Introduction and Contribution

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) continue to deepen their decades-long authoritarian control over Turkish politics, economy, and society. Indeed, repressive tactics once reserved for Turkey’s marginalized Kurdish community have increasingly been applied to AKP’s opponents more generally, including journalists, business elites, and mayors. Key among these opponents is Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, viewed as the face of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). İmamoğlu, seen as the frontrunner to challenge Erdoğan’s presidency in 2028, was arrested in March 2025 on spurious charges of terrorism and corruption.

At the same time, Turkey’s opposition is finding ways to resist Erdoğan’s autocratization. CHP — which traces its roots to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his vision for a secular Turkish nation — learned from its disappointing loss in Turkey’s 2023 national elections. By transforming its electoral strategy for the 2024 local elections, the CHP not only bested AKP’s vote share but also won in many areas that are historically AKP strongholds, which are often populated by conservative voters. What explains the CHP’s significant local turnaround under the constraints of Turkey’s ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime? 

In “Turkey's Hard Road to Democratic Renewal,” Ayça Alemdaroğlu, Toygar Sinan Baykan, Ladin Bayurgil, and Aytuğ Şaşmaz caution against the received wisdom that broad, national-level coalitions offer the best hope of undermining authoritarian power. Such coalitions are difficult to sustain in countries like Turkey or Hungary, where authoritarian leaders control major political institutions and the public purse while muzzling their opponents and the media. Instead, the authors point to the surprising benefits of building alternatives to authoritarianism at the local level.

Argument

At first glance, the control of local governments in authoritarian political systems does not seem especially advantageous in terms of autonomy and influence. However, Turkish mayors control many of the policy domains that directly affect ordinary citizens, including transportation, sanitation, and housing. When local services and infrastructure are poor, voters may be willing to switch their partisan allegiance, even in places where the incumbent party works to distribute patronage and to propagandize them. Local governance enables opposition politicians to gain visibility and public support, as well as to demonstrate their administrative competence. 

How exactly did the CHP pull off its impressive local showing in 2024? As noted above, the opposition built a national-level coalition in 2023, fractured by ideological divisions and disputes over its presidential candidate against Erdoğan, ultimately collapsing after the election. It was no match for Erdoğan’s unified messaging around threats to Turkey’s national security — portraying Kurds at home and in Syria as threats — and on nationalist pride in Turkey’s indigenous defense industry.

In 2024, by contrast, the CHP’s campaign strategy emerged from the bottom up: it employed electoral strategists and pollsters across Turkish municipalities, conducted fieldwork in competitive areas, selected mayoral candidates who could win, created local coalitions across ideological lines, and fine-tuned its messaging around service provision. Its flexible and pragmatic strategy appealed to both Turkey’s Sunni majority as well as its minority Alevis and Kurds. Meanwhile, the AKP was highly centralized in its reliance on Erdoğan’s popularity, failing to adapt to the demands of local residents whose support it believed was guaranteed.
 

Unpacking the CHP’s Victory

To understand how the CHP won and how it consolidated its electoral gains, the authors conducted interviews with newly elected mayors and vice mayors, CHP party officials, activists, journalists, and political observers. Interviewees were selected from six municipal districts where no opposition-controlled mayor had won an election for at least two decades and where the CHP improved its vote share by five or more points between 2019 and 2024. In these traditional AKP strongholds, voters complained a great deal about the high cost of living in Erdoğan’s Turkey. At the same time, they were becoming less religiously conservative and less supportive of a “majoritarian” style of politics.
 

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Table 1: Six Turkish districts in brief
 

During the campaign, the CHP worked to reverse its image as a party committed to Atatürk’s “aggressive” secularism, sometimes nominating conservative Sunni candidates in otherwise divided districts. It focused not on ideology but on service delivery and other issues that appealed across ethnic and sectarian lines. Incumbent CHP mayors advised prospective mayors, creating intra-party relationships that were complemented by the work of CHP grassroots organizations. 

The authors introduce a number of the CHP’s successful mayoral candidates. Some of them were well-known national-level politicians who realized the benefits they could accrue by leaving Turkey’s toothless parliament and applying their skills to local government. Multiple mayors were of Kurdish and/or Alevi background, but they used these identities to appeal both inside and outside of their in-groups, for example, by attending Friday prayers with their Sunni constituents. One Alevi candidate gave municipal assembly list spots to conservative Sunnis and Kurds. By contrast, the AKP’s mayoral candidates — mainly nominated on the basis of their loyalty to Erdoğan — were perceived by their constituents as corrupt, aloof, and inefficient.

Challenges

Erdoğan’s opponents will likely struggle to reap the benefits of local governance, let alone to mount an effective challenge to AKP rule at the national level. These challenges will be heightened by AKP’s efforts to repress and arrest those whom it finds threatening. What’s more, CHP constituents expect not only the delivery of effective public services, but also patronage, especially public sector jobs, in exchange for their continued support. The AKP recognizes the challenge posed by its mayoral opponents and has responded by slashing municipal budgets. But the CHP is becoming more unified in the face of these common hardships posed by the AKP.

Ultimately, the growth of local-level CHP power opens up possibilities for democratic alternatives to AKP. The authors offer a novel perspective on how pragmatic local election campaigns, centered on service delivery, can serve as a means of undermining the influence of authoritarian leaders.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Introduction

Generative AI has become an incredibly attractive and widespread tool for people across the world. Alongside its rapid growth, AI tools present a host of ethical challenges relating to consent, security, and privacy, among others. As Generative AI has been spearheaded primarily by large technology companies, these ethical challenges — especially as viewed from the vantage point of ordinary people — risk being overlooked for the sake of market competition and profit. What is needed, therefore, is a deeper understanding of and attention to how ordinary people perceive AI, including its costs and benefits.

The Meta Community Forum Results Analysis, authored by Samuel Chang, James S. Fishkin, Ricky Hernandez Marquez, Ayushi Kadakia, Alice Siu, and Robert Taylor, aims to address some of these challenges. A partnership between CDDRL’s Deliberative Democracy Lab and Meta, the forum enables participants to learn about and collectively reflect on AI. The impulse behind deliberative democracy is straightforward: people affected by some policy or program should have the right to communicate about its contents and to understand the reasons for its adoption. As Generative AI and the companies that produce it become increasingly powerful, democratic input becomes even more essential to ensure their accountability. 

Motivation & Takeaways

In October 2024, the third Meta Community Forum took place. Its importance derives from the advancements in Generative AI since October 2023, when the last round of deliberations was held. One such advancement is the move beyond AI chatbots to AI agents, which can solve more complex tasks and adapt in real-time to improve responses. A second advancement is that AI has become multimodal, moving beyond the generation of text and into images, video, and audio. These advancements raise new questions and challenges. As such, the third forum provided participants with the opportunity to deliberate on a range of policy proposals, organized around two key themes: how AI agents should interact with users and how they should provide proactive and personalized experiences for them.

To summarize some of the forum’s core findings: the majority of participants value transparency and consent in their interactions with AI agents as well as the security and privacy of their data. In turn, they are less comfortable with agents autonomously completing tasks if this is not transparent to them. Participants have a positive outlook on AI agents but want to have control over their interactions. Regarding the deliberations themselves, participants rated the forum highly and felt that it exposed them to alternative perspectives. The deliberators wanted to learn more about AI for themselves, which was evidenced by their increased use of these tools after the deliberations. Future reports will explore the reasoning and arguments that they used while deliberating.
 

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^{The participants of this Community Forum were representative samples of the general population from five countries - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Nigeria, and South Africa. Participants from each country deliberated separately in English, Hindi, Turkish, or Arabic.}

Methodology & Data

The deliberations involved around 900 participants from five countries: India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. Participants varied in terms of age, gender, education, and urbanicity. Because the deliberative groups were recruited independently, the forum can be seen as five independent deliberations. Deliberations alternated between small group discussions and ‘plenary sessions,’ where experts answered questions drawn from the small groups. There were around 1000 participants in the control group, who did pre- and post-surveys, but without deliberating. The participant sample was representative with respect to gender, while the treatment and control groups were balanced on demography as well as on their attitudes toward AI. Before deliberating on the proposals, participants were presented with background materials as well as a list of costs and benefits to consider.

In terms of the survey data, large majorities of participants had previously used AI. There was a statistically significant increase in these proportions after the forum. For example, in Turkey, usage rates increased from nearly 70% to 84%. In several countries, there were large increases in participants’ sense of AI’s positive benefits after deliberating, as well as a statistically significant increase in their interest. The deliberations changed participants’ opinions about a host of claims; for example, “people will feel less lonely with AI” and “more proactive [agents] are intrusive” lost approval whereas “AI agents’ capability to increase efficiency…is saving many companies a lot of time and resources” and “AI agents are helping people become more creative” gained approval. After deliberating, participants demonstrated an improved understanding of some factual aspects of AI, although the more technical aspects of this remain challenging. One example here is AI hallucinations, or rather, the generation of false or nonsensical outputs, usually because of flawed training data.
 

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Proposals

Participants deliberated on nineteen policy proposals. To summarize these briefly: In terms of whether and how AI remembers users’ past behaviors and preferences, participants preferred proposals that allowed users to make active choices, as opposed to this being a default setting or only being asked once. They also preferred being reminded about the ability of AI agents to personalize their experience, as well as agents being transparent with users about the tasks they complete. Participants preferred that users be educated on AI before using it, as well as being informed when AI is picking up on certain emotional cues and responding in “human-like” ways. They also preferred proposals whereby AI would ask clarifying questions before generating output. Finally, when it comes to agents helping users with real-life relationships, this was seen as more permissible when the other person was informed. Across the proposals, gender was neither a significant nor consistent determinant of how they were rated. Ultimately, the Meta Community Forum offers a model for how informed, public communication can shape AI and the ethical challenges it raises.

The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

What is the most exciting or impactful finding from your research, and why do you think it matters for democracy, development, or the rule of law?

My current research examines the question of how opposition movements survive in authoritarian contexts, with a focus on recent local elections in Turkey, where conservative incumbents were defeated for the first time in decades. We found that the opposition successfully built bottom-up alliances at the local level, which may be more successful than parties trying to form coalitions at the national level. 

This is because top-down alliances, as were attempted to be formed in Turkey in 2023, tend to be fragile and lack sufficient power to win elections. Top-down efforts involve convincing leaders of ideologically opposed parties to join together, which often isn’t effective in convincing their base to join suit. 

On the other hand, bottom-up local action can be much more powerful, with alliances in municipalities formed through an intimate knowledge of how resources and power are distributed among groups. These opposition coalitions, bound together by substantive ideas and community knowledge, tend to be more persuasive. 

This research demonstrates the power of local government and how opposition can be strengthened through numerous bottom-up alliances, as opposed to a weak, top-down national approach. Still, there are difficulties in preventing authoritarian backlash as a response to oppositional successes. After the loss of many governing party candidates in Turkey recently, there has been a new wave of coercion against municipal leaders, such as the Istanbul mayor being jailed after running as a presidential candidate. Several other newly elected mayors have been in jail for months without even an indictment.

How does the increased authoritarianism in Turkey fit into the context of global democratic recession? Are these patterns of oppositional gains in local elections a sign of a more optimistic future for Turkey, or is it still in a state of democratic decline?

I believe our research suggests that the opposition is more effectively contesting the governing party; however, it is too early to say whether this could serve as a model for a broader shift. Despite being embedded in European organizations and experiencing a moment of democratization in the 2000s, Turkey has become increasingly authoritarian, becoming one of the earliest cases of modern democratic decline. Also, global influences are harming Turkey’s trajectory, such as the presence of a more undemocratic leader in the U.S.
 

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change?

When starting research, I don’t think of writing policy as my main goal. Instead, it’s to understand big questions or add more nuance to a discussion about a phenomenon. My research today on local power dynamics and bottom-up coalition building continues to have real-world relevance in the battle against authoritarian regimes.

Returning to your research on Turkey and particularly the plight of the Kurdish minority, how can states mitigate the effects of ethnic fractionalism on development?

In Turkey, I think of democratization as being possible through the recognition of the cultural and political rights of the Kurds. The opening of systems to those who have been historically excluded would benefit not only democratic development but also economic development. This is because ethnically inclusive states are more prosperous, as otherwise, ethnic conflict hinders development, with national security concerns scaring off investment.

Amidst increasing authoritarianism, have situations for minorities like the Kurds worsened or improved over time?

While there have been gestures of peace with the Kurds, when those efforts fail, the Turkish government often strengthens authoritarian measures. This is exemplified by the peace negotiations from 2013 to 2015, which initially resulted in the Kurds amassing more political power. This caused the regime to fear being undermined and become more coercive toward the minority group in the long run.

Overall, improvements for the Kurds have not been linear. Peace negotiations are currently underway, though many believe them to be insincere. When looking at the regime’s other policies towards opposition, journalists, and students, it’s easy to be pessimistic. 

What gaps do you feel need to be addressed in your research field, and what do you anticipate you will study more in the future?

In the intellectual circles I have been a part of, academics tend to come from a political science background. I’m more interested in bringing in cultural and sociological perspectives, such as through discussions of social class or different ethnic groups. My research will continue to unite multi-disciplinary ideas to gain a deeper understanding of authoritarian regimes.

Could you elaborate further on your research into youth participation?

Currently, I’m working on a project comparing the U.S. and Turkey to better understand youth political behavior. In the recent elections in both countries, there was a lot of emphasis on the youth voice as a counter-authoritarian force, but this prediction did not necessarily hold true. In the US, many were persuaded by Trump’s agenda, especially young men. It’s important not to generalize too much when studying youth, as they are as diverse as the rest of the population. Still, there are notable trends among young people to monitor, like the Turkish youth’s growing secularism and how that might impact the Islamist parties’ power. 

You’ve discussed the importance of recognizing the impact of class when conducting research. How do you think politicians have capitalized on class to maintain power in Turkey, and is the opposition or current regime more supported by the working class?

The Islamist parties have been most known to garner support from lower economic groups. While the main opposition party is relearning how to succeed among the working class, it would be an overstatement to assume this shift has significantly expanded beyond the local level at this point.

President Erdogan was able to amass power by garnering support from the poor, going door-to-door and engaging in bottom-up efforts to get their votes. Now, opposition leaders appear to be learning from these strategies, leading to improved outcomes so far.
 

Lastly, what books would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field?

I may be expected to recommend political science books, but it is American sociologist Richard Sennett who especially influenced me early in my career. He focuses on how big social changes affect individuals. His book, The Hidden Injuries of Class, shaped my understanding of how social class is not just a reflection of an individual’s position in society, but also influences one’s sense of self. He also wrote Respect in a World of Inequality about how changes in the economy and labor market influence individuals. Sennet’s work successfully approaches issues in a humane, historical, and power-conscious way.