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SURF Predoctoral Fellow, 2023-24
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Sierra Nota is a doctoral candidate (ABD) in Russian and East European History at Stanford University. Her dissertation explores the relationship between Mezhyhirya, a land parcel north of Kyiv, and the regimes that possessed it from 1786 to 2014. She has also conducted archival research on Siberian city planning, the Nazi Occupation of Ukraine, and the formation of the Russo-Ukrainian border. Before Stanford, Sierra received her BA, summa cum laude, from Harvard University.

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From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.



Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)
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Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Michael McFaul Headshot

Michael McFaul

Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

Woman smiling

Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
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The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

Man smiling

Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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Understanding Russia and the War in Ukraine

For more commentary and analysis from FSI scholars about the war in Ukraine and events in Russia, follow the link to our resources page, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’

Read More

Michael McFaul moderates a panel with Oleksiy Honcharuk, Serhiy Leshchenko, Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova on the one-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Ukraine’s Fight for Democracy, One Year In

To commemorate the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian leaders joined a panel hosted by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies to express their hopes for victory and their gratitude for Western support.
Ukraine’s Fight for Democracy, One Year In
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Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia. | Getty
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Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer insight on what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may signal about Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

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Leader personality has a major impact on decisions made and policies chosen, yet the systematic study of political leadership using observational data is challenging. This is particularly true in closed informational settings of authoritarian regimes, where, incidentally, the effects of leader personalities are often more pronounced and less institutionally constrained. I show one way of addressing this challenge by focusing on political ambition, or self-selection into the political career, and exploring how selection rules affect an individual decision to run for office in a lab setting. I argue that certain properties of the selection process lead to self-selection based on risk attitudes.  Using a series of laboratory experiments in Russia, I demonstrate that higher costs of candidacy and public accountability of the selected officials lead to an increased role of risk-seeking in the decision to pursue an office. These findings suggest, for example, that in hybrid regimes, pro-regime candidates would be more risk-averse than the opposition candidates. The study shows the directions for theory development and research within the scholarship on ambition and candidacy under imperfect democracies and non-democratic regimes.

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Guzel Garifullina
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Stan Markus seminar

Why do super-wealthy business owners in developing democracies engage in politics? Is corporate political activity fundamentally “defensive” or “offensive” in nature?

Using an original longitudinal dataset of 177 Ukrainian oligarchs, this paper investigates the reasons for (and the ramifications of) tycoons’ political activity. The analysis differentiates between political and economic vulnerabilities — as well as capabilities — of the oligarchs as antecedents for their political strategy. I also investigate how asset specificity of oligarchs’ portfolios, as well as their media ownership and foreign holdings, mitigate the results. Theoretical implications are drawn for our understanding of state-business relations in emerging democracies lacking the rule of law.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Stan Markus is an Associate Professor of International Business at the University of South Carolina and an Associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Markus works on state-business relations and is broadly interested in the political economy of development. His projects explore property rights protection, oligarchs, corporate social responsibility, lobbying, corruption, state capacity, and institution building.

His book — Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2015) — was awarded the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. His research has also been published in the leading peer-reviewed journals in management (e.g. Academy of Management Review), political science (e.g. Comparative Political Studies), development studies (e.g. Studies in Comparative International Development), economic sociology (e.g. Socio-Economic Review), and general interest (e.g. Daedalus). It has also been recognized through many awards, including the Wilson Center Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in D.C.; the Harvard Academy Fellowship from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; the Jean Monnet Fellowship from the European University Institute; the Academy of Management Best Paper Award; and the Best Article in Comparative Politics Award from APSA.

Markus's commentary has been featured in media outlets, including CNN, BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, Bloomberg, Forbes, Fortune, CNBC, NPR, Vox, and Voice of America, among others.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

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CDDRL Visiting Scholar, 2023
Associate Professor of International Business, University of South Carolina
Associate, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
stanislav.markus_-_stanislav_markus.jpg

Stan Markus is an Associate Professor of International Business at the University of South Carolina and an Associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Markus works on state-business relations and is broadly interested in the political economy of development. His projects explore property rights protection, oligarchs, corporate social responsibility, lobbying, corruption, state capacity, and institution building.

