Milada Anna Vachudova of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill presented on “Europe in the Face of War and America’s Authoritarian Turn” during a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC). Drawing on research coauthored with Nadiia Koval of the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, Vachudova examined how Russia’s war in Ukraine, democratic backsliding within the European Union, and changing U.S. foreign policy are reshaping Europe’s geopolitical role.

Vachudova began by arguing that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion is also a defense of European democracy, national sovereignty, and the security of EU and NATO members. She situated this claim within a broader account of the EU’s power. Historically, the EU has exerted influence through its democratic norms, economic integration, market access, and enlargement rather than military force. Yet she rejected the idea that Europe must choose between defending liberal values and pursuing geopolitical interests. Military capabilities, she suggested, can complement the EU’s normative and economic strengths.

The EU’s potential as a geopolitical power has long been undermined by political expediency. Vachudova pointed to Europe’s pre-2022 dependence on Russian energy and continued economic engagement with Moscow, as well as the challenge posed by authoritarian-minded political parties within the EU. These vulnerabilities illustrated the costs of prioritizing short-term economic interests over democratic commitments and long-term security.

Russia’s February 2022 invasion nevertheless prompted an unusually rapid European response. EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, moved to assist Ukrainian refugees, expand market access, impose sanctions, provide financial and military assistance, and revive enlargement. Vachudova emphasized that this early institutional leadership occurred amid an absence of traditional French-German leadership. It also coincided with the emergence of ad hoc coalitions and a shift in influence toward northern and eastern EU member states, whose governments have often taken a more urgent view of the Russian threat.

However, translating this initial momentum into sustained military capacity has proven difficult. Increased defense spending, including in Germany and Poland, has not eliminated obstacles to coordination, implementation, and collective action. The EU must contend with powerful veto players even as uncertainty about the United States raises questions about Europe's ability to help defend Ukraine and eventually defend itself.
Vachudova characterized the current U.S. trajectory as an “authoritarian turn,” arguing that the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine has eroded transatlantic trust. In her assessment, perceived American unreliability carries significant security, reputational, and economic costs, including growing doubts among allies about dependence on U.S.-made weapons systems.

Despite these challenges, Vachudova identified reasons for cautious optimism. Europeans will not stop mobilizing against authoritarian rule even as these forces continue to fight for power with the help of the Kremlin. External threats and shocks can catalyze European integration. Vachudova also described a pattern of “democratic bandwagoning,” exemplified by Canada moving closer to the EU. Ultimately, she suggested that Ukraine’s determination could help sustain enlargement and strengthen Europe’s identity as both a democratic community and a geopolitical actor. The central question is whether Europe can convert crisis-driven solidarity into lasting political unity and defense capabilities.

The Fisher Family Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is now accepting applications for our summer 2027 program, which will run from Sunday, July 18, to Friday, August 6, 2027. The deadline to apply is 11:59 pm PST on Tuesday, January 12, 2027.

The program brings together an annual cohort of approximately 30 mid-career practitioners from countries in political transition who are working to advance democratic practices and enact economic and legal reform to promote human development. Launched by CDDRL in 2005, the program was previously known as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program. The new name reflects an endowment gift from the Fisher family — Sakurako (Sako), ‘82, and William (Bill), MBA ‘84 — that secures the future of this important and impactful program.

From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, we select our program participants from among hundreds of applicants each year for the significant contributions they have already made to their communities and their potential to make an even greater impact with some help from Stanford. We aim to give them the opportunity to join a global network of over 500 alumni from 96 countries who have all faced similar sets of challenges in bringing change to their countries.

The Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program provides an intensive 3-week on-campus forum for civil society leaders to exchange experiences and receive academic and policy training to enrich their knowledge and advance their work. Delivered by a leading Stanford faculty team composed of Michael McFaul, Kathryn Stoner, Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond, Erik Jensen, and more, the program allows emerging and established global leaders to explore new institutional models and frameworks to enhance their ability to promote good governance, accountable politics, and find new ways to achieve economic development in their home countries.

Prospective fellows from Ukraine are also invited to apply for our Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development (SU-DD) Program, which runs concurrently with the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program. The SU-DD program provides a unique opportunity for mid-career practitioners working on well-defined projects aimed at strengthening Ukrainian democracy, enhancing human development, and promoting good governance. Applicants to the SU-DD program will use the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program application portal to apply and indicate their interest there. You will then be directed to a series of supplemental questions specific to the SU-DD program, including requiring a detailed description of your proposed project.

Amid the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, two leaders from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) brought a view from the ground to Stanford on October 14. Dr. Alexandra Vacroux and Yevhenii Malik spoke in a discussion moderated by Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

Dr. Vacroux is KSE’s vice president for strategic engagement and a longtime scholar of Russia. Malik, a former Marine infantry sergeant, fought in the 2022 battle for Mariupol and spent nearly two and a half years as a prisoner of war in Russian captivity before being released in a prisoner exchange in 2024. He now leads undergraduate national security and defense programs at KSE.

The talk came days after the U.S. president announced plans to buy Russian diesel. The speakers also reworked their presentation following that morning’s news, which Vacroux described as a cutoff of Starlink and Starshield service for Ukrainian forces.

Running through the conversation was a larger point: Ukraine is fighting a different kind of war, one in which inexpensive drones and robots do work that once took soldiers and costly weapons, and the lessons reach well beyond Ukraine.

