Miriam Golden’s presentation in CDDRL’s Research Seminar on April 23, 2026, addressed a central puzzle in democratic politics: why are incumbent reelection rates systematically higher in richer democracies? Drawing on cross-national data, she demonstrates a strong positive relationship between national income and reelection rates, a pattern that is both statistically robust and theoretically unexpected. This empirical finding motivates a reassessment of two dominant frameworks — accountability theory, associated with John Ferejohn, and selection theory, associated with James Fearon. Accountability models suggest that voters reward good performance and punish poor performance, but they do not explain cross-national variation in reelection rates. Selection models argue that elections filter out low-quality politicians, implying that poorer countries with lower reelection rates must have dishonest or incompetent politicians, yet empirical evidence does not align well with these inferences.

Golden proposes an alternative framework centered on “capacity gaps,” introducing the resources that politicians have available and voters' ability to discern political performance as key missing parameters. In poorer countries, both state capacity and voter interpretive capacity are constrained. Governments face fiscal and administrative limitations that restrict policy delivery, while voters struggle to distinguish whether poor outcomes result from incompetence, corruption, or structural constraints. As a result, the informational conditions necessary for effective accountability break down. Golden further argues that informational signals are asymmetric: markers of “bad” types, such as corruption scandals, criminal convictions, or dynastic ties, are visible and salient, whereas markers of “good” types, such as competence or honesty, are diffuse and easily mimicked. In these settings, even honest, competent, and well-intentioned politicians are likely to lose office because they are indistinguishable to voters from the malfeasant and incompetent. Even high-performing politicians may not be rewarded electorally, and good types gain no consistent advantage in reelection. 

To evaluate this framework, Golden presents multiple empirical investigations. First, she examines whether voters reward economic performance using within-country variation in GDP growth. The results show that higher growth increases reelection rates, but only in countries with high literacy levels. Since literacy roughly proxies voter discernment capacity, this suggests that performance matters electorally only when voters can interpret it. Second, she analyzes survey data from legislators in Italy and Pakistan to assess whether elections filter out low-quality politicians. She finds that politicians with “bad-type” markers, such as dynastic backgrounds or long tenure, exhibit higher tolerance for corruption yet continue to survive electorally, contradicting selection theory. Third, she tests whether poorer democracies have lower-quality politicians by examining education levels and relative salaries. She finds no meaningful differences in legislator quality across income levels and no relationship between salaries and reelection rates, further weakening selection-based explanations.

Overall, Golden’s approach reconciles several empirical anomalies: the income–reelection relationship, the conditional effect of economic performance, and the persistence of low-quality politicians. At the same time, important questions remain regarding causal identification and measurement, as proxies like literacy may capture broader development effects. Nonetheless, the framework offers a compelling shift in focus from politicians to voters, highlighting how limits in information processing can undermine both accountability and selection in democratic systems.

On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

In a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar held on April 9, 2026,  and co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Konstantin Sonin, a John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, presented his research on “The Reverse Cargo Cult: Why Authoritarian Governments Lie to Their People,” offering a theoretical explanation for why regimes such as the Soviet Union would knowingly tell citizens visibly false statements. According to Sonin’s research, authoritarian propaganda is much more complex than simple misinformation or manipulation, as it is often designed not to convince people of a single claim, but to shape how they evaluate information more broadly. 

Sonin begins with a personal anecdote, reflecting on his own experience participating in Soviet elections where there was only one candidate on the ballot, despite the process being presented as a meaningful choice. Using this example, he questions why regimes like the Soviet Union invest so heavily in clearly staged elections or exaggerated portrayals of Western life, even when citizens recognize these distortions. From this, he introduces the idea that such actions are not meant to persuade citizens of a specific falsehood, but instead to influence how they interpret all incoming information. Drawing on the metaphor of a “reverse cargo cult,” he suggests that just as some communities misinterpret the source of Western goods, citizens in authoritarian systems may come to believe that institutions in other countries are equally performative or deceptive. In this sense, narratives about foreign countries become an integral tool for reinforcing domestic political stability. 

He further explores how citizens evaluate elections and the decision to replace an incumbent under uncertainty about both competence and trustworthiness. He recognizes that in these regimes, citizens are not entirely naïve and may often recognize when a leader is lying. However, Sonin shows that even obvious lies can be effective. When a domestic leader lies about conditions that citizens already know to be bad, it signals not only that the leader is untrustworthy but also raises the perceived likelihood that foreign leaders are similarly dishonest. As a result, citizens downgrade their expectations of potential replacements, concluding that alternatives may not be any better. This dynamic ultimately reduces the incentive to replace the incumbent. 

