Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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Introduction and Contribution


Large parts of the Arab world were convulsed by mass protests between 2010 and 2012. The protests were fueled by decades of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement by corrupt political parties and entrenched bureaucrats. Many of the region’s autocrats saw this as evidence that prior ways of “managing” politics — such as through unfree elections or parliamentary debate among relatively loyal politicians — were no longer reliable. Indeed, elections could serve as spaces to mobilize collective opposition while debate could quickly turn chaotic, stalemated, or critical of the autocrat. 

Accordingly, Arab autocrats became ever more reliant on two broad strategies. The first is repression: brutalizing, surveilling, jailing, and exiling their opponents, both real and suspected. The second is a more tightly controlled kind of management: creating parallel political institutions to produce a façade of genuine political engagement. This second strategy has been especially clear under Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (2014-) in his embrace of youth-led propaganda initiatives.

In “Youth and the Reinvention of State-managed Politics in Sisi’s Egypt,” Hesham Sallam shows how what he terms the “New Youth Project” has helped Sisi bypass elections and parliaments, groom a new class of pro-military civilian leaders, and portray his regime as modern and inclusive. These projects include highly choreographed youth forums and conferences, organizations to build support for his regime within political parties, and publications by purportedly independent national security experts. As a consequence, Sisi has effectively co-opted key segments of Egyptian youth in hopes of avoiding the fate of his predecessors. Sallam carefully unpacks the New Youth Project’s history, varied functions, and embeddedness within Sisi’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. 

Background to the New Youth Project


At the time of the Arab Uprisings, Egypt was ruled by President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). His National Democratic Party and cadre of corrupt bureaucrats played a key role in igniting the public outrage that led to his downfall. Mubarak was succeeded by the civilian President Mohamed Morsi, who then-General Sisi ousted in a military coup after just over a year in power. For Sallam, these years were formative for Sisi, convincing him that ruling parties and entrenched “political classes” were serious impediments to regime survival, as was cooperation between civilian and military authorities. As such, Sisi did not build a party of his own. Yet he understood the need to groom new cadres and deepen his administration’s legitimacy.

Sallam dates the New Youth Project to 2014, when the Nasser Military Academy began organizing programs to socialize young civilian leaders in military propaganda. The following year, Sisi founded a Presidential Youth Leadership Program that holds regular forums. Meanwhile, the regime tacitly supported the youth-led Nation’s Future Party until it was internally overtaken by Mubarak-era elites. Sisi responded by creating a Coordination Committee of Parties’ Youth Leaders and Politicians, helping the regime build its influence within various parties while giving it the appearance of cross-partisan support.

Functions of the New Youth Project


Sisi’s efforts to build parallel institutions, groom pro-military civilian leaders, and construct a façade of participation can be helpfully illustrated via Sallam’s examination of the National Youth Conference (NYC). NYC is a regime-led forum where young Sisi supporters gather to discuss public policy and make recommendations to the president. 

NYC is an extravagant endeavor, involving fireside chats and Q&As between Sisi and Egyptian youths, TED-style talks by young entrepreneurs, screenings of documentaries touting the regime’s initiatives, and mock simulations of official dialogue. NYC moderators raise (likely prepared) proposals to Sisi, which he promises to take into consideration. These activities give authoritarian Egypt an air of democratic accountability: the president is responsive, public policy is effective, and the state is open and transparent. Importantly, the regime also uses NYC to respond to episodes of mass dissatisfaction. For example, during an economic downturn in 2017, NYC featured presentations justifying Sisi’s monetary policies and efforts to counter price hikes. 

NYC also serves as a reliable forum for the grooming of pro-military civilian leaders. This complements existing military training programs for bureaucrats, journalists, and university employees, which have become de facto prerequisites for government employment. The conferences consistently uphold the military’s view of national security. In 2019, for example, the regime faced protests sparked by a former contractor who accused Sisi and his inner circle of corruption; accordingly, the year’s NYC centered on how terrorists use misinformation and fake news to undermine Egypt. Such narratives and propaganda would likely be less persuasive in an electoral or parliamentary forum than in the carefully managed NYC.

During the conference, young speakers tell the audience about their self-improvement or entrepreneurial success — the implication being that anyone can be successful in Sisi’s Egypt. Meanwhile, presentations filled with data and statistics provide a sense of scientific credibility. One presentation sought to convey that NYC had been a resounding democratic success because it was attended by Egyptians across gender, age, and geography; yet no mention was made of the exclusion of opposition perspectives or those regularly victimized by state repression. 

