Ali Çarkoğlu, a political scientist specializing in elections, voting behavior, and Turkish politics, presented an analysis of Turkey's electoral dynamics from 1990 to 2023 at a CDDRL research seminar. His study focused on the interplay between social cleavages, democratic backsliding, and their impact on political competition and voter behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, Çarkoğlu explored the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.

Central to his analysis was the "alla Turca kulturkampf," a concept describing the deep-rooted center-periphery divide in Turkish politics. This cleavage reflects a cultural conflict between two contrasting societal visions: the Kemalist ideal of secularism, gender equality, and scientific rationalism versus the pro-Islamist focus on tradition, religion, and family values. Despite the AKP’s success in bringing peripheral groups into the state’s institutional core, these cultural divides persist as a primary source of polarization. Çarkoğlu argued that this polarization has entrenched partisan loyalty and overshadowed other factors in shaping voter behavior.

A key theme of the presentation was Turkey's democratic backsliding, characterized by the erosion of democratic institutions, curtailment of civil liberties, and electoral manipulation. Çarkoğlu noted that Turkey ranks 148th on the liberal democracy index, illustrating its significant democratic decline. He linked these trends to heightened polarization, which weakens opposition forces and reduces the influence of traditional electoral cleavages. Instead of fostering competitive elections, the political landscape is increasingly dominated by entrenched party loyalties and identity-driven politics.

The presentation also highlighted the significant social and economic changes Turkey has undergone since 1990. Urbanization surged from 61% in 1992 to 78% in 2024, while agriculture’s share of employment dropped from 45% to 17%. Economic growth has raised per capita income from $2,000 to $10,000, but inequality remains pervasive, and safety nets are inadequate. Women’s labor force participation remains low at 35%, and educational disparities persist. Household sizes have decreased, and the dependency ratio has dropped from 65 to 47 over 30 years. However, these societal shifts have had limited political consequences, as electoral dynamics remain anchored in longstanding cultural cleavages.

Çarkoğlu’s findings indicated that Turkey’s party system has remained "frozen" for the past three decades. While socio-demographic factors play a declining role in explaining voter behavior, attitudinal variables such as group identity and cultural values have gained prominence. This shift reflects how polarization has solidified, with partisan loyalty reinforcing competitive authoritarianism.

Çarkoğlu emphasized that the weakening of electoral cleavages has facilitated democratic backsliding by reducing opposition effectiveness and enabling strategic manipulation. Despite rapid social change, entrenched cultural divides and polarization have prevented political transformation. His research underscores the importance of addressing institutional decline, polarization, and social inequality to combat democratic erosion. Turkey’s experience offers critical lessons for other unconsolidated democracies facing similar challenges.

In a recent REDS Seminar, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science Yoshiko Herrera examined the role of identity in shaping the causes, conduct, and impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the groups they align themselves with, Herrera explained, individuals hold collective memories and similar interpretations of a shared past. These memories and interpretations are often central to our understanding of wars. In the Russian context, the narrative of humiliation by the West in the 1990s and the urge to show strength against NATO expansion fueled Russia’s violent drive to assert its national identity.

During conflict, identity is central to an individual’s assessment of who is an ally or enemy. According to the social identity theory, humans cooperate more within their ingroups than outgroups, or those they perceive as different. Importantly, it can be difficult to determine which identity markers prevail the most. Although identity is often viewed through the limited lens of ethnicity, factors like nationality, religion, or gender can anchor group cohesion. In Ukraine, for example, a concept of national identity has unified people across other markers, such as ethnicity. The fundamental denial of Ukraine’s national identity has been central to Putin’s devastating invasion of the country.

Group alignment, moreover, continues to affect political attitudes throughout a war, affecting, for instance, how invested the masses are in victory. The perception of a conflict as an assault on identity tends to deepen the public’s personal investment in that conflict, as evidenced by Ukraine’s high military mobilization since the onset of the war.

Identity is not only a driver of conflict; it also is a dependent variable, or a domain that is shaped by the experience of war. In Ukraine, a cohesive national identity has strengthened in reaction to Russia’s devastating aggression. Language, a crucial dimension of identity, demonstrates this pattern; as of 2023, 82% of Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their “native tongue,” compared to only 57% in 2012. There has been a rapid evolution in how Ukrainians view themselves, extending beyond what even the most ardent nationalists could have hoped for a decade ago.

It is not just policy considerations and pragmatism that propel the decisions of political leaders; abstract and ever-evolving concepts of identity are motivating forces behind conflicts. Herrera’s research recognizes identity as a key factor influencing war, with the power to uniquely mobilize the masses. In the face of conflict, identities can change and strengthen; Russia’s construed narratives of national identity fuel its war conduct, while in Ukraine, there has been a corresponding maturing of a unified national identity. The role of identity in all aspects of conflict must not be underplayed, as it is manipulated by and motivates political leaders, especially in times of war.

In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, FSI Senior Fellow Alberto Díaz-Cayeros presented his research on “Epidemiological Shocks, Governance, and Extraction in Colonial Mexico.”

The European conquest of the Americas brought dramatic changes to Indigenous societies, dismantling pre-colonial empires and city-states while imposing exploitative colonial systems. One such institution was the Encomienda, which placed Indigenous communities under the control of individual conquistadores. This system disrupted traditional authority, exploited indigenous labor, and deepened social and economic upheavals. Díaz-Cayeros’s study focuses on Tepetlaoztoc, a city-state in the Acolhua Kingdom of the Aztec Empire, to understand how demographic collapse, epidemic disease, and colonial rent extraction were interconnected.

The research challenges the widely accepted "virgin soil" hypothesis, which attributes the catastrophic population decline — over 90% — to Indigenous Peoples’ lack of immunity to European diseases. Instead, Díaz-Cayeros argues that colonial exploitation and the destruction of political autonomy played a significant role in amplifying the effects of these epidemics. This reframe shifts the narrative from viewing these declines as natural consequences of disease to seeing them as direct outcomes of systemic colonial policies.

Using historical records, Díaz-Cayeros’ study reconstructs population changes in Tepetlaoztoc and employs epidemiological models to analyze how diseases spread and killed so many. For instance, mortality rates during smallpox outbreaks were around 25%, while cocoliztli — a deadly hemorrhagic fever — caused up to 40% mortality. These rates varied depending on social factors, such as land ownership and class. Wealthier or more socially connected groups sometimes fared better, while laborers and marginalized groups were more vulnerable due to overwork and poor living conditions under colonial rule.

The study also employs advanced epidemiological modeling techniques to understand the spread of diseases. These models reveal that the devastation in Tepetlaoztoc was not solely due to pathogens but also to the breakdown of traditional agricultural systems and trade networks. The shift in land use toward livestock farming, for example, disrupted local food production and made recovery nearly impossible. This prolonged what the study calls a “poverty trap,” where the region remained economically and socially stagnant for centuries.

Importantly, the research highlights Indigenous resilience. Codices (historical documents) and oral histories show that indigenous communities actively responded to these crises, storing food and reorganizing resources to survive famine and disease. These accounts challenge the Eurocentric portrayal of Indigenous Peoples as passive victims and instead emphasize their adaptability and agency.

Díaz-Cayeros’ research provides a nuanced understanding of the catastrophic demographic changes in colonial Mexico. It shows that these were not inevitable consequences of disease but were exacerbated by colonial systems that exploited and dismantled Indigenous societies. By combining historical data with modern analytical tools, the study highlights the enduring impacts of colonialism and underscores the importance of including indigenous perspectives in understanding history.

You can view a complete recording of Díaz-Cayeros’ presentation below:

In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Postdoctoral Fellow Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki presented her research on “Varieties of Identity Politics: A Macro-Historical Approach.” She explored how identity politics — strategies of political mobilization based on group identity — shapes the development of new political parties, particularly those trying to establish themselves in a competitive environment.

Mierke-Zatwarnicki explained how challenger parties use identity politics to address challenges like uniting diverse groups, building party structures, and navigating uncertainty. Identity politics help create internal unity and differentiate these parties from competitors. She identified two main types:

1. Solidaristic Identity Politics: This type relies on a clear ingroup — a homogenous group with a shared identity and common interests that form the party's main support base. By emphasizing a common identity, parties can strengthen internal cohesion and appeal to voters with a unified message.
2. Oppositional Identity Politics: When a clear ingroup is not available, parties may use oppositional identity politics, which involves creating a sense of "us versus them." By identifying specific outgroups as adversaries, the party can unite a diverse coalition of supporters around a common enemy.
    

To illustrate these two types of identity politics, Zatwarnicki used examples from six political parties in the UK, Netherlands, and Germany, focusing on social democratic and fascist parties:

• Social Democratic Parties: The Labour Party in the UK exemplifies solidaristic identity politics. The party relied on class identity to unify workers, gain trade union support, and differentiate itself from the Liberal Party. Over time, Labour evolved from being solely a worker’s party to a party focused on "progress," with its class-based identity helping to maintain a stable group of supporters.
• Fascist Parties: The NSDAP (Nazi Party) in Germany during the interwar period used oppositional identity politics. Without a clear ingroup, the NSDAP targeted minorities, Marxists, immigrants, and others to build support. This strategy created an "us versus them" dynamic, allowing the party to unite a heterogenous electorate in a time of social and economic instability.
   

Mierke-Zatwarnicki’s research combined qualitative case studies and quantitative text analysis to show how these styles of identity politics have been used. She concluded that while both styles can be challenging to employ effectively, each can succeed under particular circumstances:

• Solidaristic identity politics are most successful when a strong, well-defined group, such as the working class, can be rallied.
• Oppositional identity politics can be effective in contexts of social fragmentation. This strategy is not limited to right-wing parties; left-wing movements like the Occupy movement have also used oppositional identity politics.
   

In conclusion, Mierke-Zatwarnicki demonstrated that identity politics is a powerful tool for new political parties striving to gain a foothold. Whether by focusing on shared identities or emphasizing opposition to outgroups, identity politics shapes how parties form, build their base, and compete in elections.

How should we think about wars in the Middle East? Past scholarship has made great strides in unpacking the region’s nuanced conflict dynamics, but the literature lacks a broader framework to examine how diverse factors interact with the international system and with each other. In a recent CDDRL Research Seminar, Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and the Director of the Project on Middle East Political Science, applies a framework of “Warscape Theory” to better understand patterns of state failures, recurrent conflict, and authoritarian rule across the region.

Three observations motivate this project. First, Middle Eastern wars are intricately interconnected. Militias, religious divisions, and refugee crises harbor no regard for borders. Second, these conflicts are long and protracted; wars may simmer down, but they never go away. The potential recurrence of direct violence remains a constant fear and expectation. Third, Middle Eastern political science has remained fairly insular, largely sticking to within region comparisons. Lynch’s warscape intervention draws inspiration from a body of anthropological research on wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, which share many similarities with wars in the Middle East. They rarely have a clear starting or ending point, they are constantly shaped by external great power interventions, and they possess a self-perpetuating dynamic that makes conflict resolution incredibly difficult to achieve.

What qualifies a region as a “warscape?” First, warscapes have protracted conflicts with periods of remission and resurgence. Second, warscape conflicts are highly transnationalized and are not contained by borders in any meaningful sense. Third, violence tends to be highly variable, both temporally and spatially. Significant intra-state differences in violence render state-level observations unhelpful; one part of the country might live in full-fledged war while another remains oblivious to the violence. Fourth, the relative strengths of belligerents are less clear than they present. Combatants possess variable motivations for participating in armed conflict, choosing to pick up and drop arms situationally. Finally, almost as a marketing tactic, groups often distinguish themselves by engaging in extreme — and sometimes performative — brutality. Beheadings, immolations, and other acts of terror simultaneously scare enemies at home and attract support from Gulf sponsors.

Why care about this new lens for studying the Middle East? This warscape framework describes a complicated reality that existing terms like “civil war” struggle to capture. It analytically repositions the state from being the central actor to only one of multiple “competing political orders” while contextualizing micro-level ethnographic observations within a broader landscape of global arms flows and international power structures. Lynch hopes scholars may leverage this lens to investigate how conflict dynamics play out differently in warscape regions compared to non-warscape regions.

Lynch’s characterization of the Middle East as a “warscape” does not suggest that war in the Middle East is inevitable. Instead, putting an end to wars in the Middle East requires a systematic understanding of how actors and structures from the individual level to the transnational level interact with one another. Warscape theory, as Lynch proposes, may enable us to better capture the full range and complexity of these interconnected conflicts.

