‘Keep the girls calm and quiet’

For almost 10 hours on October 7, Tibon and his wife and daughters listened to the sounds of gunfire and rockets outside, while monitoring Hamas atrocities on their phones and sending desperate SOS messages from their darkened safe room. 

Tibon said, “We had only one advantage, which is that we could hear them, we could hear their bullets, we could hear their shouting, and if we managed to keep the girls calm and quiet, they wouldn't hear us. And so that was our mission, to keep the girls calm and quiet.” 

They did, waiting until about 4:00 pm when the family was eventually freed by Tibon’s father, who drove with his mother from Tel Aviv to rescue the besieged family. Along the way, his parents made key decisions to rescue wounded Israelis by taking them to the hospital.

Learning later on about his parents’ dangerous foray into a war zone — and the aid they offered along the way — Tibon gained a deeper insight about saving those in grave peril. This informs his moral stance on prioritizing the rescue of the remaining 58 hostages — alive and dead — still held by Hamas in Gaza, over the competing priority of dismantling Hamas as a military and governing organization:

“When I look today at the dilemma of the state of Israel, whether to continue the war after 20 months or to stop in order to save those who need immediate saving, I don't see a dilemma. You save those who need immediate saving, and then you continue the mission,” said Tibon, focusing on the fates of the approximately 20 living Israeli hostages still held in Gaza.

When Diamond asked him about the word “betrayal” in the book’s subtitle, Tibon said the dual meaning of the term is a conscious one. The word “betrayal” reflects two concepts — the failure of the Israeli government, military, and intelligence services to heed early danger warnings about a Hamas attack, and the disappointment about their neighbors in Gaza, with whom they had for years worked with on peace and reconciliation issues. 

He recalled kibbutz members who volunteered to take cancer patients from Gaza in their cars to Israeli hospitals so they could receive optimal medical treatments.

“This was a peace-seeking community that, for many years, advocated for peace and reconciliation,” he said.

As for accountability, Tibon emphasized the need for Israel to launch an independent and professional investigation into the October 7 catastrophe through a State Commission of Inquiry. Such an inquiry would examine the causes of the strategic, intelligence, defensive, and operational breakdowns experienced by Israel before, during, and after the attack, and would establish who was responsible for the multiple failures. 

“This is the strongest tool in the Israeli system for investigating failures of the state. It's a commission established by the government, headed by a former judge, that has all the powers of a seated court to invite witnesses and investigate,” he added, noting that the current government has not yet approved such an endeavor, despite about 70-85 percent of Israelis supporting such a commission.

Tibon said, “The government is refusing to do it because they are afraid of what will come out.”

‘Shifted public opinion’

The October 7 Hamas terrorist attack marked a major, and rather peculiar, shift in domestic Israeli politics, Tibon said.

“It shifted public opinion on the conflict to the right because there is a lack of belief in the peace process after this kind of thing. And at the same time, it significantly weakened the current right-wing government, which in all the public opinion polls is losing a lot of support,” he said.

He explained that this trend reveals that Israelis currently do not believe in a peace process and that they perceive an existential need to defend their families and homeland. 

At the same time, Israelis want a serious and competent government, and the existing right-leaning government is not viewed as such.

“We have to be led and managed by competent, serious people, and this government is not considered competent or serious by most of the Israeli public for obvious reasons,” he said.
 

In his book, Tibon expresses deep empathy for the people who are suffering in Gaza, and he reflects on another subtitle, “hope.”

Hope can begin, he said, with saving the Israeli hostages and then ending the war. “Forever wars may be good for religious preachers, but they're not good for border communities. Border communities need to reach an end and go back and rebuild,” said Tibon.

He cited a Polish poet, who once wrote that after every war, somebody has to clean up. “We are the ones who are going to have to clean up and fix our own houses,” he said.

Tibon is an award-winning diplomatic correspondent for Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper. His story and book, The Gates of Gaza, was featured on 60 Minutes.

He, his wife, and daughters are currently living in temporary housing in north-central Israel.  

Diamond said, “This is a story of remarkable courage and tenacity from many quarters in the face of unspeakable terror and potentially paralyzing fear. It is quintessentially an Israeli story.”

A full recording of the conversation can be viewed here.

The 2025 Daniel Pearl Memorial Lecture was presented by the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program in partnership with the Daniel Pearl Foundation, the Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and Hillel at Stanford. 

Argument & Key Findings

Hesham Sallam draws our attention to a surprising pattern: Egyptian Islamists and leftists have, for several generations, criticized each other on remarkably similar grounds. Their arguments have sometimes focused on Islam and left-wing political goals. But just as — if not more — frequently, they have focused on how each other’s agendas are inauthentic to Egyptian society and promoted to benefit foreign actors. It is true that the contents of their critiques have differed: Islamists denounce the left as betraying Egypt’s pure, Islamic nation while acting on behalf of “Zionists” or “western imperialists.” Meanwhile, leftists see Islamists as inauthentic to Egypt’s secular, pluralistic history, as well as advancing foreign interests. These differences notwithstanding, a common structure of political argument has been preserved across decades. 

The article introduces the history of Islamist-leftist debate in Egypt since the 1970s. Central to this history was the process of reappropriation: Islamists criticized the left, and the left responded by criticizing Islamists using more or less the same script. The study draws upon an array of Arabic sources likely unknown to readers outside of Egypt, including editorials, monographs, and public debates.

The Islamist Critique

The article first presents the intricacies of Egyptian Islamists’ critique of the left. There is a long history of Egyptian political elites denouncing left-wing politics as inauthentic and foreign. For example, Gamal Abdel-Nasser accused Egyptian communists of conspiring with Zionists and Soviets, while Anwar al-Sadat accused them of atheism and thus betraying Egypt’s Islamic essence. As leftists were repeatedly accused of disloyalty, nationalist ideas became even more dominant within leftist circles — this despite the historical suspicions of left-wing thinkers of nationalism as a distraction from class politics. The Egyptian case thus mirrors the trajectory of Europe’s internationalist labor movements during World War II, when leftist political goals were abandoned for state nationalism. In any case, the Islamist critique, which was led principally by the Muslim Brotherhood, regularly accused the left of foreign loyalties and a betrayal of Egyptian values. Over time, this critique was extended to secular Egyptians and deployed increasingly virulent language; for example, an academic critic of Islamism was denied promotion, ostensibly for his writings that were described by an Islamist detractor as “spreading cultural AIDS.” They also drew on prominent social science frameworks like Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”: Egypt’s authentic Islamic nation was seen as pitted in an irresolvable clash against the atheistic West, which, they alleged, was simultaneously funding the Egyptian left. These are just a few of the examples Sallam uses to show how Islamists portrayed the left as inauthentic and disloyal, undermining its legitimacy in Egyptian politics.
 

The Leftist Critique

Sallam next shows us how the left struck back at their Islamist foes. A key process in this history concerns the Hosni Mubarak regime’s co-optation of influential leftists into the state’s cultural institutions. This occurred as a response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral successes in the 1980s. Coincident with these institutional changes, leftists began appropriating the authenticity critique. They claimed that Islamists were engaged not in building a pure Islamic state and society, but in a narrow project meant to advance their own political standing. Rejecting the Islamist critique of them as atheists, leftists accused their opponents of weaponizing Islam and betraying its true essence. They rejected the distinction between so-called violent and nonviolent Islamism, on the grounds that nonviolent Islamists still were willing to justify violence. Islamists were said to be working on behalf of foreign interests like Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, whose designs on Egyptian territory went unnoticed by Islamists. The Brotherhood was deemed a cult-like vehicle for indoctrinating and promoting foreign goals, especially those of the Gulf. Far from authentic to Egyptian society, Islamists were seen as holding Egyptian Muslims in contempt for their alleged heresies. And in one of the most surprising appropriations, leftists claimed that Islamists were in fact quite similar to both Zionists and imperialists: all three sought to dominate the Middle East through sectarian politics. The Brotherhood’s Egyptian constitution was denigrated for being indistinguishable from versions published in Europe and Pakistan. Especially inauthentic to Egyptian society was the Brotherhood’s view of religious minorities as second-class citizens; this was deemed a fundamental betrayal of Egypt’s national essence, namely secular pluralism. These counter-critiques helped the left frame itself as the true guardian of the Egyptian nation.
 

Beyond Speech

Importantly, the Islamist-leftist debates were not mere rhetoric, but served as a basis for political action, especially when it came to questions of cooperation. For example, after the Islamist critic Farag Foda was assassinated, the so-called ‘moderate’ Islamist Mohamed Al-Ghazali defended his assassins; some leftists used these events to justify their refusal to cooperate with Islamists. More generally, they argued that Islamists’ quest for a religious state would only lead to political violence and exclusion, further grounds to reject compromise. Yet claims about authenticity and nationalism were also used to justify cooperation, as when leftists argued that both they and the Brotherhood were natural allies in the fight against foreign imperialism and Zionism. It is not clear whether a less confrontational approach would have helped Islamists and leftists cooperate against Egypt’s successive dictators, but their divisive rhetoric almost certainly did not help matters.
 