Finally, the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies has extended the regime’s efforts. Led by former security officials, the self-proclaimed independent think tank provides ostensibly expert analyses linking regime opponents, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to terrorism. Ultimately, Sallam shows that Sisi’s youth project is less about empowering young Egyptians than about creating new channels through which the regime can exercise authoritarian control.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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Lexie is a B.A. candidate in Political Science in the Class of 2029 at Stanford University. Her academic interests include comparative politics, democratic institutions, constitutional law, and the governance of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies. At Stanford, she is involved with Stanford Women in Law (SWIL) and hopes to pursue law school after graduating. 

Research Assistant to Professor Didi Kuo, 2026
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Introduction and Contribution


American bureaucracies are frequently criticized for impeding the delivery of both public infrastructure and private development projects, wrapping them in the “red tape” of regulatory procedures. Of course, bureaucratic oversight is necessary to ensure public accountability, enable stakeholder input, and respond to market failures. It is hard to imagine how, for example, the natural environment could be protected from exploitation without regulation. Yet disagreement persists about whether the current regulatory landscape strikes the right balance between oversight and efficiency.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 is one of the most significant federal administrative laws and is foundational to American environmental law. Per its objective of protecting the environment, NEPA requires agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major federal projects. These include construction, energy, water, and public lands projects. 

NEPA’s highest level of review is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which requires substantial time and scientific expertise to complete. Accordingly, the EIS process has been criticized for causing project delays. This critique is plausible at first glance: average EIS reviews now take over four years to complete and often produce documents over 600 pages long (over 1,000 pages including appendices). 

Despite criticism over NEPA procedures, little is known about why some EISs take longer to be approved than others. Answering this question is important for assessing whether American bureaucracies can adequately balance the oversight-efficiency tradeoff.

In “A hazard analysis of federal permitting under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,” Michael Bennon, Daniel De La Hormaza, and R. Richard Geddes present findings on the correlates of EIS permitting. Using a dataset of nearly 1,300 EISs, the authors show that major construction projects and those occurring in states with more restrictive environmental laws are associated with longer permitting times. By contrast, privately financed projects are permitted more quickly. These findings will likely cohere with readers’ intuitions, namely that (a) more demanding regulations increase approval times and (b) private economic interests have the resources to navigate regulatory environments.

Using a dataset of nearly 1,300 EISs, the authors show that major construction projects and those occurring in states with more restrictive environmental laws are associated with longer permitting times.

The authors’ findings are relevant not only for those interacting directly with NEPA. Indeed, as illustrated in their analysis of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, lengthy environmental reviews can make it difficult to quickly undertake new infrastructure projects when they are needed — as was the case following the Great Recession.

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses


The authors’ dataset includes 1,269 EIS reviews. Of these, 1,161 reached a Record of Decision (ROD), the federal agency’s final decision. The average duration of time from a Notice of Intent (NOI — i.e., the intent to undertake an EIS) to ROD was 4.5 years, and the median was 3.6 years. This underscores the time required for projects to complete environmental review under NEPA.

The authors include variables for (1) major construction and infrastructure projects, which comprise about half of the data set; (2) projects backed by private investors; (3) states with restrictive environmental laws, defined, for example, in terms of whether uninjured parties can challenge projects in court or whether private actions require environmental review; and (4) inclusion in the “federal permitting dashboard,” which was created in 2015 with the goal of improving the efficiency of large projects.

To measure the correlates of EIS permitting, the authors use a “Cox proportional hazards model,” a statistical method for estimating how different variables affect the time until an event happens. For example, hazard models are often used to measure how different medical treatments affect patient mortality. For the authors’ purposes, a lower hazard rate indicates a longer permitting duration. 

The authors first hypothesize that larger projects will take longer to approve. This may be the case because such projects tend to attract greater stakeholder engagement, opposition, and litigation. Projects in states with more restrictive environmental laws, as well as those requiring supplemental EISs, are also hypothesized to take longer to approve. In addition, private financing ought to lead to faster approvals because private funders have the incentives and resources to expedite permitting. So too should the permitting dashboard decrease permitting times, consistent with its efficiency-maximizing objectives. 

Findings


As mentioned, the authors find that major construction and infrastructure projects have significantly longer permitting times, averaging 5.2 years.
 


 

Table 3 Average permit duration by phase and covariates

 

Table 4 Cox regression results for permit characteristics


Conversely, privately financed projects are indeed found to be approved more quickly, taking an average of just 3.7 years. Meanwhile, projects in states with restrictive environmental laws, such as California, New York, and Washington, are found to take longer. Contrary to the authors’ expectations, however, projects included in the federal permitting dashboard face longer permitting times. This may reflect selection bias, or the fact that projects placed on the dashboard tend to be especially large or complex. In terms of page count, longer EISs are associated with longer permitting times and longer delays. 

Finally, the authors examine permit completion rates by federal agencies, finding an average of 3 RODs per week. This rate is generally stable over time, though it spiked during Donald Trump’s election in 2016 and his inauguration in early 2017. Ultimately, the findings suggest that permitting duration is shaped not only by technical regulations but also by differences in economic resources, political conflict over projects, and federalism.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Turlock Irrigation District (Turlock, CA). | American Public Power Association
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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Caption Turlock Irrigation District (Turlock, CA). | Photo credit American Public Power Association
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The Fisher Family Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is now accepting applications for our summer 2027 program, which will run from Sunday, July 18, to Friday, August 6, 2027. The deadline to apply is 11:59 pm PST on Tuesday, January 12, 2027.

The program brings together an annual cohort of approximately 30 mid-career practitioners from countries in political transition who are working to advance democratic practices and enact economic and legal reform to promote human development. Launched by CDDRL in 2005, the program was previously known as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program. The new name reflects an endowment gift from the Fisher family — Sakurako (Sako), ‘82, and William (Bill), MBA ‘84 — that secures the future of this important and impactful program.

From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, we select our program participants from among hundreds of applicants each year for the significant contributions they have already made to their communities and their potential to make an even greater impact with some help from Stanford. We aim to give them the opportunity to join a global network of over 500 alumni from 96 countries who have all faced similar sets of challenges in bringing change to their countries.

The Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program provides an intensive 3-week on-campus forum for civil society leaders to exchange experiences and receive academic and policy training to enrich their knowledge and advance their work. Delivered by a leading Stanford faculty team composed of Michael McFaul, Kathryn Stoner, Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond, Erik Jensen, and more, the program allows emerging and established global leaders to explore new institutional models and frameworks to enhance their ability to promote good governance, accountable politics, and find new ways to achieve economic development in their home countries.

Prospective fellows from Ukraine are also invited to apply for our Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development (SU-DD) Program, which runs concurrently with the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program. The SU-DD program provides a unique opportunity for mid-career practitioners working on well-defined projects aimed at strengthening Ukrainian democracy, enhancing human development, and promoting good governance. Applicants to the SU-DD program will use the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program application portal to apply and indicate their interest there. You will then be directed to a series of supplemental questions specific to the SU-DD program, including requiring a detailed description of your proposed project.

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Spotlight on the 2026 Summer Fellows

The Fellow Spotlight Series is an inspiring and moving series of "TED"-style talks given by each of our 2026 Fisher Family Summer Fellows to share their backstories and discuss their work.
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Announcing the 2026 Class of the Fisher Family Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program

In July 2026, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law will welcome a diverse cohort of 26 experienced practitioners from 19 countries who are working to advance democratic practices and economic and legal reform in contexts where freedom, human development, and good governance are fragile or at risk.
Announcing the 2026 Class of the Fisher Family Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program
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Four Years After the Invasion, Ukrainian Leaders Build Foundations for Recovery

From parliament to regional government to independent media, alumni of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development Program are implementing reform initiatives under wartime conditions.
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Francis Fukuyama looks on as a group of fellows works through a case study. | Emin Huseynov
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The program will run from Sunday, July 18, to Friday, August 6, 2027. Applications are due by 11:59 pm PST on Tuesday, January 12, 2027.

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Caption Francis Fukuyama looks on as a group of fellows works through a case study. | Photo credit Emin Huseynov
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Sonia is an Editorial Assistant at the Journal of Democracy, in partnership with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. She is an undergraduate in the Class of 2029, majoring in Political Science with a minor in Economics. Her academic interests focus on democracy, technology, and U.S. elections. She has worked at the California State Assembly, the Immigration Institute of the Bay Area, and Legora, a legal AI company.

Editorial Assistant, Journal of Democracy, Fall 2026
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Nensi Hayotsyan
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At a CDDRL research seminar held on October 1, 2026, Frances Cayton, the Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, presented research from her book project on civil society in backsliding democracies.

Her presentation centered on the democratic potential of informal, apolitical civil society groups in resisting democratic erosion. She argued that autocrats devote little attention to these groups, leaving them with greater autonomy and the ability to decide when and whether to engage with the government. At the outset, these groups often have low civic consciousness, meaning they do not recognize the social capital and civic resources they hold. However, as autocratization threatens their independence, they become more aware of those resources and more committed to defending them, which makes them more likely to mobilize democratically and across partisan divides. 

Cayton began by noting that current scholarship often focuses on two ways autocratic regimes interact with civil society. First, they work alongside and reward groups that share their views as a source of support, and second, they crack down on opponents through repression and bureaucratic pressure. What this picture overlooks, Cayton argues, are the apolitical and informal groups that make up much of civic life, such as biking clubs and mushroom hunters, who often do not consider themselves part of civil society at all. 

To account for these groups, Cayton organizes civic life into a two-by-two framework of formal and informal organizations with political and apolitical missions. Formal groups have internal structures such as membership and dues, making them easy for the state to see. Informal groups have looser arrangements, such as friends who help stray dogs in their neighborhood. Political groups have an explicit political mission, such as human rights, labor, religious, or left-and right-wing causes, while apolitical groups focus on areas like sports, education, and the arts. 

Her argument therefore suggests that the less visible nature of these informal, apolitical groups makes them an almost blind spot in the autocrat's agenda, allowing them to maintain their autonomy. Cayton hypothesizes that, relative to formal pro-regime civil society, aspiring autocrats will target formal apolitical and opposition groups more often, but will not treat informal civil society differently. 

She then tests this through the case of Poland, drawing on a panel dataset covering the universe of Polish civil society, a survey of civic organizations, and interviews. Her analysis of public funding shows that after the Law and Justice party (PiS) took power in 2015, formal apolitical and formal opposition groups lost public funding relative to formal pro-regime groups, while informal groups saw no significant change. Informal and apolitical groups also became less likely to file optional financial disclosures, which she reads as a choice to remain less visible to the state. 

In her survey experiment, Cayton reminded civic groups of government threats to civil society. Informal and apolitical groups became more open to meeting groups with different political views and hosting cross-partisan events, while showing no greater willingness to work with PiS. Together, these results suggest that the regime's pressure largely bypassed informal and apolitical groups, and that the threat to civil society strengthened their commitment to independence and pluralism. 

Ultimately, Cayton's research shows that informal, apolitical civil society is a powerful tool for democratic resilience. As one interviewee put it, these groups often "become political in order to maintain apoliticality," which leads them to defend their independence by mobilizing in support of democracy.

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Emily Russell presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on September 24, 2026.
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The Hidden Economics of Police Repression in India's Tea Country

A spatial analysis of Assam's plantations reveals that policing rises sharply in the zones where owners' authority over workers ends.
The Hidden Economics of Police Repression in India's Tea Country
Alice Evans presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on May 21, 2026.
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Modernization and the Global Islamic Revival

Visiting Associate Professor Alice Evans explores how modernization and expanded access to religious knowledge impact the global Islamic revival.
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Michael Albertus presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on May 14, 2026.
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Study Finds Polling Center Expansion in Venezuela Favored Regime Strongholds

Michael Albertus argues electoral infrastructure should be considered part of the broader “menu of manipulation” used by authoritarian regimes.
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Frances Cayton presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on October 1, 2026.
Frances Cayton presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on October 1, 2026. | Nora Sulots
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Research by CDDRL’s Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow Frances Cayton shows how threats to civil society in Poland strengthened the independence and pluralism of groups the regime overlooked.

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  • Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow Frances Cayton argues that informal, apolitical groups such as biking clubs and mushroom hunters draw little attention from aspiring autocrats, which leaves them with greater autonomy.
  • Cayton's analysis of Poland shows that after Law and Justice took power in 2015, formal apolitical and opposition groups lost public funding relative to formal pro-regime groups, while informal groups saw no significant change.
  • In Cayton's survey experiment, informal and apolitical groups reminded of government threats to civil society became more open to cross-partisan cooperation, but not to working with the ruling party.
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Civil servants are a neglected source of democratic resilience. Their partial autonomy lets them resist abuses of state power. This resistance is possible because politicians cannot perfectly observe bureaucrats’ preferences or behavior. Artificial intelligence is closing this gap. States are collecting more data on their own officials, and AI tools can merge and analyze extensive records that once sat in separate systems. Illiberal leaders can now identify and punish bureaucrats they consider disloyal at scale. Drawing on cases from democracies and authoritarian regimes, this article argues that the legal architecture protecting bureaucratic autonomy must be updated for the data age.

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Journal of Democracy
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Maria Nagawa
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Khushmita Dhabhai
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During the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law's (CDDRL) first Fall 2026 Research Seminar, Emily Russell, the 2026-27 Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at CDDRL, presented her research on why police selectively target certain minorities within particular regions of India. She began by situating her work within the literature on common explanations of police repression. These explanations often include crime and political dissent that the police seek to curtail, or racial and ethnic biases within policing institutions. Russell, however, argues that police may also target vulnerable groups in order to enforce an economic order and maintain and enable conditions of extraction that sustain production and hierarchy. 

Russell contextualizes this through the broader literature on coercion, taxation, extraction, and labor control. Existing work already shows how coercion can be used to restrict workers’ outside options and prevent laborers from leaving. Acemoglu and Wolitzky’s 2011 paper, for example, models coercion as force or the threat of force that employers use to influence workers’ participation decisions. Russell adds another layer to this literature by focusing on how coercion can be exercised through the state, rather than only directly by employers. 

Russell situates this argument in the context of Assam’s tea plantation economy. Plantation owners have incentives to control labor, prevent dissent, and discourage laborers from leaving. Within the plantation, they can engage in private coercion directly. Beyond the plantation, however, private coercion becomes more difficult. At that point, landowners may rely on the state, particularly the police, to exercise coercion on their behalf. This produces a clear testable implication: where plantation owners retain incentives to control labor but private coercion can no longer easily reach workers, policing should increase, particularly against the relevant labor population. This is where Assam’s plantation geography becomes useful.

Russell distinguishes between plantations themselves, plantation catchments, and more distant rural areas. Catchment areas are the residential zones surrounding plantations where laborers can still live within commuting distance while remaining beyond employers’ direct control. She then uses a spatial regression discontinuity design across plantation boundaries and catchments to estimate whether policing increases in these areas.

To measure policing and police abuse, Russell draws on GDELT-type media data to capture visible policing events, and legal and human-rights records help capture forms of abuse that may be less visible in media reporting. The broader project also incorporates qualitative evidence from more than 60 interviews.

What she finds is that policing increases sharply in plantation catchment areas relative both to plantations themselves and to more remote rural areas. This increase is especially important in areas with larger populations descended from indentured laborers (Adivasis). Measuring this population is difficult using conventional demographic data, so Russell constructs a surname-based measure based on fieldwork with interviews of elders from indentured communities and geocoded voter records. This allows her to estimate where populations historically connected to plantation labor are concentrated.

The heterogeneity result is particularly important. Policing increases with the concentration of Adivasi populations within plantation catchment areas, but not beyond that geographic zone. This matters because it helps distinguish her argument from a purely ethnic-bias explanation. If repression were driven only by generalized discrimination against Adivasis, one might expect policing to increase wherever these populations are concentrated. Instead, the increase appears specifically where these communities remain economically connected to plantation production but are beyond employers’ direct private control.

The broader point is therefore that the state can use coercion to maintain inequalities that sustain production. Police repression may not only reflect attempts to control crime, political dissent, or ethnic minorities. It can also function as a state-supplied mechanism of labor control, particularly where private coercive authority becomes insufficient.

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Alice Evans presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on May 21, 2026.
News

Modernization and the Global Islamic Revival

Visiting Associate Professor Alice Evans explores how modernization and expanded access to religious knowledge impact the global Islamic revival.
Modernization and the Global Islamic Revival
Michael Albertus presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on May 14, 2026.
News

Study Finds Polling Center Expansion in Venezuela Favored Regime Strongholds

Michael Albertus argues electoral infrastructure should be considered part of the broader “menu of manipulation” used by authoritarian regimes.
Study Finds Polling Center Expansion in Venezuela Favored Regime Strongholds
Katherine Case presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on May 7, 2026.
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Can Voters Help Identify Better Political Candidates?

Katherine Casey’s research finds that while community nominations can surface strong entrants, barriers to candidacy remain.
Can Voters Help Identify Better Political Candidates?
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Emily Russell presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on September 24, 2026.
Emily Russell presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on September 24, 2026. | Nora Sulots
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A spatial analysis of Assam's plantations reveals that policing rises sharply in the zones where owners' authority over workers ends.

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  • New research from Emily Russell, Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at CDDRL, finds that police repression in Assam's tea plantations acts as a state substitute for private labor control.
  • Policing rises sharply in "catchment" areas just beyond plantation boundaries, where owners' direct authority ends.
  • The effect is strongest among descendants of indentured laborers — but only within catchment zones, distinguishing it from ethnic bias alone.
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