The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law proudly congratulates its 2025 graduating class of honors students on their outstanding original research conducted under CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program. Among those graduating is Charles Sheiner, an International Relations major, who has won a Firestone Medal for his research on the electoral impact of Biden-era spending programs. Additionally, two students were selected as recipients of the CDDRL Outstanding Thesis Award. Adrian Feinberg, an International Relations major who is also minoring in History, Film & Media Studies, was honored for his research revealing how postwar Yugoslavia utilized the justice system to build state power and suppress dissent. Adelaide Madary, a Political Science major, was honored for her research exploring how local leadership shapes the responses of rural Calabrian communities to immigration, fostering hospitality in some towns and resistance in others.

On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

On February 26, the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) was pleased to host Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat for a talk on his new book, The Art of Diplomacy. Eizenstat’s distinguished career in Washington, spanning five decades, included his work as a former ambassador to the European Union and as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He spoke with Stanford faculty and students about the importance of diplomacy and the dangers of isolationism. Drawing from personal experience and examples from close colleagues such as Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, Eizenstat identified the attributes and strategies necessary for diplomacy. Leaders engaged in diplomacy require “unsympathetic empathy,” courage, and intellect. They must know the other side’s history and culture, come to negotiations prepared, and possess stamina — both mental and physical — for months-long or years-long negotiations.

Eizenstat shared how his connection to Israel has inspired some of his teaching. He described how Jimmy Carter’s incremental progress and knowledge of his fellow negotiators allowed him to drive the Camp David Accords. In his stories about the Oslo Accords, he also highlighted the utility of back channels in negotiations.

Outlining the role of leverage in diplomacy, Eizenstat noted that whereas positive leverage involves giving the other side what they want, negative leverage includes actions such as sanctions and military support. He argued that sanctions are ineffective in the current era and that military force should come as a last resort. Offering analyses of the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the war in Gaza, Eizenstat described successful and unsuccessful uses of war in diplomacy. If resorting to war, leaders must prioritize national interests, stay equipped to change their plans, have good intelligence, understand local alliances and advantages, and establish post-war strategies.

During the question and answers portion of the seminar, Eizenstat spoke about deterrence, credibility, and strategic decision-making in international conflicts, referencing Obama's red line in Syria, Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis strategy, and the current situation in Ukraine. He also emphasized the roles public opinion and public pressure play in diplomacy, noting that they are far more powerful in democracies.

You can listen to the audio of Ambassador Eizenstat's presentation below:

McGill University Professor of Political Science Juliet Johnson unpacked how central banks use their own museums to support the ‘stability narrative’ and promote confidence in financial institutions. She discussed her research in a recent REDS seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center.

Central banks may be unique among government bureaucracies because of their investment in their own museums. Central banks focus on public outreach because monetary systems depend on collective belief in the value of money, as it is one of the most essential social contracts upon which modern society is built.

Museums can be effective instruments for improving faith in money and financial institutions. Visitors are unusually receptive to learning from museums because museums are often viewed as neutral, trusted guides. The number of central bank museums has increased significantly over the last two decades, and some get many visitors yearly. The Museum Bank Indonesia has an impressive 10,781 Google reviews and a 4.7-star rating.

The nearly 60 central bank museums that focus on economic education (in addition to numismatics and/or art) promote what Johnson calls the stability narrative, which is that central banks can maintain the value and security of money, represent the nation, and have become progressively more effective over time.

Through interactive exhibits and games, these museums aim to teach visitors that the central bank is needed to fight the evils of inflation. For example, the Bank of Finland museum has a display that features a green inflation monster to convey this sentiment. They use the exhibits to emphasize how people can be personally affected by inflation and, in many cases, to explain why maintaining a 2% inflation rate is ideal for protecting the value of money.

Central banks convey a sense of security to visitors through exhibits about detecting counterfeit money, regulating banks, and displaying their wealth, such as with gold bars. They tie their work to national pride through art displays about national heroes depicted on currency and by relating their work to prominent historical events. Through visual timelines, they convey how central bankers have learned from past mistakes and solved problems, making them more equipped to continue ensuring the stability of our financial system.

The rise of central bank museums exhibits the importance of improving public confidence in money and the financial institutions that control it, legitimizing an essential aspect of our society. 

At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.

In a recent REDS Seminar, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science Yoshiko Herrera examined the role of identity in shaping the causes, conduct, and impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the groups they align themselves with, Herrera explained, individuals hold collective memories and similar interpretations of a shared past. These memories and interpretations are often central to our understanding of wars. In the Russian context, the narrative of humiliation by the West in the 1990s and the urge to show strength against NATO expansion fueled Russia’s violent drive to assert its national identity.

During conflict, identity is central to an individual’s assessment of who is an ally or enemy. According to the social identity theory, humans cooperate more within their ingroups than outgroups, or those they perceive as different. Importantly, it can be difficult to determine which identity markers prevail the most. Although identity is often viewed through the limited lens of ethnicity, factors like nationality, religion, or gender can anchor group cohesion. In Ukraine, for example, a concept of national identity has unified people across other markers, such as ethnicity. The fundamental denial of Ukraine’s national identity has been central to Putin’s devastating invasion of the country.

Group alignment, moreover, continues to affect political attitudes throughout a war, affecting, for instance, how invested the masses are in victory. The perception of a conflict as an assault on identity tends to deepen the public’s personal investment in that conflict, as evidenced by Ukraine’s high military mobilization since the onset of the war.

Identity is not only a driver of conflict; it also is a dependent variable, or a domain that is shaped by the experience of war. In Ukraine, a cohesive national identity has strengthened in reaction to Russia’s devastating aggression. Language, a crucial dimension of identity, demonstrates this pattern; as of 2023, 82% of Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their “native tongue,” compared to only 57% in 2012. There has been a rapid evolution in how Ukrainians view themselves, extending beyond what even the most ardent nationalists could have hoped for a decade ago.

It is not just policy considerations and pragmatism that propel the decisions of political leaders; abstract and ever-evolving concepts of identity are motivating forces behind conflicts. Herrera’s research recognizes identity as a key factor influencing war, with the power to uniquely mobilize the masses. In the face of conflict, identities can change and strengthen; Russia’s construed narratives of national identity fuel its war conduct, while in Ukraine, there has been a corresponding maturing of a unified national identity. The role of identity in all aspects of conflict must not be underplayed, as it is manipulated by and motivates political leaders, especially in times of war.