-

Abstract:

It has long been recognized that corruption and clientelism feed upon each other. However, how public malfeasance affects citizens' willingness to engage in patron-client relations remains unexplored. This article shows that perceptions, experiences, and information about political corruption influence a citizen's likelihood to sell his or her vote, and the types of gifts, favors, or public services he or she is willing to trade for it. The context of the article is Mexico's presidential and local elections. To circumvent methodological challenges posed by social desirability bias and reverse causation, the article presents evidence from a list experiment embedded in a national representative survey conducted close to the 2012 presidential election, and evidence from a field experiment conducted close to the 2009 municipal elections. I conclude that, given favorable circumstances, governmental corruption breeds forms of political behavior that are detrimental to the proper functioning of democracy, such as vote buying.

About the Speaker:

Ana L. De La O is assistant professor of Political Science at Yale University. She is affiliated with the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, the Institution of Social and Policy Studies, and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. Her research relates to the political economy of poverty alleviation, clientelism and the provision of public goods. She recently completed a book manuscript that explores the causes and political consequences of the proliferation of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America. Her work has been published in academic journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. She earned her PhD in Political Science from M.I.T.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Ana L. De la O Assistant professor, Political Science, Yale University Speaker
Seminars
Paragraphs

On July 1, over 50 million Mexicans went to the polls to elect the next President of the Republic. The official count showed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, as winning with 38.21% of the vote. He was followed by Democratic Revolucionary Party (PRD) candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who received 31.59% of the vote and National Action Party (PAN) candidate Josefina Vázquez Mota with 25.41% of the vote.

Electoral geography is a tool we use to visualize the overarching factors that divide Mexican society and motivate the citizens to express their distinct electoral preferences. Using a statistical analysis that encompasses the more than 66 thousand electoral sections based on the 2010 census cartography (created through a noble and intense effort by the IFE and INEGI), this report discusses which factors best explain voting behavior on election day. Notably, our analysis differs from those based on exit polls, which more accurately reflect the actual vote, but by their nature do not contain enough questions to assess in more depth the determinants behind that vote.(En): On June 1, over 50 million Mexicans went to the polls to elect the next President of the Republic. The official count showed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, as winning with 38.21% of the vote. He was followed by Democratic Revolucionary Party (PRD) candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who received 31.59% of the vote and National Action Party (PAN) candidate Josefina Vázquez Mota with 25.41% of the vote.

One of the great advantages of working with electoral section data is that they reflect voting decisions of millions of voters. The risk associated with census data and exit polls is that they represent aggregated rather than individualized data because people’s votes are secret. With aggregated data, we cannot be absolutely certain that what happens in the aggregate also applies to all individuals within the group. Nevertheless, the possibility for error is diminished as we work with a large number of jurisdiction units that are highly disaggregated. 

 

 

(Es): El pasado primero de julio más de 50 millones de mexicanos acudieron a las urnas para elegir al futuro Presidente de la República. El conteo nacional reflejó al candidato del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN), como el ganador de la contienda electoral al recibir 38.21% de los votos. En segundo lugar se ubicó el candidato del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) con 31.59% de los votos, seguido por la candidata del Partido Acción N, Josefina Vázquez Mota (JVM), con el 25.41% de los votos.

La geografía electoral permite visualizar de manera contundente los factores que dividen a la sociedad mexicana y motivan a los ciudadanos a expresar preferencias electorales distintas. Por medio de un análisis estadístico de las más de 66 mil secciones electorales y con base en la cartografía de los datos censales de 2010 (creada en un esfuerzo notable del Instituto Federal Electoral y el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía), este reporte discute qué factores explican los resultados del comportamiento electoral tal como sucedió el día de las elecciones. Cabe destacar que nuestro análisis difiere de los que se basan en las encuestas de salida, las cuales reflejan con más precisión el voto efectivo, pero por su naturaleza no contienen suficientes preguntas que permitan evaluar en manera más profunda las determinantes del voto.

