Various forms of sabotage and corruption that stem from workers' inability to voice their discontent at perceived injustices any other way have cost the Soviet and post- Soviet societies dearly. Under what circumstances are workers ready to take overt action against perceived injustices against themselves and the interests of their colleagues?

Using ordered logistic regression models and People's Security Survey data from a 2004 national sample from Ukraine, this paper argues that different forms of socio-economic security significantly increase the readiness of workers to take action if faced with grievances. Our findings add to the body of literature on mobilization in several ways. First, they contribute to the social movement literature on Post-Soviet countries by focusing on Ukraine.

They also enrich the social movement literature by the concept of security or the perception of resources across time. Furthermore, our models translate largely macro-level concepts, such as the political opportunity structure, to the microlevel of an individual's attitudes as they relate to their work life. Finally, our results provide limited support for the older grievance theory in the social movement literature: grievance is not the most influential factor, yet it remains significant.

Russia's invasion of Georgia last month seriously undermined peace and security in Europe for the first time in years. Russia's military actions and subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states also represent a fundamental challenge to the norms and rules that help to promote order in the international system.

The initial skirmishes between Ossetian and Georgian forces that first sparked this conflict in early August 2008 should have been contained. Had the international community – led by an attentive and proactive American government – engaged both the Russian and Georgian governments in an effort to first stop the violence immediately, and then more ambitiously, to mediate a permanent solution to Georgia’s border disputes, this war might have been avoided. It still remains unclear what sequence of events turned skirmishes into war -- an international investigation should be conducted to shed light on this question. Irrespective of who moved first to escalate, the Georgian government’s decision to use military force to reassert its sovereignty over South Ossetia, which included sending its forces into the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was short-sighted and ill-considered. Nonetheless, Georgian military action within its borders can in no way be equated with or cited as an excuse for Russia’s invasion and then dismemberment of a sovereign country. Russia’s actions were disproportionate and illegal. The tragic loss of life – soldiers and civilians alike – on all sides was regrettable, unnecessary and avoidable.

Because Georgia is a democracy, Georgian voters will someday judge the decisions of their government last month. But let’s not confuse that discussion with a clear-headed understanding of Russian motivations. Russia’s military actions last month and continued illegal occupation of Georgian territory today were not a mere defensive reaction to Georgian military actions in South Ossetia. On the contrary, the Kremlin’s moves represent the latest and boldest moves in a long-term strategy to undermine Georgian sovereignty, cripple the Georgian economy, and ultimately overthrow the democratically-elected government of Georgia. Moreover, Russia’s government actions in Georgia constitute just one front of a comprehensive campaign to reassert Russian dominance in the region through both coercive and cooperative instruments.

The 2005 elections in Azerbaijan qualify as a failed transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The ability of the Aliyev regime to maintain its hold on power reflected both internal and external factors.  Although there is no way to judge the level of actual support for the government, Aliyev retained control of the security apparatus. Through its control of oil and gas revenues and the tight links between most business endeavors and politics, and its control of the broadcast media in particular, the regime was also able to prevent the opposition, which was more united than in previous elections, from mounting effective campaigns to mobilize citizens as voters or protestors.  Thus, although the Aliyev regime was vulnerable along certain dimensions (sizable groups living in poverty amidst high economic growth and rampant corruption in particular), in others, it was not. The lack of clear outside interest in seeing regime change in Azerbaijan was another factor that worked in the regime

Do external factors facilitate or hamper domestic democratic development? Do international actors influence the development of greater civil and political freedom, democratic accountability, equality, responsiveness and the rule of law in domestic systems? How should we conceptualize, identify and evaluate the extent and nature of international influence?

These are some of the complex questions that this volume approaches. Using new theoretical insights and empirical data, the contributors develop a model to analyze the transitional processes of Romania, Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine. In developing this argument, the book examines:

• the adoption, implementation and internalization of the rule of law
• the rule of law as a central dimension of liberal and substantive democracy
• the interaction between external and domestic structures and agents

Offering a different stance from most of the current literature on the subject, International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the international dimensions of democratization. This book will be of importance to scholars, students and policy-makers with an interest in the rule of law, international relations theory and comparative politics.