Economic Affairs
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Michael Blake is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington. He holds a joint appointment with the Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. He received his bachelor degree in philosophy and economics from the University of Toronto, and his legal training at Yale Law School. He specializes in social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, and international ethics.

Sponsored by the Program on Global Justice, the Stanford Humanities Center, and the Department of Political Science (Stanford Political Theory Workshop).

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Michael Blake, PhD Associate Professor Speaker the University of Washington
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Michael M. May, Michael A. McFaul, Scott D. Sagan, David G. Victor, and John P. Weyant talk to Stanford magazine for the November/December cover story on energy security. It's not our oil dependence that's the problem, say these scholars - it's our vulnerability to oil producers who use revenues for political purposes that work against our own. In this discussion, these five FSI scholars talk about the dynamics of an energy security threat that's more serious than supply disruption, the risks of isolationist solution-seeking instead of collective action, and why we need to come up with good economic incentives for alternative-energy research.

Every day, the United States burns through 20.7 million barrels of oil. China, the world's second largest consumer, uses about 6.9 million barrels a day. Although the United States is the third leading oil producer in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Russia), its appetite is so enormous that it overwhelms the country's production capacity. Its known reserves, about 21 billion barrels, would supply only enough to keep the country running at full speed for about three years.

So when STANFORD gathered five faculty members to talk about the implications of U.S. dependency on foreign oil, we expected grave declarations of alarm. But their concern did not square with the growing chorus of citizens and elected officials about why reducing this dependency is so important.

On the next five pages, faculty from political science, economics, law and engineering explain why the debate about energy security is missing the point, and what they think needs to be done.

STANFORD: How would you frame the issue of dependency on foreign oil? What should we be concerned about?

David Victor: The problem is not dependence per se. In fact, dependence on a world market produces enormous benefits, such as lower prices. Nor is the problem that energy's essential role in the economy means that dependence must be avoided. The real problem is that energy - oil, especially - doesn't operate according to normal market principles. Something like 75 percent of the reserves of oil and gas are controlled by companies that are either wholly owned or in effect controlled by governments, and there's enormous variation in how those companies perform. Some of them are just a disaster, like [Mexico's state-owned oil company] Pemex, and others can work at world standards, like Saudi Aramco or Brazils Petrobrás. Some of these governments, such as Venezuela, use oil revenues for political purposes that undermine U.S. influence. High prices do not automatically generate new supply or conservation, partly because suppliers can drop prices to undercut commercial investment in alternatives. Second, we have what has become known as "the resource curse." There'sa lot of evidence that the presence of huge windfalls in poorly governed places makes governance even worse. Revenue that accrues to oil-exporting governments is particularly prone to being misspent, often in ways that work against U.S. interests.

Scott Sagan: I agree that calling the problem "energy dependence" and therefore seeking energy independence is the wrong way to think about this problem. Talking about energy independence feeds the xenophobic impulse that occurs all too easily in American politics. And it suggests to other countries that they should seek independence rather than a more cooperative approach. I see very negative consequences politically in the signal that attitude sends. Think about the current nuclear crisis with Iran. Iran claims that it needs independent uranium enrichment capabilities to have "energy sovereignty." Such uranium enrichment production could be used, however, for civilian nuclear power or for making a bomb, creating enormous nuclear weapons proliferation problems. We're feeding into that kind of thinking when we use the same language about independence when referring to oil. And it produces uncooperative effects elsewhere. The Chinese, for example, cut a deal with Sudan as a means of creating energy security for themselves. It inhibits efforts of the international community to encourage that government to behave responsibly.

John Weyant: There is a distinction between dependence, meaning how much of the oil the United States consumes is imported, and vulnerability, meaning how at risk our economy and our social order are to oil-supply disruptions. That vulnerability is defined by how much of the total supply of oil in the world market comes from unreliable sources. So you have to look at oil supply on a global scale, not just in the United States. It's the instability of the supply that affects price.

