Argument & Key Findings

The system of reentry institutions — including halfway houses, parole agencies, and housing assistance programs — can be extremely complicated for formerly incarcerated persons (FIPs) to navigate. These complications are not merely logistical, but also social and emotional: the ways in which FIPs interact with reentry institutions can affect their sense of belonging, dignity, and prosperity. When the rules and practices of reentry institutions undermine these needs, it becomes more likely that participants will violate rules, withdraw from the institutions altogether, or find themselves reincarcerated. 

In “Home But Not Free,” Gillian Slee offers a rich analysis of these socioemotional dynamics. The paper both increases our knowledge of reentry processes and deepens our understanding of FIPs and reentry staff. Previous scholars have focused more on how adverse outcomes stem from reentry institutions prioritizing surveillance or control. Slee pushes forward this conversation by highlighting how adverse outcomes also stem from failures to acknowledge and support the dignity of FIPs.

Slee’s paper is informed by over two years of ethnographic fieldwork with FIPs in Philadelphia. This includes observing over 200 appointments at a housing assistance program, analyzing more than 130 files of program participants, and both observing and assisting with programming at a women’s halfway house. 
 

Three Mechanisms:

The core of the paper centers on Slee’s elaboration of three mechanisms that link socioemotional concepts, such as indignity, to outcomes like withdrawal or reincarceration. Each mechanism is clarified through a range of examples and case studies.

1. Unrecognized vulnerability:

Reentry institutions and their staff often fail to recognize or respond to the constraints and vulnerabilities faced by FIPs. These failures can undermine the dignity of FIPs and provoke their withdrawal from such institutions. In the realm of housing assistance, the Philadelphia program requires that rent falls between 30% and 45% of participants’ income. However, this is often unrealistic given the difficulties of finding fairly priced units or securing gainful employment with a felony conviction. Accordingly, FIPs must seek low-quality units or roommates. Yet most participants do not want roommates because it reminds them of being incarcerated. Participants are thus presented with an undignified set of choices. The program restrictions mean that many FIPs cannot or will not utilize housing assistance programs, deepening their sense of instability.

Another source of vulnerability concerns the mismatch between FIPs’ expectations and the realities of frontline bureaucracy. For example, many housing assistance programs have too few staff, some of whom struggle to juggle appointments or return phone calls. Because reentry staff are overburdened, they may ask participants to pick up the slack by searching for housing units. Yet many FIPs lack the requisite know-how, for example, calling about units too frequently or too early in the morning. Others may show up hours early for their appointments, in the process annoying reentry staff. Yet participants are not coached on how to improve these behaviors, leading to neglect. Other FIPs must learn that the majority of units are listed online as opposed to in newspapers, incurring the mockery from reentry staff in the process. 

A final source of vulnerability concerns participants’ lack of efficacy — the sense that their efforts make little difference or are inadequate. Reentry staff may have high expectations of people who feel “cryogenically frozen in time” (p. 32) because of years of incarceration. Some are unable to use modern cell phones or have no rental history.
 

2. Discretion’s Benefits and Drawbacks:

The discretion exercised by reentry staff introduces difficult choices for participants, forcing them to choose between (a) following the rules and becoming socially isolated or (b) breaking the rules and developing social connections. For example, some halfway houses are restrictive about time spent outside of the house. Participants who abide by the rules may miss out on socially important events, like a child’s basketball game. Some FIPs may lie about or conceal where they live in order to deal with less intrusive parole agents. Others may cross state lines to pursue important career opportunities. One participant parked their mobile home outside of the parole district lines because it was less expensive and easier than seeking alternative units, but these kinds of ‘rational’ behaviors cannot be accommodated. Discretion is a highly variable attribute: some reentry staff cancel meetings and inconvenience participants, while others remember individuals’ needs and accommodate them. Those who expect more discretion than they receive may break the rules out of frustration. Ultimately, discretion and its absence can provoke a host of socioemotional problems.
 