As his theory suggests, negative information about conditions abroad, or even skepticism toward foreign success, can benefit authoritarian leaders. For example, Sonin points to Soviet reactions to the American National Exhibition in Moscow, where displays of a typical American home were dismissed by officials as unrealistic or misleading. This kind of framing encouraged citizens to question whether life in the United States was truly better, reinforcing the idea that shortcomings at home were not unique. As a result, domestic failures appear less exceptional, helping explain why authoritarian propaganda frequently emphasizes criticism of other countries and why such narratives often reinforce one another. 

Sonin concludes by emphasizing that lying in this context is not primarily about persuading citizens of a particular false claim, but about shaping their broader beliefs about the reliability of information. By weakening trust in information overall, leaders can make bad conditions at home seem like the safer or more reliable option compared to the uncertainty of change.

On April 2, FSI Center Fellow Didi Kuo opened CDDRL’s Spring Research Seminar Series with a presentation titled “Beyond Policy: The Rise of Non-Programmatic Party Competition in Advanced Democracies.” The seminar examined whether policy continues to serve as the primary basis of political competition and voter-party linkage in advanced democratic systems.

Kuo began by outlining the traditional “programmatic” model of party competition, which assumes that political parties compete by offering distinct policy platforms and that voters make choices based on these policy differences. In this framework, democratic responsiveness emerges from the alignment between public preferences and party positions. Historically, such programmatic competition has been closely associated with democratic consolidation, strong institutions, and effective governance.

However, Kuo challenged this assumption by asking whether policy still plays a central role in contemporary politics. She presented evidence suggesting that political discourse, particularly in the United States, has shifted away from policy-focused communication. For example, recent political speeches were shown to contain fewer policy references and more grievance-based and retrospective language. This shift raised concerns that parties may increasingly rely on alternative strategies to mobilize voters.

The seminar then explored several non-programmatic forms of political competition. These included identity-based appeals, grievance politics, populism, and affective polarization. Kuo explained that these strategies emphasize emotional resonance, group identity, and symbolic representation rather than concrete policy proposals. In such contexts, voters may be motivated less by policy preferences and more by partisan identity or perceived cultural alignment. Importantly, these dynamics do not fully replace programmatic competition but instead reduce its relative importance.

Kuo also discussed theoretical and empirical research showing that many voters possess limited policy knowledge and often hold unstable or weakly structured policy preferences. As a result, factors such as party identification, emotion, and social identity can play a more significant role in shaping political behavior. This complicates the traditional view that democratic accountability operates primarily through policy evaluation.

To assess whether programmatic competition is declining, Kuo introduced new measurement strategies. These included expert surveys evaluating party cohesion and policy salience, as well as analyses of voter responses over time to determine whether individuals reference policy when expressing political preferences. The findings suggested a gradual decline in policy-based reasoning among voters, even in countries like the United States that have historically been highly programmatic.

Kuo concluded by considering the broader implications of this shift. A decline in programmatic competition may weaken democratic accountability, as voters become less likely to evaluate governments based on policy performance. It may also contribute to increased polarization and reduced willingness to compromise, as identity-driven politics tends to be more zero-sum. Ultimately, the seminar suggested that if policy is no longer the dominant mode of political competition, scholars may need to rethink core assumptions about how democracy functions.

In sum, Kuo’s presentation highlighted a significant transformation in advanced democracies: the growing importance of non-programmatic strategies in party competition and the potential consequences this shift holds for democratic governance.

In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL, TEC, and the Hoover Institution held on March 12, 2026, Hannah S. Chapman, the Theodore Romanoff Associate Professor of Russian Studies and an Associate Professor of International and Area Studies at the University, presented a new project exploring how crises affect authoritarian regimes’ ability to gather information from their citizens. This question connects to the well-known dictator’s dilemma, which describes the challenge authoritarian leaders face in obtaining accurate information from society while maintaining political control. Chapman’s project explores how this dilemma plays out during crises, when governments may simultaneously need more information from society while also increasing repression.

