India’s once-robust democracy is in decline, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) being the only party with effective political organizing and a clear national message. FSI Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Larry Diamond, Hoover Senior Fellow Šumit Ganguly, and Hoover Research Fellow Dinsha Mistree reflected on this reality in a CDDRL seminar series talk. The discussion built on findings from their recently released book, The Troubling State of India's Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 2024).

The absence of a coordinated opposition in India has continued to threaten the functioning of its democracy. The challenges confronting the Indian National Congress Party (INC) are at the heart of the problem.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the INC emerged as a healthy political party. It enjoyed a unified national vision that championed secularism and independence from the British Empire. By being inclusive towards various political and religious identities, it unified a vast coalition across India’s broad geography, utilizing effective grassroots organizing mechanisms.

Today, however, the INC is hampered by extreme personalism due to the domineering role of the Gandhi family. The party lacks the organization or national vision to compete with the BJP. This decline began under the populist prime minister Indira Gandhi, who rose to power in the late 1960s. She replaced party leaders with loyalists and sycophants, weakening critical party mechanisms. The party began to set aside ideologically-driven political priorities in favor of more personalistic sinecures.

As subsequent members of the Gandhi family continued to lead the party, the INC failed to pose as an effective alternative to the BJP. The lack of political options results in a harmful feedback loop where citizens are discouraged from engaging with the opposition at all because they perceive no other candidates as having a chance at gaining power.

The future of India’s democratic competition requires the revival of opposition parties. Local parties at the state level are unlikely to grow to match the BJP, as they are often focused on specific ethnic and regional concerns, as well as lacking the infrastructure to take on the BJP nationally. The INC, once a leading national party, is unlikely to reinvent itself effectively unless it is released from the personalist grasp of the Gandhi family. The history of coalition building among the diversity of parties at the state and regional levels may provide a potential model for democratic checks or even electoral alternation. In any case, vigorous opposition must emerge from within India's political party system if backsliding is to be countered in the world's largest democracy.

A full recording of the seminar can be viewed below:

At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.

Alice Siu, the Associate Director of CDDRL’s Deliberative Democracy Lab (DDL), presented her work at a CDDRL research seminar on the effect of deliberation on how people think about political issues, particularly in the current polarized context.

DDL and its partners organized discussions on contentious issues, ranging from climate change to institutional democratic reforms, among hundreds of participants from wide-ranging demographic and political backgrounds. For a total of 12 hours, participants discussed topics through an AI-assisted deliberation platform. They were polled before and after deliberation and compared to a control group who did not engage in the discussions. 

The results showed a consistent and significant opinion change among participants following deliberation, with movement towards consensus across party affiliations. Satisfaction with democracy dramatically improved, especially among Republicans, who shifted from 18.9% to 50.1% satisfaction. Evidence showed an increase in participants’ trust and empathy toward individuals with opposing opinions.

The effects of these conversations persisted after the intervention. Three months after deliberation, participants continued to feel more positively about those they disagreed with. Results show that 41.7% agreed that those with opposing viewpoints “have good reasons; there are just better ones on the other side,” compared to 31% before deliberation and 33% immediately after. These long-term effects manifested in the participants’ political participation as well. One year after a climate-focused deliberation, participation in discussions was correlated with stronger support for a Democratic-controlled congress before the 2022 midterm elections.

These results demonstrate that democracy can be strengthened through deliberation. However, for a substantial, long-lasting impact, deliberation must be scaled significantly. To do so, technology must be leveraged. For example, using an AI instead of a human moderator may improve affordable access to deliberation platforms. Furthermore, deliberation should occur in educational settings from the middle school to the graduate level. Investing in youth’s communication skills and civic engagement affords them tools to uphold our democracy for generations. Challenging but empathic conversations with those from differing viewpoints must be encouraged. While this research offers reasons for optimism, a more scalable model must be developed to ensure large-scale participation in robust discourse; at DDL, Siu is leading this effort to bring deliberation to entire societies through the AI-assisted Stanford Online Deliberation Platform.

Ali Çarkoğlu, a political scientist specializing in elections, voting behavior, and Turkish politics, presented an analysis of Turkey's electoral dynamics from 1990 to 2023 at a CDDRL research seminar. His study focused on the interplay between social cleavages, democratic backsliding, and their impact on political competition and voter behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, Çarkoğlu explored the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.