In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), Cornell Assistant Professor of Political Science Bryn Rosenfeld explored a compelling question: Why do people in authoritarian regimes take bold political actions — such as protesting, voting for the opposition, or criticizing the government — despite the threat of severe consequences? Her research highlights the role of emotions, particularly anger, in motivating these high-risk decisions and provides fresh insights into the dynamics of dissent under repressive regimes.

Rosenfeld challenged the common assumption that high-risk political activism requires strong organizational ties, such as membership in activist groups or networks. While this holds true in some cases, she argued that recent civic uprisings in authoritarian regimes often involve ordinary individuals — novices with no prior links to organized activism. These participants act despite the threat of repression, presenting a puzzle for traditional theories of political participation.

Central to Rosenfeld's argument is the critical role of emotions in shaping political behavior. Authoritarian regimes often use repression as a tool to silence dissent, but her findings show that this strategy frequently backfires by triggering anger. When people experience acts of repression — such as arrests or violence during protests — they often view these actions as deeply unjust, fueling their anger. This anger reduces fear of risks, shifts focus from personal consequences to collective grievances, and creates a sense of urgency to act. As a result, anger motivates bold political actions like protesting or voting against the regime. In contrast, fear amplifies the perception of danger, discourages action, and reinforces passivity. Rosenfeld’s work demonstrates how anger can transform repression into a catalyst for resistance, showing that attempts to suppress dissent often inspire even greater mobilization.

Her research is grounded in extensive data collected between 2021 and 2023 in Russia, a period marked by significant political upheaval, including the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, widespread protests, and the invasion of Ukraine. Through surveys and experiments, she measured participants’ emotions, risk attitudes, and political intentions in response to different scenarios. Participants exposed to information about repression reported higher levels of anger, which translated into a greater willingness to protest or take other political risks. For example, participants in the repression treatment group showed significantly higher risk acceptance scores than those in the control group, highlighting anger’s pivotal role in driving political action.

Rosenfeld’s findings have far-reaching implications. They challenge the assumption that repression is an effective tool for silencing dissent, showing instead that it often fuels resistance by mobilizing anger and encouraging the acceptance of risk. Her work also explains why ordinary citizens — those without activist ties — sometimes take extraordinary risks to stand up to authoritarian regimes. By focusing on the interplay of emotions and risk, Rosenfeld underscores the paradox of repression: rather than quelling dissent, it can inspire ordinary people to take extraordinary risks in the pursuit of justice. Anger, often seen as a destructive force, emerges in her work as a powerful driver of political change.

Parole failure in the United States is a growing problem. Prison admissions for parole violations in 2000 were equal to all prison admissions in 1980. By 2021, conditional release violations accounted for 29 percent of all prison admissions. This carceral churn — where people move from prison to parole, then violate parole restrictions and wind up back in prison — is a sign of a flawed system. But why does this happen? In a recent CDDRL Research Seminar talk, Gillian Slee — Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at CDDRL — explored the parole system’s struggles, highlighting the importance of examining the “personal sides” of institutions.

Previous works paint three broad challenges with the parole system: material hardship, where structural adversity complicates life after prison; negative social networks, where disadvantaged social ties can constrain compliance; and carceral governance, where criminal-legal oversight reconstitutes the experience of citizenship. Slee, however, proposes a crucial fourth explanation for why re-entry fails: socioemotional dynamics.

Drawing on two years of extensive ethnographic fieldwork with people on parole in Pennsylvania, Slee’s research reveals how the parole system often overlooks values like dignity and agency, inadvertently prompting parolees to withdraw from or subvert parole guidelines. This structural inattention to how parolees actually interact with institutions leads to rule-breaking, pushing parolees away from supportive resources and toward reincarceration.

How does the parole system affect socioemotional dynamics? Slee identifies three mechanisms:

First, parole rules often fail to align with the needs of parolees, overlooking unrecognized vulnerabilities. Many of the parolees, Slee observed, had been referred to resources they were, practically speaking, ineligible for, forcing them into difficult situations. Parolees see re-entry as “being born grown,” often needing to take on extra jobs, strike borderline deals with landlords, or find shared living arrangements — all of which compromise their sense of dignity and autonomy.