Victor: I like John's term "vulnerability," and it leads us to various kinds of actions to reduce our vulnerability to the market rather than trying to make us completely independent. One of them has been around since the '70s - building and coordinating strategic stockpiles so that they are supplied into a single world market. Traditionally that could be done by the major Western countries because they were the major oil consumers. One of the big challenges for policy makers today is how to get India and China to think about the operation of this world market in the same market-based way that we think about it, and to get them to build up those stockpiles and coordinate them with our own. There's some evidence that that kind of coordination can reduce our vulnerability.

Weyant: There's this fallacy among the public that if we don't import so much oil, other oil-exporting countries are going to be hurt and we will be unaffected if oil supplies are cut off. But these countries are sometimes major trading partners of allies, and asking those allies to take a hit on our behalf just leads to other economic problems. If the economies in China and Europe and Japan, who are all major trading partners, go down, it affects how much they can buy from us. It's another reason we can't be xenophobic and just look inward on an issue like this. You get these international trade flows outside the energy sector that could be pretty devastating.

STANFORD: Last summer we saw crude oil prices hit $70 a barrel and gas prices went well above $3 per gallon nationwide. That momentarily changed consumer behavior, and reduced demand. Are high prices a good thing?

Michael May: The key factor in normalizing market conditions is assuring the market that high prices are here to stay. Major oil companies like Exxon and bp have been putting their money to other uses than exploration. They have been buying back shares and increasing returns to stockholders because that's the way Wall Street drives them. That might change if prices stayed high. It probably won't be $70 a barrel, but even $50 a barrel as a base price is almost twice the historic average. The extent to which investors become convinced that that's going to be the future average will have some bearing as to how much money they spend on exploration. Toyota and General Motors and others can make hybrids or much more efficient cars, but it takes billons of dollars of investment, and if the price of gasoline goes down, they have less incentive. When gas is cheap, driving an SUV is not such a big deal.

Victor: The reason some of these companies are buying back the shares is not just because of Wall Street but because they don't have a lot of truly attractive opportunities for investing in new production. Most of the oil reserves are either legally off limits for the Western oil companies or international oil companies generally, or they're de facto off limits because they're in places where it's so hard to do business. Although the public is seized by the high price of energy, the major energy companies are seized by concerns that prices are going to decline sharply. If there is a recession, which would dampen demand for energy, or the capacity to produce oil around the world improves, then prices will decline. It has happened in the past. That fear really retards a lot of investment because these investments have a very long capital lifetime, and you need to protect them against low prices over an incredibly long time horizon.

Michael McFaul: It's very important to understand that oil companies owned and operated by governments are not necessarily profit-maximization entities. Take Gazprom, the gas company of Russia. It is closely aligned with state interests, so profit isn't its only motivation. It will use its money for strategic purposes as defined by Vladimir Putin, not as defined by the shareholders of Gazprom. For instance, early in 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, mostly for geopolitical reasons. Why is Hezbollah so well armed? Because of Iran, which uses oil revenue for strategic purposes; it is not used for investing in a company or investing in the market per se. This is part of the problem of the "resource curse" David referred to. If oil is discovered in a country before democratic institutions are in place, the probability of that country becoming democratic is very low. In countries where the state does not rely on the taxation of its citizens for its revenues, it doesn't have to listen to what its citizens want to do with that money. So instead of building roads or schools or doing things that taxpayers would demand of them, they use their money in ways that threaten the security of other countries, and, ultimately, their own.

Victor: It's important that we not overstate the extent to which users of energy are going to respond automatically to high prices, and the personal vehicle is a great example. Fuel accounts for about 20 percent of the total cost of operating a vehicle. Traditionally it's only been 10 or 15 percent, but we are much wealthier today than we were three decades ago when we had the [first OPEC oil embargo]. I think that helps explain a lot of the sluggishness in response in the marketplace. People are buying smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, but that trend will only go so far because there are other factors that determine what kinds of vehicles people purchase. In the United States and most advanced industrialized countries, most oil is used for transportation, where oil products have no rival. It is hard to switch. In most of the rest of the world, oil gets used for a variety of other purposes, including generating electricity. Those markets are probably going to be more responsive to the high price of oil because they're going to have opportunities to switch to other fuels. The United States used a lot of oil to generate electricity in the early 1970s and when that first oil shock came along, essentially all of that disappeared from our market. That's part of the reason why the U.S. energy system responded fairly quickly to the first oil shock, and why changes in behavior are harder to discern in the current crisis. There is no easy substitute for gasoline.

