Introduction and Contribution

Nearly half of the world (46%) lives in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections — compared to 28% who live in autocracies without elections and 26% who live under democracy. In these “electoral autocracies,” the ruling party can theoretically lose power, but its ability to repress and co-opt its opponents makes defeat unlikely. Incumbent executives and parties in electoral autocracies have become increasingly sophisticated in their repressive techniques and increasingly connected to other regimes that share similar fears of democracy. “How can electoral authoritarianism be resisted?” is thus a pressing question for domestic opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) as well as international actors seeking to promote democracy, including governments, nonprofits, think tanks, and academics. 

In “Opposition strategies and electoral challenges under autocracy,” Oren Samet analyzes five strategies opposition parties use to fight electoral authoritarianism during campaigns, on election day, and after polls have closed. These are: joining multiparty coalitions, strengthening their party organization, mobilizing mass protests, boycotting elections, and seeking international assistance. Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient. For example, joining a multiparty coalition can both increase the incumbent’s likelihood of defeat and increase his propensity to repress — insofar as he perceives the opposition as popular and threatening.

Samet offers several prescriptions for international democracy promoters. First, they must collaborate with domestic opposition parties, because only they — and not CSOs — can win elections. Yet many international actors avoid this approach; for instance, some opposition parties may care more about power than democracy, or collaborating with them may invite criticism that democracy promotion is partisan. While these risks cannot be ignored, neither can political parties.

A second prescription follows from the fact that oppositions have at least five tools at their disposal: there can be no single “best practice” in democracy promotion; it requires flexibility, adaptability, and an integrated approach. Finally, because autocrats continue to become more sophisticated, democracy promoters must take steps to prepare for the repression of their partners. 

Five Approaches and Their Pitfalls

Otherwise effective strategies for winning democratic elections — such as running savvy campaigns on primetime television that are informed by public opinion polling — will not work for opposition parties under electoral autocracy. This is because the system is structurally biased toward incumbents. As such, one common approach has been for individual opposition parties to join together in a coalition: sharing policy platforms, endorsing joint candidates, and merging their party organizations. And indeed, multiparty coalitions are statistically associated with higher vote shares and a higher likelihood that autocrats are defeated. At the same time, however, such coalitions are difficult to form and sustain due to ideological differences and polarization. In especially repressive electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia or Cambodia, incumbent parties are often able to neutralize or eliminate coalitions. Finally, when coalitions pose a serious challenge on election day but without winning, autocrats may repress even harder.

A second strategy involves strengthening party organization, for example, by improving its geographic reach or recruiting more professional candidates. These efforts can increase competitiveness and popular appeal, but they risk providing the incumbent with a large amount of information that he can use to more efficiently target his opponents. This includes formal lists of members, candidates, and party branch locations. Meanwhile, more organized opposition parties may inadvertently legitimize the system by affording it some semblance of democracy.

Encouraging mass protests is a third strategy available to opposition parties. As the number of protesters grows, authoritarian repression becomes more costly and more likely to backfire, while the incumbent’s allies become more likely to defect and join the opposition. Parties help with this process by translating protester demands into coherent party platforms. However, and especially after the 2010-12 Arab Uprisings, electoral authoritarian regimes have become highly sensitive to and ready to combat protests. This may be accomplished via surveillance or assistance from powerful third parties such as China or Russia.

A fourth, common strategy has been for parties to boycott the autocrat’s electoral facade. Doing so signals to the international community that the playing field is skewed and the system illegitimate. Yet boycotts can lead to missed opportunities for the opposition to build electoral strength, influence policy change as legislative minorities, or monitor the autocrat from inside government. In addition, they rob oppositions of the chance to take advantage of the autocrat’s miscalculations, which may even lead to his defeat. 