Second, discretion has both benefits and drawbacks. The uneven application of discretion among parole officers incentivizes parolees to live life “in the red,” socializing rule-breaking through direct and indirect experiences. This socializing force creates winners and losers, where those who comply face isolation while those who bend the rules risk reincarceration.

Third, the parole system imposes risk-escalating rules. Many states prohibit parolees from associating with other prior offenders, rendering an important source of support illicit. These rules sideline concerns of parolees’ need for belonging and companionship, prompting them to rule-break to satisfy said needs.

Slee reminds us of the importance of the personal dimensions of policy research. Intimate ethnography allows us to unpack the subtle nuances of how humans interact with institutions. Her findings also highlight a much-needed policy recommendation: parole systems need to recognize the dignity and agency of parolees re-entering society. Whether by simplifying bureaucratic processes, reforming the nature and scope of supervision, or instituting more flexible compliance measures, policymakers must address the socioemotional needs of parolees to support reintegration rather than perpetuate cycles of incarceration. 

The U.S. faces increasing levels of political polarization. Bipartisan disagreements over moral, cultural, and socioeconomic issues have turned into social conflict, political gridlock, and personal animosity. How did we get here? The dominant narrative has argued that identity cleavages have caused increasing splits in values. Yet Klaus Desmet — Research Fellow at CEPR, Research Associate at NBER, and the Altshuler Professor of Cities, Regions, and Globalization at Southern Methodist University — painted a different picture in a CDDRL seminar series talk.

Leveraging data from seven waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), Desmet develops a new methodology to study the evolution of these social divisions. For Desmet, the problem with an identity-based measure of polarization is that these demographic traits do not necessarily align with people’s values. If we care about splits in values, we need to create social partitions based on values, not identity traits.

Desmet asks how individuals would optimally form groups based on “homophily in values.” If people associate with others who hold similar views, they will sort themselves into groups based on these preferences. Individuals leave groups with fewer shared values and join groups with more shared values. Eventually, this self-sorting process reaches what Desmet calls a “Global Values Identification Equilibrium (VIE),” where within-group value heterogeneity is lowest and between-group value heterogeneity highest. Importantly, Desmet can then compare the split in values between these underlying clusters (latent polarization) to the split in values between Democrats and Republicans (partisan polarization).

What does the model find? While many have argued that America has witnessed a shift from disagreements on redistribution to disagreements on culture, Desmet’s findings indicate otherwise. Since at least the early 1980s, the latent values-based clusters have been divided mostly along moral and religious values, and the level of disagreement has been remarkably stable. There is no evidence of latent polarization increasing over time, and the underlying conditions for the culture wars have been present for a long time.

Partisan polarization, on the other hand, is a more recent development. Using the same model, Desmet shows that in 1981, the average value positions of Democrats and Republicans were almost indistinguishable, nowhere close to aligned with the endogenous clusters. By 2017, however, the average positions of Democrats and Republicans have diverged, aligning with the positions of the values-based clusters. These findings suggest that there has been rising partisan polarization in spite of stable latent polarization.

How might we explain this sequence of events? Desmet suggests that increasing partisan polarization may be a consequence of politicians discovering which values are particularly salient for political mobilization. Instead of politicians engendering value splits in society, partisanship has become more representative of people’s values. The American public has long had the conditions to be divided — they just needed parties to catch on. 

In a recent CDDRL seminar series talk, UVA Associate Professor of Politics Anne Meng shared her research on global patterns of presidential election concessions. Her study underscores the crucial yet often overlooked role of election concessions in democracies.

Meng emphasized the vitality of concessions in facilitating peaceful transfers of power, an essential element for the functioning of democracy. When losing candidates concede defeat, they validate the election results and contribute to a smooth transition of power. Despite their significance, systematic data on post-election concessions worldwide has been limited. Meng’s research seeks to fill this gap by presenting a comprehensive dataset tracking presidential election concessions from 1980 to 2020 across 107 countries.

Encompassing both democratic and autocratic regimes, the dataset includes 638 election observations, wherein concessions are categorized into three distinct groups:

1. Strong concessions (losing candidates explicitly admit defeat)
2. Weak concessions (vague statements regarding defeat)
3. No concession (candidates either refuse to concede or make no statement at all).

