On February 26, the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) was pleased to host Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat for a talk on his new book, The Art of Diplomacy. Eizenstat’s distinguished career in Washington, spanning five decades, included his work as a former ambassador to the European Union and as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He spoke with Stanford faculty and students about the importance of diplomacy and the dangers of isolationism. Drawing from personal experience and examples from close colleagues such as Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, Eizenstat identified the attributes and strategies necessary for diplomacy. Leaders engaged in diplomacy require “unsympathetic empathy,” courage, and intellect. They must know the other side’s history and culture, come to negotiations prepared, and possess stamina — both mental and physical — for months-long or years-long negotiations.

Eizenstat shared how his connection to Israel has inspired some of his teaching. He described how Jimmy Carter’s incremental progress and knowledge of his fellow negotiators allowed him to drive the Camp David Accords. In his stories about the Oslo Accords, he also highlighted the utility of back channels in negotiations.

Outlining the role of leverage in diplomacy, Eizenstat noted that whereas positive leverage involves giving the other side what they want, negative leverage includes actions such as sanctions and military support. He argued that sanctions are ineffective in the current era and that military force should come as a last resort. Offering analyses of the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the war in Gaza, Eizenstat described successful and unsuccessful uses of war in diplomacy. If resorting to war, leaders must prioritize national interests, stay equipped to change their plans, have good intelligence, understand local alliances and advantages, and establish post-war strategies.

During the question and answers portion of the seminar, Eizenstat spoke about deterrence, credibility, and strategic decision-making in international conflicts, referencing Obama's red line in Syria, Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis strategy, and the current situation in Ukraine. He also emphasized the roles public opinion and public pressure play in diplomacy, noting that they are far more powerful in democracies.

You can listen to the audio of Ambassador Eizenstat's presentation below:

McGill University Professor of Political Science Juliet Johnson unpacked how central banks use their own museums to support the ‘stability narrative’ and promote confidence in financial institutions. She discussed her research in a recent REDS seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center.

Central banks may be unique among government bureaucracies because of their investment in their own museums. Central banks focus on public outreach because monetary systems depend on collective belief in the value of money, as it is one of the most essential social contracts upon which modern society is built.

Museums can be effective instruments for improving faith in money and financial institutions. Visitors are unusually receptive to learning from museums because museums are often viewed as neutral, trusted guides. The number of central bank museums has increased significantly over the last two decades, and some get many visitors yearly. The Museum Bank Indonesia has an impressive 10,781 Google reviews and a 4.7-star rating.

The nearly 60 central bank museums that focus on economic education (in addition to numismatics and/or art) promote what Johnson calls the stability narrative, which is that central banks can maintain the value and security of money, represent the nation, and have become progressively more effective over time.

Through interactive exhibits and games, these museums aim to teach visitors that the central bank is needed to fight the evils of inflation. For example, the Bank of Finland museum has a display that features a green inflation monster to convey this sentiment. They use the exhibits to emphasize how people can be personally affected by inflation and, in many cases, to explain why maintaining a 2% inflation rate is ideal for protecting the value of money.

Central banks convey a sense of security to visitors through exhibits about detecting counterfeit money, regulating banks, and displaying their wealth, such as with gold bars. They tie their work to national pride through art displays about national heroes depicted on currency and by relating their work to prominent historical events. Through visual timelines, they convey how central bankers have learned from past mistakes and solved problems, making them more equipped to continue ensuring the stability of our financial system.

The rise of central bank museums exhibits the importance of improving public confidence in money and the financial institutions that control it, legitimizing an essential aspect of our society. 

At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.

In a recent REDS Seminar, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science Yoshiko Herrera examined the role of identity in shaping the causes, conduct, and impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the groups they align themselves with, Herrera explained, individuals hold collective memories and similar interpretations of a shared past. These memories and interpretations are often central to our understanding of wars. In the Russian context, the narrative of humiliation by the West in the 1990s and the urge to show strength against NATO expansion fueled Russia’s violent drive to assert its national identity.

During conflict, identity is central to an individual’s assessment of who is an ally or enemy. According to the social identity theory, humans cooperate more within their ingroups than outgroups, or those they perceive as different. Importantly, it can be difficult to determine which identity markers prevail the most. Although identity is often viewed through the limited lens of ethnicity, factors like nationality, religion, or gender can anchor group cohesion. In Ukraine, for example, a concept of national identity has unified people across other markers, such as ethnicity. The fundamental denial of Ukraine’s national identity has been central to Putin’s devastating invasion of the country.

Group alignment, moreover, continues to affect political attitudes throughout a war, affecting, for instance, how invested the masses are in victory. The perception of a conflict as an assault on identity tends to deepen the public’s personal investment in that conflict, as evidenced by Ukraine’s high military mobilization since the onset of the war.

Identity is not only a driver of conflict; it also is a dependent variable, or a domain that is shaped by the experience of war. In Ukraine, a cohesive national identity has strengthened in reaction to Russia’s devastating aggression. Language, a crucial dimension of identity, demonstrates this pattern; as of 2023, 82% of Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their “native tongue,” compared to only 57% in 2012. There has been a rapid evolution in how Ukrainians view themselves, extending beyond what even the most ardent nationalists could have hoped for a decade ago.

It is not just policy considerations and pragmatism that propel the decisions of political leaders; abstract and ever-evolving concepts of identity are motivating forces behind conflicts. Herrera’s research recognizes identity as a key factor influencing war, with the power to uniquely mobilize the masses. In the face of conflict, identities can change and strengthen; Russia’s construed narratives of national identity fuel its war conduct, while in Ukraine, there has been a corresponding maturing of a unified national identity. The role of identity in all aspects of conflict must not be underplayed, as it is manipulated by and motivates political leaders, especially in times of war.

In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), Cornell Assistant Professor of Political Science Bryn Rosenfeld explored a compelling question: Why do people in authoritarian regimes take bold political actions — such as protesting, voting for the opposition, or criticizing the government — despite the threat of severe consequences? Her research highlights the role of emotions, particularly anger, in motivating these high-risk decisions and provides fresh insights into the dynamics of dissent under repressive regimes.

Rosenfeld challenged the common assumption that high-risk political activism requires strong organizational ties, such as membership in activist groups or networks. While this holds true in some cases, she argued that recent civic uprisings in authoritarian regimes often involve ordinary individuals — novices with no prior links to organized activism. These participants act despite the threat of repression, presenting a puzzle for traditional theories of political participation.

Central to Rosenfeld's argument is the critical role of emotions in shaping political behavior. Authoritarian regimes often use repression as a tool to silence dissent, but her findings show that this strategy frequently backfires by triggering anger. When people experience acts of repression — such as arrests or violence during protests — they often view these actions as deeply unjust, fueling their anger. This anger reduces fear of risks, shifts focus from personal consequences to collective grievances, and creates a sense of urgency to act. As a result, anger motivates bold political actions like protesting or voting against the regime. In contrast, fear amplifies the perception of danger, discourages action, and reinforces passivity. Rosenfeld’s work demonstrates how anger can transform repression into a catalyst for resistance, showing that attempts to suppress dissent often inspire even greater mobilization.

Her research is grounded in extensive data collected between 2021 and 2023 in Russia, a period marked by significant political upheaval, including the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, widespread protests, and the invasion of Ukraine. Through surveys and experiments, she measured participants’ emotions, risk attitudes, and political intentions in response to different scenarios. Participants exposed to information about repression reported higher levels of anger, which translated into a greater willingness to protest or take other political risks. For example, participants in the repression treatment group showed significantly higher risk acceptance scores than those in the control group, highlighting anger’s pivotal role in driving political action.

Rosenfeld’s findings have far-reaching implications. They challenge the assumption that repression is an effective tool for silencing dissent, showing instead that it often fuels resistance by mobilizing anger and encouraging the acceptance of risk. Her work also explains why ordinary citizens — those without activist ties — sometimes take extraordinary risks to stand up to authoritarian regimes. By focusing on the interplay of emotions and risk, Rosenfeld underscores the paradox of repression: rather than quelling dissent, it can inspire ordinary people to take extraordinary risks in the pursuit of justice. Anger, often seen as a destructive force, emerges in her work as a powerful driver of political change.