May: If we generally agree that high oil prices, on the whole, are a good thing because they cause investment in more production and more efficient uses of oil, then it would follow that the rapid growth in consumption in China is also a good thing and we should welcome it, right?

Victor: I disagree with that. In effect what we have right now is a "tax" that's been applied to the oil market due to the various dysfunctions of the way it operates and to unexpectedly high demand in the United States and China. The revenue from that tax is accruing to the producers, and if we think about how to get out of the mess here, then what we want to do is in effect apply a tax to the oil products. If we raise the price of these products to reflect the real total cost of our vulnerability to the world oil market, those companies have an incentive to go off and look for alternatives.

May: So you're saying the same thing: that high oil prices, whether from this tax or otherwise, are a good thing.

Weyant: It depends significantly on who is collecting the tax.

McFaul: Yes, the fundamental question is how the money is being spent. If I had high confidence that the money was going to reinvestment, then I could agree that high prices are good, but that's not what is happening. The Soviet Union's most dangerous adventures in the Third World correlated with the high oil prices in the 1970s. You can see the direct effect. And when the prices came down, the Soviet Union collapsed. The same is true with Iran today. They are being very aggressive in the region - in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Afghanistan - trying to become the Middle East hegemon. This would not be happening if they didn't have all these clients - Hezbollah, Hamas, their friends in Iraq - that they can support with millions of dollars. Going back a few decades, where did Osama bin Laden come from? Where did support for the Taliban come from? It came from this tax that David is talking about. If we're talking about security issues and oil, this is much more serious than supply disruption to the United States.

Victor: I agree with Mike 100 percent. If you look at where the revenues are going from Iran, Venezuela and so on, there's a long list of folks who are doing things that are contrary to our interests with the money that ultimately is coming out of the pockets of American consumers. Dealing with that is job one.

STANFORD: So how would you counsel American policy makers? What needs to happen to reduce our vulnerability over the long term?

Sagan: The vulnerabilities we have today should provide an incentive to make some critical investments and to change our thinking, but we're not really doing that. I was quite surprised at how much I agreed with one aspect of the second Bush inaugural address. [He said] let's start talking about our addiction to oil and all the problems associated with that, but I've been completely disappointed with the lack of follow-through. And part of the problem is this notion of energy independence. We need diversity in our research and development spending across the board, on a variety of technologies. We're going to produce energy security to a large degree by finding cooperative solutions that are efficient and secure for many countries working together. We need to see our national security as being very dependent on others and that's not entirely a bad thing.

Victor: There is one cluster of technology that's going to be exceptionally important - electric vehicles. The all-electric vehicle has been kind of a disaster. We tried to do that in California without much success at all. The new set of pluggable hybrid vehicles, which you plug in at night and charge up, are more promising. If such technologies make it feasible to reduce some of the transportation dependence on oil, then markets will be forced to become more "normal" and more responsive. Electric cars and other technologies can help to keep prices lower and ultimately help make the transition completely away from oil over a period of 30 or 50 years.

Weyant: We only think about energy as a nation when prices are high, and so there's a short attention span on the issue. That makes it really hard to sustain a policy that would be rational over the long term. If we're going to have a big R&D program, for example, you need to invest in technologies and sustain the investment over a long time horizon. If you couple this short attention span with our aversion to taxes, at least historically, you end up with policies that are almost designed from the outset to fail. The political tide is turning a little bit so a well-designed tax might be possible. Maybe you don't raise taxes now but you assure that the price of a [hybrid] car won't go below a certain level and that'll help create a little more confidence with the marketplace. If you just focus on research and development without getting the economic incentives right, you come up with all kinds of great gizmos that no one will actually make or use.

