In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL, TEC, and the Hoover Institution held on March 12, 2026, Hannah S. Chapman, the Theodore Romanoff Associate Professor of Russian Studies and an Associate Professor of International and Area Studies at the University, presented a new project exploring how crises affect authoritarian regimes’ ability to gather information from their citizens. This question connects to the well-known dictator’s dilemma, which describes the challenge authoritarian leaders face in obtaining accurate information from society while maintaining political control. Chapman’s project explores how this dilemma plays out during crises, when governments may simultaneously need more information from society while also increasing repression.

Chapman studies this question in the context of Russia, specifically focusing on the presidential appeals system in which citizens can submit appeals to the Presidential Administration via online platforms, written letters, or in person. These appeals typically address everyday governance issues such as infrastructure problems, utilities, social benefits, healthcare access, or bureaucratic disputes. Importantly, appeals are not anonymous and require individuals to submit identifying information, meaning citizens must voluntarily engage with the state to raise concerns. While these systems provide the government with valuable information about societal problems, moments of crisis raise the question of whether citizens will continue to use them as repression increases. 

To explain variation in citizen appeals during crises, Chapman introduces a theory of crisis based on two key factors that shape citizen behavior. Crisis immediacy, which refers to how directly and rapidly a crisis affects people’s everyday lives, and the government’s repressive response, meaning whether the state increases repression during the crisis. Together, these two factors shape whether citizens are willing to voluntarily engage with the state despite heightened repression and risk. To evaluate these expectations, Chapman analyzes a dataset of monthly reports produced by the Russian Presidential Administration that summarize citizen appeals. The dataset includes approximately 1.7 million appeals between 2017 and 2023, covering hundreds of categories of complaints. Using these reports, the project examines four major crises in Russia during this period: the 2018 pension reform, the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the partial military mobilization announced in September 2022. 

Each crisis demonstrates how immediacy and repression shape citizen behavior. The 2018 pension reform represents a low-immediacy, low-repression crisis. Although the policy change was unpopular, its effects were expected to unfold gradually, and protests were not heavily suppressed. As a result, appeals about pensions increased modestly while everyday appeals continued at normal levels. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a high-immediacy, low-repression crisis because lockdowns and economic disruptions immediately affected daily life, but restrictions were largely framed as public health measures rather than political repression. During this period, crisis-related appeals increased significantly while everyday appeals remained stable. 

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents a low-immediacy, high-repression crisis. Although repression increased dramatically through censorship laws and arrests for criticizing the war, the conflict initially felt distant from everyday life for many Russians. As a result, both crisis-related appeals and everyday appeals remained relatively low. Finally, the mobilization announced in September 2022 represents a high-immediacy, high-repression crisis. Because hundreds of thousands of Russians faced the immediate possibility of military conscription, crisis-related appeals increased dramatically, with approximately 42.3% of appeals related to military issues, even though everyday appeals remained suppressed. 

Chapman claims that in high-urgency crises, immediacy outweighs repression, creating an urgent incentive for citizens to seek help despite the risks. As a result, there is a spike in crisis-related appeals and a sharp decline in everyday complaints. As discussed, this is significant as systems designed to gather citizen feedback depend on citizens’ willingness to communicate with the state. Consequently, when repression increases, these channels become more fragile and less effective at capturing routine issues. As a result, authoritarian governments may lose important information about everyday problems when they most need accurate information to maintain stability.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on February 19, 2026, Oliver Kaplan, visiting scholar at CDDRL and Associate Professor at the University of Denver, presented a collaborative project on labor market discrimination against ex-combatants in Colombia. The study explores how prevalent hiring discrimination is against ex-combatants in the formal job market and whether this bias can be reduced. To highlight the significance of this issue, Kaplan emphasized the central role employment plays in reintegration, explaining that it is not only about income and individual well-being, but also about preventing recidivism, which is critical to long-term democratic stability and the rule of law. 

