On May 29, 2025, Dr. Natalia Forrat, a comparative political sociologist and lecturer at the University of Michigan’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, presented findings from her recently published book The Social Roots of Authoritarianism. Part of CDDRL’s research seminar series, the talk explored how authoritarian regimes are maintained not only through top-down coercion but also through everyday social dynamics at the grassroots level. Using fieldwork from four Russian regions, Forrat developed a framework that links citizens’ perceptions of the state to the type of authoritarian institutions that emerge, with implications for how different societies experience and resist autocratic rule.

At the core of Forrat’s theory is the insight that authoritarian power at the grassroots level is shaped by how ordinary people perceive the state. Do they view it as a “team leader” worthy of cooperation, or as an “outsider” that must be bargained with or avoided? These contrasting perceptions form the foundation of two distinct models of authoritarianism: unity-based and division-based.

In unity-based regimes, found in statist societies, the state is embedded in everyday life. Citizens engage with state officials as collaborators, and civic life is deeply intertwined with state-led institutions. This creates top-down political machines that recruit activists, channel discontent, and generate electoral support through community structures such as residential councils and cultural centers. Kemerovo, a highly statist region, exemplifies this model. Its dense network of community institutions performs both civic and political functions — organizing holidays and cleanup drives, while also mobilizing voters and monitoring dissent.

In contrast, division-based regimes operate in anti-statist societies, where the state is distrusted and seen as an alien force. Here, political life is mediated through informal, bottom-up networks of brokers — non-state leaders who command local authority. Rostov offers a vivid illustration. A former official described how community initiatives failed until informal leaders intervened. While state officials are ignored, trusted local figures can instantly galvanize action. This form of authoritarianism relies on clientelism and strategic distribution of perks and punishments.

Forrat’s comparative analysis — spanning the Kemerovo region, the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Rostov region — reveals how different grassroots visions of the state produce divergent regime dynamics. Importantly, she argues that these regime types are not interchangeable: an autocrat ruling over an anti-statist society cannot adopt statist tools without risking backlash, and vice versa. Each regime requires a distinct toolkit to maintain legitimacy and control.

This distinction has powerful implications for democratization. According to Forrat, unity-based authoritarianism lacks institutions that ensure accountability of the executive branch — like independent media, party competition, and pluralist civil society — while division-based regimes lack institutions that cultivate collective unity — such as inclusive state-building or civic trust. Democracy, then, is not merely a midpoint between authoritarian extremes, but a system that must deliberately cultivate the institutions its authoritarian predecessor lacked.

Conventional indicators may suggest that the United States is not susceptible to democratic backsliding, given its levels of wealth and the longevity of its political institutions. Yet a different picture emerges when considering assaults on the law following President Donald Trump’s return to power. In a recent CDDRL seminar. U.C. Berkeley Distinguished Professor of Political Science Paul Pierson examined the institutional roots of this trend and how it was shaped by the current moment of polarization and rising inequality.

Deepening partisanship, Pierson explained, has eroded the checks and balances embedded in U.S. institutions. Some assert that polarization is not abnormal in our country’s history, but Pierson believes that the state of polarization today poses unprecedented challenges. Politics has been increasingly nationalized, with state elections serving as a virtual training ground for ambitious politicians. Local media have declined in influence relative to nationally oriented partisan news outlets like Fox News. State issues are blending into national politics. These trends have undermined the system of federalism that historically kept the national government in check. 

As politicians have become more concerned about teamsmanship and partisan loyalty, the path of least resistance for them has been to prop up their party leaders even at the expense of democratic processes. In the past, partisan politicians could be trusted to keep their leaders in check should they behave undemocratically, regardless of how popular they may be. A case in point is President Richard Nixon, who had been reelected in a landslide in 1972, but was later held accountable by members of his own party once his transgressions were revealed in the wake of the Watergate scandal. The same cannot be said for the contemporary Trump era, as politicians appear reluctant to hold their president accountable due to partisan considerations. This trend has undermined horizontal oversight and, arguably, vertical accountability. On the latter, political elites have failed to adequately press citizens to hold the current administration accountable. 