His book — Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2015) — was awarded the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. His research has also been published in the leading peer-reviewed journals in management (e.g. Academy of Management Review), political science (e.g. Comparative Political Studies), development studies (e.g. Studies in Comparative International Development), economic sociology (e.g. Socio-Economic Review), and general interest (e.g. Daedalus). It has also been recognized through many awards, including the Wilson Center Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in D.C.; the Harvard Academy Fellowship from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; the Jean Monnet Fellowship from the European University Institute; the Academy of Management Best Paper Award; and the Best Article in Comparative Politics Award from APSA.

Prof. Markus has lived in Russia, Ukraine, China, and several West European countries. He has native fluency in Russian and German, proficiency in French and Ukrainian, and a conversational understanding of Mandarin.

His commentary has been featured in media outlets, including CNN, BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, Bloomberg, Forbes, Fortune, CNBC, NPR, Vox, and Voice of America, among others.

Stanislav Markus Associate Professor of International Business | Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina Associate Professor of International Business | Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina Associate Professor of International Business | Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina
Seminars
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Nora Fisher-Onar seminar

Nora Fisher-Onar will present an original and timely key to (Turkey’s) politics as driven not by any perineal conflict between “Islamist vs. secularist,” “Turk vs. Kurd,” or “Sunni vs. Alevi.” Rather, she argues, the driving force of political contestation is shifting coalitions of moderates across camps who seek to pluralize public life, versus coalitions of those who champion ethno- and ethno-religious nationalism. Using the key to retell Turkey’s political history from the late Ottoman empire through to the present, she concludes with insights for coalition dynamics today. The talk emanates from her book, Contesting Pluralism(s): Islam, Liberalism, and Nationalism in Turkey and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

This talk is hosted in partnership with CDDRL's Program on Turkey.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Nora Fisher-Onar is Associate Professor and Director of the Masters of Arts in International Studies at the University of San Francisco, as well as coordinator of Middle East Studies. Her research interests include IR and social theory, comparative politics (Turkey, Middle East, Europe), foreign policy analysis, political ideologies, gender, and history/memory.

She received a doctorate in IR from Oxford and holds master's and undergraduate degrees in international affairs from Johns Hopkins (SAIS) and Georgetown universities, respectively.

Fisher-Onar is the lead editor of the volume, Istanbul: Living With Difference in a Global City (Rutgers University Press, 2018) and author of Contesting Pluralism(s): Islam, Liberalism and Nationalism in Turkey (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

She has published extensively in academic journals like the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), Conflict and Cooperation, Global Studies Quarterly, Millennium, Theory and Society, Women’s Studies International Forum, and Turkish Studies.

Fisher-Onar also contributes policy commentary to platforms like the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, the Guardian, and OpenDemocracy, and fora like Brookings, Carnegie, and the German Marshall Fund (GMF). At the GMF, she has served as a Ronald Asmus Fellow, a Transatlantic Academy Fellow, and a Non-Residential Fellow.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Ayça Alemdaroğlu
Ayça Alemdaroğlu

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Nora Fisher-Onar
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Peter Henry seminar

In 1985, James A. Baker III's “Program for Sustained Growth” proposed a set of economic policy reforms, including inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, greater openness to foreign investment, and privatization, that he believed would lead to faster growth in countries then known as the Third World, but now categorized as emerging and developing economies (EMDEs).

A country-specific, time-series assessment of the reform process reveals three clear facts. First, in the 10-year-period after stabilizing high inflation, the average growth rate of real GDP in EMDEs is 2.6 percentage points higher than in the prior ten-year period. Second, the corresponding growth increase for trade liberalization episodes is 2.66 percentage points. Third, in the decade after opening their capital markets to foreign equity investment, the spread between EMDEs average cost of equity capital and that of the US declines by 240 basis points. The three central facts of reform provide empirical support for the Baker Hypothesis.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Peter Blair Henry is the Class of 1984 Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and dean emeritus of New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business. The youngest person ever named to the Stern Deanship, Henry has authored numerous peer-reviewed articles in the flagship journals of economics and finance, as well as a book on global economic policy, Turnaround: Third World Lessons for First World Growth (Basic Books).