Una de las grandes ventajas de trabajar con los datos de las secciones electorales es que éstos reflejan las decisiones efectivas de millones de votantes. El riesgo de utilizar datos censales y votos efectivos es que nos vemos obligados a trabajar con datos agregados, pues el voto individual es secreto. El problema de la agregación es que no se puede tener certeza absoluta de que lo que sucede en el agregado también lo sea para los individuos que constituyen el conjunto. Sin embargo, las posibilidades de error se ven disminuidas al trabajar con un número tan grande de unidades jurisdiccionales que son sumamente desagregadas.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Policy Briefs
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
México Evalua
Authors
Beatriz Magaloni
Alberto Díaz-Cayeros
Jorge Olarte
Paragraphs

Merit‐based incentives are a topic of growing interest in labor economics due to their potential to increase performance for private and public employees. Following this argument, such pay schemes have been applied in numerous countries to provide incentives to teachers and schools based on their students’ achievement scores and other performance metrics. However, because of the multi-task, multi-principal and multi-period nature of education, they present several caveats. Observational and experimental research provides ambiguous conclusions about their impact. This paper contributes to this literature by evaluating the effects of the Mexican PECD, a program that since 2010 has provided salary bonuses to teachers in primary and secondary public schools based on their national standardized tests scores. Nearly 30,000 schools and 300,000 teachers have benefited from this program in its first implementation. Given its characteristics, the PECD provides an ideal ground for a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and for a Multiple Rating‐Score Discontinuity (MRSD). Combining these quasi‐experimental techniques with a Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM), I show that the effect of this program on student performance is null. If any, this program seems to harm student performance; this negative effect is more evident for indigenous schools.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

CDDRL's Program on Poverty and Governance posted a research project update for the project The Incidence of Criminal Activity Near Schools in Mexico. Currently this project is studying the interaction between education and violence in the context of Mexico's war on drugs. The initial results shed light on falling secondary educational attainment in Mexico, and its relationship to gang activity and school dropout rates. The project is working to systematically analyze several Mexican governmental programs including Escuela Segura and Espacios Recuperados that seek to rebuild disintegrating communities in order to improve educational attainment. You can read the update here

 

Increase in Drug Related Deaths, 2007-2010

 
Hero Image
MEXICO VIOLENCE    Version 2
Police officers carry children away during a gun battle in Tijuana, in Mexico's state of Baja California. REUTERS/Jorge Duenes.
All News button
1
-
We exploit a unique institutional feature in the state of Oaxaca,  Mexico,  where municipalities were allowed to choose between a form of autonomy called “usos y costumbres” or delegating decisions to “modern” forms of representative government. Using a geographic discontinuity approach to identify causal effects,  we find strong evidence that political autonomy enhances development outcomes for indigenous communities. To explore plausible mechanisms,  we collected a household survey in over 90 villages. In autonomous villages,  direct participatory democracy practices lead to a more egalitarian distribution of services with a less notable anti-poor bias.

CISAC Conference Room

Dept. of Political Science
Encina Hall, Room 436
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA

(650) 724-5949
0
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations
Professor of Political Science
beatriz_magaloni_2024.jpg MA, PhD

Beatriz Magaloni Magaloni is the Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. Magaloni is also a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, where she holds affiliations with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). She is also a Stanford’s King Center for Global Development faculty affiliate. Magaloni has taught at Stanford University for over two decades.

She leads the Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab (Povgov). Founded by Magaloni in 2010, Povgov is one of Stanford University’s leading impact-driven knowledge production laboratories in the social sciences. Under her leadership, Povgov has innovated and advanced a host of cutting-edge research agendas to reduce violence and poverty and promote peace, security, and human rights.

Magaloni’s work has contributed to the study of authoritarian politics, poverty alleviation, indigenous governance, and, more recently, violence, crime, security institutions, and human rights. Her first book, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is widely recognized as a seminal study in the field of comparative politics. It received the 2007 Leon Epstein Award for the Best Book published in the previous two years in the area of political parties and organizations, as well as the Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization Section. Her second book The Politics of Poverty Relief: Strategies of Vote Buying and Social Policies in Mexico (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estevez) (Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores how politics shapes poverty alleviation.