The U.S. remains an extreme outlier in its growing wealth inequality, as mirrored by the ascendancy of ultra-wealthy plutocrats. Campaign funding has been increasingly dominated by the ultra-wealthy, many of whom supported the Republican ticket in the 2024 election. That said, these individuals’ influence is not unlimited, considering that the president has leverage over them and has shown willingness to threaten their interests should they behave disloyally. 

Despite blatant warning signs, there are some reasons to temper the alarmism surrounding the prospects of democratic backsliding in the United States. President Trump is not overwhelmingly popular, and aspects of his agenda will unlikely garner support from most of the electorate. Furthermore, whether his legacy will endure following the end of his presidency is unclear. Indeed, the vulnerabilities of U.S. political institutions remain salient. But plenty of room remains for resisting anti-democratic transgressions, given the non-partisan orientation of the judiciary and the small size of the Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The challenges confronting U.S. political institutions in the face of hyperpolarization and deepening wealth inequality demonstrate that democracy should not be taken for granted and that more efforts are needed to protect and strengthen democratic accountability.

A recording of Professor Pierson's talk can be viewed below:

As part of the CDDRL research seminar series, Clémence Tricaud, Assistant Professor of Economics at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, delivered a talk on the evolving nature of electoral competition in the United States. Her presentation explored a question of growing political and public interest: Are U.S. elections truly getting closer — and if so, why does that matter?

To begin answering this, Tricaud emphasized the need to clarify what we mean by “closeness.” She distinguished between vote margins, which measure how much one candidate wins over another in a specific race, and seat margins, which reflect the difference in how many seats each party wins in a legislative body like the House, Senate, or Electoral College.

These margins have real consequences. Seat margins affect which party holds power, the likelihood of legislative gridlock, and how legitimate elected officials are perceived to be. Vote margins, on the other hand, influence how informed and motivated voters are, especially if they feel their votes can truly make a difference.

Using a vast dataset covering over 150 years of U.S. federal elections, Tricaud and her coauthors documented a striking trend: while seat margins have narrowed significantly over the past 60 years, vote margins have remained relatively stable. In fact, there has been a decline in the number of extremely close races at the district level. This raises a puzzling question — how can national elections appear tighter if the races themselves are not actually becoming more competitive?

To address this, Tricaud presented a novel theoretical model of electoral competition. Building on the classic “Downsian framework,” where candidates try to appeal to the median voter, her model incorporates multiple districts, national and local shifts in voter preferences, and differences in whether candidates tailor their platforms to local constituencies or follow national party lines.

The model explains that two major changes have reshaped U.S. elections:

1. Better Information: Thanks to advances in polling and data analytics, candidates now have a much clearer sense of where voters stand.
2. Nationalization of Politics: Candidates increasingly campaign on unified national platforms rather than platforms tailored to respond to local issues.
    

Together, these changes help parties target just enough competitive districts to win control, even if many races remain lopsided. This leads to narrower seat margins without narrower vote margins.

Tricaud also examined campaign finance data to show how this shift affects political behavior. Since only a small number of districts are truly competitive, campaign resources are increasingly concentrated in these few swing districts. This geographic targeting could have troubling implications: growing political attention to a handful of places, rising regional inequalities, and a sense of disconnection between local voters and national outcomes.

In sum, Clémence Tricaud’s presentation provided a fresh lens on how modern campaigns operate and why elections may feel closer than they truly are. By disentangling seat and vote margins, her work sheds light on the evolving dynamics of U.S. democracy — and the challenges that come with it.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the resilience of international support is being tested. Public opinion in neighboring countries — many of which have absorbed refugees and face direct geopolitical pressure — has become a critical variable in sustaining aid and solidarity. In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

The study draws on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in eight countries bordering Ukraine and/or Russia: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Over 1,000 people were surveyed in each country, with a randomly assigned half receiving a brief empathy prompt. This prompt asked them to reflect on the daily challenges Ukrainians face living in a war zone. The goal was to measure whether simply imagining life in Ukraine could increase support for the Ukrainian cause.

The presentation began by outlining the stakes. Support for Ukraine has implications beyond aid flows. It affects how elites justify their positions, how international coalitions hold, and how misinformation, especially from Russia, can shift public discourse. The researchers focused on whether empathy-based interventions could increase not only emotional identification with Ukrainians, but also concrete actions such as signing petitions, donating money, or supporting humanitarian and military aid.