Central to his analysis was the "alla Turca kulturkampf," a concept describing the deep-rooted center-periphery divide in Turkish politics. This cleavage reflects a cultural conflict between two contrasting societal visions: the Kemalist ideal of secularism, gender equality, and scientific rationalism versus the pro-Islamist focus on tradition, religion, and family values. Despite the AKP’s success in bringing peripheral groups into the state’s institutional core, these cultural divides persist as a primary source of polarization. Çarkoğlu argued that this polarization has entrenched partisan loyalty and overshadowed other factors in shaping voter behavior.

A key theme of the presentation was Turkey's democratic backsliding, characterized by the erosion of democratic institutions, curtailment of civil liberties, and electoral manipulation. Çarkoğlu noted that Turkey ranks 148th on the liberal democracy index, illustrating its significant democratic decline. He linked these trends to heightened polarization, which weakens opposition forces and reduces the influence of traditional electoral cleavages. Instead of fostering competitive elections, the political landscape is increasingly dominated by entrenched party loyalties and identity-driven politics.

The presentation also highlighted the significant social and economic changes Turkey has undergone since 1990. Urbanization surged from 61% in 1992 to 78% in 2024, while agriculture’s share of employment dropped from 45% to 17%. Economic growth has raised per capita income from $2,000 to $10,000, but inequality remains pervasive, and safety nets are inadequate. Women’s labor force participation remains low at 35%, and educational disparities persist. Household sizes have decreased, and the dependency ratio has dropped from 65 to 47 over 30 years. However, these societal shifts have had limited political consequences, as electoral dynamics remain anchored in longstanding cultural cleavages.

Çarkoğlu’s findings indicated that Turkey’s party system has remained "frozen" for the past three decades. While socio-demographic factors play a declining role in explaining voter behavior, attitudinal variables such as group identity and cultural values have gained prominence. This shift reflects how polarization has solidified, with partisan loyalty reinforcing competitive authoritarianism.

Çarkoğlu emphasized that the weakening of electoral cleavages has facilitated democratic backsliding by reducing opposition effectiveness and enabling strategic manipulation. Despite rapid social change, entrenched cultural divides and polarization have prevented political transformation. His research underscores the importance of addressing institutional decline, polarization, and social inequality to combat democratic erosion. Turkey’s experience offers critical lessons for other unconsolidated democracies facing similar challenges.

In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, FSI Senior Fellow Alberto Díaz-Cayeros presented his research on “Epidemiological Shocks, Governance, and Extraction in Colonial Mexico.”

The European conquest of the Americas brought dramatic changes to Indigenous societies, dismantling pre-colonial empires and city-states while imposing exploitative colonial systems. One such institution was the Encomienda, which placed Indigenous communities under the control of individual conquistadores. This system disrupted traditional authority, exploited indigenous labor, and deepened social and economic upheavals. Díaz-Cayeros’s study focuses on Tepetlaoztoc, a city-state in the Acolhua Kingdom of the Aztec Empire, to understand how demographic collapse, epidemic disease, and colonial rent extraction were interconnected.

The research challenges the widely accepted "virgin soil" hypothesis, which attributes the catastrophic population decline — over 90% — to Indigenous Peoples’ lack of immunity to European diseases. Instead, Díaz-Cayeros argues that colonial exploitation and the destruction of political autonomy played a significant role in amplifying the effects of these epidemics. This reframe shifts the narrative from viewing these declines as natural consequences of disease to seeing them as direct outcomes of systemic colonial policies.

Using historical records, Díaz-Cayeros’ study reconstructs population changes in Tepetlaoztoc and employs epidemiological models to analyze how diseases spread and killed so many. For instance, mortality rates during smallpox outbreaks were around 25%, while cocoliztli — a deadly hemorrhagic fever — caused up to 40% mortality. These rates varied depending on social factors, such as land ownership and class. Wealthier or more socially connected groups sometimes fared better, while laborers and marginalized groups were more vulnerable due to overwork and poor living conditions under colonial rule.

The study also employs advanced epidemiological modeling techniques to understand the spread of diseases. These models reveal that the devastation in Tepetlaoztoc was not solely due to pathogens but also to the breakdown of traditional agricultural systems and trade networks. The shift in land use toward livestock farming, for example, disrupted local food production and made recovery nearly impossible. This prolonged what the study calls a “poverty trap,” where the region remained economically and socially stagnant for centuries.

