A growing literature examines democratic backsliding, but there is little consensus on when, where, and why it occurs. Reviewing more than 100 recent articles and working papers, this research note argues that inattention to the measurement of backsliding and the underlying concept of democracy drives this disagreement. We propose three remedies. First, we outline several questions that help researchers navigate common measurement challenges. Second, we argue that conceptual confusion around backsliding is driven in large part by inconsistent definitions of democracy. We show how outlining a comprehensive concept of democracy enables researchers to better account for the diversity of instances of democratic backsliding. Our third contribution is drawing attention to a previously overlooked form of backsliding: when governments lose the effective power to govern or voters and elites increasingly disagree about truths and facts. The research note urges scholars to pay closer attention to the conceptualization and measurement of backsliding prior to empirical analysis.

This special issue demonstrates that authoritarian legislatures often matter for their countries’ policy processes in myriad ways, despite the fact that their influence is constrained by the nature of authoritarian politics. In all four of the special issue’s articles, the authors use novel, country-specific data to provide detailed analysis of legislature activity in authoritarian policy processes. First, as illustrated by Noble’s (2018) writing on Russia and Lü et al.’s (2018) writing on China, legislators may shape major policy decisions through their interactions with executive branch officials or their participation in elite coalitions, even when they remain relatively weak and broader outcomes are rarely in doubt. Second, as shown by Noble (2018), Lü et al. (2018), and Truex (2018), policy processes in these institutions are often defined by competing regime actors who hold divergent preferences, and as such, these processes can be messy and inefficient, contrary to popular notions of authoritarian policy making. And third, as demonstrated by Schuler (2018) through his study of Vietnam, legislatures may be permitted to engage in open debate on delegated policy issues, with the goal of holding government officials accountable and shaping the public’s attributions of blame for poor performance.

Understanding how policies are made in these contexts is important in its own right, and the authors’ efforts to open the blackbox of authoritarian policy making reflects a useful contribution of the articles. In this conclusion, we build on the authors’ insights to consider the special issue’s broader implications for the literature on authoritarian rule. We first note how the articles highlight the complexity of policy processes in these political systems, despite the capacity of most autocrats to dominate decision-making in many circumstances. Next, we discuss how the articles demonstrate the utility of legislatures for improving autocrats’ abilities to share power and control the public more effectively, thereby reinforcing the durability of authoritarian regimes. We then consider briefly which legislators and policy issues are more active in these legislatures, before concluding with a discussion of generalizability and suggestions for future research.

Russia’s democratic collapse must rank as one of the most consequential setbacks among the third and fourth waves of democratization. A comprehensive explanation for Russia’s transition from autocracy and back again counts on both structure and agency, but leans toward agency. Structurally, Russia was forced to navigate democratic and market reforms while managing the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Yet the agency of individual actors may have played a more decisive role: It was Mikhail Gorbachev, not weakening state institutions or a failing command economy, who triggered regime change in the Soviet Union. Following Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin made decisions that undermined democratic consolidation and to some extent paved the way for future autocratic restoration. The most notable of these was Yeltsin’s naming of Vladimir Putin as his successor. While Russians may be shaped by historical legacies, immutable cultural norms, or static institutions, they are not trapped forever by them. If some Russians in the past made decisions that produced autocracy, others in the future might make choices that engender democracy.

What happens when authoritarian populist parties lose elections despite a tilted playing field? Postelection capture might be their new tool: Confronted with losses in the 2016 and 2019 local elections, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) set about undoing the results by dismissing over 150 democratically elected mayors—mostly in predominantly Kurdish cities—and replaced them with state-appointed trustees or kayyums. These political captures expand the AKP’s patronage networks through what we call forced clientelism and further polarization, thereby undermining the formation of a stronger prodemocratic coalition.