Magaloni’s work was published in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Criminology & Public Policy, World Development, Comparative Political Studies, Annual Review of Political Science, Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, Latin American Research Review, and others.

Magaloni received wide international acclaim for identifying innovative solutions for salient societal problems through impact-driven research. In 2023, she was named winner of the world-renowned Stockholm Prize in Criminology, considered an equivalent of the Nobel Prize in the field of criminology. The award recognized her extensive research on crime, policing, and human rights in Mexico and Brazil. Magaloni’s research production in this area was also recognized by the American Political Science Association, which named her recipient of the 2021 Heinz I. Eulau Award for the best article published in the American Political Science Review, the leading journal in the discipline.

She received her Ph.D. in political science from Duke University and holds a law degree from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.

Director, Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab
Co-director, Democracy Action Lab
CV
Date Label
Beatriz Magaloni Associate Professor of Political Science, FSI Senior Fellow, Director of Program on Poverty and Governance Speaker
Seminars
-

Abstract:

This talk will present an account of long-run institutional development in Latin America that emphasizes the social and political foundations of state-building processes. The argument focuses on societal dynamics that have path-dependent consequences at two critical points: the initial consolidation of national institutions in the wake of independence, and at the time when the "social question" of mass political incorporation forced its way into the national political agenda across the region during the Great Depression. Dynamics set into motion at these points in time have produced widely varying, but highly stable distributions of state capacity in the region.

About the speaker:

Marcus Kurtz is an Associate Professor at Ohio State University. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of comparative politics, democratization, political economy and development, with a focus on Latin America. His publications have appeared in such journals as American Journal of Political Science, World Politics, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Journal of Politics, and Politics & Society. He has written two books, Free Market Democracy and the Chilean and Mexican Countryside (Cambridge, 2004) and Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Cambridge 2013).

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Marcus Kurtz Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Speaker Ohio State University

Encina Hall, C148
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

0
Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Research Affiliate at The Europe Center
Professor by Courtesy, Department of Political Science
yff-2021-14290_6500x4500_square.jpg

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.

Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

(October 2025)

CV
Date Label
Francis Fukuyama Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Moderator CDDRL, Stanford University
Seminars

We study the dynamics and logic of extortion in Mexico’s drug war. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have diversified into a host of other illicit activities, protection rackets, oil and fuel theft, kidnapping, human smuggling, prostitution, money laundering, weapons trafficking, auto theft and domestic drug sales. The project seeks to measure, through the use of list-experiments, patterns of extortion by both criminal organization and the police, and the extent to which drug cartels coopt civil society and become embedded in the social fabric.

Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Enrique Peña Nieto was elected Mexico's president promising to curb the drug-related violence that exploded during Felipe Calderon’s past six years in office. His victory means the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, will return to power after being defeated 12 years ago in the country’s first truly democratic election.

The PRI has a complicated history of corruption. But it also built a reputation for guaranteeing political stability and making the peace among Mexican post-revolutionary warlords during its 71 years as the country’s ruling party.

Associate professor of political science Beatriz Magaloni talks about what to expect from Peña Nieto, what his policies may mean for Mexican-U.S. relations, and how his government would likely allow drug cartels some freedom to operate in exchange for the promise of peace.

Magaloni is the director of the Program on Poverty and Governance at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

What do we know about Enrique Peña Nieto? Who is he?

His campaign slogan was “Because you know me.” But the paradox is that nobody knows him at all. He’s been the governor of Mexico State for six years, but he doesn’t have a particularly good or impressive record. There hasn’t been a lot of scrutiny of his performance, and people perceive him as a product of the media. He’s married to a soap opera star, and he’s known for his good looks – but also his shallowness. He was asked to list three books that have influenced him, and he had a lot of trouble answering the question.

Peña Nieto is the new face of an old party. What did the PRI accomplish in its 71 years of power?

Mexico had a social revolution in 1910. After the revolution there was continuous violence for almost two decades, and the PRI was created to put an end to the violence by bringing together all the post-revolutionary warlords into one single organization. The idea was they would stop killing each other and as long as they joined this organization, they would be guaranteed a piece of the pie.

The party did tame violence in Mexico, and that’s a big accomplishment. The party also has a history of social reform. They organized massive land redistribution, expanded welfare benefits to workers and oversaw moderate economic growth.

But the PRI was so successful in monopolizing power that they became increasingly corrupt. In the end, the corruption wound up destroying Mexico’s development. By the time of the PRI loss in 2000, we had more than 20 years of economic catastrophe. There was huge inflation, devaluation, unemployment, and a lot of corruption that was exceedingly destructive.

What does corruption in Mexico look like today, and how can it be addressed?

The relationships among cartels, police and politicians are very complicated throughout the country. Mexico has 31 states and one federal district. There are more than 2,400 municipalities, each with its own police force. There are also state and federal police. There are about 15 cartels, and as many as 10 different gangs operating in many of the larger cities. So in each region, you never know who the police are really working for.

The drug trade is so profitable that there are huge incentives for vast sectors of Mexican society to participate. You have to offer people opportunities and chances to make money outside of the drug market. You have to give civil society groups the room they need to grow and influence communities. Tijuana has been successful in turning things around. There was a big push to engage entrepreneurs and make them understand it was up to them to reclaim the city. They helped support the arts and culture. And, most importantly, they gave young people opportunities.

There have been at least 50,000 drug-related killings during Calderon’s term. Why has it been such a bloody six years?

This is a big debate. Some people blame Calderon’s policy of attacking the cartels, which they say forced them to strike back with more force. They say that if he didn’t do that, Mexico wouldn’t be as violent as it is now. Implicit in that critique is that Mexico shouldn’t have done anything about the drug problem. This is the argument that PRI is capitalizing on now – this notion that things were better off when we did nothing.

The other argument from Calderon and his supporters is that criminal organizations were already out of control when he took office. He said cartels were the de facto power holders in vast areas of the territory throughout Mexico, and the government had to do something about it to regain control.

How will the drug war shift?

Peña Nieto says he’s going to control the violence more than fight the cartels. So that’s implying that you have to let the cartels operate. Wars are ended with either a pact or a victory. There can be no victory as long as the drug market is as lucrative as it is. So you need a pact that says as long as the cartels don’t kill or kidnap or do violence, they can operate. But the problem with that is they will continue to be extremely powerful and in control of state institutions. It is very hard to draw the line between that kind of pact and absolute state corruption. I fear it’s hard to reach that pact without acknowledging that Mexico will never have rule of law.

It is clear that we cannot continue with the violence as it is. That’s the biggest thing that needs to be addressed. People are suffering so much. Crimes are not being solved. There is no real sense of justice.

As Mexico’s neighbor and the largest consumer of drugs moving out of Mexico, what role does the United States need to play in reducing the violence?

Much of the problem is about the demand for drugs in the U.S. That’s the source. But people aren’t going to stop consuming drugs. So you need to do something about the legal nature of drugs. Making all drug use and trafficking into an illegal activity is what’s fueling a lot of the violence. So if you legalize drugs – that doesn’t mean you sell them as freely as you sell alcohol, but you can sell them under legal regulation – I think violence will be reduced. And if the United States doesn’t become more engaged and rethink its policies, the violence is going to eventually come across its borders.

Hero Image
3550 small PienaNieto logo
All News button
1
-

Abstract:

We present a new framework for conceptualizing and assessing the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. This framework constitutes the backbone of the WJP Rule of Law Index® and is organized around nine basic concepts or factors: limited government powers; absence of corruption; order and security; fundamental rights; open government; effective regulatory enforcement; access to civil justice; effective criminal justice; and informal justice. These factors are further disaggregated into 52 sub-factors. We estimate numerical scores of these factors and sub-factors for a group of 66 countries and jurisdictions. These estimates are built from two novel data sources in each country: (1) a general population poll; and (2) qualified respondents’ questionnaires. All in all, the data contain more than 400 variables drawn from the assessments of over 66,000 people and 2,000 local experts. Our presentation will conclude with an overview of some highlights from Index data findings, as well as examples of ways in which the data have been applied in different contexts.