Importantly, the research highlights Indigenous resilience. Codices (historical documents) and oral histories show that indigenous communities actively responded to these crises, storing food and reorganizing resources to survive famine and disease. These accounts challenge the Eurocentric portrayal of Indigenous Peoples as passive victims and instead emphasize their adaptability and agency.

Díaz-Cayeros’ research provides a nuanced understanding of the catastrophic demographic changes in colonial Mexico. It shows that these were not inevitable consequences of disease but were exacerbated by colonial systems that exploited and dismantled Indigenous societies. By combining historical data with modern analytical tools, the study highlights the enduring impacts of colonialism and underscores the importance of including indigenous perspectives in understanding history.

You can view a complete recording of Díaz-Cayeros’ presentation below:

In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Postdoctoral Fellow Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki presented her research on “Varieties of Identity Politics: A Macro-Historical Approach.” She explored how identity politics — strategies of political mobilization based on group identity — shapes the development of new political parties, particularly those trying to establish themselves in a competitive environment.

Mierke-Zatwarnicki explained how challenger parties use identity politics to address challenges like uniting diverse groups, building party structures, and navigating uncertainty. Identity politics help create internal unity and differentiate these parties from competitors. She identified two main types:

1. Solidaristic Identity Politics: This type relies on a clear ingroup — a homogenous group with a shared identity and common interests that form the party's main support base. By emphasizing a common identity, parties can strengthen internal cohesion and appeal to voters with a unified message.
2. Oppositional Identity Politics: When a clear ingroup is not available, parties may use oppositional identity politics, which involves creating a sense of "us versus them." By identifying specific outgroups as adversaries, the party can unite a diverse coalition of supporters around a common enemy.
    

To illustrate these two types of identity politics, Zatwarnicki used examples from six political parties in the UK, Netherlands, and Germany, focusing on social democratic and fascist parties:

• Social Democratic Parties: The Labour Party in the UK exemplifies solidaristic identity politics. The party relied on class identity to unify workers, gain trade union support, and differentiate itself from the Liberal Party. Over time, Labour evolved from being solely a worker’s party to a party focused on "progress," with its class-based identity helping to maintain a stable group of supporters.
• Fascist Parties: The NSDAP (Nazi Party) in Germany during the interwar period used oppositional identity politics. Without a clear ingroup, the NSDAP targeted minorities, Marxists, immigrants, and others to build support. This strategy created an "us versus them" dynamic, allowing the party to unite a heterogenous electorate in a time of social and economic instability.
   

Mierke-Zatwarnicki’s research combined qualitative case studies and quantitative text analysis to show how these styles of identity politics have been used. She concluded that while both styles can be challenging to employ effectively, each can succeed under particular circumstances:

• Solidaristic identity politics are most successful when a strong, well-defined group, such as the working class, can be rallied.
• Oppositional identity politics can be effective in contexts of social fragmentation. This strategy is not limited to right-wing parties; left-wing movements like the Occupy movement have also used oppositional identity politics.
   

In conclusion, Mierke-Zatwarnicki demonstrated that identity politics is a powerful tool for new political parties striving to gain a foothold. Whether by focusing on shared identities or emphasizing opposition to outgroups, identity politics shapes how parties form, build their base, and compete in elections.

How should we think about wars in the Middle East? Past scholarship has made great strides in unpacking the region’s nuanced conflict dynamics, but the literature lacks a broader framework to examine how diverse factors interact with the international system and with each other. In a recent CDDRL Research Seminar, Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and the Director of the Project on Middle East Political Science, applies a framework of “Warscape Theory” to better understand patterns of state failures, recurrent conflict, and authoritarian rule across the region.

Three observations motivate this project. First, Middle Eastern wars are intricately interconnected. Militias, religious divisions, and refugee crises harbor no regard for borders. Second, these conflicts are long and protracted; wars may simmer down, but they never go away. The potential recurrence of direct violence remains a constant fear and expectation. Third, Middle Eastern political science has remained fairly insular, largely sticking to within region comparisons. Lynch’s warscape intervention draws inspiration from a body of anthropological research on wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, which share many similarities with wars in the Middle East. They rarely have a clear starting or ending point, they are constantly shaped by external great power interventions, and they possess a self-perpetuating dynamic that makes conflict resolution incredibly difficult to achieve.

