Between Electoral Cooptation and Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies?

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s capacity for coopting competitors, local elites, and voters is low, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime’s capacity for coopting local elites and competitors is low, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens’ capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for efforts to contain electoral violence in less democratic contexts.