As Kaplan argues, stigma can play a major role in shaping hiring outcomes, as employers may associate ex-combatants with violence, instability, or unreliability, impacting the hiring process. Hence, the research tests whether ex-combatants face an employment penalty relative to non-ex-combatants. The study also examines whether conflict victims face similar bias and whether applicants who were both ex-combatants and victims experience different outcomes, since victim status could either reinforce stigma or generate sympathy and improve hiring chances. Finally, the study aims to identify practical ways to mitigate discrimination through education and skills training beyond high school, participation in reconciliation or peacebuilding activities, and the presence of employer tax incentives.

Kaplan and colleagues implemented a field experiment, partnering with Columbia’s reintegration agency to work with eight former combatants who applied to jobs using different versions of their resumes. The key treatment was selectively including or withholding information such as reintegration status, education, training, or reconciliation experience. This allowed the researchers to see how employers respond to different signals without faking information or using false identities. Applications were submitted through major online job platforms, and employer responses, including interview invitations, requests for additional information, and job offers, were tracked through calls, messages, and emails.  

Kaplan concluded by emphasizing the potential policy implications of these findings, explaining that improving access to employment through training and employer incentives might strengthen reintegration and reduce barriers faced by ex-combatants. Ultimately, Kaplan stressed that employment is not just an economic issue, but a key component of long-term peacebuilding, as access to stable jobs reduces the likelihood that ex-combatants return to conflict and helps sustain democratic stability.

On March 5, as part of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Research Seminar Series, Laia Balcells — the Christopher F. Gallagher Family Professor of Government at Georgetown University — delivered a presentation on the impact of transitional justice museums. Balcells presented a series of co-authored studies that have examined the political and social effects of transitional justice museums — institutions that commemorate victims of past violence and shape collective memory in post-conflict or post-authoritarian societies. These museums were presented as part of broader transitional justice efforts, alongside trials, truth commissions, and reparations, all of which aim to address historical injustices and strengthen democratic values. The central question of the research project is whether these museums actually influence visitors’ political attitudes and beliefs, and under what conditions such influence occurs.

Transitional justice museums have become increasingly common around the world, particularly since World War II, as societies have attempted to confront legacies of violence and authoritarian rule. Despite their growing prevalence, their societal impact has remained contested. Some scholars have argued that museums encourage empathy, tolerance, and greater awareness of human rights. Others have warned that they may generate political polarization, especially when the historical narratives they present challenge existing identities or ideological commitments. The presentation, therefore, emphasized the need for systematic evidence to determine when museums persuade audiences and when they instead reinforce existing divisions.

To investigate this question, the research presented by Balcells relied on multiple field experiments conducted in museums across different political contexts. The first case study (co-authored with Valeria Palanza and Elsa Voytas) examined the Museo de la Memoria y de los Derechos Humanos in Santiago, Chile, which commemorates victims of the Pinochet dictatorship. Participants were randomly assigned either to visit the museum or to a control group, and their attitudes were measured before and after the visit. The results suggested that visiting the museum significantly influenced visitors’ emotions and political attitudes. In particular, exposure to the museum increased emotional responses, such as compassion toward victims, and affected views on transitional justice and democratic institutions. Some of these effects also persisted over time, indicating that museum experiences could have lasting attitudinal consequences.

The second case (co-authored with Elsa Voytas) focused on an exhibit on “The Troubles” at the Ulster Museum in Northern Ireland. This context differed from Chile because the conflict involved multiple groups and remained politically sensitive. The research design combined focus groups, field experiments with university students, and survey experiments with members of the general population. Although the exhibit generated strong emotional reactions among visitors, the findings showed little evidence that it significantly changed attitudes toward out-groups or transitional justice policies. Instead, political identities and sectarian divisions remained largely stable. This suggested that in deeply divided societies, emotional responses to historical narratives do not necessarily translate into meaningful changes in political attitudes.

The third case (co-authored with Francesca Parente and Ethan vanderWilden) examined the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. Unlike the previous cases, the Holocaust did not directly implicate the museum’s primary audience in the same way as domestic conflicts. The research tested whether visiting the museum increased support for democratic values and reduced antisemitic attitudes. The findings showed that visits increased agreement with what Balcells and her co-authors described as “inclusive Holocaust lessons,” including stronger support for democracy, human rights, and opposition to genocide and authoritarianism. The museum also increased empathy toward Jewish people and support for Holocaust remembrance, with some effects lasting for at least one month after the visit.