3. Risk-Escalating Rules:

Instead of preventing noncompliance, program rules may serve to encourage it when they undermine participants’ sense of dignity. For example, 29 states prohibit associating with other FIPs, yet many participants have friends or family supervised by the system; as such, people violate the rules in order to preserve meaningful relationships. Some FIPs are faced with painful dilemmas, for example, choosing between living in halfway houses where drug use is common or breaking the rules by leaving. Others report using cocaine instead of marijuana because the latter can be detected in their bloodstream for much longer. Some halfway houses mandate spending a certain number of hours inside the house, but this leads to participants being unable to work multiple jobs to support themselves, a clear violation of their dignity.

For many FIPs in uncomfortable halfway houses, they cannot be placed in another house unless they break the rules of their existing house; some consider breaking the rules for the sake of their well-being, even though doing so might land them under even more restrictive supervision. One participant was refused permission to live in a camper that he could afford because the camper’s mobility posed a flight risk. Another participant broke the rules by traveling out of state because her son’s father had cancer, and a reentry professional later told her to return in a rather threatening way. The rules of reentry institutions thus incentivized FIPs to make very risky choices.
 

By highlighting socioemotional concepts — especially (in)dignity — as central to the experiences of formerly incarcerated persons, Slee shows how the rules and practices of reentry institutions can undermine reintegration. Addressing sources of vulnerability and counterproductive rules may help reform reentry institutions in more humane and effective ways.

The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

What is the most exciting or impactful finding from your research, and why do you think it matters for democracy, development, or the rule of law?

My current research examines the question of how opposition movements survive in authoritarian contexts, with a focus on recent local elections in Turkey, where conservative incumbents were defeated for the first time in decades. We found that the opposition successfully built bottom-up alliances at the local level, which may be more successful than parties trying to form coalitions at the national level. 

This is because top-down alliances, as were attempted to be formed in Turkey in 2023, tend to be fragile and lack sufficient power to win elections. Top-down efforts involve convincing leaders of ideologically opposed parties to join together, which often isn’t effective in convincing their base to join suit. 

On the other hand, bottom-up local action can be much more powerful, with alliances in municipalities formed through an intimate knowledge of how resources and power are distributed among groups. These opposition coalitions, bound together by substantive ideas and community knowledge, tend to be more persuasive. 

This research demonstrates the power of local government and how opposition can be strengthened through numerous bottom-up alliances, as opposed to a weak, top-down national approach. Still, there are difficulties in preventing authoritarian backlash as a response to oppositional successes. After the loss of many governing party candidates in Turkey recently, there has been a new wave of coercion against municipal leaders, such as the Istanbul mayor being jailed after running as a presidential candidate. Several other newly elected mayors have been in jail for months without even an indictment.

How does the increased authoritarianism in Turkey fit into the context of global democratic recession? Are these patterns of oppositional gains in local elections a sign of a more optimistic future for Turkey, or is it still in a state of democratic decline?

I believe our research suggests that the opposition is more effectively contesting the governing party; however, it is too early to say whether this could serve as a model for a broader shift. Despite being embedded in European organizations and experiencing a moment of democratization in the 2000s, Turkey has become increasingly authoritarian, becoming one of the earliest cases of modern democratic decline. Also, global influences are harming Turkey’s trajectory, such as the presence of a more undemocratic leader in the U.S.
 

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change?

When starting research, I don’t think of writing policy as my main goal. Instead, it’s to understand big questions or add more nuance to a discussion about a phenomenon. My research today on local power dynamics and bottom-up coalition building continues to have real-world relevance in the battle against authoritarian regimes.

Returning to your research on Turkey and particularly the plight of the Kurdish minority, how can states mitigate the effects of ethnic fractionalism on development?

In Turkey, I think of democratization as being possible through the recognition of the cultural and political rights of the Kurds. The opening of systems to those who have been historically excluded would benefit not only democratic development but also economic development. This is because ethnically inclusive states are more prosperous, as otherwise, ethnic conflict hinders development, with national security concerns scaring off investment.

Amidst increasing authoritarianism, have situations for minorities like the Kurds worsened or improved over time?