McFaul: We've been talking mostly about how to manipulate the market to change people's behavior and I think that's quite right. I can't tell you how many people I saw come out of a Palo Alto theater after seeing Al Gore's movie [An Inconvenient Truth] and jump into their gas-guzzling machines. I would like to tax those machines; use economic tools to change people's behavior in a way the movie didn't. This has to become a public policy issue. It's not right now. Think about the way the market for cigarettes worked in this country 50 years ago, and think of how it is structured now. We have not just taxes but regulation - they can't be advertised on television - and a national campaign trying to educate people about the health concerns. We need a similar effort on this issue.

Sagan: When you watch the Super Bowl you don't see advertisements for cigarettes, but you do for Hummers. There's no attempt at all to educate people about the relationship between these longer-term problems and what you do individually. And that takes decades.

Victor: One of the acid tests for whether the nation is pursuing a coherent energy policy is our policy on ethanol. Ethanol is important because it is a partial substitute for oil-based gasoline. In this country, almost all of the ethanol that is delivered to the marketplace is made from corn, which is economically inefficient. But we do that because the corn grows in the heartland, such as Iowa - an important state electorally. There have been lots of proposals to, for example, erase the tariff on imported ethanol. Brazil produces ethanol from sugar cane and it's much cheaper and more efficient. But the farm lobby always intervenes and these proposals languish, with the result that the U.S. ethanol industry never faces the rigors of world competition. So long as energy is bouncing around lower on the list of priorities, it will be difficult to have a coherent policy.

Weyant: It would be far better if people were willing to bite the bullet and say this is a problem and it's not going to be painless to solve it, but if we play our cards right it's not going to reduce our standard of living much. Convincing the public is really one thing that might be worth some more effort. It's a cacophony to them.

STANFORD: What is your greatest hope and your worst fear with regard to demand for oil?

Victor: My greatest hope is that inside the Chinese government and inside the Indian government people know that this independence view of the world energy market is completely wrongheaded. Maybe that will create an opportunity for the United States and India and China along with other major oil consumers to collectively manage this issue, and the consequences of doing that will spill over onto other areas of cooperation. My greatest fear, in addition to the things we've already discussed, is that the United States will use the oil issue to beat up on the Chinese and the Indians, and that our relationship with those countries, which is already fragile, will make it harder to work together on other things that also matter.

May: My greatest hope is that the United States, China, India and other major countries work together towards a more hopeful future, including improving the global environment, providing a counterbalance to mischief in the Middle East, and promoting a transition to modernization and away from extremism. My greatest fear is that the little termites who are nibbling at what is currently a somewhat sensible Chinese policy will have their way, either because the country's economy slows down - which it will inevitably - or for some other reason, and we'll wind up fighting each other or destroying each other's capabilities.

McFaul: My greatest sense of optimism comes from this discussion, and about what my colleagues in this discussion said about China, because from the surface it looks like there's a much more pernicious policy of China going its own way. I've learned today that in fact there are very reasonable voices within the Chinese government, and I hope that there will be in my own government. My greatest fear is that there will continue to be politicians who control oil revenues who do things that do not serve international security, and I'm speaking not only of Iran. My nightmarish scenario is that 10 years from now Iran, Iraq and, God forbid, Saudi Arabia are controlled by hostile governments that want to use the revenues that we pay them for their oil to harm us. I give that a low probability, but in terms of things that worry me about our security, it's the instability of those oil-exporting regimes.

Sagan: The hope is that this current crisis will provide the right set of incentives to encourage investment in a diverse set of energy R&D programs across the board, and will encourage cooperation between countries in energy research and development. That would help educate and change the culture of the United States away from a gas-guzzling, governor-in-the-Hummer culture. The fear is that this will become yet one more excuse to move to a more xenophobic policy that discourages cooperative international policies.

Weyant: Remember David Stockman, the erstwhile head of the Office of Management and Budget? I ran into him in Washington and he literally said to me, "Don't worry about oil security and disruptions or any of that stuff. We've got battleships to take care of this problem." That shocked me to no end, and my response was "Do you really want to be in that position, where that's your only option?" Your whole response is "We're best in the battleship field and you shouldn't mess with us?" This type of attitude is what worries me the most.