Overall, the comparative analysis suggested that transitional justice museums could shape attitudes, but their effectiveness depended heavily on political and social context. Museums appeared more successful at reinforcing democratic norms and historical awareness than at transforming deeply entrenched intergroup attitudes. The presentation concluded by highlighting what Balcells referred to as the “Transitional Justice Museum Paradox”: societies that most need such institutions to promote reconciliation may also be the places where the likelihood of establishing such museums is lower, and where, if they are built, their impact is most limited.

On February 27, Professor Adrienne LeBas, Associate Professor at the American University School of Public Affairs, presented her co-authored book project, Can Social Intermediaries Build the State? This project, in collaboration with Jessica Gottlieb at the University of Houston, focuses on a field experiment and also uses other forms of data to explore statebuilding from non-state intermediaries.

State capacity refers to a government’s ability to execute policies, collect taxes, and deliver goods and services. If there is low-state capacity — a weak ability of a country to execute state functions — citizens might not believe that tax payments will be enforced or public goods delivered, so they are less likely to pay taxes. This also makes tax-evasion low-cost, because the state cannot enforce tax structure. LeBas frames this as a credibility issue.

LeBas introduces a new dimension of this issue: widespread non-state services provision. Present models of fiscal and tax exchange ignore social institutions, which step in to provide services where the state is not. In their project, LeBas and Gottlieb set out to understand if weak states could “borrow” the capacity of stronger social intermediaries, and who should deliver tax appeals — governments, or social intermediaries.

LeBas and Gottlieb turned to look at Lagos, Nigeria, for a field experiment. Direct taxation has been an aim of the Lagos Government since 1999, and the city has found success in collecting income tax from the formal sector, increasing public goods supply, and establishing fiscal credibility. Additionally, Lagos’s marketplaces have long been governed by a strong social institution operating between informal vendors and the state, making it a strong case study.

These social institutions are described as a hierarchical structure of marketplace associations (MPAs). At the market level, these MPAs are headed by an Iyaloja, or “Mother of the Market.” This leader collects taxes, provides services, and bargains with the state. All of these markets are under the leadership of the Iyaloja-General, who heads the Lagos Market Women & Men Association (LMWMA).

LeBas and Gottlieb partnered with the Lagos Internal Revenue Service (LIRS) and the LMWMA to craft an experiment to increase registration and income tax payment via tax appeals. LeBas and Gottlieb hypothesized that tax appeals will be more effective when delivered by the MPA than by state agents, more effective when delivered by a trusted agent, more effective when viewed as credible, and that ethnic minorities will be less responsive to tax appeals. However, the opposite was found. Those who trusted the MPA were not responsive to MPA-delivered appeals and were less likely to respond after receiving an LIRS appeal. Additionally, ethnic minorities were more responsive to tax appeals, due to their position as a clientelistic in-group.

During the course of conducting this experiment, LeBas and Gottlieb observed the ways that social intermediaries differ from other non-state actors. They are paramount authorities: difficult for the state to bypass, difficult for individuals to escape. They treat in-groups and out-groups differently, generating benefits for in-groups and costs for out-groups. They are central actors in electoral mobilization.

These findings then show that social intermediaries might impede state-building. While these intermediaries are effective messengers of fiscal exchange, they are also best at generating benefits for in-groups and creating a disadvantage for out-groups. These disadvantages are observed on general market days, when out-groups are required to pay higher fees and pack up earlier, and during elections, when out-groups face electoral repression. When it comes to registering with the formal state as taxpayers, those who benefit from social intermediaries’ discretionary rule may hesitate to alter the terms of their bargain. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, respond to state-delivered tax appeals – possibly because their disadvantage under the clientelistic status quo makes them eager to find new bargains with the state, LeBas and Gottlieb hypothesize.

LeBas concluded by stating that states are unlikely to be able to ”borrow” the capacity of social intermediaries to boost formal tax compliance. Social intermediaries may collaborate with the state but will resist elimination, and they may strike bargains with the state that run counter to individualized fiscal exchange. Additionally, those who are advantaged under the status quo will resist fiscal exchange, and those who are marginalized under the clientelistic status quo are the best candidates for tax appeals.
 