Contributions

The article will help readers understand why Egyptian politics has become increasingly marked by groups’ ‘affective’ hatreds for one another, as opposed to normal political disagreements. By weaving the themes of treason and inauthenticity through decades of history, Sallam shows us why this new status quo is not surprising. Affective polarization has led many Egyptians to view their opponents as unworthy of political inclusion, consistent with the rise of a global populism that emphasizes “us vs. them” distinctions. Sallam fleshes this out by relaying the different responses among leftists and Islamists to Egypt’s 2013 military coup, which ousted the Brotherhood leader Morsi. Leftists called the coup a necessary evil to counter foreign influences seeking to establish an Islamic state, while Islamists accused the left of being sponsored by the West. 

Readers will see the conflict between Islamists and leftists as not just fleeting moments of political disagreement, but a generations-long battle for domination in the realm of ideas.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), introduced the panelists, and Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, moderated the discussion.

On the frontlines, outnumbered Ukrainian troops have waged a stiff resistance, while a mass influx of Russian troops, with enormous loss of life, have made incremental but not decisive progress. Hundreds of thousands have died or been injured on both sides. Talks to end the war are underway between the Trump Administration and Russia, with Ukraine and European nations not currently invited to participate.

‘We will cease to exist’

Matviichuk, who was a visiting scholar from 2017-2018 with the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program at CDDRL, noted the conflict has actually been going on for 11 years, since 2014 when Russia invaded and occupied Crimea. Today, she said, there is no safe place in Ukraine where people can hide from Russian rockets. “Just two days ago, Russia sent 263 drones against Kyiv and other peaceful cities in Ukraine.”

Matviichuk described how Russia seeks to ban the Ukrainian language and culture, and how they take Ukrainian children to Russia to put them in Russian education camps. “They told them they are not Ukrainian children, but they are Russian children.”

If the West does not provide Ukraine with security guarantees in a peace plan, then “it means that we will cease to exist. There will be no more of our people,” Matviichuk said.

Oleksandra Ustinova, a member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's Parliament, said, “If we talk about life in Ukraine now, it's complicated, especially during the last week after the Munich Security Conference,” where Vice President JD Vance delivered a speech that focused on internal politics in Europe.

“People do not understand how we thought the United States was our biggest partner,” she said.
 

At one point, Ustinova noted that she could not hear the conversation in her headphones because sirens were blaring as Russia had just launched an aerial attack on Kyiv.

She said that Russian President Putin and others who seek a Ukrainian election are trying to set a trap because Ukrainian law does not allow an election during martial law, which Ukraine has declared because of the Russian invasion. Plus, it would involve the demobilization of more than 400,000 troops.

“It would be very easy to fake elections, and that’s what the Russians would do,” Ustinova said. “It’s a trap. They're going to find where to put the money into their own candidate.”

Ustinova, who was also a visiting scholar with the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program from 2018-2019, said, “We can see that this is a new reality, not only in the Ukrainian war, but in foreign relations, and hopefully the Europeans can unite. Because if they don't, it will be a disaster for everyone.”

Oleksiy Honcharuk, a former Ukrainian prime minister from 2019-2020 who was the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at FSI in 2021, said, “I think that we are still strong. My prediction is that in three or six months, Ukraine can double the damage to Russia on the battlefield from a technological perspective with drones.”

But time is very expensive now, he added, because every single day, every single hour, Ukrainians are paying with the lives of their best people and soldiers.

Honcharuk said Ukrainians are “shocked” about the position of the United States’ recent vote against a United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion as well as the Trump Administration’s position on talks with Russia.

“This is exactly the moment when all the people of goodwill should do everything possible to support Ukraine in this very complicated time,” said Honcharuk.

Regarding the UN vote, McFaul said, “I am shocked, I am appalled, I am embarrassed as an American to see those votes today. We are voting with the most horrific dictators in the world.”

‘Not about people’

Matviichuk said, “Putin started this war of aggression, not because he wanted to occupy just more Ukrainian land. Putin started this war of aggression because he wanted to occupy and destroy the whole of Ukraine and even go further. He wants to forcibly restore the Russian Empire — he dreams about his legacy, his logic is historical.”

This ultimately means that Ukraine needs real security guarantees, she said. “President Trump said he started the peace negotiation because he cares about people dying in this war. So, if President Trump cares about people dying in this war, he also has to care about people dying in Russian prisons.”

She explained that she’s spoken with hundreds of people who have survived brutal conditions in Russian captivity. And so, it’s surprising, Matviichuk said, to hear political statements from U.S. officials “about natural minerals and elections, about possible territorial concessions, but not about people.”

