This event is co-sponsored by NHK WORLD, Global Agenda, and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
About NHK and Global Agenda
NHK WORLD is NHK's international broadcast service. NHK is Japan’s national public broadcasting corporation and operates international television, radio, and internet services; together, they are known as NHK WORLD.
The aims of NHK WORLD are:
To provide both domestic and international news to the world accurately and promptly
To present information on Asia from various perspectives, making the best use of NHK's global network
To serve as a vital information lifeline in the event of major accidents and natural disasters
To present broadcasts with great accuracy and speed on many aspects of Japanese culture and lifestyles, recent developments in society and politics, the latest scientific and industrial trends, and Japan's role and opinions regarding important global issues
To foster mutual understanding between Japan and other countries and promote friendship and cultural exchange
“Global Agenda” is a new program within NHK WORLD TV where world opinion leaders discuss various issues facing Japan and the rest of the world today.
Symposium Overview
Innovation is essential for economic growth, especially in advanced economies. As the catch-up phase of economic growth is ending or has ended for many Asian economies, they face the challenge of transforming their economic systems to ones that encourage innovations and use those as the most important source for growth. The panel will discuss various issues surrounding the economic system that is favorable for innovations. Silicon Valley, where Stanford University is located, has an ecosystem that is conducive to innovations. The panel will pay special attention to implications for Japan and other Asian economies.
Panelists
William Barnnett, Professor of Business Leadership, Strategy, and Organizations, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Francis Fukuyama, Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Insititute for International Studies
Takeo Hoshi, Director, Japan Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Kenji Kushida, Research Associate, Japan Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Note
This event will be recorded and broadcast worldwide. By registering to attend you hereby grant Stanford University and NHK World permission to use encode, digitize, copy, edit, excerpt, transmit, and display the audio or videotape of your participation in this event as well as use your name, voice, likeness, biographic information, and ancillary material in connection with such audio or videotape. You understand that this event will be broadcast worldwide, which will be available to the general public. This event may also be webcast over one or more websites. By registering to attend you grant, without limitations, perpetual rights for the use and transmission and display of audio or videotape of this event. This permission is irrevocable and royalty free, and you understand that the University and NHK will act in reliance on this permission.
RSVP
RSVP for this event is mandatory as seating is limited. Doors will open at 3:00pm and the event will begin promptly at 3:30pm. Since the event is being recorded, we ask that participants arrive on time.
William Barnnett
Professor of Business Leadership, Strategy, and Organizations- Graduate School of Business
Francis Fukuyama
Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law- FSI
Takeo Hoshi
Director, Japan Program- Shorenstein APARC
Kenji Kushida
Research Associate, Japan Program- Shorenstein APARC
The sectarian-based segregation that has shaped urbanism in Baghdad is a direct outcome of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The "post"-occupied city is characterized by the normalization of concrete “security” blast-walls that choke urban circulation and sever communities. The notorious blast walls -- or "Bremer Walls" -- perpetuate and intensify conditions of urban segregation. As the summer's surge of anti-government protests in Baghdad demonstrate, the short-sighted nature of this militarized solution to sectarian-based violence has proven to be a superficial and unsustainable fix to the deep dilemma of sectarian segregation codified in Iraq’s political system. This presentation will examine the context for recent public dissent on the streets of Baghdad through the story of the capital city's fragmentation between 2006 and 2007.
Speaker Bio
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Mona Damluji is Associate Dean and Director of The Markaz: Resource Center at Stanford University. She is a liberal arts educator, cultural activist and scholar with expertise in the Arab Middle East and broader Muslim World. Mona received her PhD from the University of California, Berkeley and was the Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Asian & Islamic Visual Culture at Wheaton College in Massachusetts. Mona regularly curates and organizes exhibits and programs featuring the work of artists and activists linked to Muslim and Arab communities and countries. Major recent projects have included "Open Shutters Iraq" at UC Berkeley and "Arab Comics: 90 Years of Popular Visual Culture" at Brown University. Mona has worked as the educational outreach director for the Arab Film Festival, organizing an annual festival screening for students and teachers in San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley. Her exhibition and book reviews appear in Jadaliyya, AMCA and the International Journal of Islamic Architecture. Mona's publications also appear in the Journal of Urban History, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and Subterranean Estates: the Life Worlds of Oil and Gas.