On February 12, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution hosted Lucan Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, for a seminar titled “Economic Dependence and Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective.” The talk, part of the REDS (Rethinking European Development and Security) series, examined the structural relationship between state resource concentration and democratic outcomes, using Russia as a central case while situating it within broader comparative patterns.

Way’s core argument centered on a simple but powerful proposition: when economic resources are concentrated in the hands of the state, autocracy becomes more likely; when resources are dispersed outside the state, democracy becomes more feasible. The key mechanism linking economic structure to regime type is the strength — or weakness — of countervailing societal power. Resource concentration generates societal dependence on political leaders. Citizens dependent on public-sector employment or state benefits face high personal costs for political opposition, including loss of income or access to essential services. Similarly, business elites reliant on state licenses, contracts, or regulatory goodwill incur substantial risks if they challenge incumbents. The result is weak opposition, limited activist networks, minimal independent funding, and fragile civil society organizations.

Way situated this framework within three major literatures on authoritarianism. First, underdevelopment (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000) remains strongly associated with autocracy: roughly 70 percent of poor countries were autocratic between 2000 and 2021. Second, oil wealth (Ross 2001; Bellin 2004) produces an even starker pattern: about 90 percent of petrostates were authoritarian in the same period. Third, statist or weak private-sector economies (Fish 2005; Greene 2007; Arriola 2013; Rosenfeld 2021) show similar tendencies, with roughly 80 percent of the most statist countries classified as autocratic. Despite their differences — very poor African states, wealthy Middle Eastern petrostates, and middle-income statist regimes — the underlying mechanism is the same: resource concentration fosters weak countervailing power.

Russia exemplifies this structural dynamic. While the 1990s appeared to feature strong countervailing forces, including powerful oligarchs credited with supporting Boris Yeltsin’s reelection, Way argued that these actors were in fact institutionally weak. Russia’s private sector relied heavily on state connections in a system with weak courts and manipulable regulatory frameworks. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky after he challenged Vladimir Putin underscored the vulnerability of even the wealthiest economic actors. The broader business community remained largely passive, reflecting structural dependence rather than autonomous strength.

Statism further entrenched authoritarian control. A state-dependent middle class and political parties reliant on Kremlin financing limited the development of robust opposition. In oil-rich systems, public-sector employment and distributive benefits deepen citizens' dependence, while governments remain fiscally insulated from private-sector pressures. In underdeveloped postcolonial contexts, even modestly financed states wield disproportionate leverage over fragile economies, facilitating cooptation and repression.
Preliminary statistical evidence using V-Dem measures of “resource concentration” supports these claims. State ownership or control over key sectors correlates strongly with authoritarianism, high pro-incumbent mobilization, low opposition mobilization, media control, and weak civil society. Way acknowledged complications, including endogeneity: autocrats often increase resource concentration through nationalization or expansion of public employment. Nevertheless, certain structural conditions — such as large oil reserves, extreme underdevelopment, or historically weak private sectors — make concentration more feasible ex ante.

In conclusion, Way emphasized that autocracy is not inevitable in such contexts. However, where countervailing societal power is weak, imposing authoritarian rule becomes far easier. Across diverse regimes, economic dependence constitutes a common mechanism of authoritarian control — whether through business capture of the state or state capture of business.

On February 5, 2026, Natalie Letsa, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina and previously a 2018-19 CDDRL postdoctoral fellow, presented the argument and contributions made in her book, The Autocratic Voter: Partisanship and Political Socialization under Dictatorship. The book addresses the question: Why do some citizens choose to get involved in politics, while others do not? And, for those who get involved, why do some support the opposition, while others support the ruling party?  

In the context of electoral autocracies, the book argues, social identity theory provides a model of partisanship, rather than rationalist or materialist theories. This argument rests on three key parts:

• Part 1: “Ruling Party Partisan" and “Opposition Partisan” are unique social identities that have common meaning across electoral autocracies.
• Part 2: Processes of partisan socialization occur within social networks.
• Part 3: The political orientations of social networks are constrained by the structural homophily created by the political geography of electoral autocracies.
   