While there have been gestures of peace with the Kurds, when those efforts fail, the Turkish government often strengthens authoritarian measures. This is exemplified by the peace negotiations from 2013 to 2015, which initially resulted in the Kurds amassing more political power. This caused the regime to fear being undermined and become more coercive toward the minority group in the long run.

Overall, improvements for the Kurds have not been linear. Peace negotiations are currently underway, though many believe them to be insincere. When looking at the regime’s other policies towards opposition, journalists, and students, it’s easy to be pessimistic. 

What gaps do you feel need to be addressed in your research field, and what do you anticipate you will study more in the future?

In the intellectual circles I have been a part of, academics tend to come from a political science background. I’m more interested in bringing in cultural and sociological perspectives, such as through discussions of social class or different ethnic groups. My research will continue to unite multi-disciplinary ideas to gain a deeper understanding of authoritarian regimes.

Could you elaborate further on your research into youth participation?

Currently, I’m working on a project comparing the U.S. and Turkey to better understand youth political behavior. In the recent elections in both countries, there was a lot of emphasis on the youth voice as a counter-authoritarian force, but this prediction did not necessarily hold true. In the US, many were persuaded by Trump’s agenda, especially young men. It’s important not to generalize too much when studying youth, as they are as diverse as the rest of the population. Still, there are notable trends among young people to monitor, like the Turkish youth’s growing secularism and how that might impact the Islamist parties’ power. 

You’ve discussed the importance of recognizing the impact of class when conducting research. How do you think politicians have capitalized on class to maintain power in Turkey, and is the opposition or current regime more supported by the working class?

The Islamist parties have been most known to garner support from lower economic groups. While the main opposition party is relearning how to succeed among the working class, it would be an overstatement to assume this shift has significantly expanded beyond the local level at this point.

President Erdogan was able to amass power by garnering support from the poor, going door-to-door and engaging in bottom-up efforts to get their votes. Now, opposition leaders appear to be learning from these strategies, leading to improved outcomes so far.
 

Lastly, what books would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field?

I may be expected to recommend political science books, but it is American sociologist Richard Sennett who especially influenced me early in my career. He focuses on how big social changes affect individuals. His book, The Hidden Injuries of Class, shaped my understanding of how social class is not just a reflection of an individual’s position in society, but also influences one’s sense of self. He also wrote Respect in a World of Inequality about how changes in the economy and labor market influence individuals. Sennet’s work successfully approaches issues in a humane, historical, and power-conscious way.

Argument & Key Findings

Hesham Sallam draws our attention to a surprising pattern: Egyptian Islamists and leftists have, for several generations, criticized each other on remarkably similar grounds. Their arguments have sometimes focused on Islam and left-wing political goals. But just as — if not more — frequently, they have focused on how each other’s agendas are inauthentic to Egyptian society and promoted to benefit foreign actors. It is true that the contents of their critiques have differed: Islamists denounce the left as betraying Egypt’s pure, Islamic nation while acting on behalf of “Zionists” or “western imperialists.” Meanwhile, leftists see Islamists as inauthentic to Egypt’s secular, pluralistic history, as well as advancing foreign interests. These differences notwithstanding, a common structure of political argument has been preserved across decades. 

The article introduces the history of Islamist-leftist debate in Egypt since the 1970s. Central to this history was the process of reappropriation: Islamists criticized the left, and the left responded by criticizing Islamists using more or less the same script. The study draws upon an array of Arabic sources likely unknown to readers outside of Egypt, including editorials, monographs, and public debates.