The results were striking. The empathy prompt had a clear and consistent effect: participants who received it expressed more sympathy for Ukrainians, more concern for their well-being, and greater willingness to support aid, both humanitarian and military. Statistical tests showed that these effects were driven by increased emotional connection (not concerns about the security of their own country), highlighting the central role of affective empathy.

Importantly, the effects were not uniform. They were strongest in countries like Hungary and Lithuania, and among individuals with strong attachments to their own national group and among those who had not previously interacted with Ukrainian refugees. Conversely, those who identified closer with Russians or who regularly consumed Russian media showed weaker or even no response. This suggests that perspective-taking can be powerful — but only in the absence of competing narratives.

The presentation concluded with a discussion of the broader implications. Empathy may offer a low-cost, scalable way to strengthen international solidarity — but its success depends on timing, exposure, and context. In countries with few refugees or limited media exposure to Ukraine, empathy interventions can fill an important emotional gap. However, where pro-Russian sentiment or misinformation dominates, their effects are muted.

At a moment when global support for Ukraine hangs in the balance, this research offers an encouraging insight: even brief moments of reflection can move people toward solidarity — if the conditions are right.

Public sectors that are plagued by corruption and poor performance hinder the development of low-income countries. Populations globally tend to perceive the police as the most corrupt sector of government, partly due to their frequent interactions with citizens. Only once corruption is reduced can trust in institutions be restored, enabling the development of countries.

Therefore, Associate Professor Danila Serra at Texas A&M University and her collaborators decided to investigate whether a training program could incentivize traffic officers to behave more ethically. Their study, presented by Serra at a recent CDDRL seminar, was conducted in Ghana, where almost 60% of people perceive the police as corrupt. 

The program, titled “Proud to Belong,” focused on creating a new group identity of officers as ‘agents of change.' It also prompted the officers to focus on their original reasons for joining the police, rebuilding their intrinsic motivations to ultimately reduce their participation in corruption. The training was implemented through a randomized control trial in randomly selected traffic police districts in the Greater Accra Region. 

The researchers first measured the program’s effectiveness through an incentivized cheating game played by officers both prior to the training and 20 months afterward. The study found a significant reduction in the unethical behavior of officers playing the game, indicating that the program successfully strengthened their values.

To understand whether these impacts extend to field behavior, Serra and her team measured police field activity in the months before and after the program’s implementation. They analyzed administrative data such as the number of drivers sent to court, those required to pay a fine, and the fine amounts. The team hypothesized that if bribes were acting as substitutes for formal law enforcement, an increase in field activity would indicate a decline in officer corruption.

This data demonstrated that the program had a significant positive impact on officer behavior, but only during the first 3 months post-training. To reconcile the limits of this short-term impact with the long-term benefits implied by the cheating game, researchers determined that this may be because of the need for reinforcements following the program. For example, an award ceremony honoring the officers’ participation in the program, 9 months post-training, revived the positive impact on field behavior. Evidence also suggests that, 20 months after the training, low-rank officers in treatment districts were less likely to have been promoted, hinting at structural problems preventing the end of corruption.

The program designed by Serra and her collaborators demonstrates that it is possible to encourage more ethical behavior among bureaucrats through targeted training, offering a promising tool for reducing corruption. However, sustained training, ongoing reinforcement, and support from higher-ranking officers are necessary to maintain these behavioral changes and ensure lasting impact.

On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

In an era of increased transnational repression against dissidents, opposition groups need to become more effective in galvanizing support and avoiding suppression. These organizations are simultaneously losing critical institutional donors, as governments are becoming less inclined to donate to pro-democratic movements. This makes it more important than ever for such organizations to find out how to stimulate collective action among diasporic communities and uncover new outlets for donations. 

Therefore, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva and her collaborator, Emil Kamalov (EUI), decided to start the OutRush project to survey Russians who have fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By understanding the conditions that drive Russian emigrants to donate to activist organizations, Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research, presented in a recent CDDRL seminar, could prove vital to more effectively mobilizing diaspora communities.