Within the idea that “ruling party partisan” and “opposition partisan” are social identities, ruling party partisans trust the regime and believe it is democratic, whereas opposition partisans do not. Amongst these identities, out-group animus occurs, but opposition partisans experience stronger animus. Letsa looked at two questions from the World Values Survey: "How democratic is your country today?" and “How satisfied are you with the political system?” Results found that partisans in electoral autocracies are divided on these questions, whereas partisans in democracies are not.

On social networks, Letsa argues that people raised by partisans are more likely to adopt partisan identities, and that people with party activists in their networks are more likely to do so. Lastly, Letsa asserts that people with more politically homogenous social networks are more likely to adopt partisan identities. When conducting an original survey in Cameroon, Letsa found that citizens with social networks that fully support the opposition are five times more likely to be opposition partisans themselves than citizens with no opposition partisans in their social networks.

On geography, Letsa argued that opposition strongholds are severely constrained in electoral autocracies, producing extreme structural homophily. Because of this structural homophily, the political orientation of a social network is largely determined by its physical location. However, political geography does not only affect the identities of partisans in party strongholds; it also predicts the political beliefs of nonpartisans and out-party partisans in these places. To test this, Letsa examined survey data from Cameroon and found that the average respondent living in an extreme ruling-party stronghold has a network composed of 29% opposition supporters. The average respondent living in an extreme opposition party stronghold has a network made up of 59% opposition supporters.

The Autocratic Voter offers a unified theory of partisanship that explains both support for the ruling party and for the opposition. It presents a new framework for understanding public opinion and political behavior in electoral autocracies. Finally, it bridges research on democracy and autocracy.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on January 29, 2026, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, presented her human rights theory of democracy to explain democratic backsliding. Arat’s research shows how economic and social policies have contributed to the decline of democracies worldwide since the mid-twentieth century. While democratic decline was once primarily associated with developing countries, it has now become a global concern, visible as the rise of electoral authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies, and right-wing populism.

Arat’s theory upholds that democracy’s stability depends on maintaining a balance between two sets of human rights: civil and political rights and social and economic rights. Civil and political rights such as freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rights to political participation, are critical components of democracy. Social and economic rights include the right to work, labor rights, education, healthcare, housing, food, an adequate standard of living, and social security. Arat argued that while democracies maintain relatively high levels of civil and political rights, successive governments may neglect social and economic rights, leading to the emergence of a growing gap between the two sets of rights. This imbalance leads to a legitimacy crisis. As citizens begin to question the government’s ability to respond to everyday struggles and provide basic welfare, the government or an alternative elite triggers a process that ultimately undermines democratic stability.

Arat outlined a three-phase process through which democratic decline unfolds. In the first phase, democratization begins, and civil and political rights expand rapidly, while social and economic rights remain stagnant. Although a gap exists between the two sets of rights, the expansion of political freedoms provides legitimacy to the new democratic system. In the second phase, civil and political rights stabilize while social and economic rights stagnate or decline, creating an imbalance that fuels social and political unrest. In the third phase, governments that are unwilling or unable to improve social and economic conditions respond by limiting civil and political rights, ultimately marking the decline of democracy.

Arat examined democratic decline for two major eras. During the Cold War, politics focused on class-based movements such as labor and student activism, while governments responded with authoritarian measures justified by anti-communism. Many developing countries followed uneven development models and trickle-down economics that promised rapid economic growth. However, in the post-Cold War era, the neoliberal economic paradigm, which seeks privatization, deregulation, labor flexibility, and reduced government services, spread across both developing and developed countries. Although promoted as efficient, these reforms weakened social and economic rights and increased public dissatisfaction. At the same time, political struggles and claims shifted toward identity politics.

Arat described this as a “convergence of fundamentalisms.” She referred to neoliberalism as “market fundamentalism,” which prioritizes the private sector and markets, reducing the public sector's role and resulting in declining employment, reduced social services, and growing inequality. Along with the rise of neoliberalism, religious and nationalist fundamentalisms gained strength, increasing cultural tensions around gender identity and roles, minority rights, immigration, and national identity. Furthermore, instead of addressing the social and economic rights violations caused by neoliberal policies, governments reverted to cultural politics to manage public frustration.

These cultural strategies served as a divide-and-rule approach. Political leaders frame social problems around internal and external enemies, such as minorities, immigrants, feminists, global/cosmopolitan elites, and intergovernmental organizations, redirecting anger away from economic policy failures. This populist rhetoric divides society into “victims” and “others,” while promoting strong leadership as the solution to the grievances of “authentic and legitimate” citizens. Through this process, governments are able to maintain neoliberal economic structures while simultaneously weakening civil and political rights and shrinking the democratic space.

Arat concluded that democratic decline cannot be understood without recognizing the central role of social and economic rights. While inequality is important, it would not be destabilizing by itself; the erosion of welfare systems and the government's failure to meet basic human needs create conditions of instability and loss of legitimacy. Hence, as long as neoliberal policies continue to undermine social and economic rights, democracies remain vulnerable to backsliding and authoritarianism.

At a recent REDS seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center, Andrew Michta, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Hamilton School, delivered a sobering assessment of European security in an era of renewed great power conflict. Framed around the question “Will deterrence hold?”, Michta’s talk examined the structural weaknesses of Europe’s post–Cold War security order, the evolving threat environment posed by authoritarian powers, and the limits of both U.S. and European military preparedness.

Michta argued that Europe has spent the past three decades on what he termed a “vacation from history” — a period marked by disarmament, strategic complacency, and the belief that economic integration could substitute for hard security. The post-1990 unification of Germany, the enlargement of the European Union, and the decline of territorial defense planning reinforced the assumption that major war on the continent was no longer plausible. This mindset, he contended, left Europe strategically unprepared for Russia’s gradual re-militarization and revisionism, culminating in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

A central theme of the talk was the failure of the European Union to develop a credible, EU-centric security architecture. While EU elites pursued visions of a “United States of Europe,” Michta emphasized that political fragmentation, divergent threat perceptions, and regulatory obstacles have undermined collective defense capacity. Events such as Brexit, the 2015 migration crisis, and internal disagreements over Russia have further eroded cohesion. In Ukraine, these weaknesses have translated into a fragmented and often reactive European response.

Michta placed Europe’s challenges within a broader systemic context, highlighting the emergence of what he described as an “axis of dictatorships” linking Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea across the Eurasian landmass. Russia, he argued, is now fully mobilized for war, while China is expanding its military capabilities at unprecedented speed and scale. These dynamics are producing an “expanding battlefield” stretching from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific, raising the prospect of simultaneous regional conflicts. Referencing warnings by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Michta noted that a two-theater conflict by 2027 can no longer be dismissed as implausible.

The talk also addressed the constraints facing the United States and NATO. Despite unmatched global reach, U.S. forces have been reshaped by two decades of counterterrorism operations, face recruitment shortfalls, and are constrained by an industrial base ill-suited for protracted large-scale combat operations. European NATO members, with a few notable exceptions such as Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states, lack deployable forces and the industrial capacity needed for sustained deterrence.

In conclusion, Michta outlined a more pragmatic path forward centered on what he called NATO’s “Northeast Corridor” — a coalition of states in Northern, Baltic, and Central Europe that share threat perceptions and possess credible military capabilities. With continued U.S. support, particularly in nuclear deterrence, logistics, and long-range fires, this regional core could serve as the alliance’s new center of gravity. Whether deterrence ultimately holds, Michta suggested, will depend on how quickly Europe can translate recognition of risk into concrete military and political action — and on how the war in Ukraine ultimately ends.

On January 15, 2026, Emil Kamalov, CDDRL’s 2025-26 Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum (SURF) Postdoctoral Fellow, presented his team’s research on whether autocracies can draw citizens who have emigrated back to their country of origin. Historically, episodes of autocratization create huge migration waves. In recent times, countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, and Russia have experienced waves of emigration as a result of authoritarian leadership. When skilled professionals who are crucial to their country’s functioning leave, a phenomenon known as “brain drain,” a central question arises: if and how these individuals will return. This raises two key questions: can autocracies reverse such a brain drain and bring their citizens back, or can only democracies do so?

Kamalov turns to the case of Russian migration to explore these questions more directly. For many Russians, the 2022 war with Ukraine was an initial trigger for leaving the country. Kamalov explains that autocrats use emigration as a safety valve to manage dissent at home. In doing so, autocrats rely on several tools to maintain control. These include selective “valving,” which allows some citizens to emigrate while retaining enough workers critical to industry, as well as imprisonment to punish those who attempt to leave. For those who have already emigrated, autocrats may introduce special policies, such as financial or tax benefits for critical professions, in an attempt to attract them back to the country. 

Kamalov then discussed what motivates citizens to move into and out of countries. He outlines a list of push and pull factors, including economic conditions, integration and discrimination, and satisfaction with amenities and services. He identifies a gap in the literature, noting that there is relatively little focus on politics — specifically regime change, autocracy, and democracy. From this gap, Kamalov poses several questions: can autocrats lure emigrants back with incentives, will people return if democratization occurs, and does democratic backsliding in host countries push emigrants back home? For political emigrants in particular, political liberties are non-tradable in their decisions about return.

Turning fully to the case of Russian emigration, Kamalov notes that about one million Russians have left the country since the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine. This represents the largest brain drain since the collapse of the USSR. Forty-one percent work in the IT sector, and the majority of emigrants are highly skilled and educated, with many working in science, media, and the arts. This emigration represents a significant share of opposition-minded Russian citizens: most of those who left had experience with protest and civic engagement in Russia, and roughly 80 percent cite political reasons for their departure. In response, the Kremlin introduced several policies aimed at discouraging professional emigration or attracting emigrants back. These include mobilization exemptions for highly skilled workers in critical industries such as math, architecture, and engineering, as well as economic support for IT workers, including subsidized mortgages. Because of these policies, Russia serves as a useful case study for understanding whether the strategies autocracies use to entice citizens back or prevent them from leaving are actually effective.

In March 2022, Kamalov and his team launched a panel survey of Russian migrants consisting of five waves. Approximately 21,000 post-2022 Russian emigrants across around 100 countries participated. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to imagine hypothetical political scenarios in Russia and indicate whether they would return if those scenarios became reality. These scenarios ranged from highly realistic but undesirable to unrealistic but highly desirable. They included continued war with Putin in power, continued war with family mobilization exemptions, an end to the war without regime change, an end to the war with political amnesty but no regime change, and full regime change with pro-democratic forces coming to power. The team also analyzed respondents’ host countries, focusing on economic conditions, citizenship opportunities, and political environments.

The results show that having a good job or a path to citizenship in the host country reduces the likelihood of returning to Russia, while democratic backsliding in the host country increases it. Draft exemptions do not increase return at all. Ending the war alone would attract only about 5 percent of emigrants, ending the war combined with political amnesty would attract about 15 percent, while democratization is by far the most attractive scenario, drawing around 40 percent back. When looking at subgroups, all professional categories studied — culture, IT, media, science, and education — were similarly unlikely to return under non-democratic conditions. During democratization, around half would return, though those working in culture, such as artists and musicians, were somewhat less likely to do so. Younger emigrants were more likely to return than older ones.

When asked why they would not return, respondents cited high migration costs, regime volatility, and distrust of Russian society. Some believed that even with political change, Russian society would take much longer to become progressive. Those who said they would return pointed to home, family, opportunities, quality of life, migration fatigue, and, in some cases, disillusionment with democracy in host countries.

The findings of Kamalov’s team demonstrate that even removing the initial trigger for emigration cannot attract many emigrants back. Job opportunities can draw certain subgroups, even during wartime, but broader political conditions matter far more. Autocratic spillovers and cooperation also matter, as democratic backsliding in host countries can motivate return. Importantly, even those who currently cannot envision retu

On December 4, 2025, Nate Persily, the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, spoke about election administration in the United States during a CDDRL research seminar. Persily discussed revelations from the 2024 election and how the 2024 election can forecast the upcoming 2026 midterm election cycle. 

Persily started his talk by sharing the “Election Administrator’s Prayer”— "Oh God, whatever happens, please don't let it be close" — as close elections expose the “fragile underbelly” of the election administration system, like the 2024 election. Roughly 230,000 votes in key swing states ultimately determined Donald Trump’s Electoral College victory of 312 votes to Kamala Harris’ 226. 