A Campaign to Make Kyiv Unlivable

Vacroux said Russia has spent the months since August trying to make Kyiv unlivable, hoping residents will leave and Ukraine will surrender. Drones struck the city’s northern and southern bridges within four days of each other earlier this month. The day before the event, 39 ballistic missiles and 120 drones hit the capital, and most of the missiles were aimed at power stations and substations. Since August, she said, air alerts have been almost constant, to the degree that Ukrainians ignore them, and many KSE classes now meet in the basement. Vacroux pointed to the London Blitz and said research on how wars end gives little reason to expect this approach to work.

On October 8, 2026, Aleksandar Matovski presented at a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC), on Russia’s nuclear escalation and restraint during the war in Ukraine. The central puzzle he sought to explain was why the severity of an external shock does not necessarily correspond to the timing or intensity of Russia’s response. Moscow has repeatedly resorted to nuclear threats and provocative signaling. Yet, at other times, it has absorbed substantial military setbacks without responding with comparable ferocity. The question, therefore, is what explains this variation in restraint and escalation.

Matovski identified three broad explanations in the existing literature. The first concerns external constraints, including backlash from Russia’s remaining partners, the limited battlefield utility of nuclear weapons, and the danger of confrontation with NATO. However, these factors primarily explain restraint rather than escalation. The second concerns credibility decay, whereby repeated threats without follow-through undermine credibility and encourage riskier behavior to restore it. The third concerns domestic political influences, including hardliner pressure, regime survival threats, and risk-averse elites and citizens. Interestingly, domestic politics can generate both escalation and restraint. The question is which pressures matter, when, and how they interact with external constraints.

Matovski consequently proposed his pressure cooker framework, based on three premises. First, Putin needs a “forever war” to maintain political control. Continued confrontation allows the regime to mobilize nationalism, justify repression, and redirect dissatisfaction toward foreign adversaries. Second, military failure does not necessarily imply domestic political failure. Much depends on how the Kremlin frames setbacks and manages their political consequences. Third, nuclear coercion is essential to sustaining the war. It discourages Western intervention and reinforces the domestic narrative that Russia cannot ultimately be defeated.

The mechanism begins with an external shock, followed by initial restraint and the gradual accumulation of political pressure. Initially, restraint may be advantageous because escalation can publicly acknowledge military failure, alarm risk-averse citizens, and create further external risks. The Kremlin can also temporarily defer the political costs of inaction by controlling the narrative. However, as setbacks accumulate, hardliners increasingly interpret restraint as weakness. Meanwhile, the wider public may question the war’s sustainability. Repeated unenforced threats also undermine Russia’s credibility and may encourage adversaries to test its limits. Eventually, the political costs of restraint may outweigh those of escalation, prompting more dramatic action.

Matovski illustrated this through the 2022 mobilization and nuclear scare. Despite the failure of Russia’s initial invasion, Putin initially avoided large-scale mobilization. However, following further setbacks, particularly Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive in September, domestic pressures arguably intensified. Putin subsequently announced partial mobilization and the purported annexation of four Ukrainian regions. Russia also intensified nuclear threats. In October, Moscow made allegations concerning a potential Ukrainian “dirty bomb,” amid heightened fears of nuclear escalation. Yet Russia subsequently withdrew from Kherson in November without nuclear retaliation. Matovski interpreted this sequence as consistent with his argument that escalation follows accumulated pressures rather than necessarily responding immediately to individual setbacks.

The central implication is that Russian restraint and escalation may represent different phases of the same political process. Apparent restraint may therefore be unstable, making subsequent escalation difficult to anticipate.

This summer, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) welcomed 26 democracy leaders from 19 countries across the developing world to its Fisher Family Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program for an intensive three-week training focused on democracy, good governance, and rule of law reform. Chosen from a highly competitive applicant pool, the fellows represent a diverse range of professional backgrounds and geographical regions, spanning civil society, public service, social enterprise, media, and technology. Launched in 2005, the program was previously known as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program. It was renamed in 2023 in recognition of a gift from the Fisher family — Sakurako (Sako), ‘82, and William (Bill), MBA ‘84 — that endowed the program and secured its future.

Fellows were instructed by a leading Stanford faculty team composed of CDDRL Mosbacher Director and FSI Satre Family Senior Fellow Kathryn Stoner; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Francis Fukuyama; Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Larry Diamond; Michael McFaul, FSI Senior Fellow, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia; and Erik Jensen, Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, on new institutional models and frameworks to enhance their ability to promote good governance, accountable politics, and find new ways to achieve economic development in their home countries.

The program opened with foundational sessions on the dimensions of development, the meaning of democracy, and the role of rule of law, led by faculty including Fukuyama, Diamond, Stoner, and Jensen. Fellows then explored comparative case studies in autocratic governance — from the Middle East to China's global information ecosystem — alongside a fireside discussion on the geopolitics of energy. The second week turned to questions of migration, gender and political development, and the causes of democratization, including a session with the Human Rights Foundation on global patterns of authoritarianism. Additional sessions covered conflict and leadership, transitional justice, and anti-corruption reform, closing with discussions of sharp power, deliberative democracy, and propaganda in autocratic states. In its third and final week, the program addressed some of today's most consequential global issues, including the future of NATO, the geopolitics of artificial intelligence, and democratic backsliding worldwide. The week also covered inequality in Latin America, political corruption, and the challenges facing American democracy ahead of the midterm elections, concluding with sessions on protecting vulnerable populations in conflict and the relationship between land power and democracy.

This year's cohort now joins a global network of more than 500 alumni from over 100 countries, whose professional backgrounds are as diverse as the challenges they confront in their home countries — reflecting a shared dedication to building sound structures of democracy and development.

During the program, the fellows delivered "TED"-style talks in our Fellow Spotlight Series, sharing personal stories about the struggles in their home countries, stories of their fight for justice, equality, and democracy, and stories of optimism and endurance. You can watch their talks in the playlist below: