Introduction and Contribution:

Addressing the climate crisis will require concerted action from political parties. Western countries arguably bear a greater responsibility to act given their greater levels of wealth. Some of this wealth has been accumulated at the expense of the countries most affected by climate change. Yet Western political parties vary widely in terms of their positions on environmental protection, particularly across Europe. Some parties conceive of climate action as a moral imperative, as a costly endeavor in which the government should not be involved, or even as a conspiracy to undermine national sovereignty.

Environmental party platforms would intuitively seem to align with familiar political “cleavages” — parties that support economic redistribution tend to favor climate action, while those resistant to social change tend to oppose it. But Europe is a continent with distinct regional and historical legacies. Indeed, some countries left the Communist bloc less than 35 years ago. All of this complicates simple inferences about party platforms and requires more thorough efforts to validate our intuitions. 

In “How green is my party?,” Anna Grzymala-Busse, Piotr Jabkowski, and Mariusz Baranowski assess the determinants of environmental platforms across 280 European parties in 38 countries. The authors find a significant relationship between support for climate action and three cleavages: the economy, cultural values, and populism. As one might expect, parties with right-wing economic positions and conservative cultural positions are less likely to support environmental protection. More surprisingly, both right- and left-wing populist parties are less likely to support climate action. However, these general associations vary considerably across regions, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The authors show that regional differences, especially between CEE and Northwestern or Southern Europe, persist and map onto climate politics. At the same time, and as populist parties in CEE such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) gain power and promote climate skepticism, the reader gains a sense of why these parties depart from traditional understandings of European politics and ideology.

More generally, populist parties and movements have garnered huge followings in places as diverse as India, the United States, and Brazil. “How green is my party?” deepens our understanding of why these movements can be so unwilling to budge on addressing climate change. 

Data and Findings:

The authors use data from a 2019 questionnaire of nearly 1900 European party and election experts. The three cleavages mentioned above are measured on an 11-point scale, with higher values indicating more right-wing, conservative, and populist platforms. Countries are grouped into three regions: Northwest, South, and CEE. The South Caucasus and the closed autocracies of Russia and Belarus are excluded.
 

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Figure 1. European democratic countries covered by the Global Party Survey, 2019.
 

Two of the most interesting contributions in “How green is my party?” are to show that (a) populism is significant in shaping opposition to climate action and (b) CEE remains a distinctive region in respect of its climate politics. Why might this be the case? 

Regarding populism, one would expect left-wing populists — who denounce a wealthy elite as standing against “the people” — to support climate action. Indeed, this elite can be easily constructed as destroying the environment in order to accumulate wealth. However, the authors note that left populists tend to deemphasize environmental issues or reframe them as purely economic. For example, such parties have been skeptical of policies such as tax breaks for electric vehicle production, on the grounds that they primarily benefit wealthy corporations. 

More generally, populists tend to view appeals to scientific consensus with skepticism, as “technocratic” schemes to undermine the people. This likely explains why the authors find a strong association between populism and opposition to environmental action across all three European regions (Southern, Northwest, and CEE). Interestingly, right populists are not found to be particularly likely to oppose environmental protection. Left and right populists are also more likely to oppose climate action than social conservatives.
 

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Figure 3. Moderating effect of populism on the impact of party position on social conservatism-liberalism on the position on the environmental protection scale.
 

CEE is distinctive in part because right-wing populist parties have thrived there. Many of these parties view climate action as a foreign, leftist conspiracy. This has fueled skepticism and opposition to green agendas. Meanwhile, CEE’s reliance on fossil fuels has led parties to view climate action as a threat to economic growth — and thus as political suicide. For these reasons and because CEE states are relatively new, the region also lacks strong environmental civil society organizations or green parties. On the 11-point scale, median opposition to environmental action in CEE is about one point higher than in Southern Europe and nearly three points higher than in Northwestern Europe.
 

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Figure 2. Parties’ positions on environmental issues by region of Europe.
 

A third notable finding is that the intuitive link between economic and cultural values is weaker in CEE. In other words, opposition to environmental protection is only associated with the economic right in South and Northwest Europe. This is because populist parties in CEE tend to support both economic redistribution and conservative cultural values. Redistribution is framed as a means of protecting people from perceived threats to their way of life, such as immigration or social liberalism. By contrast, CEE social liberals tend to support the free market, a position owing to their negative experiences with communist central planning.

