Electoral Margins and Political Competition

Electoral Margins and Political Competition

Thursday, May 15, 2025
12:00 PM - 1:15 PM
(Pacific)

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Speaker: 
  • Clémence Tricaud
Moderator: 
Clémence Tricaud seminar

We assemble a comprehensive database of historical electoral results for the US House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. We analyze long run trends in election vote margins and party seat margins. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We interpret these facts in the context of a simple model of electoral competition where seat margins and vote margins depend on the availability of information about voter preferences, as well as the ability of political candidates to tailor their platforms locally. We argue that the gradual increase in politicians' information about voter preferences, as well as the growing nationalization of politics can explain the long-run decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Clemence Tricaud is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the UCLA Anderson School of Management. She is also a research affiliate of the NBER and CEPR. She received her Ph.D in Economics from Ecole Polytechnique and CREST in 2020. Her research lies at the intersection of political economy and public economics. Her work combines quasi-experimental designs with administrative data to better understand the determinants and consequences of citizen and policymaker behaviors. The first part of her research studies the factors affecting voters' and candidates' behavior during elections and the consequences of their choices on electoral outcomes. The second part of her work explores how the identity of policymakers and the level of governance affect the design of local public policies and the provision of public goods.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.