In a January 28, 2026, Israel Insights Webinar hosted by the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program and moderated by Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies Or Rabinowitz, security experts Sima Shine and Raz Zimmt analyzed the growing risk of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel and the broader regional consequences of such a conflict. They argued that while Iran’s proxy strategy has failed to prevent escalation, Tehran remains committed to rebuilding Hezbollah and other allied groups despite mounting domestic economic pressures. Both speakers warned that any future war would likely be far more expansive than previous exchanges, potentially involving strikes on leadership, economic, and symbolic targets, and noted Israel’s preference for U.S. leadership in any major military action against Iran. Turning to the regional and long-term outlook, the panel highlighted Gulf states’ strong opposition to war in favor of stability and a negotiated U.S.–Iran agreement, and expressed skepticism that external military action would produce rapid democratic change in Iran, suggesting instead that any near-term transformation is more likely to emerge gradually from within the existing regime.

A full recording of the webinar can be viewed above.

In January and February of 2026, Alon Tal, Former Member of Knesset and Professor in the Department of Public Policy at Tel Aviv University, spoke in the Stanford course, "Sustainable Societies Lab: Exploring Israel’s Innovation Ecosystem in Human & Planetary Health – Pathways to Peace.” During his visit, he caught up with Amichai Magen, Director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at CDDRL. They discussed the atmosphere and sentiment on the ground in Israel as Israelis begin preparing for the first national elections since the launch of the Netanyahu coalition government's controversial "judicial overhaul" campaign in January 2023 and the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. 

They set out seven principles for understanding Israeli elections, democracy, and electoral politics, and seven key questions about the upcoming elections.

A full recording of the webinar can be viewed above.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on January 29, 2026, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, presented her human rights theory of democracy to explain democratic backsliding. Arat’s research shows how economic and social policies have contributed to the decline of democracies worldwide since the mid-twentieth century. While democratic decline was once primarily associated with developing countries, it has now become a global concern, visible as the rise of electoral authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies, and right-wing populism.

Arat’s theory upholds that democracy’s stability depends on maintaining a balance between two sets of human rights: civil and political rights and social and economic rights. Civil and political rights such as freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rights to political participation, are critical components of democracy. Social and economic rights include the right to work, labor rights, education, healthcare, housing, food, an adequate standard of living, and social security. Arat argued that while democracies maintain relatively high levels of civil and political rights, successive governments may neglect social and economic rights, leading to the emergence of a growing gap between the two sets of rights. This imbalance leads to a legitimacy crisis. As citizens begin to question the government’s ability to respond to everyday struggles and provide basic welfare, the government or an alternative elite triggers a process that ultimately undermines democratic stability.

Arat outlined a three-phase process through which democratic decline unfolds. In the first phase, democratization begins, and civil and political rights expand rapidly, while social and economic rights remain stagnant. Although a gap exists between the two sets of rights, the expansion of political freedoms provides legitimacy to the new democratic system. In the second phase, civil and political rights stabilize while social and economic rights stagnate or decline, creating an imbalance that fuels social and political unrest. In the third phase, governments that are unwilling or unable to improve social and economic conditions respond by limiting civil and political rights, ultimately marking the decline of democracy.

Arat examined democratic decline for two major eras. During the Cold War, politics focused on class-based movements such as labor and student activism, while governments responded with authoritarian measures justified by anti-communism. Many developing countries followed uneven development models and trickle-down economics that promised rapid economic growth. However, in the post-Cold War era, the neoliberal economic paradigm, which seeks privatization, deregulation, labor flexibility, and reduced government services, spread across both developing and developed countries. Although promoted as efficient, these reforms weakened social and economic rights and increased public dissatisfaction. At the same time, political struggles and claims shifted toward identity politics.

Arat described this as a “convergence of fundamentalisms.” She referred to neoliberalism as “market fundamentalism,” which prioritizes the private sector and markets, reducing the public sector's role and resulting in declining employment, reduced social services, and growing inequality. Along with the rise of neoliberalism, religious and nationalist fundamentalisms gained strength, increasing cultural tensions around gender identity and roles, minority rights, immigration, and national identity. Furthermore, instead of addressing the social and economic rights violations caused by neoliberal policies, governments reverted to cultural politics to manage public frustration.

These cultural strategies served as a divide-and-rule approach. Political leaders frame social problems around internal and external enemies, such as minorities, immigrants, feminists, global/cosmopolitan elites, and intergovernmental organizations, redirecting anger away from economic policy failures. This populist rhetoric divides society into “victims” and “others,” while promoting strong leadership as the solution to the grievances of “authentic and legitimate” citizens. Through this process, governments are able to maintain neoliberal economic structures while simultaneously weakening civil and political rights and shrinking the democratic space.

Arat concluded that democratic decline cannot be understood without recognizing the central role of social and economic rights. While inequality is important, it would not be destabilizing by itself; the erosion of welfare systems and the government's failure to meet basic human needs create conditions of instability and loss of legitimacy. Hence, as long as neoliberal policies continue to undermine social and economic rights, democracies remain vulnerable to backsliding and authoritarianism.

On January 15, 2026, Emil Kamalov, CDDRL’s 2025-26 Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum (SURF) Postdoctoral Fellow, presented his team’s research on whether autocracies can draw citizens who have emigrated back to their country of origin. Historically, episodes of autocratization create huge migration waves. In recent times, countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, and Russia have experienced waves of emigration as a result of authoritarian leadership. When skilled professionals who are crucial to their country’s functioning leave, a phenomenon known as “brain drain,” a central question arises: if and how these individuals will return. This raises two key questions: can autocracies reverse such a brain drain and bring their citizens back, or can only democracies do so?

Kamalov turns to the case of Russian migration to explore these questions more directly. For many Russians, the 2022 war with Ukraine was an initial trigger for leaving the country. Kamalov explains that autocrats use emigration as a safety valve to manage dissent at home. In doing so, autocrats rely on several tools to maintain control. These include selective “valving,” which allows some citizens to emigrate while retaining enough workers critical to industry, as well as imprisonment to punish those who attempt to leave. For those who have already emigrated, autocrats may introduce special policies, such as financial or tax benefits for critical professions, in an attempt to attract them back to the country. 

Kamalov then discussed what motivates citizens to move into and out of countries. He outlines a list of push and pull factors, including economic conditions, integration and discrimination, and satisfaction with amenities and services. He identifies a gap in the literature, noting that there is relatively little focus on politics — specifically regime change, autocracy, and democracy. From this gap, Kamalov poses several questions: can autocrats lure emigrants back with incentives, will people return if democratization occurs, and does democratic backsliding in host countries push emigrants back home? For political emigrants in particular, political liberties are non-tradable in their decisions about return.

Turning fully to the case of Russian emigration, Kamalov notes that about one million Russians have left the country since the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine. This represents the largest brain drain since the collapse of the USSR. Forty-one percent work in the IT sector, and the majority of emigrants are highly skilled and educated, with many working in science, media, and the arts. This emigration represents a significant share of opposition-minded Russian citizens: most of those who left had experience with protest and civic engagement in Russia, and roughly 80 percent cite political reasons for their departure. In response, the Kremlin introduced several policies aimed at discouraging professional emigration or attracting emigrants back. These include mobilization exemptions for highly skilled workers in critical industries such as math, architecture, and engineering, as well as economic support for IT workers, including subsidized mortgages. Because of these policies, Russia serves as a useful case study for understanding whether the strategies autocracies use to entice citizens back or prevent them from leaving are actually effective.

In March 2022, Kamalov and his team launched a panel survey of Russian migrants consisting of five waves. Approximately 21,000 post-2022 Russian emigrants across around 100 countries participated. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to imagine hypothetical political scenarios in Russia and indicate whether they would return if those scenarios became reality. These scenarios ranged from highly realistic but undesirable to unrealistic but highly desirable. They included continued war with Putin in power, continued war with family mobilization exemptions, an end to the war without regime change, an end to the war with political amnesty but no regime change, and full regime change with pro-democratic forces coming to power. The team also analyzed respondents’ host countries, focusing on economic conditions, citizenship opportunities, and political environments.

The results show that having a good job or a path to citizenship in the host country reduces the likelihood of returning to Russia, while democratic backsliding in the host country increases it. Draft exemptions do not increase return at all. Ending the war alone would attract only about 5 percent of emigrants, ending the war combined with political amnesty would attract about 15 percent, while democratization is by far the most attractive scenario, drawing around 40 percent back. When looking at subgroups, all professional categories studied — culture, IT, media, science, and education — were similarly unlikely to return under non-democratic conditions. During democratization, around half would return, though those working in culture, such as artists and musicians, were somewhat less likely to do so. Younger emigrants were more likely to return than older ones.

When asked why they would not return, respondents cited high migration costs, regime volatility, and distrust of Russian society. Some believed that even with political change, Russian society would take much longer to become progressive. Those who said they would return pointed to home, family, opportunities, quality of life, migration fatigue, and, in some cases, disillusionment with democracy in host countries.

The findings of Kamalov’s team demonstrate that even removing the initial trigger for emigration cannot attract many emigrants back. Job opportunities can draw certain subgroups, even during wartime, but broader political conditions matter far more. Autocratic spillovers and cooperation also matter, as democratic backsliding in host countries can motivate return. Importantly, even those who currently cannot envision retu