Sagan: We were earlier talking about the resource curse, and this strikes me as an example of the hegemon's curse. To not take the necessary steps on economic policies or energy policies because you think you've got a military backup solution. If our military strength causes us to be passive or uncooperative on the economic or energy front, it will have a boomerang effect that will really hurt us.

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In an article written for the current issue of the Washington Quarterly by Larry Diamond, Michael McFaull and Abbas Milani, suggests that the U.S. government seek a comprehensive agreement with Tehran that would "end the economic embargo, unfreeze all Iranian assets, restore full diplomatic relations, support the initiation of talks on Iran's entry into the WTO, encourage foreign investment, and otherwise move toward a normal relationship with the Iranian government." In exchange, Iran would have to suspend its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner, accept fundamental human-rights principles and terminate its "support for terrorist groups and activities, including training, intelligence support, and weapons shipments for Hezbollah, Hamas, and radical Shi'ite militias in Iraq." As much as possible, it is important that the people of Iran are made aware of the proposal and its benefits: "badly needed economic development, foreign investment, increased employment, new educational prospects at home and abroad and more generally an end to Iran's international isolation." Diamond, McFaul, and Milani think the Iranian regime will probably reject this grand bargain, but by doing so the mullahs "further undermine their already weak legitimacy with a young, restive, and suffering people. The blunt exposure of the mullahs' obsession with defending their own power and privilege at the expense of the public could intensify popular unrest, further divide an already splintered regime, and eventually create the conditions for regime crisis and transition to democracy. Heads we win, tails they lose."

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This talk will discuss the study of a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. However, while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.

About the speaker:

Philip Keeferis a Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. Since receiving his PhD in Economics from Washington University at St. Louis in 1991, he has worked continuously on the interaction of institutions, political economy and economic development on issues ranging from the impact of insecure property rights on economic growth to the effect of political credibility on the fiscal and monetary policy choices of governments. His work has appeared in journals ranging from the Quarterly Journal of Economics to the American Review of Political Science.

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Philip Keefer Lead Research Economist, Development Research Group Speaker the World Bank
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Dr. Andrei Illarionov served as President Valdimir Putin's Chief Economic Advisor (2000-2005) and his personal representative to the G-8 (2002-2005). He resigned from both posts in December 2005, in objection to the government's curtailment of political freedoms. From 1993 to 1994, Illarionov served as chief economic advisor to the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin. He resigned in February 1994 to protest changes in the government's economic policy. From 1994 to 2000, Illarionov was the director of the Institute of Economic Analysis.

Andrei Illarionov is a passionate advocate of an open society and democratic capitalism in Russia and a forceful and articulate critic of the political, economic, and social situation in the country.

Illarionov received his PhD in economics in 1987 from the Leningrad State University. Illarionov has coauthored several economic programs for Russian governments and has written three books and more than 300 articles on Russian economic and social policies. He joined the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity in 2006 as a senior fellow.

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Andrei Illarionov Chief Economic Advisor to the President of Russia, 2000 - 2005 Speaker
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Eleonora Pasotti is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UC Santa Cruz and Postdoctoral Fellow at CDDRL. Her work has been concerned with the relationship between democracy, personal power and electoral law. Pasotti's research at CDDRL is directed toward three aspects of this relationship: how proportional and majoritarian electoral systems interact with clientelistic networks; how institutions shape the cost structure of political mobilization; and how institutions of vote mobilization, from clientelism to mass campaigning, distort the normative goal of democracy. Her previous work has been based largely on the politics of Naples, Italy, but has broad comparative implications for the study of clientelism, patronage politics and populism in the developing world as well. Prior to joining the faculty at Santa Cruz, Eleonora completed a PhD in Political Science at Columbia University under the direction of Charles Tilly, Jon Elster, and Ira Katznelson. She also holds an MSc in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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UC Santa Cruz