Chapman studies this question in the context of Russia, specifically focusing on the presidential appeals system in which citizens can submit appeals to the Presidential Administration via online platforms, written letters, or in person. These appeals typically address everyday governance issues such as infrastructure problems, utilities, social benefits, healthcare access, or bureaucratic disputes. Importantly, appeals are not anonymous and require individuals to submit identifying information, meaning citizens must voluntarily engage with the state to raise concerns. While these systems provide the government with valuable information about societal problems, moments of crisis raise the question of whether citizens will continue to use them as repression increases. 

To explain variation in citizen appeals during crises, Chapman introduces a theory of crisis based on two key factors that shape citizen behavior. Crisis immediacy, which refers to how directly and rapidly a crisis affects people’s everyday lives, and the government’s repressive response, meaning whether the state increases repression during the crisis. Together, these two factors shape whether citizens are willing to voluntarily engage with the state despite heightened repression and risk. To evaluate these expectations, Chapman analyzes a dataset of monthly reports produced by the Russian Presidential Administration that summarize citizen appeals. The dataset includes approximately 1.7 million appeals between 2017 and 2023, covering hundreds of categories of complaints. Using these reports, the project examines four major crises in Russia during this period: the 2018 pension reform, the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the partial military mobilization announced in September 2022. 

Each crisis demonstrates how immediacy and repression shape citizen behavior. The 2018 pension reform represents a low-immediacy, low-repression crisis. Although the policy change was unpopular, its effects were expected to unfold gradually, and protests were not heavily suppressed. As a result, appeals about pensions increased modestly while everyday appeals continued at normal levels. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a high-immediacy, low-repression crisis because lockdowns and economic disruptions immediately affected daily life, but restrictions were largely framed as public health measures rather than political repression. During this period, crisis-related appeals increased significantly while everyday appeals remained stable. 

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents a low-immediacy, high-repression crisis. Although repression increased dramatically through censorship laws and arrests for criticizing the war, the conflict initially felt distant from everyday life for many Russians. As a result, both crisis-related appeals and everyday appeals remained relatively low. Finally, the mobilization announced in September 2022 represents a high-immediacy, high-repression crisis. Because hundreds of thousands of Russians faced the immediate possibility of military conscription, crisis-related appeals increased dramatically, with approximately 42.3% of appeals related to military issues, even though everyday appeals remained suppressed. 

Chapman claims that in high-urgency crises, immediacy outweighs repression, creating an urgent incentive for citizens to seek help despite the risks. As a result, there is a spike in crisis-related appeals and a sharp decline in everyday complaints. As discussed, this is significant as systems designed to gather citizen feedback depend on citizens’ willingness to communicate with the state. Consequently, when repression increases, these channels become more fragile and less effective at capturing routine issues. As a result, authoritarian governments may lose important information about everyday problems when they most need accurate information to maintain stability.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on February 19, 2026, Oliver Kaplan, visiting scholar at CDDRL and Associate Professor at the University of Denver, presented a collaborative project on labor market discrimination against ex-combatants in Colombia. The study explores how prevalent hiring discrimination is against ex-combatants in the formal job market and whether this bias can be reduced. To highlight the significance of this issue, Kaplan emphasized the central role employment plays in reintegration, explaining that it is not only about income and individual well-being, but also about preventing recidivism, which is critical to long-term democratic stability and the rule of law. 

As Kaplan argues, stigma can play a major role in shaping hiring outcomes, as employers may associate ex-combatants with violence, instability, or unreliability, impacting the hiring process. Hence, the research tests whether ex-combatants face an employment penalty relative to non-ex-combatants. The study also examines whether conflict victims face similar bias and whether applicants who were both ex-combatants and victims experience different outcomes, since victim status could either reinforce stigma or generate sympathy and improve hiring chances. Finally, the study aims to identify practical ways to mitigate discrimination through education and skills training beyond high school, participation in reconciliation or peacebuilding activities, and the presence of employer tax incentives.

Kaplan and colleagues implemented a field experiment, partnering with Columbia’s reintegration agency to work with eight former combatants who applied to jobs using different versions of their resumes. The key treatment was selectively including or withholding information such as reintegration status, education, training, or reconciliation experience. This allowed the researchers to see how employers respond to different signals without faking information or using false identities. Applications were submitted through major online job platforms, and employer responses, including interview invitations, requests for additional information, and job offers, were tracked through calls, messages, and emails.  

