Will land reform sow peace in Latin America?
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling.
FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world.
FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.
Abstract:
On both sides of the Taiwan Strait and on both sides of Taiwan’s partisan divide, international legal concepts—the criteria for statehood, other factors that matter for international status (including democratic politics and human rights), standards for and rights of self-determination and secession—have been key weapons in the political struggle over Taiwan’s international stature and security and the nature and trajectory of cross-Strait relations. Rooted in steps taken during the early days of China’s Reform Era, this pattern of politics developed dramatically during the Lee Tenghui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies on Taiwan and has taken new turns since Hu Jintao shifted Beijing’s cross-Strait policies and Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan. The prospect of Ma’s second term and a leadership transition on the Mainland raise new questions about future trends in this unusually international law-focused politics.
Speaker Bio:
Jacques deLisle is the Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law, professor of political science, and associate director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania and the director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His writings on Taiwan’s politics and international status, cross-Strait relations, China’s approach to international law, and domestic legal reform and its challenges in China appear in law reviews, international affairs journals, policy commentaries, and other media.
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Abstract:
"Insider Activists: Personal Connections and Political Action in China", co-authored by Lily Tsai and Yiqing Xu, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at MIT.
This project finds that in both rural and urban China, political "insiders" are actually more likely to make complaints about the government to local officials, including complaints about public goods provision, than political outsiders. We argue that personal connections to government officials may constitute an important resource for political action in nondemocratic systems such as China by providing information about how to participate effectively and protection against reprisal for making complaints.
About the speaker:
Lily L. Tsai is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT. Her research focuses on issues of accountability, governance, and political participation in developing countries with a particular emphasis on Chinese politics. Her book, Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China, was published in Cambridge University's Studies on Comparative Politics and received the 2007-08 Dogan Award from the Society of Comparative Research for the best book published in the field of comparative research. Tsai has also published articles in The American Political Science Review, Studies in Comparative International Development, The China Quarterly, and The China Journal. Tsai is a graduate of Stanford University, where she graduated with honors and distinction in English literature and international relations. She received a M.A. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, and a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University in 2004.
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.
Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.
Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.
Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.
(October 2025)
Philanthropist and software giant Bill Gates spoke to a Stanford audience last week about the importance of foreign aid and product innovation in the fight against chronic hunger, poverty and disease in the developing world.
His message goes hand-in-hand with the ongoing work of researchers at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Much of that work is supported by FSI’s Global Underdevelopment Action Fund, which provides seed grants to help faculty members design research experiments and conduct fieldwork in some of the world’s poorest places.
Four FSI senior fellows – Larry Diamond, Jeremy Weinstein, Paul Wise and Walter Falcon – respond to some of the points made by Gates and share insight into their own research and ideas about how to advance and secure the most fragile nations.
Without first improving people’s health, Gates says it’s harder to build good governance and reliable infrastructure in a developing country. Is that the best way to prioritize when thinking about foreign aid?
Larry Diamond: I have immense admiration for what Bill Gates is doing to reduce childhood and maternal fatality and improve the quality of life in poor countries. He is literally saving millions of lives. But in two respects (at least), it's misguided to think that public health should come "before" improvements in governance.
First, there is no reason why we need to choose, or why the two types of interventions should be in conflict. People need vaccines against endemic and preventable diseases – and they need institutional reforms to strengthen societal resistance to corruption, a sociopolitical disease that drains society of the energy and resources to fight poverty, ignorance, and disease.
Second, good governance is a vital facilitator of improved public health. When corruption is controlled, public resources are used efficiently and justly to build modern sanitation and transportation systems, and to train and operate modern health care systems. With good, accountable governance, public health and life expectancy improve much more dramatically. When corruption is endemic, life-saving vaccines, drugs, and treatments too often fall beyond the reach of poor people who cannot make under-the-table payments.
Foreign aid has come under criticism for not being effective, and most countries have very small foreign aid budgets. How do you make the case that foreign aid is a worthy investment?
Jeremy M. Weinstein: While foreign aid may be a small part of most countries’ national budgets, global development assistance has increased markedly in the past 50 years. Between 2000 and 2010, global aid increased from $78 billion to nearly $130 billion – and the U.S. continues to be the world’s leading donor.
The challenge in the next decade will be to sustain high aid volumes given the economic challenges that now confront developed countries. I am confident that we can and will sustain these volumes for three reasons.
First, a strong core of leading voices in both parties recognizes that promoting development serves our national interest. In this interconnected world, our security and prosperity depend in important ways on the security and prosperity of those who live beyond our borders.
Second, providing assistance is a reflection of our values – it is these humanitarian motives that drove the unprecedented U.S. commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS during the Bush Administration.
Perhaps most importantly, especially in tight budget times, development agencies are learning a great deal about what works in foreign assistance, and are putting taxpayers’ dollars to better use to reduce poverty, fight disease, increase productivity, and strengthen governance – with increasing evidence to show for it.
Some of the most dire situations in the developing world are found in conflict zones. How can philanthropists and nongovernmental organizations best work in places with unstable governments and public health crises? Is there a role for larger groups like the Gates Foundation to play in war-torn areas?
Paul H. Wise: As a pediatrician, the central challenge is this: The majority of preventable child deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa and in much of the world occur in areas of political instability and poor governance.
This means that if we are to make real progress in improving child health we must be able to enhance the provision of critical, highly efficacious health interventions in areas that are characterized by complex political environments – often where corruption, civil conflict, and poor public management are the rule.
Currently, most of the major global health funders tend to avoid working in such areas, as they would rather invest their efforts and resources in supportive, well-functioning locations. This is understandable. However, given where the preventable deaths are occurring, it is not acceptable.
Our efforts are directed at creating new strategies capable of bringing essential services to unstable regions of the world. This will require new collaborations between health professionals, global security experts, political scientists, and management specialists in order to craft integrated child health strategies that respect both the technical requirements of critical health services and the political and management innovations that will ensure that these life-saving interventions reach all children in need.
Gates says innovation is essential to improving agricultural production for small farmers in the poorest places. What is the most-needed invention or idea that needs to be put into place to fight global hunger?
Walter P. Falcon: No single innovation will end hunger, but widespread use of cell phone technology could help.
Most poor agricultural communities receive few benefits from agricultural extension services, many of which were decimated during earlier periods of structural reform. But small farmers often have cell phones or live in villages where phones are present.
My priority innovation is for a $10 smart phone, to be complemented with a series of very specific applications designed for transferring knowledge about new agricultural technologies to particular regions. Using the wiki-like potential of these applications, it would also be possible for farmers from different villages to teach each other, share critical local knowledge, and also interact with crop and livestock specialists.
Language and visual qualities of the applications would be key, and literacy problems would be constraining. But the potential payoff seems enormous.
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Tanja Aitamurto was a visiting researcher at the Program on Liberation Technology at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. In her PhD project she examined how collective intelligence, whether harvested by crowdsourcing, co-creation or open innovation, impacts incumbent processes in journalism, public policy making and design process. Her work has been published in several academic publications, such as the New Media and Society. Related to her studies, she advises the Government and the Parliament of Finland about Open Government principles, for example about how open data and crowdsourcing can serve democratic processes. Aitamurto now works as a postdoctoral fellow at the Brown Institute for Media Innovation at Stanford.
Aitamurto has previously studied at the Center for Design Research and at the Innovation Journalism Program at Stanford University. She is a PhD Student at the Center for Journalism, Media and Communication Research at Tampere University in Finland, and she holds a Master’s Degree in Public Policy, and a Master of Arts in Humanities. Prior to returning to academia, she made a career in journalism in Finland specializing in foreign affairs, reporting in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola and Uganda. She has also taught journalism at the University of Zambia, in Lusaka, and worked at the Namibia Press Agency, Windhoek.
She also actively participates in the developments she is studying; she crowdfunded a reporting and research trip to Egypt in 2011 to investigate crowdsourcing in public deliberation. She also practices social entrepreneurship in the Virtual SafeBox (http://designinglibtech.tumblr.com/), a project, which sprang from Designing Liberation Technologies class at Stanford. Tanja blogs on the Huffington Post and writes about her research at PBS MediaShift. More about Tanja’s work at www.tanjaaitamurto.com and on Twitter @tanjaaita.
On May 25-26, the Taiwan Democracy Project will hold its seventh annual conference on "How the Public Views Democracy and its Competitors in East Asia: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective." The conference, co-sponsored by the Program for East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University, brings together leading political scientists from Taiwan and social scientists from a number of other Asian countries to examine the levels, trends, and causal determinants of support for democracy in Taiwan and throughout East Asia. The papers analyze data from the recently completed third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. Discussants will include leading scholars of comparative politics and comparative public opinion globally.
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On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.
Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.
The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?
Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.
However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.
The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime
The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.
In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.
The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa
The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.
The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.
Malian and International Reactions to the Coup
Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.
The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.
The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.
Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.
The Arab Spring has unleashed powerful social forces across the region ignited by young people seeking to reclaim their countries from the hands of long-standing dictators. In the aftermath of the revolutions, this younger generation has expressed a greater interest and responsibility towards improving their communities. Faced with crumbling economies and rising unemployment, young people in the region are combining their activism and entrepreneurial ingenuity to launch new businesses and non-profit organizations.
A new research study entitled, Social Entrepreneurship: Why is It Important Post Arab Spring? released by the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law finds that economic conditions coupled with social changes unleashed by the Arab Spring have created an environment ripe for social entrepreneurship.