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CDDRL Post-doctoral Fellow 2006 - 2007
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Eleonora comes to CDDRL all the way from UC Santa Cruz. Her work to date has been concerned with the relationship between democracy, personal power and electoral law. Her research at CDDRL will be directed toward three aspects of this relationship - how proportional and majoritarian electoral systems interact with clientelistic networks; how institutions shape the cost structure of political mobilization; and how institutions of vote mobilization, from clientelism to mass campaigning, distort the normative goal of democracy. Her previous work has been based largely on the politics of Naples, Italy, but has broad comparative implications for the study of clientelism, patronage politics and populism in the developing world as well. Prior to joining the faculty at Santa Cruz, Eleonora completed a PhD in Political Science at Columbia University under the direction of Charles Tilly Jon Elster and Ira Katznelson. She also holds an MSc in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Eleonora Pasotti Post-doctoral Fellow Speaker CDDRL
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Anders Åslund joined the Institute for International Economics in 2006. He has served previously as the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 2003 and as codirector of the Carnegie Moscow Center's project on Economies of the Post-Soviet States. He joined the Carnegie Endowment as a senior associate in October 1994. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His work examines the transformation of formerly socialist economies to market-based economies. While the central areas of his studies are Russia and Ukraine, he also focuses on the broader implications of economic transition.

Åslund has served as an economic adviser to the governments of Russia and Ukraine and to President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan. He was a professor at the Stockholm School of Economics and director of the Stockholm Institute of East European Economics. He has worked as a Swedish diplomat in Kuwait, Poland, Geneva, and Moscow. He is a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and an honorary professor of the Kyrgyz National University. He is co-chairman of the Economics Education and Research Consortium and chairman of the Advisory Council of the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw.

He is the author of Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cambridge University Press, 2001), How Russia Became a Market Economy (Brookings, 1995), Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform, 2d ed. (Cornell University Press, 1991), and Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe: The Non-Agricultural Private Sector in Poland and the GDR, 1945-83 (Macmillan, 1985) and editor or coeditor of several books, including with CDDRL Director, Michael McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

This event is co-sponsored with the Center on Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

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Anders Åslund Senior Fellow Speaker Institute for International Economics
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This event will be opened first by a talk on Terrorism and Motivation by Arie Kruglanski and then followed by a Roundtable conversation on Terrorism, Leadership and Motivation with Eva Meyersson Milgrom, SIEPR, Stanford University, Robert Powell, Department of Sociology, UC Berkeley, Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University

David Laitin, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, and Lee Ross, Department of Psychology, Stanford University.

Professor Kruglanski has been a pioneer in fields such as intrinsic motivation, open and close mindedness and goals and motivation. He is a frequent keynote speaker around the world, and a recipient of the Donald T. Campbell Award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution to Social Psychology, as well as the Humboldt Forschungspreis. Professor Kruglanski is a fellow of the American Psychology Association and the National Academy of Sciences. He is on the editorial boards of Psychological Review, New Review of Social Psychology and American Psychologist

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Arie Kruglanski Co-Director Speaker The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland
Paul Milgrom Professor Speaker Dept. of Economics, Stanford University
David Laitin Professor Speaker Department of Political Science, Stanford University

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Visiting Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Business
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Eva Meyersson Milgrom is a senior research scholar at CDDRL and a visiting associate professor at Stanford's Graduate School of Business and the Public Policy Program. She is also an associate professor and senior research fellow at the School of Business at Stockholm University in Sweden.

Her current research focuses on the following topics: (1) implications of social behavioral theories on economic growth, in conjunction with Guillermina Jasso of New York University; (2) institutional change and its effects on promotion and demotion in Swedish private companies; inter-firm wage mobility in Sweden from 1979-1990; labor markets segregation (firm and individual characteristics) in collaboration with Illong Kwon of the University of Michigan along with Mike Gibbs and Kathy Lerulli; (3) equity considerations and the trade-offs between complementarities and influence costs within organizations; and (4) the structure of inequality and extremism. At Stanford, she has taught courses on international corporate governance and on managing diversity.

Her previous interdisciplinary work includes the following: In the summer of 2002, she organized a laboratory to provide an institutional analysis of economic growth based on firm-matched data from four Scandinavian countries. In fall 2002, she organized a conference that brought together scholars from diverse fields to analyze the phenomenon of suicide bombing and to discuss how this phenomenon affects current social science thinking and research. A book is in the works on this topic. Meyersson Milgrom also organized sessions on rational choice at the August 2002 meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Meyersson Milgrom previously served as a visiting scholar in the sociology departments at Stanford University (1998-2000) and Harvard University (2000-2001), and also served as a visiting associate professor at the Sloan School of Management, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2001-2002).

Her recent books published in Sweden include: The State as a Corporate Owner (1998, with Susannah Lindh) and Compensation Contracts in Swedish Publicly Traded Firms (1994). Her recently published articles include: "An Evaluation of the Swedish Corporate System" in Hans T:son Soderstom (January 2003); "Pay, Risk and Productivity" in Finnish Economic Papers (with Trond Petersen and Rita Asplund); "Equal Pay for Equal Work? Evidence from Sweden, Norway and the United States" in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics (vol. 4, 2001, with Trond Petersen and Vermund Snartland); and "More Glory and Less Injustice: The Glass-Ceiling in Sweden 1970-1990" in Research in Social Stratification and Mobility (Kevin T. Leicht, editor, with Trond Petersen).

Meyersson Milgrom was born in Sweden and received a PhD in sociology from Stockholm University.

CDDRL Senior Research Scholar
Eva Meyersson Milgrom Senior Researcher Speaker Stanford Institute for Economics and Policy Research
Robert Powell Department of Sociology Speaker UC Berkeley
Lee Ross Department of Psychology Speaker Stanford University
Panel Discussions

The conference, organized by the Taiwan Democracy Program of the Center on The conference, organized by the Taiwan Democracy Program of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), will consider what Taiwan's democratic development may teach us about possible future democratic development in mainland China.

DAY I: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE: COMPARING THE ROC AND THE PRC

Morning Session (8:30 am - 12:30 am):

  • Introduction
  • Panel 1: The Impact of Economic Development on Political Culture and Social Structure
  • Panel 2: Civil Society and Civic Resistance

Afternoon Session (1:30 pm - 4:10 pm):

  • Panel 3: Political Institutional Change
  • Panel 4: The International Context

Keynote Speach (7:30 pm - 8:30 pm):

  • The Honorable James C. F. Huang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China (Taiwan)

DAY II: WILL CHINA FOLLOW TAIWAN'S PATH TO DEMOCRACY? HOW WILL CHINA CHANGE POLITICALLY IN THE NEXT TWO DECADES

Morning Session (8:45 am - 12:00 pm):

  • Panel 5: Future Political Change in the PRC: Adaptation or Decay
  • Panel 6: China's Economic Development and Its Consequences

Afternoon Session (1:00 pm - 5:00 pm):

  • Panel 7: Scenarios for Change
  • Panel 8: External Factor
  • Round Table Conclusion: What Lessons Does Taiwan's Past Hold for China's Future?

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    Conferences
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    Avner Greif is Professor of Economics and Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford. His research interests include European economic history: the historical development of economic institutions, their interrelations with political, social and cultural factors and their impact on economic growth. Some of his publications are: "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade", Cambridge University Press (March 2006); "Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System," Chicago Journal of International Law (2004); "How Do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change? Institutional Reinforcement and Quasi-Parameters" (with David Laitin), the American Political Science Review (2003); "Analytic Narratives," Oxford University Press, 1998. Avner Greif received his Ph. D. in economics from Northwestern University, and his B.A. in economics and history - from Tel Aviv University.

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    Department of Economics
    Stanford University
    Stanford, CA 94305-6072

    (650) 725-8936 (650) 725-5702
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    Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, Emeritus
    Bowman Family Endowed Professor in the Humanities and Sciences
    avner_greif.jpg PhD

    Avner Greif is Professor of Economics and Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford. His research interests include European economic history: the historical development of economic institutions, their interrelations with political, social and cultural factors and their impact on economic growth. Some of his publications are: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press (March 2006); Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System, Chicago Journal of International Law (2004); How Do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change? Institutional Reinforcement and Quasi-Parameters (with David Laitin), the American Political Science Review (2003); Analytic Narratives, Oxford University Press, 1998. Avner Greif received his Ph. D. in economics from Northwestern University, and his B.A. in economics and history - from Tel Aviv University.

    Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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