“How green is my party?” both accounts for the high degree of variation across European party platforms and identifies patterns and regional clusters to help readers sift through climate politics across the continent. It remains to be seen whether supranational institutions such as the EU can offset weak climate action by some European ruling parties.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

What’s the most exciting finding from your research, and why does it matter for democracy and development?

In the mid-1990s, I worked in the U.S. government at the State Department and the National Security Council, focusing on Russia and European security. One of the major issues at the time was whether NATO should expand to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe. I later wrote a book on that decision, which was published in 1999.

One of the most important things I found was that NATO enlargement didn’t come from a single formal decision by the president and his cabinet. Instead, it developed gradually, driven by individuals who believed strongly in the policy and worked to move it forward over time. It was a much more incremental and contested process than people often assumed.

What was especially significant was that policymakers saw NATO enlargement as a way to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe. By offering countries the prospect of membership, they hoped to encourage democratic reforms and political stability. I think NATO enlargement had a profound impact on democratic development in the region, and my research helped explain how and why that policy came about.

What have been some of the most challenging aspects of conducting research in this field, and how did you overcome them?

Much of my work sits at the intersection of political science and history, and one of the biggest challenges is studying relatively recent events, where records are often incomplete. When you study earlier historical periods, you have access to archives and official records, but when you study more recent foreign policy decisions, much of that material is still classified.

Because of that, I’ve relied heavily on interviews with policymakers and officials. Interviews are incredibly valuable, but they also have limitations. People remember events differently, and often present events in a light that best reflects their own role or perspective, which is why it’s important to interview multiple people and compare their accounts to develop a more accurate understanding of what happened.

I’ve also used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain declassified documents, although that process can take many years. Some requests I filed for my 1999 book didn’t produce results until I was working on later books in 2003 and even 2008. But over time, those documents helped confirm and strengthen my understanding of how key decisions were made. Doing this kind of research requires patience, but it’s essential if you want to understand how foreign policy actually develops.

How has the field changed since you started, and what gives you hope?

The field has changed quite a bit since I finished my PhD in 1990. One major shift was that after the Cold War ended, there was less emphasis on area studies and regional expertise. When I was trained, people were expected to combine theoretical work with deep knowledge of particular regions, which is now less common. 

What gives me hope is the current generation of students. Many students today are highly capable of integrating knowledge of politics and history with technological expertise. Especially at places like Stanford, students have the opportunity to combine social science knowledge with new technologies. I think that combination will shape the future of the field.

What gaps still exist in your research, and what projects are you currently working on?

I’m currently working on a project with Michael McFaul and Elizabeth Economy on great power competition, focusing on how major powers try to influence the foreign policy orientation of smaller states. It’s an important issue, especially given the current international environment.

I’ve also continued working on NATO enlargement and its long-term consequences. When I published my book on NATO expansion in 1999, I didn’t expect that these issues would still be so central decades later. But NATO enlargement continues to shape relations between Russia, Europe, and the United States, particularly in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Hence, understanding how those earlier decisions connect to current events remains a major focus of my work.

What advice would you give to students interested in this field?

Students should focus on topics that genuinely interest them. You can’t predict what will be important five or ten years from now. Choosing a topic solely because you think it will be important in the future isn’t a good strategy if you’re not truly interested in it. Instead, study subjects that motivate you and that you feel compelled to understand. Unexpected events can suddenly make your area of interest highly relevant. Passion and curiosity are essential for meaningful research.

What book would you recommend to students interested in international relations?

I recommend Robert Jervis’s Perception and Misperception in International Politics, published in 1976. Jervis was one of the most brilliant scholars in international relations and had a major influence on the field.

His book explores how leaders interpret and misinterpret the world, and how those perceptions shape international relations. It combines insights from politics, psychology, and history, and helps explain why cooperation between states is often difficult. It’s an excellent starting point for anyone who wants to understand the role of leadership and perception in international politics.

Introduction and Motivation:

Social scientists and philosophers have shown increased interest in the concept of descriptive representation. Indeed, the identities and life experiences of those doing the representing may be critical for enacting the preferences of those being represented. This is especially the case for historically marginalized groups — upper-class, educated men may simply fail to adequately represent lower-class, uneducated, or women voters. In addition to considerations of fairness, there is growing recognition that descriptive representation can improve policy outcomes, such as service delivery or trust in government.

However, the study of descriptive representation has been hampered by data availability. Identifying simple correlations across the world’s democracies — for example, between proportions of working-class legislators and levels of social welfare provision — has hitherto been impossible.

In “The Global Legislators Database,” Nicholas Carnes, Joshua Ferrer, Miriam Golden, Esme Lillywhite, Noam Lupu, and Eugenia Nazrullaeva introduce the largest dataset of biographic and demographic information on national legislators ever assembled. GLD will enable scholars to assess just how much voters elect those with life experiences resembling their own. The authors compile information on five descriptive variables across 97 democracies: legislators’ party affiliation, gender, age, highest level of education, and previous occupation (to assess their social class). By contrast, prior datasets have focused only on heads of state or cabinet members, or on only a selection of more developed democracies.

Some questions around descriptive representation would seem to have intuitive answers: Wouldn’t developed countries have more women representatives, or wouldn’t women legislators feature less prominently in right-wing parties? Scholars can now hope to do more than merely gesture at answers.

Characteristics, Validity Checks, and Applications:

GLD comprises countries that (a) have a population of over 300,000 and (b) meet the standard for what Freedom House calls “Electoral Democracy” — having some minimum of political rights and civil liberties. Excluding six cases of data availability constraints, this yields 97 countries, including India, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Scholars of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Turkey — who would likely characterize these countries as authoritarian during the 2015-17 time period — will be pleased that the authors chose a more forgiving measure of democracy.

Biographic data is drawn from the national legislature in unicameral countries and the lower chamber in bicameral countries. (By contrast, upper chambers are sometimes indirectly appointed or hereditary, which sheds less light on whether voters choose descriptively similar representatives.) This yields over 19,000 individuals who held office during at least one legislative session in 2015, 2016, and 2017. GLD has remarkably complete data for the five variables mentioned above: age and education data are presented for over 90% of legislators in the dataset, for over 93% as regards occupation, and nearly 100% for gender.

In order to assess GLD’s validity, the authors compare select variables to those in comparable datasets. For example, the gender variable is compared with gender data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which shows that the two measures are nearly identical. So too is the age data nearly identical to an index from 15 affluent democracies.
 

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Figure 1. Shares of women legislators in the GLD and V-Dem. Note: Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, and Kosovo are omitted because of missing data in the V-Dem.
 

For categories like education and prior occupation — where comparable data are unavailable — the authors conduct “face validity” tests: these draw on our intuitions that legislators are, for example, mostly educated and not working class. And indeed, these intuitions are borne out in the distributions of GLD data. In terms of total coverage, GLD includes information on more legislators than the comparable Global Leadership Project database for all but two countries, and in many cases, the differences are large.
 

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Figure 3. Distributions of legislator traits in the GLD. Note: Age is calculated at the time of election. Higher education includes levels beyond primary and secondary education (Bachelors, Masters, PhD, LLB, LLM, JD, MD, and short-cycle tertiary). Data on educational attainments for legislators is unavailable for Côte d’Ivoire.
 

The authors then use GLD in application to a number of questions for which scholars have lacked global data. First, some have hypothesized that in legislatures with more (a) uneducated, (b) female, and (c) working-class representatives, incumbency rates will be lower. This is because individuals from these three groups might have a harder time overcoming challenges relating to expertise, sexism, and fundraising, respectively. Correlating GLD data with a global reelection database, the authors find only evidence for (b), suggesting that women may face higher barriers to remaining in office. These are only correlations, but they point to fruitful areas for exploration: why might women face unique barriers, and what distinguishes countries with lower versus higher barriers?
 

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Figure 5. Re-election rates by years of education, gender, and occupational background. Note: The share of working-class legislators is zero for six countries that are dropped from the figure: Albania, Botswana, Cyprus, Estonia, Guatemala, and Mongolia.
 

A second application involves public financing of elections, which is thought to favor more working-class legislators who would have a harder time fundraising. Correlating V-Dem data on public financing with the GLD variable on prior occupation, however, the authors find limited evidence for this conjecture. Finally, some have proposed that countries with a stronger rule of law would favor a higher proportion of lawyers in the national legislature. Looking again at GLD prior occupation data alongside V-Dem rule of law data, the authors find limited evidence for this hypothesis.

These varied applications point to how the Global Legislators Database can serve as a valuable resource for scholars interested in the causes and consequences of descriptive representation. Although the GLD covers only a single point in time, it can serve as a bedrock for additional data-collection efforts. In addition to expanding its temporal coverage, scholars may also wish to gather data on upper chambers. Especially in ethnically diverse countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, upper chambers are intended to mirror the descriptive composition of specific regions. However, it may be the case that ethnic representatives are still vastly more wealthy or educated than their constituents, thus impeding their ability to represent.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.