Introduction and Motivation:

Social scientists and philosophers have shown increased interest in the concept of descriptive representation. Indeed, the identities and life experiences of those doing the representing may be critical for enacting the preferences of those being represented. This is especially the case for historically marginalized groups — upper-class, educated men may simply fail to adequately represent lower-class, uneducated, or women voters. In addition to considerations of fairness, there is growing recognition that descriptive representation can improve policy outcomes, such as service delivery or trust in government.

However, the study of descriptive representation has been hampered by data availability. Identifying simple correlations across the world’s democracies — for example, between proportions of working-class legislators and levels of social welfare provision — has hitherto been impossible.

In “The Global Legislators Database,” Nicholas Carnes, Joshua Ferrer, Miriam Golden, Esme Lillywhite, Noam Lupu, and Eugenia Nazrullaeva introduce the largest dataset of biographic and demographic information on national legislators ever assembled. GLD will enable scholars to assess just how much voters elect those with life experiences resembling their own. The authors compile information on five descriptive variables across 97 democracies: legislators’ party affiliation, gender, age, highest level of education, and previous occupation (to assess their social class). By contrast, prior datasets have focused only on heads of state or cabinet members, or on only a selection of more developed democracies.

Some questions around descriptive representation would seem to have intuitive answers: Wouldn’t developed countries have more women representatives, or wouldn’t women legislators feature less prominently in right-wing parties? Scholars can now hope to do more than merely gesture at answers.

Characteristics, Validity Checks, and Applications:

GLD comprises countries that (a) have a population of over 300,000 and (b) meet the standard for what Freedom House calls “Electoral Democracy” — having some minimum of political rights and civil liberties. Excluding six cases of data availability constraints, this yields 97 countries, including India, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Scholars of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Turkey — who would likely characterize these countries as authoritarian during the 2015-17 time period — will be pleased that the authors chose a more forgiving measure of democracy.

Biographic data is drawn from the national legislature in unicameral countries and the lower chamber in bicameral countries. (By contrast, upper chambers are sometimes indirectly appointed or hereditary, which sheds less light on whether voters choose descriptively similar representatives.) This yields over 19,000 individuals who held office during at least one legislative session in 2015, 2016, and 2017. GLD has remarkably complete data for the five variables mentioned above: age and education data are presented for over 90% of legislators in the dataset, for over 93% as regards occupation, and nearly 100% for gender.

In order to assess GLD’s validity, the authors compare select variables to those in comparable datasets. For example, the gender variable is compared with gender data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which shows that the two measures are nearly identical. So too is the age data nearly identical to an index from 15 affluent democracies.
 

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Figure 1. Shares of women legislators in the GLD and V-Dem. Note: Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, and Kosovo are omitted because of missing data in the V-Dem.
 

For categories like education and prior occupation — where comparable data are unavailable — the authors conduct “face validity” tests: these draw on our intuitions that legislators are, for example, mostly educated and not working class. And indeed, these intuitions are borne out in the distributions of GLD data. In terms of total coverage, GLD includes information on more legislators than the comparable Global Leadership Project database for all but two countries, and in many cases, the differences are large.
 

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Figure 3. Distributions of legislator traits in the GLD. Note: Age is calculated at the time of election. Higher education includes levels beyond primary and secondary education (Bachelors, Masters, PhD, LLB, LLM, JD, MD, and short-cycle tertiary). Data on educational attainments for legislators is unavailable for Côte d’Ivoire.
 

The authors then use GLD in application to a number of questions for which scholars have lacked global data. First, some have hypothesized that in legislatures with more (a) uneducated, (b) female, and (c) working-class representatives, incumbency rates will be lower. This is because individuals from these three groups might have a harder time overcoming challenges relating to expertise, sexism, and fundraising, respectively. Correlating GLD data with a global reelection database, the authors find only evidence for (b), suggesting that women may face higher barriers to remaining in office. These are only correlations, but they point to fruitful areas for exploration: why might women face unique barriers, and what distinguishes countries with lower versus higher barriers?
 

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Figure 5. Re-election rates by years of education, gender, and occupational background. Note: The share of working-class legislators is zero for six countries that are dropped from the figure: Albania, Botswana, Cyprus, Estonia, Guatemala, and Mongolia.
 

A second application involves public financing of elections, which is thought to favor more working-class legislators who would have a harder time fundraising. Correlating V-Dem data on public financing with the GLD variable on prior occupation, however, the authors find limited evidence for this conjecture. Finally, some have proposed that countries with a stronger rule of law would favor a higher proportion of lawyers in the national legislature. Looking again at GLD prior occupation data alongside V-Dem rule of law data, the authors find limited evidence for this hypothesis.

These varied applications point to how the Global Legislators Database can serve as a valuable resource for scholars interested in the causes and consequences of descriptive representation. Although the GLD covers only a single point in time, it can serve as a bedrock for additional data-collection efforts. In addition to expanding its temporal coverage, scholars may also wish to gather data on upper chambers. Especially in ethnically diverse countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, upper chambers are intended to mirror the descriptive composition of specific regions. However, it may be the case that ethnic representatives are still vastly more wealthy or educated than their constituents, thus impeding their ability to represent.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Authoritarian rebalance 

Maduro served as president of Venezuela for more than 10 years before he was ousted Jan. 3 in a U.S. military operation that brought him to America to face narco-terrorism charges.