Meng’s analysis unveiled significant patterns in concession behavior across different political systems. In established democracies, losing candidates typically concede, while “no concession” outcomes are more prevalent in autocratic regimes. When incumbents lose, they are more likely to concede than opposition candidates who lose, a finding that may run contrary to perceptions of incumbents. However, incumbents are less likely to lose elections in the first place.

Meng's study underscores the connection between election integrity and the likelihood of concessions. When the fairness of an election is in doubt, opposition candidates may justifiably withhold concessions to avoid legitimizing an unfair process. Furthermore, the study found that strong concessions correlate with fewer post-election protests and acts of violence, suggesting a potential link between concessions and the stability of power transitions. Meng cautioned, however, that the causal relationship remains unclear, indicating the need for further research to ascertain whether concessions directly reduce unrest or if other factors, such as election integrity, are at play.

Meng identified several factors influencing whether a losing candidate concedes. Candidate characteristics significantly impact concession behavior; for instance, incumbents and successors tend to concede more often. In contrast, factors like gender and ideology do not significantly affect the likelihood of conceding. Additionally, the specifics of the election play a role: concessions are more likely when the victory margin falls between 5% and 10%. Overall, losing candidates in democracies are generally more willing to concede than those in autocratic systems. Notably, Meng's research suggests that past concessions do not guarantee future ones, revealing challenges in establishing consistent democratic norms.

In her conclusion, Meng emphasized that while election concessions generally reflect the health of democracy, their absence can mirror legitimate concerns about unfair elections. This complexity calls for a reevaluation of how we understand concessions, emphasizing the need to consider underlying narratives of election quality and integrity.

In a CDDRL seminar series talk, Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Fellow Maria Snegovaya discussed findings from her latest book, When Left Moves Right: The Decline of the Left and the Rise of the Populist Right (Oxford University Press, 2024). Eastern European party politics have seen two concurrent trends in recent years, namely the rise of populist right parties and the decline of leftist social democratic parties. Snegovaya, who is an adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, unpacked this puzzling dynamic by centering the economic policy preferences of key electoral constituencies.

Existing theories have largely attempted to explain these two trends as independent phenomena, often attributing them to weak party organization, anti-incumbent bias, and changes in class structure. Snegovaya argued that these explanations only tell half the story.

Throughout the 1990s, social democratic parties in Eastern Europe adopted neoliberal market reforms, among other reasons, out of interest in accommodating the demands of European Union (EU) accession. These conditions prioritized low inflation, low fiscal deficit, and moderate state indebtedness. For the social democratic parties in power, this meant advancing privatization, reducing state involvement in the economy, and cutting back on social welfare spending.

While this shift appealed to middle-class voters, the cutting of redistributive policies widened socio-economic inequality. Thus, constituencies who depended heavily on state support became increasingly disillusioned with the left. Combining individual-level data from the European Social Survey with election data from 45 elections in 10 countries, Snegovaya showed that as leftist parties adopted increasingly right-leaning economic policies, their vote shares dropped, especially among the working class.

Meanwhile, populist right parties took advantage of this discontent, campaigning on protectionist platforms that advocated for redistributive policies. Most scholars argue that populist right parties capture electoral victories through the xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric of their nativist platforms. When Left Moves Right does not discount this argument but qualifies that these parties managed to attract voters by combining those stances with appeals to their economic needs, filling the void left by the neoliberal turn of social democratic parties.

The book underscores points of convergence and divergence between party politics in Postcommunist European states and that of the rest of the world. Mirroring trends across Western Europe and Latin America, social democratic parties in Eastern Europe secured short-term electoral gains through pro-market rebranding. But in the long run, they lost the votes of working-class voters who had depended heavily on redistributive policies.

At the same time, the trends exhibited by Postcommunist European states are distinct in other respects. For instance, beyond pressures to join the EU, social democratic parties have shifted away from redistributive platforms to distance themselves from their former communist legacies. The working class in Eastern Europe constitutes around two-thirds of the electorate, which meant that the losses imposed by neoliberal economic policies were felt more widely than in many other countries.

When Left Moves Right invites more critical reflection on the conditions shaping democratic resilience in nascent democracies, particularly as they relate to the configuration of party politics, as well as parallels in this dynamic with more advanced democracies.