Negotiators from 12 Pacific Rim countries recently reached an agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping trade pact that has been promoted by the Obama administration as a high-quality, next-generation deal that will set standards for international trade for years to come. While noting the agreement still requires ratification by each member state, Stanford scholars believe that the TPP will be approved and reshape not only trade but also security relations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
The TPP negotiations originally began as an expansion of the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005, and then took on broader significance in 2008 when the United States expressed interest. The number of members eventually grew to include the other North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) economies of Canada and Mexico, as well as Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan. Even before the agreement was finalized, leaders of many other Asia-Pacific countries expressed interest in joining the next round of negotiations, including South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Colombia, Thailand and most recently, Indonesia.
A summit with leaders of the member states of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). Pictured, from left, are Naoto Kan (Japan), Nguyễn Minh Triết (Vietnam), Julia Gillard (Australia), Sebastián Piñera (Chile), Lee Hsien Loong (Singapore), Barack Obama (United States), John Key (New Zealand), Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei), Alan García (Peru), and Muhyiddin Yassin (Malaysia). Six of these leaders represent countries that are currently negotiating to join the group.
The appeal of the TPP in the region is twofold. First, the repeated failure of new trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO) has forced countries seeking greater trade liberalization to pursue it through other bilateral or regional multilateral negotiations. Second, in the Asia-Pacific region, the number of these agreements has rapidly multiplied, creating myriad different standards, procedures and tariff rates that raise the costs of doing business across state borders and inhibit international trade and investment.
The TPP offers the prospect of a common set of rules governing investment, production and exchange across all member states, with significant improvements in economic efficiency. In addition, the danger of being excluded from a new trade regime that includes a huge share of the region’s economic activity has created a sense of urgency to seek membership from those countries not in the initial round of negotiations. By far the most conspicuous absence among the TPP members is China, which is now the world’s second-largest economy and a significant trading partner of all current member states.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership has been a research focus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has organized several eventsexploring aspects of the TPP, and the Taiwan Democracy Project in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law held a conference in 2013 that examined the TPP from a Taiwanese perspective. The conference produced a comprehensive report on the topic, and an audio recording of an earlier Shorenstein APARC panel event was made available online. Now that negotiations have concluded, the Taiwan Democracy Project will revisit the topic in an upcoming conference on Feb. 9.
With the public release of the agreement in early October, three noted experts from Stanford University, Thomas Fingar, Michael Armacost, and Donald Emmerson, offered their analysis of the TPP’s prospects for ratification and its impact on the Asia-Pacific region.
Now that the agreement has been published, what is significant about the TPP? What does it mean for China?
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The TPP is a big deal for many reasons, perhaps the most important of which is that it will provide the impetus and the template for concluding the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and myriad other regional and mini-lateral trade negotiations initiated in response to the failure of the Doha Round of WTO reform. As with all trade agreements, there will be winners and losers, pain will be local and benefits diffuse, and critics will find much to criticize. But the agreement is likely to be ratified and its provisions will affect corporate strategies, investment decisions and globalized production chains. The fact that North America (the United States, Canada and Mexico) are parties to the TPP virtually assures that the globally important NAFTA group will not accept terms in TTIP or other negotiations that are incompatible with the TPP because NAFTA governments and companies do not want to cope with multiple standards, requirements, and procedures. The same is true of other major trading states and international firms, so the TPP will quickly become the new standard for “everyone” wishing to take advantage of opportunities in a globalized world.
This means that the TPP will serve as a—the—decisive building block for beyond-WTO trade arrangements. Without success in the TPP (or TTIP, which also has the size and importance to have become the new global standard if it had been concluded before the TPP) negotiations, there was a danger that the advantages of an integrated global trading system would be degraded by adoption of multiple and partially incompatible sub-regional agreements. Now those negotiating bilateral and mini-lateral agreements are likely to strive for consistency with the requirements adopted by key trading nations and the firms based in them.
The TPP is often but erroneously described as part of a U.S. effort to contain or constrain China. It isn’t. The United States should and will seek to bring China into the TPP, not to exclude it. I anticipate that Beijing will join together with South Korea, Indonesia, and possibly other states that are not yet members.
Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Distinguished in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, principal deputy assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretary for analysis, director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division.
Does the TPP carry security benefits? What are possible consequences for the U.S.-Japan relationship?
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The TPP is a trade agreement, not a security pact. Security is generally a predicate for growth and trade. It does not thrive amidst turmoil, let alone conflict. But with greater economic interdependence, the incentives for avoiding conflict increase. And fortuitously Asia remains an unusually peaceful region despite some growing tensions between China and its neighbors.
