Abstract:

In developing countries, the efficacy of subsidized food delivery systems is particularly challenged by corruption that can disproportionately affect less powerful areas or less powerful households, thereby steering aid away from the most vulnerable beneficiaries. In this paper, Sriniketh Nagavarapu and others examine how the identity of food delivery agents affects the take-up of vulnerable populations.  Specifically, they investigate the take-up of subsidized goods in Uttar Pradesh, India, under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), a system undermined by widespread corruption. Using rich household survey data from the first year of the TPDS, they establish that households from the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Castes exhibit lower take-up when facing non-Scheduled Caste delivery agents. After showing that several potentially reasonable explanations (e.g. discrimination or elite capture) are not consistent with the data, they assess the quantitative impact of the most plausible remaining explanation, which involves monitoring and enforcement.

Speaker Bio:

Sriniketh Nagavarapu is an assistant professor of economics and environmental studies at Brown University. His research is focused on environmental and labor economics in developing countries.  Specifically, he is interested in understanding how local institutions manage natural resources and service delivery, and how management effectiveness is shaped by market incentives and the nature of the institutions. His recent work in this area examines the management of fisheries by cooperatives in Mexico and the delivery of food assistance by government-appointed authorities in India. In other work, he has examined how the labor market mediates the link between ethanol production expansion and deforestation in Brazil. Nagavarapu received his Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. from Stanford University. At Brown, he is a faculty associate of the Population Studies and Training Center, Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, and the Environmental Change Initiative.

Since 2006, more than 40,000 people in Mexico have died in drug-related homicides, and recent figures indicate that the pace and severity of drug-related violence is increasing. Experiencing a significant breakdown of its rule of law, the population of Ciudad Juárez alone suffered more than 3,000 homicides in 2010, making it the most dangerous city anywhere in the world. Dr. Poiré Romero will address the characteristics of the security situation in Mexico, the historical events and situations that made it what it is now, and the current strategy that the Federal Government is implementing to achieve security. Dr. Poiré’s talk will be completely off-the-record, and is by invitation only.

Speaker biography:

On September 9, 2011, Dr. Alejandro Poiré Romero was appointed as Director of Mexico´s National Security Agency by President Felipe Calderón. Prior to that, Dr. Poiré served as Secretary of the National Security Council and Cabinet, and has held a variety of cabinet-level positions since 2007. He also worked as an adviser to the National Institute of Statistics on the creation of the first National Survey on Political Culture and Citizenship Practices. He has published several academic pieces analyzing public opinion, campaign dynamics and voting behavior in Mexico, in addition to two books on Mexico’s democratic process, Towards Mexico’s Democratization: Parties, Campaigns, Elections, and Public Opinion and Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election.

Dr. Poiré holds a PhD in Political Science from Harvard University, and a Bachelor’s degree in the same field from Mexico’s Autonomous Technological Institute (ITAM), where he has been a professor and the Political Science Department Chair. He has also been a visiting researcher and lecturer at several institutions in the USA, including MIT, and Latin America.