Introduction & Contribution:

The social and economic costs of climate change are significant, including damage to infrastructure, loss of agriculture, and disruptions to education. Hurricanes and storms, such as Hurricane Katrina or Myanmar’s Cyclone Nargis, are particularly visible and destructive manifestations of climate change. The incidence of these storms varies across places, suggesting that migration from more- to less-exposed areas could be an important form of climate adaptation, alongside, e.g., building more resilient infrastructure. However, our knowledge of climate migration, particularly its causes and frequency, is limited.

In “Understanding the migratory responses to hurricanes and tropical storms in the USA,” A. Patrick Behrer and Valentin Bolotnyy show — perhaps contrary to expectations — that Americans’ migratory response to storms is limited. Most storms do not result in meaningful out-migration from impacted counties. Meanwhile, when people do migrate, they do not necessarily move to areas with less storm exposure. The paper draws on a range of data sources to highlight the deeply economic drivers of migration, which stem from the concentration of economic opportunity in storm-exposed areas.

The paper highlights tensions between two commonplace assumptions: first, that “rational” migration should reduce the risks of climate change, and second, that migration is driven by economic opportunity. These assumptions are in tension precisely because, as Behrer and Bolotnyy show, hurricane risk and economic opportunity are highly correlated in America. One policy implication is that local governments must invest in storm-resilient infrastructure to prevent the destruction of physical capital and the flight of human capital. In addition, permitting more remote work could reduce the economic appeal of productive but vulnerable migration hubs.

Prior Research:

Scholars have found evidence that hurricanes and storms both do and do not affect migration, which tends to vary based on the places studied and their levels of economic development. These contradictory findings would seem to call for a deeper investigation of the causal mechanisms underlying climate migration, but our understanding is also limited here. Do individuals and families migrate as a consequence of long-term factors (e.g., frequent, medium-intensity flooding) or short-term ones (e.g., a single severe flood)? Do they migrate on the basis of rational, cost-minimizing calculations, or are they influenced by cognitive biases that lead them to overestimate the true costs of one disaster? And what role do certain amenities (e.g., reliable infrastructure) or forms of protective insurance play in decreasing the incentives to migrate?

It is difficult to sustain a purely instrumental account of migration, which is largely driven by existing social networks and occurs over short distances. For example, many survivors of Hurricane Katrina moved to Houston, which is a similarly exposed city just over 300 miles away. Even long-distance migration tends to be driven by social networks and may offer little protection against storms. Finally, migration is costly, not only in terms of moving but because housing prices in less-exposed areas are often bid up for that very reason.

Data, Methods, and Results:

Behrer and Bolotnyy’s empirical analysis is guided by several questions. First, do we observe greater outmigration after storms? Second, do migrants move to less at-risk counties? And finally, has the overall population of high-risk areas declined over the last 25 years? To answer these questions, the authors utilize migration data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as well as storm exposure data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Hurricane Center, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Their regression models estimate the extent of migratory change in storm years relative to non-storm years, including lagged models that estimate changes in the years following storms.
 

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Fig. 1C-F: c,d, Coefficients from a panel fixed-effects regression of outmigration (c) and net migration (d) on whether a county experienced a storm. The first bar plots the coefficient from a regression with only contemporaneous storms. The next six bars show coefficients from a separate regression that includes contemporaneous storms and five year lags (L1–L5). The final bar shows the sum of the coefficients from the lags regression. The light grey lines show the 95% CIs. The sample size for these regressions was 52,514 for the outmigration results and 52,448 for the net migration results. e, Migrant-receiving counties in our sample period and the average number of migrants received in non-storm years. f, The same as e but in storm years.
 

Their results indicate that American outmigration has not increased at statistically significant levels after storms. In addition, there is no evidence that migrants in storm years move to less exposed areas compared to migrants in non-storm years. The most damaging storms are indeed followed by increased outmigration, but there is no evidence that migrants move to low-risk areas. In fact, they often migrate to other high-risk areas and to places with high economic activity. This is because the majority of American GDP is generated in coastal areas where storms are more prevalent. The authors thus uncover a tradeoff, namely that places in the U.S. with more opportunity face more risk. GDP is substantially more predictive of migration than storm risk. The economic and social benefits of moving to high-risk areas appear to outweigh any incentives to reduce one’s storm exposure via relocation. Finally, the authors find that overall population exposure to storms has increased.
 

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Fig. 4: GDP versus net migration and number of storms. a, Correlation between net migration and GDP. The Z-score of total net migration is the Z-score across all counties of the sum of net migration (in-migration minus outmigration) for each county across all years in the sample. The Z-score of GDP is based on county GDP in 2019, as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. All points are shaded equally, with darker areas on the graph indicating a greater density of counties. We omitted three outliers with GDP Z-scores >10. We show a version of this figure that includes the outliers in Supplementary Fig. 3. b, Correlation between the number of storms and GDP. Total storms is the sum of storms hitting each county across all years in our sample. ln(2019 GDP) is the natural log of county GDP in 2019, as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. All points are shaded equally, with darker areas on the graph indicating a greater density of counties. The x-axis units are log points.
 

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Fig. 3: Trend in population-weighted exposure and correlation between net migration and total storms. a, Trend in population-weighted exposure. We plotted the weighted average number of storms across all 2,387 counties in our sample. Weights are the county population in each year. The number of storms in each county is the sum over the sample and so remains constant across years. The change in the trend line is due to changes in where people live. The flat grey lines show the weighted average if populations had not changed from 1990 levels—that is, if no one had moved. The solid lines show all storms. The dashed lines show storms with at least US$10 million in damages according to FEMA. b, Correlation between net migration and total storms. The Z-score of total net migration is the Z-score across all counties of the sum of net migration (in-migration minus outmigration) in the county across all years in the sample. The Z-score of total storms is the Z-score across all counties of all storms over our sample period. All points are shaded equally; darker areas on the graph indicate a greater density of counties. The dashed line is the linear best fit line of the plotted data points.
 

The authors caution that these findings may be driven by (a) those Americans most impacted by storms being least able to move, this despite their preferences to do so, and (b) those with the means to insure themselves against climate risks having weaker preferences to move. In addition, migration within the same county — for example, moving from lower to higher sea level areas — may be a significant but hidden process that enables climate adaptation. The findings may also be less relevant to understanding migration dynamics in low- and middle-income countries, especially in places with less comprehensive insurance and less resilient infrastructure.

Behrer and Bolotnyy deepen our understanding of the importance and “stickiness” of geography. Indeed, many people do not or cannot move, even if they want to and even if staying in place puts them at risk. One wonders about how these processes interact with politics. For example, climate change has coincided with the powerful forces of climate change denial. Perhaps skepticism about storms as systemic phenomena is blunting migratory pressures, leading those affected to view them as one-off occurrences. Similarly, social scientists have coined the term “petro-masculinity” to describe an identity that views the climate change consensus as an attack on, e.g., driving large trucks or eating meat. It may be that when this identity is salient, people view climate migration as a form of weakness or betrayal.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Motivation & Overview:

The effects of the climate crisis are thought to be extremely far-reaching, from declining economic growth and agricultural productivity to housing displacement and job loss. An important set of consequences are psychological, relating to how climate change can exacerbate anxiety and one’s sense of hopelessness about an uninhabitable future. These psychological impacts are heightened for members of vulnerable and marginalized groups, as well as for those in poor and underdeveloped places that struggle to address climate change.

In “Adolescent psychological health, temporal discounting, and climate distress under increased flood exposure in Bangladesh,” Liza Goldberg and her coauthors examine the psychological well-being of 15 to 18-year-olds in two Bangladeshi cities that have been differentially affected by floods. The authors conduct surveys and focus groups with adolescents in the low-flood-risk capital city of Dhaka and the high-flood-risk city of Barisal. They find that although adolescents in both cities fear the personal impacts of climate change, rates of anxiety and depression are significantly higher in Barisal. In addition, those with anxiety and depression exhibit greater temporal discounting, meaning that short-term consequences are favored over longer-term ones. Discounting is an important — if neglected — consequence because adolescents will emerge as household decision-makers who must plan to adapt to climate change. The article is notable in increasing our knowledge of how floods harm members of an already vulnerable population.

Case Selection and Hypotheses:

Bangladesh is among the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries. This is due to its “deltaic” geography (i.e., its low, flat land, crossed by many rivers) and consequent flood exposure, extreme temperature and humidity, and poor air quality. Barisal — a city of over 500,000 that is roughly 115 kilometers from Dhaka — is highly vulnerable to flooding, as well as being poorer (relative to Dhaka) and limited in its “climate adaptation infrastructure.” Partly for these reasons, rates of migration from Barisal to Dhaka are the highest in Bangladesh. By contrast, Dhaka — the capital city of over 24 million — is less flood-exposed and is slightly wealthier. Respondents in Barisal and Dhaka reported around four floods and one flood per year, respectively.
 

Figure. Study site locations in Bangladesh. Study sites at Dhaka (A) and Barisal (B) are shown in red.
 

The authors hypothesize that Barisal’s greater flood exposure would be associated with more anxiety and depression among its adolescents, and that anxiety and depression would be associated with greater temporal discounting. (In other words, they do not expect that flood exposure would be directly associated with discounting.) In addition, the authors expect that these negative psychological effects would be especially pronounced among poor Bangladeshis, girls, and those with a greater awareness of the climate crisis.

Data and Findings:

The authors surveyed 1200 Bangladeshi adolescents in 24 schools immediately after the flood season, which usually runs from May to September. In addition, 16 focus groups were conducted with around 160 total participants. Adolescents in both cities expressed a high familiarity with climate change. However, and consistent with the authors’ expectations, those in Barisal expressed significantly higher levels of agreement with statements about climate distress. For example 97% of those in Barisal compared to just 68% in Dhaka agreed that “My family’s security will be threatened,” 93% in Barisal and 58% in Dhaka agreed that “The things I most value will be destroyed,” and 98% in Barisal and 67% in Dhaka agreed that “My feelings about climate change negatively affect my daily life.” 
 

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Table 3. Climate distress survey results disaggregated by region.
 

The focus groups corroborated this unequal sense of despair, especially concerning the future and one’s educational and career goals. In Barisal, a boy said, “We expect that we will have to continue withstanding this [flooding] for many years to come,” while a girl said, “I used to want to become a teacher myself, but now I believe I will need to get married immediately after school because my father keeps losing his job during the floods.” By contrast, and because flooding in Dhaka is so infrequent, adolescents did not expect climate change to meaningfully threaten their life trajectories.

In terms of anxiety and depression, 86% of those in Barisal reported anxiety symptoms, compared to 71% in Dhaka, while 98% in Barisal and 88% in Dhaka reported depressive symptoms. After adjusting for factors like sex, wealth, and climate change awareness, the odds of being anxious and depressed in Barisal were nearly twice as high and more than 3.5 times as high, respectively. Across both cities, females were more than 1.75 times as likely to experience anxiety. And the odds of being depressed were over 1.85 times as high for those with a greater awareness of climate change.

Girls in the Barisal focus groups revealed that flooding was linked to domestic violence. Fathers facing financial insecurity were reported to engage in violence against their mothers as a consequence of this stress. As one girl put it, “The floods keep getting worse and worse. So, I may experience even more violence than my mother does.” By contrast, few girls in Dhaka expressed worsening family dynamics, and none reported domestic violence owing to flooding. Adolescents in Dhaka believed that floods in their region were simply too fleeting to result in such abuse.

Finally, only 7% and 6% of adolescents in Barisal and Dhaka showed signs of temporal discounting. However, the odds of discounting were twice as high for those with anxiety and almost 2.5 times as high for those with depression. The authors find some evidence of discounting in the focus groups, but no meaningful differences across cities. This absence may be due to discounting behaviors emerging around adulthood, which is older than the adolescent study population. Taken together, the authors’ findings imply that mental health support will be essential for those affected by climate change — especially in impoverished areas — to help them manage stress and to improve their ability to plan for the future.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

A Pivotal Moment for Climate Policy

In early May, Israel faced its second major wildfire in a month, as flames tore through the woodlands around Jerusalem, forcing the shutdown of the central region and the cancellation of Independence Day celebrations. Conference Chair, Professor Alon Tal, Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies and a leading environmental advocate, explained that once a rare occurrence, such fires have become far more frequent, reflecting a broader international pattern.

“In the past, fires of this magnitude maybe happened once a decade,” Tal noted. “But like California, Israel’s fire service now reports a tripling of high-risk fire days — ultra-dry conditions paired with high winds. This is an international phenomenon. This past year, Canadian fires destroyed 45 million acres of woodlands — seven times the annual average. Israel has received a wake-up call about the impacts of the climate crisis.”

Across two days of programming, the conference will bring together 25 Israeli experts to discuss potential solutions alongside colleagues from Los Angeles and California. “This is not just a policy conversation. This is about how we prepare our communities for an uncertain future,” Tal said. “Both Los Angeles and Tel Aviv are confronting real environmental risks, but they also have the innovation ecosystems and civic infrastructure needed to respond creatively. We have a lot to learn from studying them side by side.”

Comparing Los Angeles and Tel Aviv offers scholars and policymakers unique insights, Tal believes. “These are two of the most creative cities in the world. They both have thriving tech sectors and liberal city governments with resources and professional expertise. At the same time, they face comparable challenges: they are both dryland cities on rising coastlines, where heat waves are becoming more treacherous. Bringing their top experts together at Stanford has tremendous merit.”

Rethinking Climate Governance at the City Level

Tal emphasized that local governments are increasingly bearing the burden of climate adaptation, especially in societies marked by inequality and demographic complexity. “The changing climate brings new challenges that cities need to be ready for. And they aren’t,” he said. “Most people live in cities — they need the tools (and the budget) to reduce new risks. The LA fires have left enormous human suffering in their wake, just like the climate-driven floods in New Orleans, Houston, and New York City did. So, the question is: what steps should cities take proactively to avert disasters and maintain stability?”

While Tal emphasized the immediate environmental threats, Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and director of the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program, framed the discussion within a broader governance context. “It is often said that ‘all politics is local,’ and there is a policy corollary to that. While we need national policies and international coordination to reduce fossil fuel emissions and accelerate the transition to renewable energy, the challenges of climate adaptation and resilience are also deeply local and must be met at that level. This is a great opportunity for all of us to learn from two cities on the front lines of the challenge in our respective countries — Tel Aviv and Los Angeles.”
 

A Vision for Collaborative Learning

The event also reflects the broader goals of Stanford’s Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program, launched in 2023 to foster cross-disciplinary analysis of Israel and its unique position as a regional influence and geopolitical actor. The program appoints an Israel-based scholar to serve as a visiting fellow at FSI for a recurring three-year term. The fellow will teach courses related to some aspect of Israel’s politics, society, economy, modern history, technological development, and/or regional or international relations, as well as advise students and collaborate with faculty interested in Israel and the Middle East.

Diamond emphasized the significance of the conference in fulfilling the program’s mission. “One of our key goals in the Israel Studies Program is to engage scholars, policymakers, and civil society leaders in Israel, not only individually but collectively based on their expertise. And we seek to promote functional and scholarly interaction and mutual learning. This conference is a historic opportunity to advance this mission in the realm of climate resilience.”

Tal also highlighted the significance of hosting the conference at Stanford. “Stanford has become the world’s leading academic center for researching critical ecological problems like biodiversity and climate change. The Doerr School of Sustainability and the involvement of Nobel laureate Steven Chu as a keynote speaker make this an unparalleled opportunity for collaboration.”

Building a Lasting Impact

Tal hopes the conference will catalyze new approaches to addressing climate impacts. “It’s clear that new environmental conditions require new strategies and technologies. Seeing practical solutions firsthand is crucial, but they don’t matter without policies that enable cities to step up their climate mitigation game. Success stories need to be shared.”

The conference outcomes will be documented in a special issue of the academic journal Sustainability, ensuring that insights resonate beyond the event itself. “By focusing on urban policies and highlighting both successes and failures, we aim to chart pathways for cities to live with global warming while mitigating emissions to address the root causes,” Tal said.

Diamond further expressed his hopes for the conference’s impact. “We hope participants will not only take away specific ideas and strategies from the two cities and countries but also connections that can be of mutual practical value going forward. We want to underscore that Israel and California, with their similar climates and start-up cultures, have a particularly rich set of possibilities for collaboration and mutual learning.”

Community members and members of the public are invited to participate in this pivotal conversation. To view the full agenda and register, visit the conference website.

Follow the link for a full transcript of "Global Threats Today: The 2024 Edition."

Illiberal Actors Are on the Move  |  Amichai Magen

Around the world, we are seeing a new axis of influence coalescing. Some have called it the "axis of misery" or the "axis of resistance." It is composed of Russia and Iran and North Korea, with a lot of Chinese involvement as well. It is transforming our international system in unbelievable ways. It is united by the desire to dismantle the liberal international order, and we're starting to see the nature and the interconnectivity of this new axis of chaos much more clearly. 

You see North Korean soldiers fighting for Putin in Ukraine. You see Putin helping the Houthis attack international Western shipping in Yemen. We see North Korean tunnel technology turn up in Lebanon with Hezbollah and then with Hamas in Gaza. The interconnectivity is something that we really need to know much more about.

Historically, emperors, kings, dukes, used to spend 50% of their resources on preparing for war or waging war. But in the post-Second World War era, we built a critical norm that we've called the liberal international order. And the miracle of the liberal international order is that we've managed to take global averages of defense spending from about 50% to a global average of about 7%. And the resulting surplus wealth has allowed us to invest in education, health, and scientific discovery.

What is at stake now is the possibility of a return of a norm where states are destroyed and disappear. And we have currently three states in the international system, at the very least — Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — that are at risk of annihilation. To that end, we must articulate a positive strategic vision for the Middle East that will strive towards a two state solution, that would give the Palestinian people the dignity and the freedom that they deserve alongside a safe and secure Israel, and that will leverage the new spirit of cooperation that exists in the Middle East.

If we allow the norm of the non-disappearance of state to erode and collapse, we will go back to the law of the jungle, where we will have to spend so much more money on the wrong things. That is what is at stake in Ukraine, in the Middle East, and with Taiwan.
 

Challenges to Democracy Come From Within |  Didi Kuo

Many people think that the threat to democracy comes from outside our borders, particularly from countries like Russia and China that are asserting themselves in new and aggressive ways.

But the real threat to democracies that we're seeing across the globe is coming from within. Leaders come to power through democratic means, but then they begin to erode power from within. They attack the electoral system and the process of democratic elections, and they take power from other branches of government and aggregate it to themselves within the office of the executive. 

The good news is there are examples of countries like France, Brazil, and Poland where illiberal leaders have been stopped by pro-democracy coalitions of people who came together. These coalitions don't necessarily agree with each other politically, but they've come together and adapted in order to foreclose on these anti-democratic forces. 

That flexibility and adaptability is the reason democracies succeed. We see this over and over again in the the United States. When our institutions have become out of date, we've changed them. We extended suffrage, first to Black Americans who were formerly enslaved, then to women, then to Native Americans. We eliminating poll taxes and rethought what it means to have a multiracial democracy. We have a long track record of making changes.

Today in 2024, some of our democratic institutions are antiquated and don't reflect our contemporary values. This is a moment where we should lean into that flexible strength of democracy and think about institutional reforms that will both strengthen our system against illiberal creep and help us better achieve the ideals that we aspiring to as a people.
 

Ukraine Is Not Fated to Lose |  Steven Pifer

There's a narrative that's taking place that Russia is winning the war, Ukraine is losing, and it's only a matter of time. And it is true that Russia has captured a bit more territory than they occupied at the start of the year. But they've only achieved that at enormous cost.

As of September, the Pentagon says Russia had lost 600,000 dead and wounded soldiers. To put that in context, in February of 2022 when this major invasion began, the total Russian military — not just the army, but the total Russian military — was 1.1 million people. And the British Ministry of Defense earlier this week assessed that Russia now is losing 1,200 soldiers killed or severely wounded per day. You have to ask how long that's sustainable.

When I talk to Ukrainians, they still regard this war as existential. They're very determined to win, and we need to do a better job of supporting that. A stable and secure Europe is vital to America's national security interests, and you're not going to have a stable and secure Europe unless there's a stable and secure Ukraine. So we need to both provide them the weapons they need and relieve some of the restrictions we currently have and allow the Ukrainians to use those weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

Because we have to ask ourselves: what does an emboldened Vladimir Putin do if he wins in Ukraine? I don't think his ambitions end with Ukraine, perhaps not even with the post-Soviet space. There's going to be a much darker Russian threat hovering over Europe if Putin wins. So let's not count the Ukrainians out.
 

China Isn't Going Away Anytime Soon  |  Oriana Skylar Mastro

There is a lot of discussion right now about the fact that the economy in China is slowing down and its demography is undergoing significant changes. What I'm here to tell you is that the challenge of China is not over, and is not going to be over any time soon. China has built power in a different way than the United States, and we have to reassess how we understand that power if we want to effectively deter, blunt, and block them from acting out in ways that threaten our partners and allies.

Since the 1990s, China has developed a significant amount of political, economic, and military power. They've gone from having an economy smaller than France’s  to the second largest in the world. They've gone from not being involved in international institutions to a great degree, not even having diplomatic relations with major countries like South Korea, to now having stronger and greater diplomatic networks, especially in Asia, than the United States.

What we really need to understand is that the U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China; it's about the rest of the world, and how the rest of the world sees us and how China interacts with us. The balance of power is shifting, and we have to be a lot smarter and a lot faster if we want to make sure it shifts in favor of our interests.

The United States hasn't had a comprehensive strategy towards the developing world in a long time. And we are running out of time to get that balance right in Asia. We don't have the right stuff. We don't have it in the right numbers, and it's not in the right place. Some of this is about deterring war over Taiwan, but it's also about generally maintaining peace and stability in Asia.
 

We're Doing Better (But Not Enough) on Climate Change |  Marshall Burke

Many people don't recognize how much progress we're actually making on climate issues. Emissions have fallen by 20% since 2005. We're actually speeding up the amount of substantial progress being made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dealing with the core climate change problem, which is the human emission of greenhouse gasses.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act and the subsequent implementation of various rules the Biden administration has championed has given a huge boost in transitioning our economy to greener energy technologies, transportation technologies, and other kinds of infrastructure. We're moving a lot of cash to get that done, and the president is trying to get as much of it out the door as he can before his term ends.

Globally, the progress has been less rapid. Emissions are roughly flat. But overall, we're still making progress. I co-teach an undergraduate class on climate change, and we've had to update our slides on how much warming we're expecting over the next century. We thought it was going to be four degrees Celsius. Now we think it's going to be something between two and three degrees Celsius.

But the flip side of that is that we're still going to get warming of two to three degrees Celsius. We're already experiencing warming of about a degree Celsius, which is about two degrees Fahrenheit, and it's projected that we're going to get another three to five degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century. That is a lot of warming, and we are not prepared to deal with it. We need to do much more on mitigation and much more on adaptation if we're going to meet the realities of living in a changing climate.

So we've had progress on the one hand, but there's still a lot of work left to do in the coming decades.
 

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