Authors
Héctor Fuentes
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

El Democracy Action Lab (DAL), una iniciativa del Centro sobre Democracia, Desarrollo y Estado de Derecho de la Universidad de Stanford para defensores de la democracia, se enorgullece en anunciar oficialmente la primera cohorte de The Democracy Garage, el primer programa acelerador de su tipo dedicado a fortalecer a los defensores de la democracia en primera línea en América Latina y el Caribe.

The Democracy Garage nació de una convicción simple pero urgente: la resiliencia democrática no se construye únicamente a través de ideas, sino a través del fortalecimiento de capacidades de la sociedad civil para actuar estratégicamente, usar la evidencia con eficacia, comunicar de manera persuasiva y adaptarse a entornos políticos en rápida evolución. DAL construyó este programa para cerrar una brecha persistente en el apoyo a la democracia, tendiendo un puente entre la investigación de alto nivel y las necesidades operativas en tiempo real de las organizaciones que hacen el trabajo más difícil sobre el terreno.

Durante los próximos meses, DAL trabajará codo a codo con ocho extraordinarias organizaciones en la región, aplicando una metodología estructurada de acelerador para co-desarrollar estrategias adaptadas a los desafíos democráticos específicos de cada país. Este no es un programa de crecimiento tradicional: es una asociación profunda y colaborativa basada en la evidencia, la estrategia y la solidaridad.

Un Modelo Acelerador de Tres Ejes


El modelo acelerador de The Democracy Garage se organiza en torno a tres ejes que se refuerzan mutuamente, diseñados para abordar una brecha clave en el ecosistema de apoyo democrático: muchos programas ofrecen formación de alto nivel desconectada de las necesidades inmediatas, o asistencia técnica a corto plazo que no genera capacidad duradera. The Garage tiende ese puente.

Eje 1  |  Análisis de Evidencia para la Estrategia Democrática  —  Asesoría Práctica

El primer eje proporciona apoyo de asesoría directa, orientada a los problemas. Cada organización  entra al Garage con un desafío concreto y actual. DAL moviliza su capacidad analítica — incluyendo la experiencia de su cuerpo docente, la participación de estudiantes y herramientas de datos — para abordarlo de forma colaborativa. No se trata de asistencia técnica unidireccional: es un proceso conjunto que desarrolla la propia capacidad de las organizaciones para usar la evidencia como herramienta estratégica, transitando de modos reactivos a anticipatorios.

Eje 2  |  Formación y Fortalecimiento de Capacidades  —  Cuatro Áreas Fundamentales

El segundo eje ofrece formación estructurada en cuatro áreas críticas para la acción democrática: (1) Estrategia para la defensa democrática — comprender el estado de la democracia en la región y sus principales desafíos; (2) IA para el activismo — aplicaciones prácticas de la inteligencia artificial para monitoreo, comunicación y toma de decisiones; (3) Evidencia para la defensa democrática — recolección, análisis e interpretación de datos vinculados directamente a las decisiones estratégicas; y (4) Narrativa para el cambio — traducir el análisis complejo en narrativas persuasivas que resuenen con tomadores de decisiones, medios de comunicación y ciudadanos.

Eje 3  |  Construcción de Plataformas para la Defensa Democrática  —  Escalar el Impacto Sistémico

El tercer eje apoya a las organizaciones  para que se conviertan en nodos fundacionales de plataformas nacionales de defensa democrática. El deterioro democrático rara vez se produce de forma aislada: requiere respuestas coordinadas entre la sociedad civil, los medios, la academia y las instituciones. A través del mapeo de actores, la articulación de redes y el desarrollo de mecanismos de coordinación, el Garage contribuye a construir ecosistemas estructurados capaces de acción colectiva. Este eje culmina en el Encuentro Regional de Sinergias en agosto de 2026, donde las organizaciones presentarán su visión de plataforma y sentarán las bases para la coordinación regional.

Image
Diagram of Democracy Action Lab's Democracy Garage accelerator methodology, showing three mutually reinforcing tracks — Advisory, Training, and Platform Building — leading to a Regional Synergy Meeting and stronger democratic ecosystems.


Metodología de aceleración de DAL (haga clic para ampliar)

Ocho Organizaciones. Tres Países. Una Región.


Tras un riguroso proceso de selección, The Democracy Garage se enorgullece en dar la bienvenida a las siguientes organizaciones participantes:

CESJUL — Centro de Estudios Socio Jurídicos Latinoamericanos (Colombia)  

Trabaja en la intersección del derecho penal, los derechos humanos y la gobernanza democrática, aportando análisis jurídico riguroso a los desafíos más urgentes de la democracia colombiana — incluyendo el uso del derecho tanto como herramienta de represión como vehículo de rendición de cuentas.

Dejusticia (Colombia)

Una de las organizaciones de derechos humanos más respetadas de América Latina — un auténtico think-and-do tank que combina investigación jurídica rigurosa con litigio estratégico, incidencia directa y formación de capacidades en antidiscriminación, justicia transicional y protección del espacio cívico.

Instituto Sou da Paz (Brazil)

Referente en política de seguridad pública en Brasil durante 25 años, influyendo en la legislación nacional sobre regulación de armas y reducción de homicidios mediante un enfoque basado en evidencia que centra a las comunidades más afectadas por la violencia, en particular la población negra brasileña.

Pacto pela Democracia (Brazil)

La principal coalición pro-democracia de Brasil, integrada por más de 200 organizaciones y reconocida internacionalmente como modelo de defensa democrática colectiva. Su protección coordinada de las elecciones de 2022 — más de 80 acciones entre 35 organizaciones — demostró el poder de construir coaliciones antes de que llegue la crisis.

Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) (Perú)

Una de las instituciones de ciencias sociales más antiguas y distinguidas de América Latina, el IEP ha construido durante seis décadas la base empírica del análisis democrático en el Perú — desde encuestas de opinión pública y estudios electorales hasta investigación interdisciplinaria sobre poder, desigualdad y el Estado.

Recambio (Perú)

En un país que ha tenido ocho presidentes en una década, Recambio reconstruye la cultura democrática desde dentro del sistema político — con una red de más de 500 egresados de 28 partidos políticos, diálogo interpartidario y la iniciativa 'Voces Contra la Polarización'.

Espacio Crítico (Regional, LAC)

Una organización regional que brinda apoyo estratégico personalizado, formación técnica y asesoría en seguridad a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, periodistas independientes y líderes políticos en la primera línea del retroceso democrático en América Latina y el Caribe.

D-Hub (Regional, Global)

Una comunidad global de defensores de la democracia que conecta a activistas de primera línea y organizaciones de la sociedad civil con expertos que han enfrentado desafíos similares — construyendo la infraestructura para la solidaridad democrática transfronteriza que ninguna organización puede sostener sola.

Un Hito Histórico


The Democracy Garage es el primer programa acelerador de este tipo diseñado específicamente para defensores de la democracia en América Latina y el Caribe. Al combinar el rigor de la investigación basada en evidencia, la agilidad de un modelo acelerador y la profundidad de una alianza a largo plazo, DAL está abriendo un camino inédito para fortalecer la resiliencia democrática — basado en la convicción de que las organizaciones más cercanas a la crisis están mejor posicionadas para afrontarla, cuando se les proporcionan las herramientas, el conocimiento y las conexiones adecuadas.

“Nos enorgullece inmensamente lanzar The Democracy Garage junto a estas ocho organizaciones extraordinarias," afirmó Beatriz Magaloni, codirectora del DAL y Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations en el Departamento de Ciencia Política. "Cada una de ellas representa lo que es la defensa de la democracia en la práctica, no en la teoría. Juntos, estamos comprometidos con algo sin precedentes: construir una comunidad de estrategia y solidaridad que fortalezca la democracia, país por país.”
 

Sobre el Democracy Action Lab

El Democracy Action Lab (DAL) es una iniciativa de investigación y estrategia con sede en el Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law de la Universidad de Stanford, dedicada a traducir las ciencias sociales en herramientas prácticas para quienes defienden la democracia. El DAL trabaja en la intersección entre la evidencia y la acción, colaborando con organizaciones de primera línea para fortalecer las instituciones democráticas, proteger el espacio cívico y contrarrestar las amenazas autoritarias en América Latina y más allá.

Read More

Wall plastered with posters and graffiti text reading "DEMOCRACY NOW"
News

Stanford Launches New Democracy Action Lab to Confront Global Democratic Backsliding

By combining rigorous research with practitioner collaborations, the Democracy Action Lab at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law turns ideas into action.
Stanford Launches New Democracy Action Lab to Confront Global Democratic Backsliding
DAL launch panel
News

Political scientists emphasize need for pro-democracy coalitions at launch of Democracy Action Lab

Political science scholars discussed strengthening pro-democracy coalitions in a Wednesday event marking the launch of CDDRL’s new Democracy Action Lab.
Political scientists emphasize need for pro-democracy coalitions at launch of Democracy Action Lab
Prof. Adam Prezworski, Prof. Beatriz Magaloni, and Prof. Alberto Díaz Cayeros present during DAL’s Inaugural Conference at El Colegio de Mexico.
Blogs

Stanford’s Democracy Action Lab Launches in Mexico City

The new initiative from the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law connects research with frontline efforts to address democratic backsliding across Latin America.
Stanford’s Democracy Action Lab Launches in Mexico City
Hero Image
Illustration of diverse young activists emerging from a garage carrying books and a raised-fist flag, with a network of connected stars overhead, symbolizing the Democracy Garage.
Pariplab Chakraborty
All News button
1
Subtitle

El Primer Acelerador de Democracia de Este Tipo en América Latina y el Caribe.

Date Label
In Brief
  • El Laboratorio de Democracia en Acción (DAL, por sus siglas en inglés) del CDDRL lanzó el primer acelerador de democracia de América Latina, el Democracy Garage (Garaje de la Democracia).
  • El programa combina la capacidad de investigación y la experiencia docente del DAL con ocho organizaciones de Colombia, Brasil y Perú.
  • Beatriz Magaloni, codirectora del DAL, calificó la iniciativa como una comunidad de estrategia y solidaridad sin precedentes, impulsada por Stanford.
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Authors
Héctor Fuentes
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

The Democracy Action Lab (DAL), a practitioner-centered initiative of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, is proud to officially announce the first cohort of its Democracy Garage, the first accelerator program of its kind dedicated to strengthening frontline democracy defenders across Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Democracy Garage was born from a simple but urgent conviction: democratic resilience is built not only through ideas, but through the capacity of organizations to act strategically, use evidence effectively, communicate persuasively, and adapt to rapidly evolving political environments. DAL built this program to close a persistent gap in democracy support, bridging high-level research with the real-time, operational needs of the organizations doing the hardest work on the ground.

Over the next few months, DAL will work side by side with eight extraordinary organizations across the region, applying a structured accelerator methodology to co-develop strategies tailored to the specific democratic challenges in each country. This is not a traditional growth program: it is a deep collaboration grounded in evidence, strategy, and solidarity.

A Three-Track Accelerator Model


The accelerator model of the Democracy Garage is organized around three mutually reinforcing tracks designed to address a key gap in the democracy support ecosystem: many programs either provide high-level training disconnected from immediate needs or short-term technical assistance that does not build lasting capacity. The Garage bridges this divide.

Track 1  |  Evidence Analysis for Democratic Strategizing  —  Hands-On Advisory

The first track provides direct, problem-driven advisory support. Each of the selected organizations enters the Garage with a defined, real-time challenge. DAL mobilizes its analytical capacity, including faculty expertise, student engagement, and data tools, to help address it collaboratively. This is not one-directional technical assistance: it is a joint process that builds organizations' own capacity to use evidence as a strategic tool, shifting from reactive to anticipatory modes of operation.

Track 2  |  Training and Capacity Building  —  Four Core Areas

The second track offers structured training in four areas critical to democratic action: (1) Strategizing for democratic defense — understanding the state of democracy in the region and its main challenges; (2) AI for activism — practical applications of artificial intelligence for monitoring, communication, and decision-making; (3) Evidence for democratic defense — data collection, analysis, and interpretation linked directly to strategic decisions; and (4) Storytelling for change — translating complex analysis into compelling narratives that resonate with policymakers, media, and citizens alike.

Track 3  |  Platform Building for Democratic Defense  —  Scaling for Systemic Impact

The third track supports participating organizations in becoming foundational nodes of country-level democratic defense platforms. Democratic erosion rarely unfolds in isolation: it requires coordinated responses across civil society, media, academia, and institutions. Through actor mapping, network articulation, and the development of coordination mechanisms, the Garage helps build structured ecosystems capable of collective action. This track culminates at the Regional Synergy Meeting in August 2026, where organizations will present their platform visions and lay the groundwork for regional coordination.

Image
Diagram of Democracy Action Lab's Democracy Garage accelerator methodology, showing three mutually reinforcing tracks — Advisory, Training, and Platform Building — leading to a Regional Synergy Meeting and stronger democratic ecosystems.


DAL's Accelerator Methodology (click to enlarge)

Eight Organizations. Three Countries. One Region.


After a rigorous selection process, The Democracy Garage is proud to welcome the following participating organizations:

CESJUL — Centro de Estudios Socio Jurídicos Latinoamericanos (Colombia)  

Works at the intersection of criminal law, human rights, and democratic governance, bringing rigorous legal analysis to the most pressing challenges in Colombian democracy — including the use of law as both a tool of repression and a vehicle for accountability.

Dejusticia (Colombia)

One of Latin America's most respected human rights organizations — a true think-and-do tank combining rigorous legal research with strategic litigation, direct advocacy, and capacity-building across anti-discrimination, transitional justice, and the protection of civic space.

Instituto Sou da Paz (Brazil)

A 25-year leader in public security policy in Brazil, shaping national legislation on firearms regulation and homicide reduction through an evidence-first approach that centers the communities most affected by violence — particularly Black Brazilians.

Pacto pela Democracia (Brazil)

Brazil's preeminent pro-democracy coalition of more than 200 organizations, and an internationally recognized model for coalition-based democratic defense. Its coordinated protection of the 2022 elections — over 80 actions across 35 organizations — demonstrated the power of building coalitions before the crisis arrives.

Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) (Perú)

One of Latin America's oldest and most distinguished social science institutions, IEP has spent six decades producing the empirical foundation for democratic analysis in Perú — from public opinion surveys and electoral studies to interdisciplinary research on power, inequality, and the state

Recambio (Perú)

In a country that has seen eight presidents in a decade, Recambio is rebuilding democratic culture from within the political system — with a network of over 500 alumni from 28 political parties, cross-partisan dialogue, and the 'Voices Against Polarization' initiative.

Espacio Crítico (Regional, LAC)

A regional organization providing tailored strategic support, technical training, and security advice to civil society organizations, independent journalists, and political leaders on the front lines of democratic backsliding across Latin America and the Caribbean.

D-Hub (Regional, Global)

A global community of democracy defenders connecting frontline activists and civil society organizations with experts who have faced similar challenges — building the infrastructure for cross-border democratic solidarity that no single organization can sustain alone.

A Historic First


The Democracy Garage is the first accelerator program of this type designed specifically for democracy defenders in Latin America and the Caribbean. By combining the rigor of evidence-based research, the agility of an accelerator model, and the depth of long-term collaboration, DAL is pioneering a new approach to democratic resilience — one grounded in the conviction that the organizations closest to the crisis are best positioned to address it, when equipped with the right tools, knowledge, and connections.

"We are immensely proud to launch the Democracy Garage alongside these eight remarkable organizations," said DAL co-director Beatriz Magaloni, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations. "Each of them represents what democratic defense looks like in practice, not in theory. Together, we are committed to something unprecedented: building a community of strategy and solidarity that makes democracy stronger, one country at a time."
 

About the Democracy Action Lab

The Democracy Action Lab (DAL) is a research and strategy initiative housed at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, dedicated to translating social science into practical tools for democracy defenders. DAL works at the intersection of evidence and action, partnering with frontline organizations to strengthen democratic institutions, protect civic space, and counter authoritarian threats across Latin America and beyond.

Read More

Wall plastered with posters and graffiti text reading "DEMOCRACY NOW"
News

Stanford Launches New Democracy Action Lab to Confront Global Democratic Backsliding

By combining rigorous research with practitioner collaborations, the Democracy Action Lab at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law turns ideas into action.
Stanford Launches New Democracy Action Lab to Confront Global Democratic Backsliding
DAL launch panel
News

Political scientists emphasize need for pro-democracy coalitions at launch of Democracy Action Lab

Political science scholars discussed strengthening pro-democracy coalitions in a Wednesday event marking the launch of CDDRL’s new Democracy Action Lab.
Political scientists emphasize need for pro-democracy coalitions at launch of Democracy Action Lab
Prof. Adam Prezworski, Prof. Beatriz Magaloni, and Prof. Alberto Díaz Cayeros present during DAL’s Inaugural Conference at El Colegio de Mexico.
Blogs

Stanford’s Democracy Action Lab Launches in Mexico City

The new initiative from the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law connects research with frontline efforts to address democratic backsliding across Latin America.
Stanford’s Democracy Action Lab Launches in Mexico City
Hero Image
Illustration of diverse young activists emerging from a garage carrying books and a raised-fist flag, with a network of connected stars overhead, symbolizing the Democracy Garage.
Pariplab Chakraborty
All News button
1
Subtitle

The first democracy accelerator of its kind in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Date Label
In Brief
  • CDDRL’s Democracy Action Lab (DAL) has launched Latin America's first democracy accelerator, the Democracy Garage.
  • The program pairs DAL’s research capacity and faculty expertise with eight organizations across Colombia, Brazil, and Perú.
  • DAL co-director Beatriz Magaloni called the initiative an unprecedented Stanford-led community of strategy and solidarity.
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Introduction and Contribution:


The recognition of indigenous territory or rights to self-governance is often viewed as intrinsically valuable: indigenous peoples (or comunidaded campesinas) deserve to be recognized as such, especially in light of the violence and discrimination they have endured. However, recognition can also be extrinsically good, insofar as it makes indigenous life more secure or sustainable in the face of political encroachment or environmental degradation.

Indigenous recognition has often occurred during, and because of, conflict and violence. In “Adhering Indigenous Communities to the State,” Michael Albertus shows that recognition during Peru’s infamous 1980-2000 “internal conflict” itself reduced violence: formally recognized communities had systematically fewer conflict deaths than those not recognized. He argues that recognition (a) made property rights more secure, thus “restrict[ing] what could be won and held with violence” (p.7), and (b) supplied the Peruvian government with detailed information about and connections into indigenous communities, thus improving state intelligence during the war. Marshaling a large and original dataset on recognition, property rights, fatalities, state capacity, and more, Albertus demonstrates how recognition can empower not only indigenous communities but also central governments.

Marshaling a large and original dataset on recognition, property rights, fatalities, state capacity, and more, Albertus demonstrates how recognition can empower not only indigenous communities but also central governments.

Peru’s “Internal Conflict”:


Between 1980 and 2000, the Peruvian state fought an extremely brutal war against the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), which sought to overthrow the government and establish an agrarian communist society. The Shining Path’s insurgency was anchored in indigenous communities, whose members suffered economic hardships and political exclusion. Nearly 75% of the estimated 70,000 people killed were indigenous, despite them constituting just 26% of the population. Some insurgents learned Quechua, married into indigenous families, and dismantled unpopular state agricultural cooperatives. 

Over time, however, Shining Path’s growing violence and village authoritarianism alienated many indigenous communities, who formed self-defense committees in response. Initially, the Peruvian government dealt with the insurgency through indiscriminate violence. However, the failure of these strategies prompted a search for alternatives within indigenous communities themselves.

How Recognition Reduced Violence:


Regarding property rights, because disputes over land and resources — those between communities and private landholders — often turned violent, recognition enabled more peaceful, state-led resolutions. Indeed, “the state invited parties for conciliation, checked public registries, examined the de facto occupation of land, and, in the case of disagreements, would begin a judicial proceeding for the disputed territory…outlining a process to identify specific community lands, to map them, and to record the responses of neighbors” (p.7). These varied activities led to a thorough “penetration” of the state into indigenous life.

Recognition was not simply a one-way grant but a mutual agreement, one that imposed clear legal conditions on indigenous communities. These included enrolling community members, forming leadership bodies, and making territorial claims. The state then verified these claims by communicating with leaders and collecting geographical data. Recognized communities also had to adapt their traditional governing institutions to a standardized framework. All of this greatly enhanced the state’s ability to gather information and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts at the community level. It also enabled the training and arming of self-defense committees, many of whose leaders became local authorities.

Research Design and Findings:


It follows from Albertus’ logic not only that (1) recognition should have decreased violence; in addition, and given the importance of property rights and state-community relations, decreases in conflict deaths should have been more pronounced in places with greater (2) land insecurity and (3) state penetration. To see this, imagine the opposite case: where land was plentiful, and ownership was clear, state recognition would have had little added value — and, in turn, minimal effects on violence. The same is true if the state had been unable to build connections with local communities and coordinate its counterinsurgency.

To measure the impact of recognition on violence, Albertus compares 2,475 recognized communities (i.e., those “treated” with recognition) between 1980 and 2000 with their pre-recognition trends, and an additional 228 communities recognized after the war — the “control” group.
 


 

Image
Figure 1. Recognized indigenous communities across Peru.

 

Figure 1. Recognized indigenous communities across Peru.
 



The findings confirm Albertus’ general hypothesis: the average number of deaths per year in a given community during the war was 0.086. (This may sound low, but the violence was heavily concentrated.) In formally recognized indigenous communities, however, the average number of deaths was 0.055 per year, about a 36 percent decline.
 


 

Image
Figure 2. Indigenous community recognition from 1980 to 2000.

 

Figure 2. Indigenous community recognition from 1980 to 2000.
 



The findings confirm Albertus’ general hypothesis: the average number of deaths per year in a given community during the war was 0.086. (This may sound low, but the violence was heavily concentrated.) In formally recognized indigenous communities, however, the average number of deaths was 0.055 per year, about a 36 percent decline.
 


 

Image
Figure 3. Indigenous communities that experienced conflict deaths.

 

Figure 3. Indigenous communities that experienced conflict deaths.
 



Albertus then assesses the importance of property rights, comparing places with different levels of land security: Insecure communities were those that had tenuously acquired land as part of state-run cooperatives under Peru’s 1960-80 military government, or who had bought pieces of that land as the cooperatives broke up; secure communities were those with longer-standing land claims. Albertus finds that the insecure communities experienced much greater declines in violence, again pointing to the state’s importance in peacefully resolving land disputes. In addition, those communities with greater state penetration — measured by road density — also experienced more pronounced declines. Recognition was also associated with greater participation in self-defense committees, perhaps unsurprising given that many of these were state-trained and -funded. 

Finally, Albertus finds that recognition had different effects on the kinds of wartime violence observed. In recognized communities, there were lower levels of violence by civilian and state actors, consistent with the logics of legibility, coordination, and penetration. By contrast, recognition initially had little effect on violence by the Shining Path — perhaps because recognized communities became targets. Over time, however, guerrilla violence also declined. In all, readers come away with an understanding that recognition is not merely symbolic but can be politically quite consequential, enhancing the state’s reach into peripheral areas and improving its intelligence capabilities.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer

Hero Image
Two native women sit atop a rock wall in Peru.
Alex Lenz
All News button
1
Subtitle

CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
No
Paragraphs
Key Finding: The extraordinary delays in the installation of polling sites, albeit leading to a significant decline in turnout and an impact on vote margins between the second and third-placed candidates, were not enough to overturn electoral results. We estimate a reduction of 3 to 5 percentage points in turnout among affected polling stations, translating to approximately 27,000 foregone votes.


Background


Peruvians went to the polls for the first round of general elections on April 12, 2026. However, major logistical failures delayed the opening of polling stations (mesas) across Lima, in some cases by more than eight hours. Using 29,229 polling-station records (actas) in PDF form to recover opening times, we estimate that at least 817,765 eligible voters were assigned to mesas that opened more than three hours late, 69,139 to mesas that opened more than eight hours late, and 54,362 to mesas that did not open until the following day.1

Peruvian democracy now finds itself at an inflection point: the margin between second and third place, with only one advancing to the runoff, is approximately 21,209 votes (0.09%), the narrowest since Peru's return to democracy in 2000. The third-place candidate, Rafael López Aliaga, has contested the results through what we term the missing voters theory: the claim that hundreds of thousands of voters were unable to cast ballots because mesas opened late or failed to open altogether. López Aliaga has called for the annulment of the election and the imprisonment of the head of the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).

Although these delays to polling site installations should never have occurred, our analysis suggests the winners of the first round of the presidential election, based on current ballot counts, are still legitimate.
 

1 See accompanying technical working paper for full details: Missing Voters? Evidence from Polling Station Delays in the 2026 Peruvian Elections.
 



Methods


Estimating the effect of delays in opening polling stations on turnout is not straightforward because stations that open late are not necessarily random events. Our core statistical analysis leverages two complementary sources of variation to better approximate “apples-to-apples” comparisons: comparing neighboring polling tables within the same district, and then comparing each voting site against itself across four consecutive elections (2011 to 2026).

We define a polling station as “late” if a mesa opened more than three hours after its scheduled opening time of 7 am, while also varying this threshold hourly until 2 pm. In the previous three elections, almost no mesa opened more than three hours late, making it a reasonable cutoff for lateness. We additionally rely on the JNE’s official report identifying mesas confirmed to have opened after 2pm as a “ground truth” measure of delayed installations and separately examine mesas that opened the following day.
 

Image
Acta

 

Figure 1. Example of a scanned acta (polling station record) used to recover opening times.


The Dataset


Because no official 2026 election database was available during our analysis, we construct our own dataset by scraping the near-universe of available polling-station records (actas) across mesas in Lima. To compare turnout over time, we additionally collect voting site-level electoral data from presidential elections since 2011.
 

Methodology


We processed over 87,000 scanned actas using a state-of-the-art multimodal large language model (Gemini 2.5 Pro via Google Vertex) to recover polling station opening times from both digital and handwritten records, which were then manually verified. We additionally incorporated the JNE's April 16 report identifying mesas confirmed to have opened after 2 pm.
 



Results


Our core result suggests that those mesas that opened after 10 am on Sunday experienced a decline in turnout by 3 percentage points. Among those mesas where we can confirm an opening time after 2 pm, this effect increases to a 5.3-percentage-point decline in turnout. Moreover, for those mesas that opened a full day late on Monday, we estimate a 5-percentage-point decline in turnout.
 

Image
Table 1: Effect of Late Opening on Turnout

 

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered by voting site in parentheses. Treated sample refers to the definition of the treatment variable. JNE refers to mesas observed opening after 2 pm by the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones report. Panel A reports OLS estimates. Panel B reports average marginal effects from fractional logit models. Column 7 only uses mesas that opened before 10 am on Sunday as the control group. Column 8 drops all mesas flagged in the JNE report given installation times cannot be confirmed before 2 pm.
 

Image
Figure 2. Binned estimates of mesa opening hour on turnout. Effects are relative to a “base” opening time of 7:00–7:59am.

 

Figure 2. Binned estimates of mesa opening hour on turnout. Effects are relative to a “base” opening time of 7:00–7:59 am.

 

Image
Figure 3. Event study results for 10am+ openers. Analysis is at the voting site level.

 

Figure 3. Event study results for 10 am+ openers. Analysis is at the voting site level.
 

When we “bin” the installation times of mesas into hourly intervals, we see an increasing pattern of turnout decline, as shown in Figure 2. However, this is not monotonic: there is a clear rebound for those mesas that opened around noon, as lunchtime gave voters a chance to return to the polls, although turnout continues to decline thereafter.

To show the impact of the delays relative to historical turnout rates, Figure 3 plots the results from an “event study,” focusing on those voting sites that comprise any mesa that opened after 10 am on Sunday. There is an evident drop in turnout for the delayed mesas of 2026, with no differential trends in turnout over the last three prior elections.
 



Estimating the “Missing Voters”


The key question emerging from the analysis is: exactly how many foregone votes resulted from the installation delays at voting stations? Using our estimates of turnout loss, we perform back-of-the-envelope calculations to quantify these “missing voters.” In Table 2, we estimate an overall loss of votes approximating 27,000 voters. This estimate combines the effects from voting stations opening after 10am on Sunday, in addition to the loss in turnout for Monday-openers.
 