Lack of Global Support

Serhiy Leshchenko, an advisor to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s Chief of Staff, spoke about the recent overtures by the Trump Administration to Russia.

“This is a new reality we are living in now. Frankly, my understanding is that Ukrainians are not very shocked with what's going on because we went through so many shocks within the last three years.”

Acknowledging the lack of an American flag at an allied event this week in Kyiv, Leshchenko said Ukrainians know perfectly well that perception is reality.

“It means that now we have an absolutely different perception. So, it’s obvious that there is no global security infrastructure anymore. It’s obvious that NATO is not an answer anymore,” said Leshchenko, an alumnus of the 2013 cohort of CDDRL’s Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program.

‘Sad occasion’

In her opening remarks, Stoner noted, “We’re here on what is actually a sad occasion, which is that Feb. 24 marks three years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.”

She said, “Only about less than 1% of land has changed hands since December 2022, so Ukraine is not losing. Ukraine is at least defending what it has, and it remains in Kursk (Russia).”

McFaul said, “It’s in our national interest that we do not line up with Belarus and Russia and North Korea – that holds negative consequences for our future security and prosperity. I actually think our country cares about values.”

He added that the notion that all America cares about is mineral rights, business deals, and hotels in Gaza is not the America he knows.

McFaul told the panelists, “I've witnessed and observed what you’ve been doing for your country, and we are just extremely fortunate to be connected to all of you, whom I consider to be heroic individuals in the world.”

A full recording of the event can be viewed below, and additional commentary can be found from The Stanford Daily.

Haddad emphasized that while many Syrians welcomed the end of Assad’s decades-long rule, the transition has raised serious concerns about the country’s future. Over time, Assad’s regime had become weakened by corruption, economic decline, and an inability to provide basic services. By late 2024, Syria’s military was fragmented, demoralized, and lacked external support. When HTS forces advanced into Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, the Syrian Army largely dissolved without significant resistance.

A key factor in Assad’s downfall was the unexpected inaction of his traditional allies. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah — longtime backers of the regime — did not intervene. Iran, facing domestic unrest and wary of escalating tensions with Israel and the U.S., chose to stay out. Hezbollah, weakened by clashes with Israel, lacked the resources to help. Russia, preoccupied elsewhere, had seemingly accepted Assad’s fate. The lack of resistance suggests that the transfer of power may have been prearranged rather than a purely military victory.

The most immediate turning point came when Israel launched airstrikes that destroyed over 80% of Syria’s remaining military infrastructure. Notably, neither HTS nor other international actors responded to these strikes, fueling speculation about behind-the-scenes agreements between Turkey, Qatar, and Western powers.

With Assad gone, Ahmad Al-Shara, the leader of HTS, was declared Syria’s new president. However, Haddad noted that this transition was neither democratic nor transparent. Al-Shara, who was previously affiliated with Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch), has rebranded himself as a moderate leader, promising inclusion and reform. However, Haddad pointed to major contradictions between his words and actions. The Syrian Army and security services have been dissolved, leading to concerns over instability. Government positions have been filled by HTS loyalists, excluding secular and nationalist opposition. Additionally, the new military structure requires recruits to undergo Sharia law training, raising fears about the ideological direction of the new government.

Syria’s transition is also deeply shaped by regional and international power struggles. Haddad stressed that HTS could not have taken power without Turkey’s approval. Turkey, focused on containing Kurdish forces in northern Syria, has played a key role in shaping post-Assad politics. Meanwhile, the U.S. recently announced its military withdrawal from Syria, leaving Kurdish forces vulnerable to both HTS control and Turkish expansion. Qatar and other Gulf states are increasingly involved in shaping Syria’s economy and political trajectory.

Looking ahead, Haddad identified five critical challenges that will determine Syria’s future:

1. Sovereignty and territorial integrity – Can Syria reclaim full control of its territory, or will it remain influenced by foreign actors?
2. Inclusion and transparency – Will the new government allow for democratic participation, or will HTS consolidate power?
3. Economic recovery – Sanctions and economic devastation pose serious obstacles to stability.
4. Rule of law and governance – No clear roadmap exists for elections, legal institutions, or constitutional reforms.
5. Rebuilding and refugee return – Over five million Syrian refugees remain abroad, with no structured plan for their safe return.

While Assad’s downfall marks a historic moment, Syria’s future remains uncertain and fragile. Many Syrians who once celebrated the regime’s collapse now fear that HTS’s dominance will not bring real change. The gap between promised reforms and actual governance policies has fueled skepticism.