Persily situated the 2024 results within the broader political trends. Traditional political science predictors — public evaluations of the incumbent administration and economic perceptions — pointed toward a Trump victory. At the same time, public confidence in the electoral system shifted. Republicans’ confidence in the national vote increased markedly compared to 2020, while Democrats’ confidence declined — a reversal Persily described as a “sore-loser” pattern, but a decline that saw greater change with Democrats than in past years. 

Persily narrowed in on the act of voting itself, and firstly covered vote-by-mail. He emphasized that vote-by-mail has a smaller partisan gap than might be assumed: states as ideologically diverse as Utah, California, and Washington rely heavily on all-mail voting. Nationwide, only about 34 percent of voters cast ballots on Election Day, reflecting a long-term move toward early in-person and mail voting. Persily emphasized that these categories themselves are increasingly fluid — voters may receive a mail ballot but choose to drop it off in person, complicating simple partisan narratives about “mail voters” versus “in-person voters.”

In 2024, states sent 67 million ballots to voters, and 72 percent were returned. About 1.2 million mail ballots were rejected, primarily due to missing or mismatched signatures — an issue concentrated among younger voters with inconsistent signatures and older voters experiencing age-related variation. Persily identified signature verification as a potential spot for further controversy, given its susceptibility to litigation, partisan pressure, and administrative inconsistency. In-person voting, by contrast, saw few changes from 2020. Approximately 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast, with 74 percent ultimately counted. 

Notably, several anticipated threats to the 2024 election did not materialize. Despite widespread discussion about AI-generated disinformation, deepfakes largely appeared in satirical contexts with little evidence of voter confusion. Fears of widespread voter suppression, election-related violence, and breakdowns in certification procedures were also less present than expected.

Persily highlighted several emerging risks that might impact the 2026 election cycle. Firstly, efforts to target overseas ballots for active military and overseas citizens (UOCAVA), particularly in Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, have increased, as have general efforts to review and purge voter rolls, signaling a growing interest in using administrative disputes to challenge ballot eligibility. 

Another concern was the over 227 bomb threats made against polling places and election offices, which led a few polling places to temporarily close or extend hours. The concern here is not necessarily the explosives themselves, as no explosives were found. Rather, Persily warned that voters might not go to the polls for fear of violence.

Other challenges included wide variation in county-level rules for curing mail ballots, particularly in Pennsylvania, where some counties offer robust curing opportunities, and others offer none — raising equal-protection concerns reminiscent of Bush v. Gore. Persistent state-level differences in counting speed, with California as the slowest, create openings for misinformation about “late-counted” ballots. Election-official turnover continues to rise, leaving many jurisdictions with less experienced administrators heading into 2026.

Persily then turned to new sources of pressure. A recent executive order requiring documentary proof of citizenship — paired with DHS review of state voter lists — could impose significant burdens, as many U.S. citizens lack passports or have name discrepancies with their documentation. On Truth Social, President Trump has also floated eliminating mail voting entirely and even ending the use of voting machines. Since May 2024, the Department of Justice has requested voter-registration databases from at least 21 states, heightening tensions over data privacy and federal authority. Persily raised concerns about the potential deployment of federal troops or ICE at polling places, noting that such actions are illegal but still feared. 

Persily lastly outlined what he called a “nuclear option.” A constitutional loophole allows Congress’s ability to refuse to seat duly elected members on the basis of qualifications, which then proceeds to a vote to seat a new member. This loophole, if used, could result in back-and-forth objections where no one is able to claim their seat. 

Persily emphasized the need for states to commit resources to speeding up mail-ballot counting, for courts to resolve executive-order challenges before the 2026 cycle begins, for early in-person voting to be encouraged, and for the House to articulate rules about objections to member seating well before November 2026. Ultimately, Persily argued that although most Americans will experience the 2026 elections as the same as elections in past years, states with competitive congressional districts may feel the strain. 

Persily ended by saying the present tension in our voting systems does not favor centralization, and perhaps, federalism is our friend at this current moment.