Trinkunas, a senior research scholar at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), discussed the possibility of Venezuela transitioning to democracy, especially given the opposition's overwhelming victory in the 2024 presidential elections. But an authoritarian rebalancing looms large, he noted.

“We have to remember that all the institutions of power and all the electoral offices in Venezuela below the president are held by supporters of the regime,” he said.

Trinkunas recalled political scientist Alexander B. Downs’ book, “Catastrophic Success,” which examined the negative consequences of foreign-imposed regime changes and highlighted that such interventions often lead to civil war and violent removals of leaders.

“About one-third to 40% of all regimes installed by a foreign intervention end up in civil conflict within 10 years,” Trinkunas said. And, almost half of leaders installed by foreign powers withdraw from or are pushed from office before their terms are up.

He foresees a divergence between the interests of the intervening power, the U.S., and Venezuela’s power elites and population under the proposed arrangement. “The people with the guns stay employed.” And they may not be eager to cooperate if it involves sharing Venezuela’s mineral wealth with the United States government.

Díaz-Cayeros said, “Nothing has changed in the basic underlying economic conditions of Venezuela that has forced an exodus of 8 million people.” Days after the arrest of Maduro, the government in office is still the same government that came into office through an electoral fraud, he added.

Status quo interests

Curiel, a research scholar at CDDRL, research manager for the Democracy Action Lab, and a native of Venezuela, described the ecosystem of armed actors in Venezuela and outlined how both state and non-state security forces have the incentives and capabilities to preserve the status quo. 

“They’ve had arrangements that have been important for their survival, up until now. And so, there’s a question that these groups face with the loss of Maduro and [his wife Cilia] Flores,” she said.

To the extent they perceive their arrangements are under threat, they might respond with violence or engage in chaos, Curiel added. This is further complicated by the fact that different armed groups are loyal to different members of the governing coalition, creating competing power centers.

Fuentes, a CDDRL visiting scholar and Venezuelan native, noted that the situation in Venezuela remains extremely fluid and that it is still too early to determine whether Maduro’s removal will lead to authoritarian rebalancing or a genuine democratic transition. He argued that policymakers face a real tension between two objectives: stabilizing the country while accounting for the complexity and fragility of the Venezuelan state, and recognizing that stabilization without a clear commitment to democratic transition as the ultimate goal is not sustainable.

“The stability is not going to happen unless you promise and commit to the final goal of a democratic transition,” said Fuentes, a lawyer and policy expert from Venezuela.

He explained that the regime’s basic instinct is to resist and survive any U.S. involvement in the way its key ally, Cuba, has done through the decades.

Zambrano, a Stanford law professor and CDDRL affiliated faculty member who grew up in Venezuela, said he was guardedly optimistic about a democratic transition and supported the military operation that removed Maduro. As for the legal implications of the capture of Maduro, he cited prior examples of the U.S. taking military action in Kosovo, Libya, and Panama, among others, without Congressional approval and in apparent violation of international law.

The international law prohibition on the use of force “has been violated [maybe] 40 times” in the last few decades, he said. “This is one more violation. Is that good? No, that’s not good, but it’s not a drastic change the way the Russian invasion of Ukraine was,” because the latter implicated the international prohibition on the annexation of territory. Moreover, in Venezuela’s case, the Venezuelan people welcomed the U.S. intervention.

Kronick, an associate professor of public policy at UC Berkeley and Stanford alum, observed that U.S. officials at a January 3 press conference didn’t mention democracy and totally dismissed María Corina Machado, whom she described as “Venezuela's most popular politician and the driving force behind the opposition candidate in last year's presidential election.”

The 2024 Venezuelan presidential election was highly controversial, given that both the opposition showed incontrovertible evidence, widely verified by the international community, that the election was stolen by Maduro and that the opposition actually won by a landslide.

Kronick said the acting president of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, is clearly not a democratic activist and has been a key member of the regime for years. “It’s a little bit hard to be optimistic about the prospects for democratization,” given her current role.

On the other hand, Venezuela has very capable election-vote-counting technology and decades of high-turnout elections, all of which could potentially facilitate re-democratization. 

‘Gangster diplomacy’

In the question-and-answer session, Michael McFaul, former FSI director, described the Trump Administration’s current attempt to take more than $2 billion in oil from Venezuela as “gangster diplomacy” and a “travesty.” 

Díaz-Cayeros said, “This kind of U.S. unilateral action strikes a very deep chord in the Latin American psyche. And it doesn’t really matter if someone is on the left or on the right” in Latin and South America.”

Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of CDDRL, noted that the U.S. arrest of Maduro raises troubling questions about whether Russia would attempt a similar action against Ukraine’s leaders in the future. “What then stops Putin, other than the incompetence of the Russian armed forces, from going in and trying to get (President Volodymyr) Zelensky or any other high leader in Ukraine?”

Kronick suggested audience members read a recent Foreign Affairs essay, “A Grand Bargain With Venezuela,” in which the author argues for a “pacted transition,” a negotiated, power-sharing arrangement, as the most viable path for Venezuela. This would involve an agreement between the current regime and opposition to coexist and gradually democratize, rather than one side seeking total victory.

“Whether you read this and think this is pie in the sky and this is never going to happen, or you think this is what we need to really push for, I think it’s really worth engaging with, so I’ll end with that recommendation,” she said.