Operating where the public and private sector have failed, social entrepreneurs introduce new ideas and approaches to solve intractable development challenges in their local communities. Applying business principles towards a social cause, social entrepreneurs create new programs, reforms, and goods that benefit disadvantaged and marginalized segments of society. Leading innovations in the non-profit and business sectors, they have generated new employment opportunities for youth, worked towards building more inclusive societies, and advanced sustainable environmental practices.
As more aid dollars flow towards social entrepreneurship programs, little research has been conducted to examine the sector post Arab Spring. Researchers with the Stanford Program on Arab Reform and Democracy launched this study to assess general economic conditions, attitudes towards entrepreneurship, and the challenges social entrepreneurs currently face.
The Stanford research team used data from an online survey issued in Arabic and English to more than 12,000 residents in 18 Arab countries by Bayt.com, the leading online jobsite in the Arab region, and YouGov, a research and consulting organization. The survey targeted respondents who are on average younger, better educated, and more technologically connected than the general Arab public—previous research issued by the Brookings Institution suggested that this target group is predisposed towards the entrepreneurial sector.
Citizen-led uprisings have inspired a new generation of youth who are increasingly invested in the future development of their societies across the larger region.
Youth-led social and economic development: One of the most revealing findings in the study uncovered the changing perceptions and attitudes of young people towards the long-term development of their societies after the revolutions. Citizen-led uprisings have inspired a new generation of youth who are increasingly invested in the future development of their societies across the larger region. In Arab Spring countries 71% of respondents in Egypt and 75% in Tunisia expressed interest in improving their communities, revealing this upward trend.
According to Jacqueline Kameel, managing director of Nahdet el Mahrousa, the first social enterprise incubator in Egypt, "Youth are more vocal than ever now, they have a sense of responsibility towards Egypt, believing that if we don't do enough now, we might never have a similar chance to take the lead and impact the future of Egypt." In addition, the survey found that volunteerism is on the rise with nearly one-third of Egyptian and Tunisian youth currently volunteering their time at local NGOs, religious establishments, and schools. These trends represent promising pathways towards social entrepreneurship for the region's youth.
Rising unemployment leads to increased interest in self-employment: The results revealed deteriorating economic conditions across the larger region, impacting all age groups and economic levels. However, the effect on countries that experienced protracted revolutions is particularly stark with 58% of respondents in Tunisia, 68% in Egypt, and 71% in Syria indicating that their employment situation now is either worse or much worse than before the revolutions. Those working in the private sector have been disproportionately impacted by the Arab Spring than their counterparts in the public sector, suffering higher levels of unemployment.
Despite this fact, respondents across the region expressed a strong desire to work in the private sector, reflecting a move away from the government as a primary employer. The survey also revealed widespread interest in business ownership as respondents in every country said that if given the choice they would opt for self-employment. While many cited the independence it would offer, others indicated they were drawn to entrepreneurship out of economic necessity, not opportunity. Current economic conditions and a move towards the private sector and business ownership point to the growth of the entrepreneurship sector across the region.
Growing awareness of entrepreneurial sector: With increasing interest in social entrepreneurship, the study evaluated the level of familiarity with entrepreneurship—in both the business and social sense—as the term is often perceived as an import from the West. Survey results concluded that overall there was a general level of familiarity with the term, but more respondents identified with the business side of entrepreneurship, indicating that there is more work to do to build awareness around the social sector. More encouraging was the number of respondents—63% in Tunisia and 56% in Egypt—who expressed an interest in starting their own business and a general openness towards working in the field of social entrepreneurship.
Challenges facing the sector: While survey results revealed several opportunities, there remains a high rate of failure for new businesses and NGOs, preventing them from reaching maturity. In Egypt 44% of business owners stated that their current businesses were not performing well, and in Syria the figures were higher at 50%. Those operating NGOs did not fare much better, as 56% of respondents in Egypt said that they had hoped to start an organization but were unable to do so. Government interference, the inability to obtain finance, bureaucratic hurdles, fear of failure, and corruption were the major obstacles to starting a new enterprise.Government interference, the inability to obtain finance, bureaucratic hurdles, fear of failure, and corruption were the major obstacles to starting a new enterprise. With transitions underway in Arab Spring countries, Stanford researchers called for a number of policy recommendations to create an ecosystem conducive for entrepreneurship to thrive. Some of their suggestions include: legal and regulatory reform in the banking sector; introducing entrepreneurial education in schools; and increasing the number of high-tech incubators.
While the Arab Spring has had an immediate negative impact on the economic landscape in the Arab world, the positive effect on citizens’ interest in social and economic development remains strong. As Arab Spring countries attempt to rebuild economically, social entrepreneurship represents a promising pathway for the post-revolutionary generation to engage in positive social change in the region and beyond.