The Russian government has expanded its criminalization of oppositional organizations since the 2022 invasion, increasingly labeling groups as “undesirable.” This designation is for organizations that are allegedly a threat to Russian security, making any collaboration with them illegal. For example, Russian citizen Alexey Malyarevsky was recently sentenced to prison for donating to Alexey Navalny’s “undesirable” Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK). With 70% of Russian emigrants being afraid of repression since the invasion, Sergeeva predicted that this designation would discourage emigrants from donating.

To test their hypothesis, Sergeeva and Kamalov surveyed respondents annually through OutRush about their willingness to donate to theoretical organizations that fit various criteria. They utilized nonmonetary incentives, such as promising to send reports to respondents, which lowered the cost of the study.

Contrary to expectations, there was a positive correlation between the criminalization of an organization and the diaspora’s willingness to donate. The “undesirable” designation did not deter support as intended. Instead, it served as a marker that the organization was effective in its opposition, incentivizing donations. This effect was especially prominent among those residing in countries outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. At the same time, it diminished in host countries friendly to Russia, reflecting the continued fear of transnational repression. Furthermore, donor anonymity and organizational transparency further incentivized support. 

The very means through which authoritarian regimes attempt to suppress dissent — the criminalization of opposition groups — can actually be used to galvanize diasporic support. Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research serves as evidence that activist organizations have the opportunity to mobilize emigrants discontented with the regimes they fled, despite oppression. 

Democracies face the challenge of requiring competent yet representative leaders in order to effectively embody the will of the people. More than a hundred countries have electoral quotas for women and minorities to ensure representation; however, such efforts are being threatened globally under the guise of critiques alleging that quotas undermine meritocracy and candidate quality. 

To assess this assumption, Stanford Assistant Professor of Political Science Soledad Prillaman examined in a CDDRL research seminar the relationship between candidate quality and electoral affirmative action. Her co-authored study relies on data from India, where the largest of such policies is enacted, and local Gram Panchayat positions are proportionally reserved for women and lower caste individuals on a rotating basis. Using population, census, and survey data, Prillaman compared the quality of politicians by looking at their level of education and their relative education performance. 

Her findings reveal that politicians in general are positively selected, meaning that they are much better educated than the constituents they serve. While quota-elected politicians had lower average education levels than non-quota politicians, they were more positively selected — they were drawn from a higher tail of their group’s education distribution. This means that quota politicians are relatively better educated than non-quota politicians, suggesting that they are of no worse quality and maybe even higher quality.

To further bolster this claim — that quota politicians may be of higher quality than non-quota politicians — Prillaman shows that voters hold quota politicians to a higher education standard than non-quota politicians and that the lower levels of average education are largely due to inequality in access to education. 

The evidence provides little justification for the assumption that electoral quotas undermine meritocracy. Instead, inequality of opportunity underlies differences in levels of education, and overall quality can be higher because voters tend to hold minority candidates to higher standards. As affirmative action policies are under challenge across the globe, it is critical to remember that improving minority representation in our democratic systems does not require sacrificing candidate quality.

As part of CDDRL’s weekly research seminar series, Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), delivered a talk on the challenge of bureaucratic authority and delegation. Fukuyama, known for his influential works on state-building and governance, used this talk to trace how scholars and policymakers have grappled with the tension between empowering bureaucracies to act effectively and ensuring they remain accountable to political leaders. The talk was not only a theoretical journey but also a response to current debates about the U.S. administrative state and what meaningful reform should look like.

Fukuyama began with the basics of organizational theory. He explained that hierarchies — systems where authority is ranked and flows from the top down — exist because they reduce "transaction costs," or the costs of coordinating and enforcing agreements between people. This insight, developed by economist Ronald Coase, shows why firms and governments prefer internal structures rather than always relying on markets. Oliver Williamson expanded this to explain how organizations manage uncertainty and complexity. Fukuyama then discussed libertarian ideas, which hoped that technology and open networks could flatten hierarchies. These visions, he noted, largely failed because real-world decisions still require clear lines of authority.

As organizations grew more complex, scholars turned to “principal-agent theory.” In this framework, a "principal" (such as an elected official) delegates tasks to an "agent" (like a bureaucrat), but must ensure the agent acts in their interest. Yet, as Herbert Simon and John DiIulio observed, bureaucrats are not simply self-interested — they are also shaped by professional norms, organizational culture, and personal values. Fukuyama stressed that delegation is unavoidable because lower-level agents often hold critical, local knowledge that distant leaders lack. As economist Friedrich Hayek argued, knowledge is dispersed in society, and central planners cannot predict every situation.