Image
Table 2: Estimates of Missing Voters from Delayed Openings

 

Note: Exposure-weighted registered voters refers to total registered voters among delayed polling tables or voting sites. Panel A reports OLS estimates. Panel B reports TWFE estimates using the continuous fraction of mesas that opened late within a site (Voted Monday is included as it is effectively a 100% fraction). Combined 10 am+ and Voted Monday sum the predicted foregone votes from the two constituent estimates, with uncertainty computed using a site-cluster bootstrap.
 

We then estimate how these foregone votes would have been distributed between the second- and third-place candidates. Because the observed López Aliaga–Sánchez margin was itself affected by the delays, we construct a counterfactual using vote shares from untreated mesas within the same district, or the nearest untreated district when necessary. In Figure 4, combining turnout losses from both 10am+ Sunday-openers and Monday-openers, we estimate that López Aliaga lost approximately 5,691 votes relative to Sánchez — comfortably below the roughly 21,209-vote gap separating the candidates.
 

Image
Figure 4. Estimated potential change in electoral margin from delayed openings.

 

Figure 4. Estimated potential change in electoral margin from delayed openings. Points show point estimates; horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals using site-cluster bootstrapping. Negative values favor Sánchez (reduced margin for López Aliaga).
 



Conclusion


By tracking the first round of the Peruvian 2026 presidential election in real time, and using state-of-the-art LLMs combined with techniques in causal inference, our analysis reveals a strong decline in turnout, albeit not large enough to overturn electoral results.


Acknowledgments: This brief was prepared collaboratively by the Democracy Action Lab team, with special contributions by Christopher Dann and Marcelo Peña.
 


Available for Interviews


Dra. Beatriz MagaloniCo-director of the Democracy Action Lab, Professor, Department of Political Science and Senior Fellow, FSI, Stanford University

Beatriz Magaloni is Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where she co-directs the Democracy Action Lab and also the Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab (POVGOV), which she founded in 2010. In 2023, she was awarded the Stockholm Prize in Criminology, considered the equivalent of the Nobel Prize in this field, in recognition of her research on police violence and mechanisms to reduce it, particularly her studies in Mexico and Brazil that demonstrated that police militarization and torture do not improve public safety but do erode human rights.

Dr. Alberto Díaz-CayerosCo-director of the Democracy Action Lab and Senior Fellow, FSI/CDDRL, Stanford University

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros is Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and co-director of the Democracy Action Lab at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He directed Stanford’s Center for Latin American Studies from 2016 to 2023, and his work focuses on federalism, poverty alleviation, indigenous governance, the political economy of health, violence, and citizen security in Mexico and Latin America.

Christopher DannResearcher, Democracy Action Lab

Chris Dann is a doctoral candidate at Stanford and a graduate fellow at POVGOV, with research focused on political economy. He was previously a pre-doctoral fellow with Professor Tim Besley at the London School of Economics.
 

Press Contact


Democracy Action Lab — CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
democracyactionlab@stanford.edu

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Reports
Publication Date
Authors
Alberto Díaz-Cayeros
Beatriz Magaloni
Paragraphs

Numerous countries in recent decades have formally recognized collective indigenous claims to territory and self-governance during civil conflict despite challenges to state authority and social order. How does collective indigenous recognition impact conflict violence within communities? This paper shows that indigenous recognition can shore up order and state reach. It does so in Peru, where the state recognized thousands of indigenous communities during an internal conflict from 1980 to 2000 that disproportionately impacted indigenous Peruvians. Using a staggered difference-in-difference research design and an original spatial mapping of conflict violence to indigenous communities, I find that formal recognition reduced wartime violence. Further analysis of community characteristics as well as state and community counterinsurgency efforts indicates that as recognition fosters greater legibility and transfers disputes into state institutions, it invites state penetration and coordination with state actors that ultimately adheres communities to the state.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Authors
Michael Albertus
Authors
Rachel Owens
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

How and why do armed actors intervene in democratic politics? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, postdoctoral fellow Andres Uribe presented a multifaceted theory explaining the strategies violent groups adopt to influence democratic processes. The talk drew on Uribe’s research on Colombia and Peru.

Uribe shows that armed groups face a choice between co-opting or undermining democracy. More specifically, groups pursuing co-optation try to influence the existing political process through either “corruption” or “capture.” Corruption entails the use of positive inducement to shape the behavior of elected officials or voters, whereas capture entails the use of the threat of force to achieve similar goals.

Those groups seeking to attack democracy do so through two different strategies. The first is “delegitimization,” which could involve attacks on elections and voting sites. The second is “displacement” or the violent removal of the democratic system and its replacement with an entirely different political order.