Kaplan concluded by emphasizing the potential policy implications of these findings, explaining that improving access to employment through training and employer incentives might strengthen reintegration and reduce barriers faced by ex-combatants. Ultimately, Kaplan stressed that employment is not just an economic issue, but a key component of long-term peacebuilding, as access to stable jobs reduces the likelihood that ex-combatants return to conflict and helps sustain democratic stability.

On March 5, as part of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Research Seminar Series, Laia Balcells — the Christopher F. Gallagher Family Professor of Government at Georgetown University — delivered a presentation on the impact of transitional justice museums. Balcells presented a series of co-authored studies that have examined the political and social effects of transitional justice museums — institutions that commemorate victims of past violence and shape collective memory in post-conflict or post-authoritarian societies. These museums were presented as part of broader transitional justice efforts, alongside trials, truth commissions, and reparations, all of which aim to address historical injustices and strengthen democratic values. The central question of the research project is whether these museums actually influence visitors’ political attitudes and beliefs, and under what conditions such influence occurs.

Transitional justice museums have become increasingly common around the world, particularly since World War II, as societies have attempted to confront legacies of violence and authoritarian rule. Despite their growing prevalence, their societal impact has remained contested. Some scholars have argued that museums encourage empathy, tolerance, and greater awareness of human rights. Others have warned that they may generate political polarization, especially when the historical narratives they present challenge existing identities or ideological commitments. The presentation, therefore, emphasized the need for systematic evidence to determine when museums persuade audiences and when they instead reinforce existing divisions.

To investigate this question, the research presented by Balcells relied on multiple field experiments conducted in museums across different political contexts. The first case study (co-authored with Valeria Palanza and Elsa Voytas) examined the Museo de la Memoria y de los Derechos Humanos in Santiago, Chile, which commemorates victims of the Pinochet dictatorship. Participants were randomly assigned either to visit the museum or to a control group, and their attitudes were measured before and after the visit. The results suggested that visiting the museum significantly influenced visitors’ emotions and political attitudes. In particular, exposure to the museum increased emotional responses, such as compassion toward victims, and affected views on transitional justice and democratic institutions. Some of these effects also persisted over time, indicating that museum experiences could have lasting attitudinal consequences.

The second case (co-authored with Elsa Voytas) focused on an exhibit on “The Troubles” at the Ulster Museum in Northern Ireland. This context differed from Chile because the conflict involved multiple groups and remained politically sensitive. The research design combined focus groups, field experiments with university students, and survey experiments with members of the general population. Although the exhibit generated strong emotional reactions among visitors, the findings showed little evidence that it significantly changed attitudes toward out-groups or transitional justice policies. Instead, political identities and sectarian divisions remained largely stable. This suggested that in deeply divided societies, emotional responses to historical narratives do not necessarily translate into meaningful changes in political attitudes.

The third case (co-authored with Francesca Parente and Ethan vanderWilden) examined the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. Unlike the previous cases, the Holocaust did not directly implicate the museum’s primary audience in the same way as domestic conflicts. The research tested whether visiting the museum increased support for democratic values and reduced antisemitic attitudes. The findings showed that visits increased agreement with what Balcells and her co-authors described as “inclusive Holocaust lessons,” including stronger support for democracy, human rights, and opposition to genocide and authoritarianism. The museum also increased empathy toward Jewish people and support for Holocaust remembrance, with some effects lasting for at least one month after the visit.

Overall, the comparative analysis suggested that transitional justice museums could shape attitudes, but their effectiveness depended heavily on political and social context. Museums appeared more successful at reinforcing democratic norms and historical awareness than at transforming deeply entrenched intergroup attitudes. The presentation concluded by highlighting what Balcells referred to as the “Transitional Justice Museum Paradox”: societies that most need such institutions to promote reconciliation may also be the places where the likelihood of establishing such museums is lower, and where, if they are built, their impact is most limited.

On February 27, Professor Adrienne LeBas, Associate Professor at the American University School of Public Affairs, presented her co-authored book project, Can Social Intermediaries Build the State? This project, in collaboration with Jessica Gottlieb at the University of Houston, focuses on a field experiment and also uses other forms of data to explore statebuilding from non-state intermediaries.

State capacity refers to a government’s ability to execute policies, collect taxes, and deliver goods and services. If there is low-state capacity — a weak ability of a country to execute state functions — citizens might not believe that tax payments will be enforced or public goods delivered, so they are less likely to pay taxes. This also makes tax-evasion low-cost, because the state cannot enforce tax structure. LeBas frames this as a credibility issue.