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Didi Kuo
Didi Kuo

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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peter_blair_henry_-_peter_henry.jpg

Peter Blair Henry is the Class of 1984 Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and Dean Emeritus of New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business. The youngest person ever named to the Stern Deanship, Peter served as Dean from January 2010 through December 2017 and doubled the school’s average annual fundraising. Formerly the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of International Economics at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business, from 2001–2006 Peter’s research was funded by an NSF CAREER Award, and he has authored numerous peer-reviewed articles in the flagship journals of economics and finance, as well as a book on global economic policy, Turnaround: Third World Lessons for First World Growth (Basic Books).

A Vice Chair of the Boards of the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Economic Club of New York, Peter also serves on the Boards of Citigroup and Nike. In 2015, he received the Foreign Policy Association Medal, the highest honor bestowed by the organization, and in 2016 he was honored as one of the Carnegie Foundation’s Great Immigrants.

With financial support from the Hoover Institution and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Peter leads the PhD Excellence Initiative, a predoctoral fellowship program in economics that identifies high-achieving students with the deepest commitment to economic research and prepares them for the rigors of pursuing a PhD in the field. For his leadership of the PhD Excellence Initiative, Peter received the 2022 Impactful Mentoring Award from the American Economic Association. Peter received his PhD in economics from MIT and Bachelor’s degrees from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was a Morehead-Cain Scholar, a member of Phi Beta Kappa, a reserve wide receiver on the football team, and a finalist in the 1991 campus-wide slam dunk competition.

Born in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1969, Peter became a U.S. citizen in 1986. He lives in Stanford and Düsseldorf with his wife and four sons.

Class of 1984 Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Dean Emeritus, New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business
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Peter Blair Henry
Seminars
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CDDRL Visiting Scholar, 2023
Associate Professor of International Business, University of South Carolina
Associate, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
stanislav.markus_-_stanislav_markus.jpg

Stan Markus is an Associate Professor of International Business at the University of South Carolina and an Associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Markus works on state-business relations and is broadly interested in the political economy of development. His projects explore property rights protection, oligarchs, corporate social responsibility, lobbying, corruption, state capacity, and institution building.

His book — Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2015) — was awarded the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. His research has also been published in the leading peer-reviewed journals in management (e.g. Academy of Management Review), political science (e.g. Comparative Political Studies), development studies (e.g. Studies in Comparative International Development), economic sociology (e.g. Socio-Economic Review), and general interest (e.g. Daedalus). It has also been recognized through many awards, including the Wilson Center Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in D.C.; the Harvard Academy Fellowship from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; the Jean Monnet Fellowship from the European University Institute; the Academy of Management Best Paper Award; and the Best Article in Comparative Politics Award from APSA.

Prof. Markus has lived in Russia, Ukraine, China, and several West European countries. He has native fluency in Russian and German, proficiency in French and Ukrainian, and a conversational understanding of Mandarin.

His commentary has been featured in media outlets, including CNN, BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, Bloomberg, Forbes, Fortune, CNBC, NPR, Vox, and Voice of America, among others.

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Andrei Soldatov
Credit: Andrei Soldatov

The Kremlin's political thinking has always been defined by an acute feeling of insecurity, rooted in the 20th century’s traumas -- the Bolshevik Revolution, Civil War, the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Vladimir Putin added to that his personal paranoia and Russia's security services to the mix. Since 1999, the security organs play a disproportionate role in Russian politics. Andrei Soldatov will explore the impact of the security services on the causes and course of the war during the first year of Russian invasion.   

Andrei Soldatov is a Russian investigative journalist, co-founder, and editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities (blocked by Russia's authorities in 2022). He is co-author with Irina Borogan of The New Nobility. The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (PublicAffairs, 2010), The Red Web: The Kremlin's wars on the Internet (PublicAffairs, 2015), and The Compatriots: The Russian Exiles Who Fought Against the Kremlin (PublicAffairs, 2022). Soldatov has been on the wanted list of the Russian authorities since May 2022, facing up to 10 years in prison.

This event is co-sponsored by CREEES Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies.