The Islamist Critique

The article first presents the intricacies of Egyptian Islamists’ critique of the left. There is a long history of Egyptian political elites denouncing left-wing politics as inauthentic and foreign. For example, Gamal Abdel-Nasser accused Egyptian communists of conspiring with Zionists and Soviets, while Anwar al-Sadat accused them of atheism and thus betraying Egypt’s Islamic essence. As leftists were repeatedly accused of disloyalty, nationalist ideas became even more dominant within leftist circles — this despite the historical suspicions of left-wing thinkers of nationalism as a distraction from class politics. The Egyptian case thus mirrors the trajectory of Europe’s internationalist labor movements during World War II, when leftist political goals were abandoned for state nationalism. In any case, the Islamist critique, which was led principally by the Muslim Brotherhood, regularly accused the left of foreign loyalties and a betrayal of Egyptian values. Over time, this critique was extended to secular Egyptians and deployed increasingly virulent language; for example, an academic critic of Islamism was denied promotion, ostensibly for his writings that were described by an Islamist detractor as “spreading cultural AIDS.” They also drew on prominent social science frameworks like Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”: Egypt’s authentic Islamic nation was seen as pitted in an irresolvable clash against the atheistic West, which, they alleged, was simultaneously funding the Egyptian left. These are just a few of the examples Sallam uses to show how Islamists portrayed the left as inauthentic and disloyal, undermining its legitimacy in Egyptian politics.
 

The Leftist Critique

Sallam next shows us how the left struck back at their Islamist foes. A key process in this history concerns the Hosni Mubarak regime’s co-optation of influential leftists into the state’s cultural institutions. This occurred as a response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral successes in the 1980s. Coincident with these institutional changes, leftists began appropriating the authenticity critique. They claimed that Islamists were engaged not in building a pure Islamic state and society, but in a narrow project meant to advance their own political standing. Rejecting the Islamist critique of them as atheists, leftists accused their opponents of weaponizing Islam and betraying its true essence. They rejected the distinction between so-called violent and nonviolent Islamism, on the grounds that nonviolent Islamists still were willing to justify violence. Islamists were said to be working on behalf of foreign interests like Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, whose designs on Egyptian territory went unnoticed by Islamists. The Brotherhood was deemed a cult-like vehicle for indoctrinating and promoting foreign goals, especially those of the Gulf. Far from authentic to Egyptian society, Islamists were seen as holding Egyptian Muslims in contempt for their alleged heresies. And in one of the most surprising appropriations, leftists claimed that Islamists were in fact quite similar to both Zionists and imperialists: all three sought to dominate the Middle East through sectarian politics. The Brotherhood’s Egyptian constitution was denigrated for being indistinguishable from versions published in Europe and Pakistan. Especially inauthentic to Egyptian society was the Brotherhood’s view of religious minorities as second-class citizens; this was deemed a fundamental betrayal of Egypt’s national essence, namely secular pluralism. These counter-critiques helped the left frame itself as the true guardian of the Egyptian nation.
 

Beyond Speech

Importantly, the Islamist-leftist debates were not mere rhetoric, but served as a basis for political action, especially when it came to questions of cooperation. For example, after the Islamist critic Farag Foda was assassinated, the so-called ‘moderate’ Islamist Mohamed Al-Ghazali defended his assassins; some leftists used these events to justify their refusal to cooperate with Islamists. More generally, they argued that Islamists’ quest for a religious state would only lead to political violence and exclusion, further grounds to reject compromise. Yet claims about authenticity and nationalism were also used to justify cooperation, as when leftists argued that both they and the Brotherhood were natural allies in the fight against foreign imperialism and Zionism. It is not clear whether a less confrontational approach would have helped Islamists and leftists cooperate against Egypt’s successive dictators, but their divisive rhetoric almost certainly did not help matters.
 

Contributions

The article will help readers understand why Egyptian politics has become increasingly marked by groups’ ‘affective’ hatreds for one another, as opposed to normal political disagreements. By weaving the themes of treason and inauthenticity through decades of history, Sallam shows us why this new status quo is not surprising. Affective polarization has led many Egyptians to view their opponents as unworthy of political inclusion, consistent with the rise of a global populism that emphasizes “us vs. them” distinctions. Sallam fleshes this out by relaying the different responses among leftists and Islamists to Egypt’s 2013 military coup, which ousted the Brotherhood leader Morsi. Leftists called the coup a necessary evil to counter foreign influences seeking to establish an Islamic state, while Islamists accused the left of being sponsored by the West. 

Readers will see the conflict between Islamists and leftists as not just fleeting moments of political disagreement, but a generations-long battle for domination in the realm of ideas.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.