LeBas introduces a new dimension of this issue: widespread non-state services provision. Present models of fiscal and tax exchange ignore social institutions, which step in to provide services where the state is not. In their project, LeBas and Gottlieb set out to understand if weak states could “borrow” the capacity of stronger social intermediaries, and who should deliver tax appeals — governments, or social intermediaries.

LeBas and Gottlieb turned to look at Lagos, Nigeria, for a field experiment. Direct taxation has been an aim of the Lagos Government since 1999, and the city has found success in collecting income tax from the formal sector, increasing public goods supply, and establishing fiscal credibility. Additionally, Lagos’s marketplaces have long been governed by a strong social institution operating between informal vendors and the state, making it a strong case study.

These social institutions are described as a hierarchical structure of marketplace associations (MPAs). At the market level, these MPAs are headed by an Iyaloja, or “Mother of the Market.” This leader collects taxes, provides services, and bargains with the state. All of these markets are under the leadership of the Iyaloja-General, who heads the Lagos Market Women & Men Association (LMWMA).

LeBas and Gottlieb partnered with the Lagos Internal Revenue Service (LIRS) and the LMWMA to craft an experiment to increase registration and income tax payment via tax appeals. LeBas and Gottlieb hypothesized that tax appeals will be more effective when delivered by the MPA than by state agents, more effective when delivered by a trusted agent, more effective when viewed as credible, and that ethnic minorities will be less responsive to tax appeals. However, the opposite was found. Those who trusted the MPA were not responsive to MPA-delivered appeals and were less likely to respond after receiving an LIRS appeal. Additionally, ethnic minorities were more responsive to tax appeals, due to their position as a clientelistic in-group.

During the course of conducting this experiment, LeBas and Gottlieb observed the ways that social intermediaries differ from other non-state actors. They are paramount authorities: difficult for the state to bypass, difficult for individuals to escape. They treat in-groups and out-groups differently, generating benefits for in-groups and costs for out-groups. They are central actors in electoral mobilization.

These findings then show that social intermediaries might impede state-building. While these intermediaries are effective messengers of fiscal exchange, they are also best at generating benefits for in-groups and creating a disadvantage for out-groups. These disadvantages are observed on general market days, when out-groups are required to pay higher fees and pack up earlier, and during elections, when out-groups face electoral repression. When it comes to registering with the formal state as taxpayers, those who benefit from social intermediaries’ discretionary rule may hesitate to alter the terms of their bargain. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, respond to state-delivered tax appeals – possibly because their disadvantage under the clientelistic status quo makes them eager to find new bargains with the state, LeBas and Gottlieb hypothesize.

LeBas concluded by stating that states are unlikely to be able to ”borrow” the capacity of social intermediaries to boost formal tax compliance. Social intermediaries may collaborate with the state but will resist elimination, and they may strike bargains with the state that run counter to individualized fiscal exchange. Additionally, those who are advantaged under the status quo will resist fiscal exchange, and those who are marginalized under the clientelistic status quo are the best candidates for tax appeals.
 

On February 12, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution hosted Lucan Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, for a seminar titled “Economic Dependence and Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective.” The talk, part of the REDS (Rethinking European Development and Security) series, examined the structural relationship between state resource concentration and democratic outcomes, using Russia as a central case while situating it within broader comparative patterns.

Way’s core argument centered on a simple but powerful proposition: when economic resources are concentrated in the hands of the state, autocracy becomes more likely; when resources are dispersed outside the state, democracy becomes more feasible. The key mechanism linking economic structure to regime type is the strength — or weakness — of countervailing societal power. Resource concentration generates societal dependence on political leaders. Citizens dependent on public-sector employment or state benefits face high personal costs for political opposition, including loss of income or access to essential services. Similarly, business elites reliant on state licenses, contracts, or regulatory goodwill incur substantial risks if they challenge incumbents. The result is weak opposition, limited activist networks, minimal independent funding, and fragile civil society organizations.

Way situated this framework within three major literatures on authoritarianism. First, underdevelopment (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000) remains strongly associated with autocracy: roughly 70 percent of poor countries were autocratic between 2000 and 2021. Second, oil wealth (Ross 2001; Bellin 2004) produces an even starker pattern: about 90 percent of petrostates were authoritarian in the same period. Third, statist or weak private-sector economies (Fish 2005; Greene 2007; Arriola 2013; Rosenfeld 2021) show similar tendencies, with roughly 80 percent of the most statist countries classified as autocratic. Despite their differences — very poor African states, wealthy Middle Eastern petrostates, and middle-income statist regimes — the underlying mechanism is the same: resource concentration fosters weak countervailing power.