What qualifies a region as a “warscape?” First, warscapes have protracted conflicts with periods of remission and resurgence. Second, warscape conflicts are highly transnationalized and are not contained by borders in any meaningful sense. Third, violence tends to be highly variable, both temporally and spatially. Significant intra-state differences in violence render state-level observations unhelpful; one part of the country might live in full-fledged war while another remains oblivious to the violence. Fourth, the relative strengths of belligerents are less clear than they present. Combatants possess variable motivations for participating in armed conflict, choosing to pick up and drop arms situationally. Finally, almost as a marketing tactic, groups often distinguish themselves by engaging in extreme — and sometimes performative — brutality. Beheadings, immolations, and other acts of terror simultaneously scare enemies at home and attract support from Gulf sponsors.

Why care about this new lens for studying the Middle East? This warscape framework describes a complicated reality that existing terms like “civil war” struggle to capture. It analytically repositions the state from being the central actor to only one of multiple “competing political orders” while contextualizing micro-level ethnographic observations within a broader landscape of global arms flows and international power structures. Lynch hopes scholars may leverage this lens to investigate how conflict dynamics play out differently in warscape regions compared to non-warscape regions.

Lynch’s characterization of the Middle East as a “warscape” does not suggest that war in the Middle East is inevitable. Instead, putting an end to wars in the Middle East requires a systematic understanding of how actors and structures from the individual level to the transnational level interact with one another. Warscape theory, as Lynch proposes, may enable us to better capture the full range and complexity of these interconnected conflicts.

In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), Cornell Assistant Professor of Political Science Bryn Rosenfeld explored a compelling question: Why do people in authoritarian regimes take bold political actions — such as protesting, voting for the opposition, or criticizing the government — despite the threat of severe consequences? Her research highlights the role of emotions, particularly anger, in motivating these high-risk decisions and provides fresh insights into the dynamics of dissent under repressive regimes.

Rosenfeld challenged the common assumption that high-risk political activism requires strong organizational ties, such as membership in activist groups or networks. While this holds true in some cases, she argued that recent civic uprisings in authoritarian regimes often involve ordinary individuals — novices with no prior links to organized activism. These participants act despite the threat of repression, presenting a puzzle for traditional theories of political participation.

Central to Rosenfeld's argument is the critical role of emotions in shaping political behavior. Authoritarian regimes often use repression as a tool to silence dissent, but her findings show that this strategy frequently backfires by triggering anger. When people experience acts of repression — such as arrests or violence during protests — they often view these actions as deeply unjust, fueling their anger. This anger reduces fear of risks, shifts focus from personal consequences to collective grievances, and creates a sense of urgency to act. As a result, anger motivates bold political actions like protesting or voting against the regime. In contrast, fear amplifies the perception of danger, discourages action, and reinforces passivity. Rosenfeld’s work demonstrates how anger can transform repression into a catalyst for resistance, showing that attempts to suppress dissent often inspire even greater mobilization.

Her research is grounded in extensive data collected between 2021 and 2023 in Russia, a period marked by significant political upheaval, including the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, widespread protests, and the invasion of Ukraine. Through surveys and experiments, she measured participants’ emotions, risk attitudes, and political intentions in response to different scenarios. Participants exposed to information about repression reported higher levels of anger, which translated into a greater willingness to protest or take other political risks. For example, participants in the repression treatment group showed significantly higher risk acceptance scores than those in the control group, highlighting anger’s pivotal role in driving political action.

Rosenfeld’s findings have far-reaching implications. They challenge the assumption that repression is an effective tool for silencing dissent, showing instead that it often fuels resistance by mobilizing anger and encouraging the acceptance of risk. Her work also explains why ordinary citizens — those without activist ties — sometimes take extraordinary risks to stand up to authoritarian regimes. By focusing on the interplay of emotions and risk, Rosenfeld underscores the paradox of repression: rather than quelling dissent, it can inspire ordinary people to take extraordinary risks in the pursuit of justice. Anger, often seen as a destructive force, emerges in her work as a powerful driver of political change.

Parole failure in the United States is a growing problem. Prison admissions for parole violations in 2000 were equal to all prison admissions in 1980. By 2021, conditional release violations accounted for 29 percent of all prison admissions. This carceral churn — where people move from prison to parole, then violate parole restrictions and wind up back in prison — is a sign of a flawed system. But why does this happen? In a recent CDDRL Research Seminar talk, Gillian Slee — Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at CDDRL — explored the parole system’s struggles, highlighting the importance of examining the “personal sides” of institutions.

