While votes from the U.S. midterm elections are still being counted and the full results of various state races are not entirely certain, what is clear is Americans did not succumb to paranoia or violence as feared, say Stanford researchers.

Read the full article from Stanford News.

SU-DD builds on some of the successes of our Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program (UELP), which was housed at CDDRL beginning in 2017. Since then, CDDRL has hosted 12 Ukrainian fellows across 4 cohorts. SU-DD aspires to multiply this success and increase our impact in Ukraine in a number of ways:
 

• First, we seek to make the experience of Ukrainian fellows at Stanford more structured and impactful by requiring them to devise focused projects as part of the application, and then by working with our faculty before they arrive at Stanford to further refine these projects so that they can provide actionable solutions to current challenges for Ukrainian democracy and human development.
   
• Second, by shortening the length of the program we can bring more Ukrainian policy influencers to campus and be more impactful with developmental solutions as a result. Fellows will participate in online coursework before joining us on campus at Stanford.
   
• Finally, by including the Ukrainian fellows in CDDRL's Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program (DHSF), we seek to create connections, synergies, and a deeper understanding of shared development problems and solutions from a variety of country contexts. This program will also expand the network for our Ukrainian fellows to draw upon as they continue their work to strengthen democracy and development when they leave Stanford.

"This past summer, I had a terrific chance to participate in the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program," shared Nariman Ustaiev, one of CDDRL's 2021-22 Ukrainian Emerging Leaders. "Being a fellow in this incredibly structured program, you learn from world-class researchers and leading practitioners, making your studying both theoretical and practical. The unique design of the Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development Program and its interconnection with the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program provides an opportunity for future fellows from Ukraine to develop their projects, take part in thought-provoking and eye-opening lectures and discussions, and create a network with outstanding people from all around the world."

Applicants to the SU-DD program will use the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program application portal to apply. Applications are open now and close at 5:00 pm PT on January 15, 2023.

If you are a Ukrainian interested in being considered for the SU-DD program, please indicate your interest on the online Draper Hills Summer Fellows application. You will then be directed to a supplemental application for the SU-DD program. The supplemental application will ask additional questions specific to the SU-DD program, including requiring a detailed description of your proposed project.

If you have questions about the program or the application, please email UkrainianDemocracy@stanford.edu.

In the afternoon, we headed to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, or IFES, where we heard from the president and CEO Anthony Banbury, and Dr. Cassandra Emmons, their Democracy Data Analysis. IFES works to advance and strengthen democracy around the world and has worked in over 145 countries since its founding in 1987. During the visit, the students learned about the Election Integrity program and the different ways that IFES helps to secure safe and effective elections as a pathway to democracy. Additionally, the visit touched on how IFES and its goals have evolved over time and how they have learned through field experience and data how to best serve these new goals, especially when the risks posed to democracy around the world are at their highest. Learning how this organization works to support democracy was definitely one of the highlights of the trip so far!

How does a ragtag group of honors students spend their nights in the nation's capitol? On Tuesday evening, after resting and getting dressed up, we headed to the Kennedy Center to watch the critically acclaimed musical, Hamilton. Witnessing the (nearly accurate) historical recount of the birth of our nation through the lens of one of our founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, is always a treat, especially in the heart of Washington D.C. Amid visits to think tanks and government agencies, Hamilton gave us the sing-along footnotes version of how democracy came to be here in the U.S. and the efforts that went into protecting it. Though the days in Honors College are long, this musical (and the overpriced snacks we grabbed during intermission) was a wonderful way to close out a fascinating day. 

Day 2 clearly was action-packed. We both returned to our hotel rooms with full hearts, tired feet, and of course, the Hamilton soundtrack stuck in our heads. But looking back, perhaps our favorite part of the day was simply getting to go full nerd-mode with everyone—whether it was over whose office we were passing by in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building or which musical number ultimately stole the show. It’s hard to come across a more caffeinated, strangely passionate group of Gen-Z’ers who are willing to unapologetically geek out about these sorts of things—we’re very glad we found this one.

Our cohort also took time to explore the many museums around Washington. Monday afternoon, we decided to stop by the Smithsonian Natural History Museum, to see some of the amazing collections the Smithsonian hosts. We enjoyed having the time to get to know each other and learn more about our theses. The discussion inspired some new questions for myself and others and helped us to better understand and approach our research questions.

