In a CDDRL research seminar held on April 30, 2026, Anna Grzymala-Busse, the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the director of The Europe Center, explored historic state development and fragmentation in Europe, focusing on how conceptualizations shape conclusions about state formation. She examined how scholars define both “Europe” and “the state,” comparing how different coding and measurement choices lead to different patterns of fragmentation over time. 

Grzymala-Busse first defines what counts as Europe, noting that while some scholars define Europe through Western Christianity, others rely on geographic cutoffs like west of the Don River or west of the Ural Mountains. This is significant, as including large cases like Russia or the Ottoman Empire creates the impression of growing state size over time, while excluding them makes Europe appear more fragmented. She also points out the risk of circularity, in which Europe is defined by certain institutions, and then that same group is used to explain why those institutions developed. In that sense, excluding places like Russia or the Ottoman Empire based on cultural or institutional reasons can lead to conclusions about European distinctiveness that are already built into how Europe was defined in the first place.

The second big question is how a state is defined, since historical Europe included a wide range of political units like empires, kingdoms, duchies, city-states, and trading leagues, making it hard to rely on a single clear definition based on sovereignty or centralization. This ties directly to how fragmentation is measured, since it depends on methodological choices such as which units are included and how they are counted. One of the most important choices is whether to include city-states. When excluded, the data show fewer and larger states over time, which supports the bellicist idea of consolidation. When included, Europe appears more fragmented, aligning more with revisionist arguments. Overall, this illustrates how a few key classification choices can shape broader conclusions about state development.

This issue becomes even more apparent when looking at fragmentation itself, which both bellicists and revisionists treat as central to their arguments. For bellicists, fragmentation is a starting point that declines over time, while for revisionists, it is more durable and persists across periods. The Holy Roman Empire serves as a key example: it was one of the largest political entities in Europe, yet remained highly fragmented, with overlapping authorities and no clear centralization. This highlights the importance of measurement and coding decisions, as choices such as which polities to include, whether to count borders or use concentration measures, and even the size of geographic grid cells all shape the results. 

Ultimately, Grzymala-Busse concludes that rules and definitions fundamentally shape how fragmentation appears in the data. Once these methodological choices are made clear, there is less clear evidence for the bellicist claim that states were consistently consolidated, but this does not fully confirm the revisionist argument either. Consequently, if the debate is a matter of coding rather than evidence, transparency in concepts and measures becomes even more important.

On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

In a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar held on April 9, 2026,  and co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Konstantin Sonin, a John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, presented his research on “The Reverse Cargo Cult: Why Authoritarian Governments Lie to Their People,” offering a theoretical explanation for why regimes such as the Soviet Union would knowingly tell citizens visibly false statements. According to Sonin’s research, authoritarian propaganda is much more complex than simple misinformation or manipulation, as it is often designed not to convince people of a single claim, but to shape how they evaluate information more broadly. 

Sonin begins with a personal anecdote, reflecting on his own experience participating in Soviet elections where there was only one candidate on the ballot, despite the process being presented as a meaningful choice. Using this example, he questions why regimes like the Soviet Union invest so heavily in clearly staged elections or exaggerated portrayals of Western life, even when citizens recognize these distortions. From this, he introduces the idea that such actions are not meant to persuade citizens of a specific falsehood, but instead to influence how they interpret all incoming information. Drawing on the metaphor of a “reverse cargo cult,” he suggests that just as some communities misinterpret the source of Western goods, citizens in authoritarian systems may come to believe that institutions in other countries are equally performative or deceptive. In this sense, narratives about foreign countries become an integral tool for reinforcing domestic political stability. 

He further explores how citizens evaluate elections and the decision to replace an incumbent under uncertainty about both competence and trustworthiness. He recognizes that in these regimes, citizens are not entirely naïve and may often recognize when a leader is lying. However, Sonin shows that even obvious lies can be effective. When a domestic leader lies about conditions that citizens already know to be bad, it signals not only that the leader is untrustworthy but also raises the perceived likelihood that foreign leaders are similarly dishonest. As a result, citizens downgrade their expectations of potential replacements, concluding that alternatives may not be any better. This dynamic ultimately reduces the incentive to replace the incumbent. 

As his theory suggests, negative information about conditions abroad, or even skepticism toward foreign success, can benefit authoritarian leaders. For example, Sonin points to Soviet reactions to the American National Exhibition in Moscow, where displays of a typical American home were dismissed by officials as unrealistic or misleading. This kind of framing encouraged citizens to question whether life in the United States was truly better, reinforcing the idea that shortcomings at home were not unique. As a result, domestic failures appear less exceptional, helping explain why authoritarian propaganda frequently emphasizes criticism of other countries and why such narratives often reinforce one another. 

Sonin concludes by emphasizing that lying in this context is not primarily about persuading citizens of a particular false claim, but about shaping their broader beliefs about the reliability of information. By weakening trust in information overall, leaders can make bad conditions at home seem like the safer or more reliable option compared to the uncertainty of change.

What does the election of Pope Leo XIV mean for international politics? While much of the global reaction has focused on his background and theological views, the political implications of a new papacy are also worth considering. FSI Senior Fellow Anna Grzymała-Busse, an expert on religion and politics in Europe, offers her analysis on what this moment might mean for U.S.-Europe relations, the future of populism, and the Vatican’s role in global affairs.

What does the choice of Pope Leo XIV mean for the relationship between the U.S. and the rest of the world, if anything?

Choosing Pope Leo XIV is more of a statement by the Vatican: this was the consensus candidate (some very conservative rivals could never muster similar support). Insofar as he’s commented on American politics, it was to upbraid JD Vance for his stance on immigration and his misunderstanding of the Catholic theology of ordo amoris. It’s important to remember that Pope Leo is not just an American pope, but a Peruvian one as well; he is a Peruvian citizen, served as the bishop of Chiclayo, and spent over three decades in Peru. This will be less of an American papacy than a global one. 

Could this papacy influence how European populist or far-right movements engage with religion in their political messaging? What effect might this have on the transatlantic political discourse?

Since these movements use religion instrumentally – to justify some of their stances – there is little relationship here to Catholic doctrine or the papacy. Francis’s more liberal language had no impact on their rhetoric, rise, or success, and Leo is equally unlikely to have much of an influence. Instead, these movements fuse religion and nationalist/nativist statements, without necessarily engaging theology. 

How might this Pope respond to global conflicts like the war in Ukraine – and what impact could that have on U.S. and European diplomacy?

One criticism of Pope Francis was that he didn’t understand the conflict in Ukraine at all, and instead talked of Ukraine "provoking” the war. Leo will probably take a more sophisticated view of the conflict, especially given the criticism that followed Pope Francis for these statements.