On May 29, 2025, Dr. Natalia Forrat, a comparative political sociologist and lecturer at the University of Michigan’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, presented findings from her recently published book The Social Roots of Authoritarianism. Part of CDDRL’s research seminar series, the talk explored how authoritarian regimes are maintained not only through top-down coercion but also through everyday social dynamics at the grassroots level. Using fieldwork from four Russian regions, Forrat developed a framework that links citizens’ perceptions of the state to the type of authoritarian institutions that emerge, with implications for how different societies experience and resist autocratic rule.

At the core of Forrat’s theory is the insight that authoritarian power at the grassroots level is shaped by how ordinary people perceive the state. Do they view it as a “team leader” worthy of cooperation, or as an “outsider” that must be bargained with or avoided? These contrasting perceptions form the foundation of two distinct models of authoritarianism: unity-based and division-based.

In unity-based regimes, found in statist societies, the state is embedded in everyday life. Citizens engage with state officials as collaborators, and civic life is deeply intertwined with state-led institutions. This creates top-down political machines that recruit activists, channel discontent, and generate electoral support through community structures such as residential councils and cultural centers. Kemerovo, a highly statist region, exemplifies this model. Its dense network of community institutions performs both civic and political functions — organizing holidays and cleanup drives, while also mobilizing voters and monitoring dissent.

In contrast, division-based regimes operate in anti-statist societies, where the state is distrusted and seen as an alien force. Here, political life is mediated through informal, bottom-up networks of brokers — non-state leaders who command local authority. Rostov offers a vivid illustration. A former official described how community initiatives failed until informal leaders intervened. While state officials are ignored, trusted local figures can instantly galvanize action. This form of authoritarianism relies on clientelism and strategic distribution of perks and punishments.

Forrat’s comparative analysis — spanning the Kemerovo region, the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Rostov region — reveals how different grassroots visions of the state produce divergent regime dynamics. Importantly, she argues that these regime types are not interchangeable: an autocrat ruling over an anti-statist society cannot adopt statist tools without risking backlash, and vice versa. Each regime requires a distinct toolkit to maintain legitimacy and control.

This distinction has powerful implications for democratization. According to Forrat, unity-based authoritarianism lacks institutions that ensure accountability of the executive branch — like independent media, party competition, and pluralist civil society — while division-based regimes lack institutions that cultivate collective unity — such as inclusive state-building or civic trust. Democracy, then, is not merely a midpoint between authoritarian extremes, but a system that must deliberately cultivate the institutions its authoritarian predecessor lacked.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the resilience of international support is being tested. Public opinion in neighboring countries — many of which have absorbed refugees and face direct geopolitical pressure — has become a critical variable in sustaining aid and solidarity. In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

The study draws on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in eight countries bordering Ukraine and/or Russia: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Over 1,000 people were surveyed in each country, with a randomly assigned half receiving a brief empathy prompt. This prompt asked them to reflect on the daily challenges Ukrainians face living in a war zone. The goal was to measure whether simply imagining life in Ukraine could increase support for the Ukrainian cause.

The presentation began by outlining the stakes. Support for Ukraine has implications beyond aid flows. It affects how elites justify their positions, how international coalitions hold, and how misinformation, especially from Russia, can shift public discourse. The researchers focused on whether empathy-based interventions could increase not only emotional identification with Ukrainians, but also concrete actions such as signing petitions, donating money, or supporting humanitarian and military aid.

The results were striking. The empathy prompt had a clear and consistent effect: participants who received it expressed more sympathy for Ukrainians, more concern for their well-being, and greater willingness to support aid, both humanitarian and military. Statistical tests showed that these effects were driven by increased emotional connection (not concerns about the security of their own country), highlighting the central role of affective empathy.

Importantly, the effects were not uniform. They were strongest in countries like Hungary and Lithuania, and among individuals with strong attachments to their own national group and among those who had not previously interacted with Ukrainian refugees. Conversely, those who identified closer with Russians or who regularly consumed Russian media showed weaker or even no response. This suggests that perspective-taking can be powerful — but only in the absence of competing narratives.

The presentation concluded with a discussion of the broader implications. Empathy may offer a low-cost, scalable way to strengthen international solidarity — but its success depends on timing, exposure, and context. In countries with few refugees or limited media exposure to Ukraine, empathy interventions can fill an important emotional gap. However, where pro-Russian sentiment or misinformation dominates, their effects are muted.

At a moment when global support for Ukraine hangs in the balance, this research offers an encouraging insight: even brief moments of reflection can move people toward solidarity — if the conditions are right.

On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

In an era of increased transnational repression against dissidents, opposition groups need to become more effective in galvanizing support and avoiding suppression. These organizations are simultaneously losing critical institutional donors, as governments are becoming less inclined to donate to pro-democratic movements. This makes it more important than ever for such organizations to find out how to stimulate collective action among diasporic communities and uncover new outlets for donations. 

Therefore, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva and her collaborator, Emil Kamalov (EUI), decided to start the OutRush project to survey Russians who have fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By understanding the conditions that drive Russian emigrants to donate to activist organizations, Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research, presented in a recent CDDRL seminar, could prove vital to more effectively mobilizing diaspora communities.

The Russian government has expanded its criminalization of oppositional organizations since the 2022 invasion, increasingly labeling groups as “undesirable.” This designation is for organizations that are allegedly a threat to Russian security, making any collaboration with them illegal. For example, Russian citizen Alexey Malyarevsky was recently sentenced to prison for donating to Alexey Navalny’s “undesirable” Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK). With 70% of Russian emigrants being afraid of repression since the invasion, Sergeeva predicted that this designation would discourage emigrants from donating.

To test their hypothesis, Sergeeva and Kamalov surveyed respondents annually through OutRush about their willingness to donate to theoretical organizations that fit various criteria. They utilized nonmonetary incentives, such as promising to send reports to respondents, which lowered the cost of the study.

Contrary to expectations, there was a positive correlation between the criminalization of an organization and the diaspora’s willingness to donate. The “undesirable” designation did not deter support as intended. Instead, it served as a marker that the organization was effective in its opposition, incentivizing donations. This effect was especially prominent among those residing in countries outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. At the same time, it diminished in host countries friendly to Russia, reflecting the continued fear of transnational repression. Furthermore, donor anonymity and organizational transparency further incentivized support. 

The very means through which authoritarian regimes attempt to suppress dissent — the criminalization of opposition groups — can actually be used to galvanize diasporic support. Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research serves as evidence that activist organizations have the opportunity to mobilize emigrants discontented with the regimes they fled, despite oppression.