Previous works paint three broad challenges with the parole system: material hardship, where structural adversity complicates life after prison; negative social networks, where disadvantaged social ties can constrain compliance; and carceral governance, where criminal-legal oversight reconstitutes the experience of citizenship. Slee, however, proposes a crucial fourth explanation for why re-entry fails: socioemotional dynamics.

Drawing on two years of extensive ethnographic fieldwork with people on parole in Pennsylvania, Slee’s research reveals how the parole system often overlooks values like dignity and agency, inadvertently prompting parolees to withdraw from or subvert parole guidelines. This structural inattention to how parolees actually interact with institutions leads to rule-breaking, pushing parolees away from supportive resources and toward reincarceration.

How does the parole system affect socioemotional dynamics? Slee identifies three mechanisms:

First, parole rules often fail to align with the needs of parolees, overlooking unrecognized vulnerabilities. Many of the parolees, Slee observed, had been referred to resources they were, practically speaking, ineligible for, forcing them into difficult situations. Parolees see re-entry as “being born grown,” often needing to take on extra jobs, strike borderline deals with landlords, or find shared living arrangements — all of which compromise their sense of dignity and autonomy.

Second, discretion has both benefits and drawbacks. The uneven application of discretion among parole officers incentivizes parolees to live life “in the red,” socializing rule-breaking through direct and indirect experiences. This socializing force creates winners and losers, where those who comply face isolation while those who bend the rules risk reincarceration.

Third, the parole system imposes risk-escalating rules. Many states prohibit parolees from associating with other prior offenders, rendering an important source of support illicit. These rules sideline concerns of parolees’ need for belonging and companionship, prompting them to rule-break to satisfy said needs.

Slee reminds us of the importance of the personal dimensions of policy research. Intimate ethnography allows us to unpack the subtle nuances of how humans interact with institutions. Her findings also highlight a much-needed policy recommendation: parole systems need to recognize the dignity and agency of parolees re-entering society. Whether by simplifying bureaucratic processes, reforming the nature and scope of supervision, or instituting more flexible compliance measures, policymakers must address the socioemotional needs of parolees to support reintegration rather than perpetuate cycles of incarceration. 

The U.S. faces increasing levels of political polarization. Bipartisan disagreements over moral, cultural, and socioeconomic issues have turned into social conflict, political gridlock, and personal animosity. How did we get here? The dominant narrative has argued that identity cleavages have caused increasing splits in values. Yet Klaus Desmet — Research Fellow at CEPR, Research Associate at NBER, and the Altshuler Professor of Cities, Regions, and Globalization at Southern Methodist University — painted a different picture in a CDDRL seminar series talk.

Leveraging data from seven waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), Desmet develops a new methodology to study the evolution of these social divisions. For Desmet, the problem with an identity-based measure of polarization is that these demographic traits do not necessarily align with people’s values. If we care about splits in values, we need to create social partitions based on values, not identity traits.

Desmet asks how individuals would optimally form groups based on “homophily in values.” If people associate with others who hold similar views, they will sort themselves into groups based on these preferences. Individuals leave groups with fewer shared values and join groups with more shared values. Eventually, this self-sorting process reaches what Desmet calls a “Global Values Identification Equilibrium (VIE),” where within-group value heterogeneity is lowest and between-group value heterogeneity highest. Importantly, Desmet can then compare the split in values between these underlying clusters (latent polarization) to the split in values between Democrats and Republicans (partisan polarization).

What does the model find? While many have argued that America has witnessed a shift from disagreements on redistribution to disagreements on culture, Desmet’s findings indicate otherwise. Since at least the early 1980s, the latent values-based clusters have been divided mostly along moral and religious values, and the level of disagreement has been remarkably stable. There is no evidence of latent polarization increasing over time, and the underlying conditions for the culture wars have been present for a long time.

Partisan polarization, on the other hand, is a more recent development. Using the same model, Desmet shows that in 1981, the average value positions of Democrats and Republicans were almost indistinguishable, nowhere close to aligned with the endogenous clusters. By 2017, however, the average positions of Democrats and Republicans have diverged, aligning with the positions of the values-based clusters. These findings suggest that there has been rising partisan polarization in spite of stable latent polarization.

How might we explain this sequence of events? Desmet suggests that increasing partisan polarization may be a consequence of politicians discovering which values are particularly salient for political mobilization. Instead of politicians engendering value splits in society, partisanship has become more representative of people’s values. The American public has long had the conditions to be divided — they just needed parties to catch on.