However, delegation creates a dilemma: how to give bureaucrats enough freedom to use their expertise, while still keeping them accountable. Formal mechanisms like audits and punishments help, but informal tools such as trust, shared values, and education are just as crucial. Fukuyama pointed to Japan’s "kanban" manufacturing system and military strategies like "mission orders," where frontline actors are trusted to make decisions based on shared goals.

A major paradox Fukuyama addressed is that while anti-corruption efforts seek to limit bureaucratic discretion, political science research shows that too much constraint stifles effectiveness. He proposed an "inverse-U curve," where both too little and too much autonomy harm performance. The right balance depends on the state’s overall capacity.

Applying this to the U.S., Fukuyama challenged claims that bureaucrats are "out of control." Instead, he argued that America’s federal bureaucracy is over-regulated, bogged down by rigid rules that prioritize compliance over results. His work with Katherine Bersch identifies five existing tools for political control, such as appointment and removal powers, showing that bureaucratic autonomy is already tightly managed.

Fukuyama concluded by advocating for genuine reform: deregulating the bureaucracy, empowering implementers to work alongside policymakers, and rebuilding internal state capacity. Inspired by agile management methods and Jennifer Pahlka’s Recoding America, he argued that a flexible, mission-driven public sector is essential to meet the complex challenges of modern governance.

A full recording of Professor Fukuyama's talk can be viewed below:

On March 6, 2025, Michael Albertus, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, presented his research at CDDRL’s weekly seminar. His talk, based on his book Land Power: Who Has It, Who Doesn’t, and How That Determines the Fate of Societies, examined how land ownership shapes political and economic hierarchies across history and in contemporary societies. Tracing land’s role as a source of power, Albertus analyzed how its distribution affects governance, social stratification, and conflict.

The talk analyzed land’s historical trajectory as a determinant of power. Sedentary societies emerged around 10,000 BC, followed by the development of permanent agricultural towns and the plow around 5,000 BC. By 3,000 BC, conflicts over land were already shaping political landscapes, as seen in Mesopotamian disputes. By 70 BC, Roman law had formalized land transactions, establishing legal frameworks that would influence future ownership systems. Throughout history, land has not only provided economic sustenance but has also been a critical tool for political control, determining who wields power in society.

A central argument of Albertus’s talk was the concept of the “Great Reshuffle,” a period of significant transformation in land ownership patterns over the past two centuries. Driven by population growth, state-building, and social conflict, this process has reshaped the global distribution of land, often exacerbating existing inequalities. Albertus identified four primary consequences of this upheaval: the reinforcement of racial hierarchies, gender disparities in land rights, economic underdevelopment, and environmental degradation.

To illustrate these dynamics, Albertus presented several case studies. He examined land dispossession in the United States, focusing on the Agua Caliente Indian Reservation in Palm Springs, California, where a checkerboard pattern of land ownership — rooted in U.S. federal policies — has marginalized Indigenous communities for over a century. He then turned to gender disparities in Canada’s settlement policies, referencing Georgia Binnie-Clark’s Wheat and Woman, which highlighted how women could buy and work land but were systematically excluded from government land grants, reinforcing gendered economic inequalities.

Albertus next analyzed Hugo Chávez’s 2001 Land Law in Venezuela as an example of state-led land redistribution. While intended to address historical inequalities, such policies often face resistance from entrenched elites and implementation challenges that limit their effectiveness. In contrast, South Africa’s post-apartheid land restitution programs have been politically significant but uneven in economic impact, as many beneficiaries struggle to secure long-term gains from reclaimed land. Finally, he discussed land conservation as a form of redistribution, using Chile’s Patagonia National Park as an example of land repurposed for ecological preservation rather than economic exploitation.

Albertus concluded by looking to the future, warning of a “Coming Global Reshuffle” driven by climate change and population growth. He presented projections suggesting that rising global temperatures will render some lands uninhabitable while making others newly viable for agriculture. These changes are likely to fuel new disputes over land, intensify migration pressures, and reshape geopolitical dynamics. Maps and population models from recent studies illustrated how shifting environmental conditions will impact territorial competition in the coming decades.