The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent, non-profit organization that works to advance the rule of law for the development of communities of opportunity and equity worldwide. The WJP’s multinational and multidisciplinary efforts are aimed at: government reforms; development of practical programs on the ground in support of the rule of law; and increased awareness about the concept and impact of the rule of law. The Project has three complementary programs: Research and Scholarship, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, and mainstreaming practical on-the-ground programs to strengthen the rule of law.

Speaker Bio: 

Image
Dr. Alejandro Ponce joined The World Justice Project as Senior Economist in 2009. He is a co-author of the WJP Rule of Law Index. Dr. Ponce has extensive experience in the development of cross-country indicators. Before joining the World Justice Project, he served as an Economist at the World Bank collaborating in the design of surveys to measure financial inclusion around the world. Earlier in his career, he worked as a consultant in the design of the index of judicial efficiency and regulation of dispute resolution as part of the Doing Business Indicators of the World Bank and served as Deputy Director for the Mexican Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). Dr. Ponce has also conducted research on behavioral economics, financial inclusion and on the linkage between economic development and the rule of law. He holds a B.A. in Economics from ITAM inMexico, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University.

Speaker Bio: 

Image
Mr. Juan Carlos Botero is The World Justice Project's Interim Executive Director and Director of the Rule of Law Index, where he has led the development of an innovative quantitative tool to measure countries’ adherence to the rule of law worldwide. Mr. Botero’s previous experience includes service as Chief International Legal Counsel of the Colombian Ministry of Commerce; Deputy-Chief Negotiator of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement; Consultant for the World Bank; Associate Researcher atYaleUniversity; and Judicial Clerk at theColombian Constitutional Court. He has taught legal theory and comparative law at the Universidad de los Andes in Colombia and Universidad Privada Boliviana in Bolivia. His academic publications focus on the areas of rule of law, access to justice, labor regulation, and child labor. Mr. Botero is a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Rule of Law 2011. A national of Colombia, Mr. Botero holds a law degree from Universidad de los Andes and a Master of Laws from Harvard University. He is also a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center.

CISAC Conference Room

Alejandro Ponce Senior Economist Speaker The World Justice Project
Juan Botero Rule of Law Index Director Speaker The World Justice Project
Seminars
-

Abstract:

In developing countries, the efficacy of subsidized food delivery systems is particularly challenged by corruption that can disproportionately affect less powerful areas or less powerful households, thereby steering aid away from the most vulnerable beneficiaries. In this paper, Sriniketh Nagavarapu and others examine how the identity of food delivery agents affects the take-up of vulnerable populations.  Specifically, they investigate the take-up of subsidized goods in Uttar Pradesh, India, under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), a system undermined by widespread corruption. Using rich household survey data from the first year of the TPDS, they establish that households from the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Castes exhibit lower take-up when facing non-Scheduled Caste delivery agents. After showing that several potentially reasonable explanations (e.g. discrimination or elite capture) are not consistent with the data, they assess the quantitative impact of the most plausible remaining explanation, which involves monitoring and enforcement.

Speaker Bio:

Sriniketh Nagavarapu is an assistant professor of economics and environmental studies at Brown University. His research is focused on environmental and labor economics in developing countries.  Specifically, he is interested in understanding how local institutions manage natural resources and service delivery, and how management effectiveness is shaped by market incentives and the nature of the institutions. His recent work in this area examines the management of fisheries by cooperatives in Mexico and the delivery of food assistance by government-appointed authorities in India. In other work, he has examined how the labor market mediates the link between ethanol production expansion and deforestation in Brazil. Nagavarapu received his Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. from Stanford University. At Brown, he is a faculty associate of the Population Studies and Training Center, Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, and the Environmental Change Initiative.

CISAC Conference Room

Sriniketh Nagavarapu Assistant Professor of Economics and Environmental Studies Speaker Brown University
Seminars
Subscribe to Mexico