Monday was an excellent beginning to our time in Washington D.C., and our visits to New America and the National Endowment for Democracy introduced guiding questions about democracy and its benefits which we would return to across the many other organizations we visited over our time in Washington.

The following commentary has been edited for clarity and length, and does not represent the full extent of the panel’s discussion.
 

Rethinking Assumptions about Russia and Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Right now, Putin is the most vulnerable he's ever been in 22 years in power. But I don’t believe he's under so much pressure at this point that he is about to leave office anytime soon. Autocracies do not usually die by popular mobilization, unfortunately. More often they end through an elite coup or turnover. And since the end of WWII, the research has shown that about 75% of the time autocracies are typically replaced by another autocracy, or the perpetuation of the same autocracy, just with a different leader. So, if Putin were replaced, you might get a milder form of autocracy in Russia, but I don't think you are suddenly going to create a liberal democracy.

This means that we in the West, and particularly in the U.S., need to think very hard about our strategies and how we are going to manage our relationships with Putin and his allies. This time last year, the U.S. broadcast that we basically wanted Russia to calm down so we could pivot to China. That’s an invitation to not calm down, and I think it was a mistake to transmit that as policy.

We need to pay attention to what Russia has been doing. They are the second biggest purveyor of weapons globally after the United States. They will sell to anyone. They’ve been forgiving loans throughout Sub Saharan Africa from the Soviet period and using that as a way of bargaining for access to natural resources. They’re marketing oil, selling infrastructure, and building railroads. Wherever there is a vacuum, someone will fill it, and that includes Russia every bit as much as China. We need to realize that we are in competition with both Russia and China, and develop our policies and outreach accordingly.

Confronting Autocracy at Home and Abroad

Anna Grzymala-Busse

Why is Putin in Ukraine? Because the fact that there is a democratic country right next door to Russia is an affront to him. Putin doesn’t care that much about NATO. The fact that nothing happened when Sweden joined is some evidence of this. That’s something to keep in mind as people are debating NATO and Ukraine and Ukraine’s possible future as a member.

NATO membership and EU membership are both wonderful things. But more fundamental that that, this war has to be won first. That’s why I think it’s necessary in the next six months to speed up the support for Ukraine by ensuring there’s a steady stream of armaments, training personnel, and providing other military support.

There’s been incredible unity on Ukraine over the last seven months across the EU, NATO, and amongst our allies. But our recent history with President Trump reminds us how fragile these international commitments can be. In foreign policy, it used to be understood that America stands for liberal democracy. But we had a president of the United States who was more than happy to sidle up to some of the worst autocrats in the world. That’s why we can’t afford to leave rising populism around the world unaddressed and fail to engage with voters. When we do that, we allow far right parties to grab those votes and go unopposed. Whatever happens domestically impacts what happens internationally.

The Consequences of Nuclear Sabre-Rattling

Scott Sagan

We have to very clear-eyed when we’re talking about the threat, however improbable, of the use of a nuclear weapon. When it comes to the deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon, its kinetic effects depend on both the size of the weapon, the yield, and the target. Tactical weapons range in yield from very low — 5-10% of what was in the Hiroshima bomb — to as large as what was used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If that kind of weapon was used on an urban target, it would produce widescale effects. In a battlefield or rural area, it would have a relatively small impact.

But in the bigger picture, what any use of a weapon like this does is break a 70+ year tradition of non-use. Those seventy years have been dicey and fragile, but they have held so far. A tradition that is broken creates a precedent, and once there’s a precedent, it makes it much easier for someone to transgress the tradition again. So even if a decision was made to use a tactical weapon with little kinetic importance for strategic effect, I think we still need to be worried about it.

Personalistic dictators surround themselves with yes men. They make lonely decisions by themselves, often filled with vengeance and delusion because no one can tell them otherwise. They don't have the checks and balances. But I want to make one point about a potential coup or overthrow. Putin has done a lot to protect himself against that. But improbable events happen all the time, especially when leaders make really, really bad decisions. That’s not something we should be calling for as official U.S. policy, but it should be our hope.

Cycles of Conflict, Climate Change, and Food Insecurity

Marshall Burke

The estimates right now project that there are 350 million people around the world facing acute food insecurity. That means 350 million people who literally don’t have enough to eat. That’s roughly double what it was pre-COVID. The factors driving that are things like supply chain disruptions from the pandemic and climate shocks, but also because of ongoing conflict happening around the world, Ukraine included.

There was an early concern that the war in Ukraine would be a huge threat to global food security. That largely has not been the case so far, at least directly. Opening the grain corridors through the Black Sea has been crucial to this, and it’s critical that we keep those open and keep the wheat flowing out. Research shows that unrest increases when food prices spike, so it’s important for security everywhere to keep wheat prices down.

What I’m worried about now is natural gas prices. With high global natural gas prices, that means making fertilizer is also very expensive and prices have increased up to 300% relative to a few years ago. If they stay that high, this is going to be a long-term problem we will have to find a way of reckoning with on top of the other effects from climate change already impacting global crop production and the global economy.

Ukraine After the War

Francis Fukuyama

I've been more optimistic about the prospects for Ukraine taking back territory for more of this war, just because of the vast difference in motivation between the two sides and the supply of modern weapons that Ukraine has been getting. But I don’t know what the conditions on the ground will look like when the decision to negotiate comes. Will Russia still be sitting on occupied territory? Are they kicked out entirely? Or are the frontlines close to where they are now?

As I’ve observed, Ukraine's demands have shifted depending on how they perceive the war going on. There was a point earlier this summer where they hinted that a return to the February 23 borderlines would be acceptable. But now with their recent successes, they're saying they want everything back to the 2014 lines. What actually happens will depend on what the military situation looks like next spring, by my guess.

However the war does end, I think Ukraine actually has a big opportunity ahead of them. Putin has unwittingly become the father of a new Ukrainian nation. The stresses of the war have created a very strong sense of national identity in Ukraine that didn’t exist previously. It’s accurate that Ukraine had significant problems with corruption and defective institutions before, but I think there’s going to be a great push to rout that out. Even things like the Azov steel factory being bombed out of existence is probably a good thing in the long run, because Ukraine was far too dependent on 20^th-century coal, steel, and heavy industry. Now they have an opportunity to make a break from all of that.

There are going to be challenges, obviously. We’ll have to watch very carefully what Zelenskyy chooses to do with the commanding position he has at the moment, and whether the government will be able to release power back to the people and restore its institutions. But Europe and the West and our allies are going to have a really big role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, and that should be regarded by everyone as a tremendous opportunity.

Victory in Ukraine, Victory for Democracy

Michael McFaul

Nobody likes a loser, and right now, Putin is losing strategically, tactically, and morally. Now, he doesn’t really care about what Biden or NATO or the West think about him. But he does care about what the autocrats think about him, especially Xi Jinping. And with reports coming out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that Xi has “concerns” about what’s happening in Ukraine, Putin is feeling that pressure. I think that's why he has decided he needs to double down, not to negotiate, but to try and “win” in some way as defined by him.

In my view, that’s what’s behind the seizure of these four regions. If he feels like he can unequivocally claim them as part of Russia, then maybe he will sue for peace. And that’s exactly what President Zelenskyy fears. Why? Because that’s exactly what happened in 2014. Putin took Crimea, then turned around to the countries of the world and said, “Aren’t we all tired of war? Can’t we just have peace? I’m ready to end the war, as long as you recognize the new borders.” And, let’s be honest, we did.

We keep hearing politicians say we should put pressure for peace negotiations. I challenge any of them to explain their strategy for getting Putin to talk about peace. There is no doubt in my mind that President Zelenskyy would sit down tomorrow to negotiate if there was a real prospect for peace negotiations. But there's also no doubt in my mind right now that Putin has zero interest in peace talks.

Like Dr. Fukuyama, I don’t know how this war will end. But there's nobody inside or outside of Russia that thinks it’s going well. I personally know a lot of people that believe in democracy in Russia. They believe in democracy just as much as you or I. I’ve no doubt of their convictions. But they’re in jail, or in exile today.

If we want to help Russia in the post-Putin world, we have to think about democracy. There’s not a lot we can do to directly help democracy in Russia right now. But we should be doing everything to help democracy in Ukraine.  It didn’t happen in 1991. It didn’t happen in 2004. It didn’t happen in 2014. They had those breakthroughs and those revolutionary moments, but we as the democratic world collectively didn’t get it right. This is our moment to get it right, both as a way of helping Ukraine secure its future, and to give inspiration to “small-d” democrats fighting for rights across the world.