Russia exemplifies this structural dynamic. While the 1990s appeared to feature strong countervailing forces, including powerful oligarchs credited with supporting Boris Yeltsin’s reelection, Way argued that these actors were in fact institutionally weak. Russia’s private sector relied heavily on state connections in a system with weak courts and manipulable regulatory frameworks. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky after he challenged Vladimir Putin underscored the vulnerability of even the wealthiest economic actors. The broader business community remained largely passive, reflecting structural dependence rather than autonomous strength.

Statism further entrenched authoritarian control. A state-dependent middle class and political parties reliant on Kremlin financing limited the development of robust opposition. In oil-rich systems, public-sector employment and distributive benefits deepen citizens' dependence, while governments remain fiscally insulated from private-sector pressures. In underdeveloped postcolonial contexts, even modestly financed states wield disproportionate leverage over fragile economies, facilitating cooptation and repression.
Preliminary statistical evidence using V-Dem measures of “resource concentration” supports these claims. State ownership or control over key sectors correlates strongly with authoritarianism, high pro-incumbent mobilization, low opposition mobilization, media control, and weak civil society. Way acknowledged complications, including endogeneity: autocrats often increase resource concentration through nationalization or expansion of public employment. Nevertheless, certain structural conditions — such as large oil reserves, extreme underdevelopment, or historically weak private sectors — make concentration more feasible ex ante.

In conclusion, Way emphasized that autocracy is not inevitable in such contexts. However, where countervailing societal power is weak, imposing authoritarian rule becomes far easier. Across diverse regimes, economic dependence constitutes a common mechanism of authoritarian control — whether through business capture of the state or state capture of business.

On February 5, 2026, Natalie Letsa, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina and previously a 2018-19 CDDRL postdoctoral fellow, presented the argument and contributions made in her book, The Autocratic Voter: Partisanship and Political Socialization under Dictatorship. The book addresses the question: Why do some citizens choose to get involved in politics, while others do not? And, for those who get involved, why do some support the opposition, while others support the ruling party?  

In the context of electoral autocracies, the book argues, social identity theory provides a model of partisanship, rather than rationalist or materialist theories. This argument rests on three key parts:

• Part 1: “Ruling Party Partisan" and “Opposition Partisan” are unique social identities that have common meaning across electoral autocracies.
• Part 2: Processes of partisan socialization occur within social networks.
• Part 3: The political orientations of social networks are constrained by the structural homophily created by the political geography of electoral autocracies.
   

Within the idea that “ruling party partisan” and “opposition partisan” are social identities, ruling party partisans trust the regime and believe it is democratic, whereas opposition partisans do not. Amongst these identities, out-group animus occurs, but opposition partisans experience stronger animus. Letsa looked at two questions from the World Values Survey: "How democratic is your country today?" and “How satisfied are you with the political system?” Results found that partisans in electoral autocracies are divided on these questions, whereas partisans in democracies are not.

On social networks, Letsa argues that people raised by partisans are more likely to adopt partisan identities, and that people with party activists in their networks are more likely to do so. Lastly, Letsa asserts that people with more politically homogenous social networks are more likely to adopt partisan identities. When conducting an original survey in Cameroon, Letsa found that citizens with social networks that fully support the opposition are five times more likely to be opposition partisans themselves than citizens with no opposition partisans in their social networks.

On geography, Letsa argued that opposition strongholds are severely constrained in electoral autocracies, producing extreme structural homophily. Because of this structural homophily, the political orientation of a social network is largely determined by its physical location. However, political geography does not only affect the identities of partisans in party strongholds; it also predicts the political beliefs of nonpartisans and out-party partisans in these places. To test this, Letsa examined survey data from Cameroon and found that the average respondent living in an extreme ruling-party stronghold has a network composed of 29% opposition supporters. The average respondent living in an extreme opposition party stronghold has a network made up of 59% opposition supporters.

The Autocratic Voter offers a unified theory of partisanship that explains both support for the ruling party and for the opposition. It presents a new framework for understanding public opinion and political behavior in electoral autocracies. Finally, it bridges research on democracy and autocracy.