The TPP agreement is certainly an integral feature of the Obama administration’s effort to “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific region. It embeds the United States in a new institution whose membership, I believe, is destined to grow. America’s engagement in the region is a source of reassurance to our friends and allies there. The United States has been bolstering its alliance with Japan, and this agreement will add a broader framework to the U.S. alliance, which was established through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and which contains a specific clause encouraging expanded economic collaboration.
I regret that selling the agreement publicly has included some explicitly anti-Chinese features such as the claim that if the United States and others don’t write the rules of trade, China will. The TPP is and should be open to new members who are prepared to live up to its requirements and that includes China.
Michael H. Armacost is a Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He held a 24-year career in the public service, including having served as U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.
How does the TPP fit into the context of Southeast Asia and its possible alternative arrangements for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region?
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In strictly economic terms, there is no exact alternative to the distinctively comprehensive and intrusive TPP. In loosely economic but mainly geopolitical terms, however, a competitor does exist: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The United States is in the TPP. China is not. In the RCEP, the reverse is true. The United States has propelled the TPP. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are driving the formation of RCEP by all ten ASEAN states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.
Compared with the TPP, RCEP is far less robust. RCEP is mainly about straightening the overlapping and sometimes inconsistent free trade agreements that already complicate Asian regionalism—the tangled contents of Asia’s “noodle bowl” of overlapping FTAs. (Trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific have burgeoned from around 60 ten years ago to some 300 today.) Under pressure from the more detailed and thoroughgoing TPP, RCEP’s would-be progenitors have been trying to expand their agenda to include more intrusive proposals. Partly for that reason, observers are pessimistic that RCEP’s negotiators will be able to proclaim its successful completion before the end of 2015.
ASEAN is divided. Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand are inside RCEP but outside the TPP. The other four ASEAN members—Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam—enjoy the advantage of sitting at both negotiating tables. If only one of the two projected partnerships fails, these four states would still have the other arrangement to fall back on, and so much the better for them if both schemes succeed. It is partly for this reason that varying degrees of interest in joining the TPP have been expressed by five of the six non-TPP states in Southeast Asia. The exception is Myanmar, but once the structure and character of its new government have been clarified, its leaders too may wish to consider the TPP. Even China’s initially hostile view of the TPP has softened.
Given the market-favoring and regulation stipulations of the TPP, new entrants may be unwilling to accept its detailed, full-spectrum rules. But the Doha Round is dead, and the proposal to replace it with a scaled-down “Global Recovery Round” has gone nowhere. For the time being, the best one can hope for in the Asia-Pacific region is a successful TPP that China could eventually join, or a successful RCEP that could someday welcome the United States, or the birth of both arrangements followed by effective steps to render them complementary rather than competitive.
Donald K. Emmerson is director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he is also affiliated with the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.
Interested in joining the conversation? The Taiwan Democracy Project will revisit this topic on Feb. 9. The one-day symposium will bring together scholars and practitioners to reconsider Taiwan's prospects for entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership. RSVP here today.
President Barack Obama participates in a trilateral meeting with Prime Minister Tony Abbott of Australia and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, right, at the Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Center, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, Nov. 16, 2014. | Official White House Photo by Pete Souza
The Internet has already changed many aspects of peoples’ lives in developed economies and has provided far-reaching economic and social benefits. Extending these opportunities is critical to accelerating economic and social growth in developing economies as well. Many international organizations have set ambitious plans to promote Internet access globally; they pore over reports and expend considerable money, time and talent exploring new ways to connect the unconnected (e.g., blimps, drones, satellites). But raw enthusiasm and aggregate statistics fail to capture the reality of the digital divide in the developing world. Facebook’s commitment to connecting the developing world includes a desire to understand the complexity of the issue as it relates to the cultural, structural and technological inequalities between and within countries. This approach requires bringing together insights from large number of publicly available data sources that employ different methodologies to understanding the multi-faceted nature of the digital divide, even when the assembled sources of data reach different conclusions.
In this talk, researchers from Facebook will discuss the difficulties and limitations often faced by aggregating numerous country-specific data sources together to measure the extent, cause and consequences of differences in Internet adoption between countries and populations. They will explain how Facebook evaluates the quality of existing publicly available data sources (e.g., national statistics, academic studies and industry reports), aggregates multiple sources to obtain relevant estimates and supplement data “holes” with original data collection efforts. The multi-faceted approach allows Facebook to conduct scalable and comprehensive comparative analyses at multiple levels, which in turn leads to more culturally-sensitive and context-specific approaches for bridging the digital divide.
