The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, is a sweeping and ambitious development strategy aimed at enhancing global connectivity through the construction of extensive infrastructure networks across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. While heralded as a potential catalyst for economic growth and cooperation, the BRI has also attracted a spectrum of criticisms. Concerns range from worries about the debt burdens placed on participating countries due to large-scale infrastructure investments to questions about transparency in project agreements and financing terms. Additionally, the initiative's geopolitical implications, potential environmental impacts, and uneven distribution of benefits have sparked debates about its long-term viability and impact on recipient nations.
CDDRL researchers Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and Michael Bennon, a research scholar and program manager for CDDRL’s Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative, have written widely about BRI’s challenges. Their latest essay, “China’s Road to Ruin: The Real Toll of Beijing’s Belt and Road,” published today in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs, explores the current state of the BRI, the challenges it has created, and the reforms needed to protect the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) from the fallout of the BRI debt crisis.
Below, Fukuyama and Bennon share their insights on the potential implications of the BRI on global development finance, as well as suggestions for reforms that could bolster the ability of international financial institutions to manage any potential debt crises arising from these projects.
What are the key factors contributing to the risk of debt crises stemming from the Belt and Road Initiative? How significant is this risk in your assessment?
It is clear that fears from a few years ago about China using “debt trap diplomacy” to gain access to strategic assets were overblown. The real problem is that poorly conceived Chinese projects have created a new round of sovereign debt crises for developing countries and put the burden of resolving them on international institutions like the IMF. This diverts time and resources away from activities that would contribute to the long-term development of many poor countries.
Assessments of the current emerging markets debt crisis have tended to focus on the amount of BRI debt that exists in aggregate or for a particular country since it is such a large initiative. A much more important factor is transparency regarding the debts associated with BRI projects and the key terms of those debts. Without considerable transparency efforts, loans to large infrastructure projects are naturally opaque. They include many contingent liabilities for borrowing governments. These are liabilities that may be the responsibility of the borrowing government if they materialize. A lack of transparency over BRI debt also undermines the trust needed when a restructuring is necessary if other lenders become concerned that other “hidden” bilateral debts are not participating. So a key difference is not simply the debt crisis itself but the lack of trust among key bilateral lenders.