In-Person: Encina Commons 123
Online: Via Zoom

Andrei Soldatov
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Meduza website on cell phone screen
Meduza.io

Meduza is the last remaining independent Russian media outlet. It continues to reach millions of people inside the country despite the project’s newsroom having to operate from exile for the last eight years. In April 2021, Russian authorities designated Meduza as a “foreign agent” in an attempt to knock out its advertising income, and weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the government began blocking Meduza’s website outright. Finally, in January 2023, the Kremlin banned Meduza completely, declaring the outlet an illegal “undesirable organization.”

In an event* hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University, Meduza’s editor-in-chief and CTO will discuss what is happening in Russia’s media landscape, how they covered the last year of brutal warfare in Ukraine and the invasion’s reverberations back in Russia, how readers in Russia have responded to the war, the nature of “proxy reporting,” and the challenges in maintaining journalistic objectivity when you’re treated like an outlaw. Meduza’s senior managers will also talk about how the outlet delivers content to people inside Russia, behind the Kremlin’s Internet firewall.

*Please note that this event is open to Stanford affiliates and invited guests only.

You can also follow Meduza’s English-language edition or support the newsroom’s work with one-time or recurring donations. 

Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This event is open to Stanford affiliates and invited guests only.

Panel Discussions
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has heavily affected country’s research and development (R&D) sector. In particular, it has caused considerable damage to research infrastructure and forced researchers to leave their homes, ruined many research teams and paralysed their work, and stopped funding and implementation of many research projects. All these devastating consequences of the full-scale war have piled on top of the existing problems and challenges of Ukrainian science and deepened its long-term crisis.

Recognition and analysis of these systemic challenges implies that the reconstruction of the Ukrainian R&D sector cannot be seen simply as physical rebuilding of the damaged research infrastructure. It is essential to transform the R&D sphere itself and build ways for science to benefit the economy and society. To enable the ‘build back better’ principle of Ukraine’s reconstruction, science, technology and innovation should be the cornerstone of the national reconstruction strategy, and their transformation should be seen as an essential part of the EU accession. This implies that, first, the agency responsible for Ukraine’s reconstruction should have a dedicated unit supervising the R&D sector. And second, Ukraine’s R&D sector should be reformed as early as possible. At the same time, its reforms need to be systemic, accurately designed and appropriately supported. If supported by appropriate resources, the National Council on Science and Technology can start designing these reforms right away.

A crucial and urgent task is helping researchers (who have mostly stayed in Ukraine) remain researchers, that is, ensuring that they do not leave for other sectors. To this end, we suggest that the government, together with international donors, provides stipends to researchers selected on merit-based principles. Furthermore, it is important to support the development of networks and partnerships at different levels - among Ukrainian researchers; among Ukrainian and foreign researchers; among researchers, businesses and local governments. These networks and partnerships will be essential for the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

For the long-term transformation of the science sphere, we suggest the introduction of performance-based funding; the gradual transition of the most capable research teams under the new research societies (created in parallel with existing academies of sciences) with a simultaneous increase in their funding; intensifying European integration of Ukrainian science, including integration of research infrastructure; and data-driven R&D policy development, the foundation for which has been already laid. Closing the gap between education and research is also one of our key recommendations.

ABOUT THE BOOK

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Cover of Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and policies

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of what Ukraine should become after the war and what tools policymakers can use to fulfill these goals. It provides perspectives from leading scholars and practitioners. While each chapter of the book covers a specific sector, there is a natural overlap across the chapters because Ukraine’s reconstruction should involve a comprehensive transformation of the country. The leitmotif of this book is clear: reconstruction is not about rebuilding Ukraine to the pre-war state; it is about a deep modernisation of the country on its path to European Union accession. All critical elements of the economy and society will have to leapfrog and undergo reforms to help Ukraine escape its post-Soviet legacy and become a full-fledged democracy with a modern economy, strong institutions and a powerful defence sector. Ukraine’s ownership of the reconstruction will be key to its success.

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A chapter in Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and policies, edited by Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Ilona Sologoub, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro.

Authors
Yulia Bezvershenko
Book Publisher
CEPR Press, London
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