Introduction and Contribution

Nearly half of the world (46%) lives in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections — compared to 28% who live in autocracies without elections and 26% who live under democracy. In these “electoral autocracies,” the ruling party can theoretically lose power, but its ability to repress and co-opt its opponents makes defeat unlikely. Incumbent executives and parties in electoral autocracies have become increasingly sophisticated in their repressive techniques and increasingly connected to other regimes that share similar fears of democracy. “How can electoral authoritarianism be resisted?” is thus a pressing question for domestic opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) as well as international actors seeking to promote democracy, including governments, nonprofits, think tanks, and academics. 

In “Opposition strategies and electoral challenges under autocracy,” Oren Samet analyzes five strategies opposition parties use to fight electoral authoritarianism during campaigns, on election day, and after polls have closed. These are: joining multiparty coalitions, strengthening their party organization, mobilizing mass protests, boycotting elections, and seeking international assistance. Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient. For example, joining a multiparty coalition can both increase the incumbent’s likelihood of defeat and increase his propensity to repress — insofar as he perceives the opposition as popular and threatening.

Samet offers several prescriptions for international democracy promoters. First, they must collaborate with domestic opposition parties, because only they — and not CSOs — can win elections. Yet many international actors avoid this approach; for instance, some opposition parties may care more about power than democracy, or collaborating with them may invite criticism that democracy promotion is partisan. While these risks cannot be ignored, neither can political parties.

A second prescription follows from the fact that oppositions have at least five tools at their disposal: there can be no single “best practice” in democracy promotion; it requires flexibility, adaptability, and an integrated approach. Finally, because autocrats continue to become more sophisticated, democracy promoters must take steps to prepare for the repression of their partners. 

Five Approaches and Their Pitfalls

Otherwise effective strategies for winning democratic elections — such as running savvy campaigns on primetime television that are informed by public opinion polling — will not work for opposition parties under electoral autocracy. This is because the system is structurally biased toward incumbents. As such, one common approach has been for individual opposition parties to join together in a coalition: sharing policy platforms, endorsing joint candidates, and merging their party organizations. And indeed, multiparty coalitions are statistically associated with higher vote shares and a higher likelihood that autocrats are defeated. At the same time, however, such coalitions are difficult to form and sustain due to ideological differences and polarization. In especially repressive electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia or Cambodia, incumbent parties are often able to neutralize or eliminate coalitions. Finally, when coalitions pose a serious challenge on election day but without winning, autocrats may repress even harder.

A second strategy involves strengthening party organization, for example, by improving its geographic reach or recruiting more professional candidates. These efforts can increase competitiveness and popular appeal, but they risk providing the incumbent with a large amount of information that he can use to more efficiently target his opponents. This includes formal lists of members, candidates, and party branch locations. Meanwhile, more organized opposition parties may inadvertently legitimize the system by affording it some semblance of democracy.

Encouraging mass protests is a third strategy available to opposition parties. As the number of protesters grows, authoritarian repression becomes more costly and more likely to backfire, while the incumbent’s allies become more likely to defect and join the opposition. Parties help with this process by translating protester demands into coherent party platforms. However, and especially after the 2010-12 Arab Uprisings, electoral authoritarian regimes have become highly sensitive to and ready to combat protests. This may be accomplished via surveillance or assistance from powerful third parties such as China or Russia.

A fourth, common strategy has been for parties to boycott the autocrat’s electoral facade. Doing so signals to the international community that the playing field is skewed and the system illegitimate. Yet boycotts can lead to missed opportunities for the opposition to build electoral strength, influence policy change as legislative minorities, or monitor the autocrat from inside government. In addition, they rob oppositions of the chance to take advantage of the autocrat’s miscalculations, which may even lead to his defeat. 

Finally, opposition parties can reach out to international actors for support. This may involve requesting that they sanction the regime or intervene in the name of democracy. International pressure can indeed encourage political openings and is especially useful for oppositions with low visibility. However, autocrats are adept at demonizing those who use this strategy as agents of malign foreign influence. These appeals can strengthen the autocrat’s domestic support base among those who see him as protecting the nation. In all, these tradeoffs suggest that effective democracy promotion requires a deep understanding of the political context in which oppositions operate.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Introduction and Contribution:

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has significantly undermined European security and Ukraine’s sovereignty, claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, and arguably solidified Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian grip on power. Aside from these more obvious consequences, around one million Russians have emigrated, changing the domestic politics of dozens of countries across Europe, Asia, and North America. 

Russian emigrants not only face discrimination, integration difficulties, and economic precarity in their host countries, but also the threat of “transnational repression.” This includes Russia seizing their property or revoking their citizenship, harassing their relatives who stayed behind, and surveilling them in their host countries. There have even been reports of activists and journalists being poisoned outside of Russia. What does transnational repression mean for the lives of ordinary Russian migrants?

In “Invisible costs of exiting autocracy,” Ivetta Sergeeva and Emil Kamalov show that these varied challenges and threats — especially fear of Russian repression and host country discrimination — have had a considerable impact on emigrants’ subjective well-being. Using original survey and interview data collected as part of the ambitious OutRush project, the authors draw our attention to the many psychological hardships faced by Russians abroad simply because they are citizens of a belligerent authoritarian state.

Data and Variables:

Surveys and interviews were conducted between August and September 2022 with over 2,500 emigrants. “Invisible Costs” focuses on Russians living across more than 60 countries, with interviews conducted in five popular destinations: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Serbia.

Sergeeva and Kamalov draw on a standard conception of subjective well-being as having ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ components. Affective well-being is operationalized in terms of how often survey respondents have felt sadness, depression, and happiness over the last three months, and cognitive well-being in terms of levels of life satisfaction. Migrant experiences ought to affect these two components differently; for example, the threat of transnational repression may significantly reduce happiness while leaving life satisfaction unchanged. As prior research has shown the importance of economic and social variables for migrant integration, the authors also include measures of income, employment, and interaction with locals. 

Results:

The survey data paint a fairly bleak picture of the emigrant experience. Over 60% of respondents reported being somewhat or very afraid of transnational repression, while only 9% expressed no such fear. Interviewees often linked these fears to at least two factors: (1) concern for the well-being of relatives still in Russia and (2) awareness of the presence of Russian agents in host countries. The statistical analysis shows that fear of transnational repression had a statistically significant (negative) correlation with affective well-being. However, it is not a significant predictor of cognitive well-being, which makes sense, as the high risks of repression in Russia make emigration seem like a rational life choice. 

Meanwhile, 22% reported experiencing discrimination. This is much higher than the OECD-wide average of 15% for migrants — the highest single-country percentage in these surveys is just 21%. In Poland and Georgia — both having a history of violent conflict with Russia — 36% and 39% of emigrants reported experiencing discrimination, respectively. For example, one interviewee reported walking into a Georgian coffee shop, scanning a QR code, and then pictures with captions saying “you’re terrorists, go away” popping up on their phone instead of the menu. Self-reported discrimination is shown to have a statistically significant effect on both types of well-being.
 

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Figure 3. Effect of discrimination, experienced and feared, on subjective well-being. The index of affective well-being represents an affective component of subjective well-being, while satisfaction with one’s life represents the cognitive component. Variables are presented in their original scales without standardization. Models with original scales are presented in online appendix D.
 

41% of respondents merely feared discrimination. This fear appears driven less by migrants’ negative experiences in their host countries and more by the risk of discrimination leading to deportation. Interviewees seem to assess this risk with reference to the high number of visa rejections they observe. Not only does fear of discrimination have a large and statistically significant effect on well-being, but its effects on affective well-being in particular are nearly twice as large as those of unemployment.

Consistent with prior research, spending time with locals has a statistically significant (positive) effect on well-being, with these effect sizes being nearly as large as those of discrimination, suggesting that social intimacy can help offset its negative effects. And indeed, several interviewees attested to this. One described an encounter with Georgians who said, “If there are any conflicts [related to discrimination]…please call me, because we understand that this is wrong and such things should not happen.”

Finally, 49% of respondents reported feeling high levels of guilt over Russia’s aggression, while 59% felt some level of responsibility. These factors are both statistically significant predictors of affective, but not cognitive, well-being. The authors explain this in terms of migrants adapting to living with emotions such as guilt; their migration choices are still seen as justified in spite of the negative psychological costs. For instance, one interviewee said, “gradually, life somehow clawed its way back…and now it has entered into some strange routine of suspension and timelessness.”
 

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Figure 4. Effect of feelings of collective guilt and responsibility on subjective well-being. The index of affective well-being represents an affective component of subjective well-being, while satisfaction with one’s life represents the cognitive component. Variables are presented in their original scales without standardization. Models with original scales are presented in online appendix D.
 

These distressing findings have implications for the priorities of host country governments. For one, even economically successful migrants still need legal protections against discrimination and physical insecurity in order to thrive. Second, because fear is itself sufficient to undermine well-being, host countries must (a) take measures to deter transnational repression and (b) make migrants aware that these measures are in place, so as to decrease their fears.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

At the institute level, the partnership also reinforces Stanford’s broader role in advancing research and engagement on democracy.

“As the threats to democratic governance around the world multiply, so too must our commitment to the rigorous, interdisciplinary scholarship that seeks to understand and address them,” said Colin Kahl, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the esteemed Journal of Democracy to CDDRL creates a powerful nexus for this vital work, strengthening FSI's role as a global leader in the study of democracy."

At the same time, the partnership comes at a moment of heightened global pressure on democratic institutions, underscoring the importance of the Journal’s role in the field.

“We are now in the twentieth consecutive year of global democratic decline — no longer just a ‘democratic recession,’ but a broader wave of authoritarian reversals,” said Larry Diamond. “Yet the struggle for democracy continues. Now more than ever, we need to understand both the causes of democratic decay and the conditions for recovery and renewal. The Journal of Democracy is unique in combining rigorous scholarship with timely, accessible analysis of developments around the world.”

For Stanford students, the partnership creates a more direct pathway into the world of ideas, publishing, and public scholarship. Through new editorial internships, undergraduates and recent graduate alumni can gain hands-on experience working with a leading journal that bridges scholarship and practice.

It also strengthens Stanford’s intellectual presence in democracy studies by giving CDDRL-affiliated faculty a more formal role in supporting the Journal’s work through serving on its editorial board. Stanford faculty will contribute to the Journal’s editorial mission, inspire new lines of inquiry, and help to identify emerging areas of research to be explored in its pages.

“This partnership with CDDRL is exceptionally exciting for the Journal of Democracy and its readers,” shared Will Dobson, the Journal’s co-editor. “CDDRL is not only the leading research center in the field, but its long history of collaboration with the Journal makes this a natural fit. We are thrilled to be working with CDDRL and with the possibilities this partnership will unlock.”

With a wide readership and growing digital footprint, the Journal of Democracy reaches audiences across academia, government, journalism, and civil society. It publishes roughly 100 online-exclusive essays each year alongside its quarterly print issues and engages readers through newsletters with more than 20,000 subscribers, across social media, in Apple News, and on leading podcasts. As the most-read journal in the Johns Hopkins University Press portfolio of more than 750 publications, it has become a central venue for ideas about democratic governance and political change worldwide. Through its partnership with CDDRL, the Journal is positioned to expand that reach even further — drawing on Stanford’s research community and global practitioner networks to bring new voices and perspectives into the conversation.