Since the first Gulf War, most authoritarian régimes in the Arab world have been able to maintain the well-worn structures of governance that have persisted since the end of World War II and the process of decolonization. Hoped-for agents of change have been unable to mount effective political challenges and régimes that often seemed to be on the edge of international and domestic credibility have been able to refashion themselves in the ways necessary to maintain power and control.

New movements and agents of change have appeared, but they have not been had the transformative results hoped for, and régimes were able to accommodate any challenges they represented. The results of the last 20 years in the region and the world---in the socioeconomic, political, ideological, and international dimensions—have ended up disappointing expectations. Neo-liberal economic policies have failed to transform the economies of the region. New middle classes have not achieved the political independence necessary to overcome clientilist structures and challenge regimes. The middle class has, rather, become disengaged from local politics; many social groups see the hope for their future outside the national context. Furthermore, the divergent perspectives of different social classes, as well as secular and Islamic elements regarding democracy, makes a forceful challenge to authoritarianism more difficult.

In fact, regimes have adapted to the demands of different actors, and played off the tensions among different social actors, to reconstruct the apparatus of authoritarianism. Regimes have been able to pose as protectors of moderation against extremism and to adopt limited reforms that absorb some of the demands for democratization. In this way, regimes have been able to construct simulacra of civil society and upgrade the accoutrements of authoritarianism.

Meanwhile, behind the quasi-mythological narrative of nationalism and unity, currents of social and ideological tension persist, now embedded in an international context of fear and crisis. New challenges to the possibility of democratization arise from the international context of violence and intervention, from Iraq to Pakistan. The distortions imposed by the “war on terror,” including the internationalization of l’état sécuritaire and the parallel internationalization of jihadi militancy—end up providing another alibi for authoritarian regimes.

Finally, social and political tensions remain, and there is no perfect mechanism of accommodation or cooptation. There remains the possibility of change from lateral as opposed to frontal actions, and from surprising new actors. For any kind of democratization to occur, it is crucial that we “re-indigenize” a message of progressive change in the countries of the regions—creating a renewed sense of shared purpose that includes the nation and Islam, but is not confined by them, that speaks to people’s local concerns while it connects them to wider projects of peace and democracy in the region and the world.