What determines a given armed group’s choice of strategies (i.e., corruption, capture, delegitimization, or displacement)? The answer, according to Uribe, is determined by the group’s ideological compatibility with democracy and its coercive capacity. Among groups professing ideologies compatible with democracy, they are likely to engage in corruption under low levels of coercive capacity, and capture under higher levels. As for groups whose aims are incompatible with the democratic process, they tend to pursue delegitimization when their coercive capacity is low, and displacement at higher levels of coercive capacity.

Uribe tested his theory based on a paired comparison of Peru’s Sendero Luminioso (SL) and Colombia’s FARC. To characterize each group’s relative ideological compatibility with democratic politics, he drew on a corpus of 7500 documents spanning 21 Latin American countries. He found FARC to be more compatible with democracy than the average armed actor, while SL was less compatible.

To measure coercive capacity, Uribe used data on coca production and cocaine retail pricing in the US as reflective of SL’s and FARC’s military finances. Using casualties in attacks against democracy as an indicator, he found that when FARC possessed a high coercive capacity, there was a slight increase in the number of victims, whereas a similar increase in Sendero’s capacity yielded a 15-fold increase in the number of deaths.

Uribe’s analysis shows that during electoral contests, FARC attempted to reduce the conservative vote share, whereas SL attempted to reduce overall turnout. These outcomes are consistent with Uribe’s theory — FARC’s compatibility with democracy pushes them to work within the system, focusing their attacks on the other party. Sendero, conversely, attempts to prevent all participation in the democratic process.

Uribe’s findings suggest the importance of ideology in understanding how armed actors behave and emphasizes that they do not all share the same motivations. His work also highlights the way some groups play the democratic game using violence, a choice previously seen as mutually exclusive.

Read More

Daniel Chen
News

Can Data Science Improve the Functioning of Courts?

Improving courts’ efficiency is paramount to citizens' confidence in legal institutions and proceedings, explains Daniel Chen, Director of Research at the French National Center for Scientific Research and Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics.
Can Data Science Improve the Functioning of Courts?
María Ignacia Curiel presents during CDDRL's research seminar
News

Do Institutional Safeguards Undermine Rebel Parties?

CDDRL postdoctoral fellow’s findings show that institutional safeguards meant to guarantee the representation of parties formed by former rebel groups may actually weaken such parties’ grassroots support.
Do Institutional Safeguards Undermine Rebel Parties?
Larry Diamond speaks during CDDRL's research seminar
News

Is the World Still in a Democratic Recession?

Is the world still in a democratic recession? Larry Diamond — the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI — believes it is.
Is the World Still in a Democratic Recession?
Hero Image
Andres Uribe presents in a CDDRL research seminar on November 16, 2024.
Andres Uribe presents in a CDDRL research seminar on November 16, 2024. | Rachel Cody Owens
All News button
1
Subtitle

In a recent CDDRL seminar, postdoctoral fellow Andres Uribe presented a multifaceted theory explaining the strategies violent groups adopt to influence democratic processes.

Date Label
-

This is a four-and-a-half-day intensive program for a small number of mid- and high-level government officials and business leaders, exploring how government can encourage and enable the private sector to play a larger, more constructive role as a force for economic growth and development. The process includes small team interactions, with case studies drawn from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Major themes are 1) Industry promotion 2) Investment promotion 3) Public private partnerships in infrastructure, and 4) Access to finance. 

Syllabus (English)
Download pdf

Universidad ESAN

Lima, Peru

Workshops
-

**Watch livestream here**

*Purchase book here*

Watch live streaming video from bccconferencechannel at livestream.com

Abstract

Latin America has gone through a major transformation in the past two decades. According to the United Nations, with the discovery of new oil and mineral deposits and increases in energy exports, manufacturing, and tourism, Latin America's economic growth and development will increase, and the region's global influence will become greater and greater.

In The Shared Society, Alejandro Toledo, whose tenure as president of Peru helped spur the country's economic renaissance, develops a plan for a future Latin America in which not only is its population much better off economically than today but the vast 40 percent of its poor and marginalized are incorporated into a rising middle class, democratic institutions work more effectively, and the extraordinary ecosystem of Latin America is preserved.


Speaker Bio:

Image
pid 25984

Alejandro Toledo served as the President of Peru from 2001 to 2006 and has been honored by the U.S. Senate for his policies during that tenure. He has held positions at the World Bank and the United Nations and was a Visiting Scholar in International Affairs at Harvard University as well as at Johns Hopkins University and a Senior Fellow and Distinguished Visiting Lecturer at Stanford University and the Brookings Institution. Toledo founded and continues to serve as the President of the Global Center for Development and Democracy in Washington, DC. 


 

This event is sponsored by CDDRL, FSI, the Center for Latin American Studies and Redwood Press.

 

[[{"fid":"218581","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"","field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto","pp_lightbox":false,"pp_description":false},"type":"media","attributes":{"height":1433,"width":870,"class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]

Former President of Peru (2001-2006) Former President of Peru (2001-2006)
Seminars
Subscribe to Peru