Finally, opposition parties can reach out to international actors for support. This may involve requesting that they sanction the regime or intervene in the name of democracy. International pressure can indeed encourage political openings and is especially useful for oppositions with low visibility. However, autocrats are adept at demonizing those who use this strategy as agents of malign foreign influence. These appeals can strengthen the autocrat’s domestic support base among those who see him as protecting the nation. In all, these tradeoffs suggest that effective democracy promotion requires a deep understanding of the political context in which oppositions operate.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

At the institute level, the partnership also reinforces Stanford’s broader role in advancing research and engagement on democracy.

“As the threats to democratic governance around the world multiply, so too must our commitment to the rigorous, interdisciplinary scholarship that seeks to understand and address them,” said Colin Kahl, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the esteemed Journal of Democracy to CDDRL creates a powerful nexus for this vital work, strengthening FSI's role as a global leader in the study of democracy."

At the same time, the partnership comes at a moment of heightened global pressure on democratic institutions, underscoring the importance of the Journal’s role in the field.

“We are now in the twentieth consecutive year of global democratic decline — no longer just a ‘democratic recession,’ but a broader wave of authoritarian reversals,” said Larry Diamond. “Yet the struggle for democracy continues. Now more than ever, we need to understand both the causes of democratic decay and the conditions for recovery and renewal. The Journal of Democracy is unique in combining rigorous scholarship with timely, accessible analysis of developments around the world.”

For Stanford students, the partnership creates a more direct pathway into the world of ideas, publishing, and public scholarship. Through new editorial internships, undergraduates and recent graduate alumni can gain hands-on experience working with a leading journal that bridges scholarship and practice.

It also strengthens Stanford’s intellectual presence in democracy studies by giving CDDRL-affiliated faculty a more formal role in supporting the Journal’s work through serving on its editorial board. Stanford faculty will contribute to the Journal’s editorial mission, inspire new lines of inquiry, and help to identify emerging areas of research to be explored in its pages.

“This partnership with CDDRL is exceptionally exciting for the Journal of Democracy and its readers,” shared Will Dobson, the Journal’s co-editor. “CDDRL is not only the leading research center in the field, but its long history of collaboration with the Journal makes this a natural fit. We are thrilled to be working with CDDRL and with the possibilities this partnership will unlock.”

With a wide readership and growing digital footprint, the Journal of Democracy reaches audiences across academia, government, journalism, and civil society. It publishes roughly 100 online-exclusive essays each year alongside its quarterly print issues and engages readers through newsletters with more than 20,000 subscribers, across social media, in Apple News, and on leading podcasts. As the most-read journal in the Johns Hopkins University Press portfolio of more than 750 publications, it has become a central venue for ideas about democratic governance and political change worldwide. Through its partnership with CDDRL, the Journal is positioned to expand that reach even further — drawing on Stanford’s research community and global practitioner networks to bring new voices and perspectives into the conversation.

Introduction and Motivation:

Social scientists and philosophers have shown increased interest in the concept of descriptive representation. Indeed, the identities and life experiences of those doing the representing may be critical for enacting the preferences of those being represented. This is especially the case for historically marginalized groups — upper-class, educated men may simply fail to adequately represent lower-class, uneducated, or women voters. In addition to considerations of fairness, there is growing recognition that descriptive representation can improve policy outcomes, such as service delivery or trust in government.

However, the study of descriptive representation has been hampered by data availability. Identifying simple correlations across the world’s democracies — for example, between proportions of working-class legislators and levels of social welfare provision — has hitherto been impossible.

In “The Global Legislators Database,” Nicholas Carnes, Joshua Ferrer, Miriam Golden, Esme Lillywhite, Noam Lupu, and Eugenia Nazrullaeva introduce the largest dataset of biographic and demographic information on national legislators ever assembled. GLD will enable scholars to assess just how much voters elect those with life experiences resembling their own. The authors compile information on five descriptive variables across 97 democracies: legislators’ party affiliation, gender, age, highest level of education, and previous occupation (to assess their social class). By contrast, prior datasets have focused only on heads of state or cabinet members, or on only a selection of more developed democracies.