Speaker Bio
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Lauren Bachan is a quantitative researcher on the Growth Population and Survey Science team at Facebook. Her current research focuses on understanding the social and cultural barriers to Internet use in developing countries. More broadly, she’s interested in how new technologies change social life and are adapted to fit long-standing cultural norms. Lauren received her PhD in Sociology and Demography from Penn State University, where she studied extended family childcare systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Lauren also holds a BA in International Relations from Mount Holyoke College and has previously worked in the fields of international development and market research.
Bruce Cain argues in "The American Interest" that greater transparency can undermine good governance by allowing undue influence of discrete interests and by creating inefficiencies. However, more transparency is needed in bureaucratic policy implementation through private contractors and organizations.
According to many commentators, political polarization is at an all-time high in American politics. This volume, edited by Nathaniel Persily, asks leading scholars to weigh in on the nature of polarization, the consequences of polarization, and solutions to polarized discourse and policymaking. While most scholars agree that American politiics is polarized, they disagree on its causes. Is it the changing media landscape? Are voters themselves polarized, or is it decision-makers and political donors who drive ideological extremism? Solutions to Polarization explores many different aspects of polarization, and issues recommendations for improving political dysfunction. Proposals include reinvigorating good government, strengthening parties, increasing transparency in campaign finance, and changing media consumption.
Author Bio
Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments also in the departments of Political Science and Communication.. Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, and Princeton. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a court-appointed expert to craft legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, and New York, and most recently as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. In addition to dozens of articles (many of which have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court) on the legal regulation of political parties, issues surrounding the census and redistricting process, voting rights, and campaign finance reform, Professor Persily has edited three books: Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy (Oxford Press, 2008) (with Jack Citrin and Patrick Egan); The Health Care Case (Oxford Press 2013); and Solutions to Polarization (Cambridge Press, forthcoming 2015). He received a B.A. and M.A. in political science from Yale (1992); a J.D. from Stanford (1998) where he was President of the law review, and a Ph.D. in political science from U.C. Berkeley in 2002.
While John Boehner was able to avoid a government shutdown this month, his successor as Speaker of the House will face another potential shutdown in December over budgetary matters. The politics of Congressional budgeting are unique among advanced democracies, since most countries insulate their budgetary procedures from partisan politics.
America is unique in experiencing shutdowns; most advanced democracies have budgetary procedures that are insulated from partisan politics. Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, and the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective hosted a conference on budgeting in May 2014 to think through possible reforms to the Congressional budgeting process. The conference brought scholars of American institutions and comparative budget policy with policymakers who have worked in American agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. Further, the conference included experts from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to compare the United States budgeting process to international benchmarks and standards. The conference report recommended institutional and technical reforms to decrease the likelihood of shutdowns.
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The fiscal year 2015 United States federal budget proposal offered by President Barack Obama, in book format. | Office of Management and Budget
The Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective is holding a conference on Democracy and its Discontents on October 8-10 in Budapest, Hungary. The conference, co-hosted with Central European University, will bring together scholars of American and European politics to examine topics such as democratic backsliding, inequality, and money in politics. Saskia Sassen of Columbia University will deliver the keynote address.
Katherine Bersch is a Kellogg Fellow at the University of Notre Dame (2022-23) and the Nancy Akers and J. Mason Wallace Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College. A research affiliate of the CDDRL Stanford Governance Project, she is also a co-founder of the Global Survey of Public Servants. Her research focuses on democratic quality in developing countries, with an emphasis on governance reform and state capacity in Latin America. She is the author of When Democracies Deliver: Governance Reform in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2019), which won the Van Cott Best Book Prize from LASA, the Levine Book Prize from IPSA, and the ASPA Prize for the Best Book Published in Public Administration.
A summit with leaders of the member states of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). Pictured, from left, are Naoto Kan (Japan), Nguyễn Minh Triết (Vietnam), Julia Gillard (Australia), Sebastián Piñera (Chile), Lee Hsien Loong (Singapore), Barack Obama (United States), John Key (New Zealand), Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei), Alan García (Peru), and Muhyiddin Yassin (Malaysia). Six of these leaders represent countries that are currently negotiating to join the group.
