of authoritarian counterattack. 

The Azadi movement addresses no demands to the regime, which it regards as fundamentally illegitimate and beyond reform.  The protestors chant “down with” it.  They want theocracy and dictatorship replaced by freedom and democracy.  They proclaim a “revolution.” 

They deserve unstinting support from freedom-loving people around the world: 

  • Governments, civic associations, and individuals should speak loudly and often in support of the protestors and in condemnation of the regime’s repressive actions.  Legislators and others should “adopt” individual arrestees, especially those facing execution, and spotlight their plight. 
  • Governments should take diplomatic, economic, and symbolic measures to punish the regime and bolster the protestors. All officials involved in the repressions, from Supreme Leader Khamenei down to local Basij commanders, should be sanctioned. The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) should be added to terrorism lists. 
  • High level officials of democratic governments should receive leaders of the opposition, in publicly-announced meetings. 
  • Accurate, reliable, fact-based reporting via international radio, television, and social media reaching Iran should be enhanced, as should assistance to private Iranian exile broadcasting. 
  • Technical assistance, including equipment, should be given to help the demonstrators counteract censorship and surveillance and to communicate despite the regime’s disruption of Internet service and blocking of websites. 
  •  Labor unions, governments, and others in the international community should express solidarity with Iranian workers, should share the experiences of other labor struggles for worker rights and democracy, and should also seek ways to provide practical assistance, such as VPNs, other means of communication, and contributions to strike funds if safe and effective channels can be found.


We pledge to do all in our power to support the Iranian struggle for Azadi and call upon all people of good will everywhere to join us.


Additional signatories as of publishing this article include CDDRL faculty (Kathryn Stoner, Abbas Milani, Michael McFaul, Francis Fukuyama, and Larry Diamond), visitors (Sheri Berman), and practitioner program alumni (Laura Alonso, Nino Evgenidze, Nino Zambakhidze, Agon Maliqi, Andrea Ngombet, Oleksandra Medviichuk, and Saeid Golkar), among the hundreds of others.

We encourage you to read the full statement and sign the petition for yourself.

Hero Image
Iran Solidarity from Freedom House Freedom House
All News button
1
Subtitle

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to join a coalition of nearly 500 experts, organizations, dignitaries, and heads of state calling on the international community to strengthen its support for Iranian pro-democracy protesters.

Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

For years leading up to last fall’s FIFA World Cup in Qatar, human and labor rights organizations pointed to what they described as the systemic abuse of migrant workers who traveled to the small country on the Arab Gulf to build the stadiums and infrastructure that allowed the global sporting event to take place.

But a new paper by Stanford political science professor Lisa Blaydes draws attention to a lesser-known migrant population in the Arab Gulf region that is perhaps even more vulnerable to exploitation: women who cook, clean, and care for families as domestic workers in private homes. The paper, “Assessing the Labor Conditions of Migrant Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States,” was published in January 2023 as part of a special ILR Review issue on labor transformation and regime transition in the Middle East and North Africa.

Read the full article from the King Center for Global Development

Hero Image
A migrant domestic worker with her employer, Kuwait City, September 2022
A migrant domestic worker with her employer, Kuwait City, September 2022
Lisa Blaydes
All News button
1
Subtitle

Professor Lisa Blaydes examines the treatment of migrant domestic workers in Arab Gulf states as part of the King Center’s initiative on gender-based violence.

Paragraphs

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s capacity for coopting competitors, local elites, and voters is low, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime’s capacity for coopting local elites and competitors is low, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens’ capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for efforts to contain electoral violence in less democratic contexts.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Subtitle

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies?

Journal Publisher
CDDRL Working Papers
Authors
Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
Paragraphs
Kurds in Dark Times book cover

With an estimated population of 35 million, Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without an independent state of their own. Kurds constitute about 20 percent of Turkey, the largest Kurdish population in the region. The history of the Kurds in Turkey is marked by state violence against them and decades of conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish fighters. Although the continuous struggle of the Kurdish people is well known, and the political actors involved in the conflict have received much attention, an increasing wave of scholarship is being written from the vantage point of the Kurds themselves.

Alemdaroğlu and Göçek’s volume develops a fresh approach by moving away from top-down Turkish nationalist macroanalyses to a microanalysis of how Kurds and Kurdistan as historical and ethnic categories were constructed from the bottom up. Contributors look beyond the politics of state actors to examine how Kurdish workers, women, youth, and political prisoners experience and resist marginalization, exclusion, and violence. Kurds in Dark Times opens an essential window into the lives of Kurds by generating meaningful insights into the formal and informal ways of negotiating their power and place in Turkey; and therefore, it provides crucial perspectives for any endeavor to create peace and reconciliation in the country.

REVIEWS


"In dark times, light is an imperative. This tome is a wonderful collection illuminating the Kurdish situation in Turkey. Their current suffering has a long history and, in examining this history, the various authors address things such as Turkishness as whiteness, the racialization of Kurds and Armenians, women as central actors in the Kurdish resistance, the prolonged history of the Kurds in what we call today Turkey, and much more. Alemdaroğlu and Göçek have produced an enormously important book that will be of interest to students of race, ethnic, and nationalist matters."—Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Duke University

"The book includes voices from a new generation of scholars in the emergent field of Kurdish studies."—Esra Özyürek, London School of Economics

"An admirable set of essays on what it means to live as Kurdish women and men in today’s Turkey, documenting the many forms of everyday oppression and resistance. Unlike much of the recent writing on the Kurds, the authors consistently and convincingly present the view from below; they deserve credit for their committed scholarship."—Martin van Bruinessen, professor emeritus, Utrecht University

"A hugely important contribution to shedding light on the structural violence, everyday violence, and political violence against Kurds in Turkey; a preciously collective effort of scholars across generations to think and stand against the 'evil' and 'dark times' of totalitarianism. This book is timely and urgent, thoughtful and compelling."—Zerrin Özlem Biner, University of Kent

ABOUT THE EDITORS


Ayça Alemdaroğlu is a research scholar and associate director of the Program on Turkey at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University.

Fatma Müge Göçek is professor of sociology and women’s studies at the University of Michigan.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Subtitle

A fresh approach to the study of Kurds in Turkey.
 

Authors
Ayça Alemdaroğlu
Book Publisher
Syracuse University Press
Subscribe to Violence