Some questions around descriptive representation would seem to have intuitive answers: Wouldn’t developed countries have more women representatives, or wouldn’t women legislators feature less prominently in right-wing parties? Scholars can now hope to do more than merely gesture at answers.

Characteristics, Validity Checks, and Applications:

GLD comprises countries that (a) have a population of over 300,000 and (b) meet the standard for what Freedom House calls “Electoral Democracy” — having some minimum of political rights and civil liberties. Excluding six cases of data availability constraints, this yields 97 countries, including India, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Scholars of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Turkey — who would likely characterize these countries as authoritarian during the 2015-17 time period — will be pleased that the authors chose a more forgiving measure of democracy.

Biographic data is drawn from the national legislature in unicameral countries and the lower chamber in bicameral countries. (By contrast, upper chambers are sometimes indirectly appointed or hereditary, which sheds less light on whether voters choose descriptively similar representatives.) This yields over 19,000 individuals who held office during at least one legislative session in 2015, 2016, and 2017. GLD has remarkably complete data for the five variables mentioned above: age and education data are presented for over 90% of legislators in the dataset, for over 93% as regards occupation, and nearly 100% for gender.

In order to assess GLD’s validity, the authors compare select variables to those in comparable datasets. For example, the gender variable is compared with gender data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which shows that the two measures are nearly identical. So too is the age data nearly identical to an index from 15 affluent democracies.
 

Image

Figure 1. Shares of women legislators in the GLD and V-Dem. Note: Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, and Kosovo are omitted because of missing data in the V-Dem.
 

For categories like education and prior occupation — where comparable data are unavailable — the authors conduct “face validity” tests: these draw on our intuitions that legislators are, for example, mostly educated and not working class. And indeed, these intuitions are borne out in the distributions of GLD data. In terms of total coverage, GLD includes information on more legislators than the comparable Global Leadership Project database for all but two countries, and in many cases, the differences are large.
 

Image

Figure 3. Distributions of legislator traits in the GLD. Note: Age is calculated at the time of election. Higher education includes levels beyond primary and secondary education (Bachelors, Masters, PhD, LLB, LLM, JD, MD, and short-cycle tertiary). Data on educational attainments for legislators is unavailable for Côte d’Ivoire.
 

The authors then use GLD in application to a number of questions for which scholars have lacked global data. First, some have hypothesized that in legislatures with more (a) uneducated, (b) female, and (c) working-class representatives, incumbency rates will be lower. This is because individuals from these three groups might have a harder time overcoming challenges relating to expertise, sexism, and fundraising, respectively. Correlating GLD data with a global reelection database, the authors find only evidence for (b), suggesting that women may face higher barriers to remaining in office. These are only correlations, but they point to fruitful areas for exploration: why might women face unique barriers, and what distinguishes countries with lower versus higher barriers?
 

Image

Figure 5. Re-election rates by years of education, gender, and occupational background. Note: The share of working-class legislators is zero for six countries that are dropped from the figure: Albania, Botswana, Cyprus, Estonia, Guatemala, and Mongolia.
 

A second application involves public financing of elections, which is thought to favor more working-class legislators who would have a harder time fundraising. Correlating V-Dem data on public financing with the GLD variable on prior occupation, however, the authors find limited evidence for this conjecture. Finally, some have proposed that countries with a stronger rule of law would favor a higher proportion of lawyers in the national legislature. Looking again at GLD prior occupation data alongside V-Dem rule of law data, the authors find limited evidence for this hypothesis.

These varied applications point to how the Global Legislators Database can serve as a valuable resource for scholars interested in the causes and consequences of descriptive representation. Although the GLD covers only a single point in time, it can serve as a bedrock for additional data-collection efforts. In addition to expanding its temporal coverage, scholars may also wish to gather data on upper chambers. Especially in ethnically diverse countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, upper chambers are intended to mirror the descriptive composition of specific regions. However, it may be the case that ethnic representatives are still vastly more wealthy or educated than their constituents, thus impeding their ability to represent.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

What have been some of the most challenging aspects of conducting research in this field, and how did you overcome these challenges? 

Early on, one of the major challenges was finding a place with the right kind of support: interested colleagues, staff who could assist with fieldwork, and, especially, a community of graduate students interested in similar questions. That kind of environment takes time to build. Oxford had a very strong community with a lot of support, funding, and students working in this area. When I later returned to Stanford, we hired younger development economists and were able to build a similarly vibrant student community working on different aspects of behavior and development.

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change? 

Mostly through understanding behavior and what lies behind different types of decisions. That’s what matters. In addition, the direct policy impact has largely come through my students. Many have gone into academia, but many others have joined organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, or private companies. One student, for example, helped set up a commodity exchange in Ethiopia, which certainly had policy impact. So my influence on policy has been felt primarily through the work that my students go on to do.
 

How have things changed in your field since you first began your research, and how has this influenced the way you approach your work? 

Research methodologies have evolved significantly over time. In the early days, researchers did not even use surveys. Later, surveys became more rigorous, and the field moved toward panel data to follow households over longer periods. With the introduction of GPS, it became possible to work with spatial data in new and more precise ways. The emergence of randomized controlled trials marked another major shift and shaped development economics for many years, although that influence is now starting to decline. Conceptually, the growing importance of behavioral economics has also been a major change and has become increasingly central to how we study issues in economic development.

What gaps do you feel need to be addressed in your research field, and what do you anticipate you will study more in the future? 

There are always gaps. It never is a finished business. The challenges also change over time. Recently, in a very short period, many things built over our lifetimes have been undone. The question is whether to try to rebuild them or conclude that they did not work and try something else. I do not think many of the solutions being proposed now will last; they are not effective. The erosion of the rule of law is especially disturbing. Even democracies struggle with it, but in this country, it has essentially gone out the window. The neglect of international law is also profoundly shocking.

Could you elaborate on the broader shifts you’ve observed in recent years, especially the weakening of institutions and systems that once supported development and international cooperation? 

Closing down USAID is a massive change. Development institutions could certainly be improved, but shutting them down entirely is something very different. These shifts have also affected research funding. Funding has dwindled, and academic positions in development have declined. The job market in development economics overall seems to be shrinking. There is also less interest in people who study democracy, because their work would necessarily be critical of what is happening. It has been a significant backward step.

In times of uncertainty, what gives you hope for the future of your field? 

My students! Their enthusiasm has not disappeared, and the enthusiasm among researchers remains strong as well. Our international contacts remain solid, and parts of the world, especially in Europe, such as Germany and Switzerland, have not given up on these ideals. For example, Esther Duflo recently moved from MIT to Zurich, and we may see more moves like that.

Lastly, what book would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field? 

Development economics now covers everything; it’s essentially all economics for 80 percent of the world, so there isn’t one book that summarizes it. If someone wants to start a research career focused on market institutions, I would recommend the book I wrote on that topic: Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence (MIT Press, 2003). But if I had to pick a book I personally enjoyed, it would be the historian Fernand Braudel's three-volume Civilization and Capitalism, which looks at market institutions across the world from 1400 to 1800. It was eye-opening and a lot more interesting than traditional, battle-focused history.
 

As he approaches retirement at the end of 2025, Dr. Fafchamps offers insights drawn from decades of research on behavior and institutions. His legacy endures through his students and the body of research that continues to shape scholarship worldwide.

On November 14, 2025, CDDRL and the King Center on Global Development hosted "Unfinished Business: A Tribute to Marcel Fafchamps" — a full-day academic symposium celebrating the career and contributions of economist Marcel Fafchamps on the occasion of his retirement. Featuring a keynote by Marcel himself, this tribute brought together colleagues, collaborators, and students to engage with the themes and ideas that have shaped his influential work in development economics, labor markets, and social networks.

Marcel's keynote on "Behavioral Markets" can be viewed below: