What is authoritarian sharp power, and how has it shaped the current geopolitical landscape and the state of democracy around the globe? In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Christopher Walker — Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy — and Will Dobson, the co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, discussed their new book Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power (Johns Hopkins University Press 2023). The co-authors argue that dictators have moved beyond the suppression of their own citizens and are now actively attempting to erode the pillars of democratic societies. 

Conventional wisdom of the last 25 years suggests that the solution to our “authoritarian problem” is simple: the passage of time. Over time, scholars argued, authoritarian political systems would gradually and peacefully give way to democratic ones, with rising demands for political rights. Globalization would bind authoritarian elites to their Western counterparts via business, and the internet would expose citizens to new ways of thinking. 

However, the authoritarian regimes have not subsided. In fact, they have worked to undermine democratic institutions in other countries. Thus, Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power serves as a rebuttal to these illusions, arguing that free societies can no longer afford this sort of complacency. 

Autocrats see democracies as an existential threat to their way of rule, both at home and abroad. Accordingly, they have begun reaching across borders to stymie democracy where it does not exist and undermine it where it does. 

How are they doing this? By attacking the facet of democratic society people believed was its principal strength, namely its openness. While autocrats are able to harden themselves and their societies from the free world, commitment to democracy fundamentally means a free exchange of ideas. This allows autocrats to target the minds of foreign publics by manipulating key institutions, such as universities, think tanks, media outlets, and entertainment companies. 

But it is not just autocrats’ outward-looking strategy that has permitted this infiltration; democracies themselves are complacent. Many powerful actors have been willing to cede their values and principles, sometimes for money or prestige, but sometimes just due to a lack of understanding and foresight. 

To prevent further influence, Walker and Dobson stress that democracies need to take both reactive and proactive measures. In response to the offense of autocracies, democracies must commit to prioritizing openness and transparency. They must, for example, prevent deals that extend China’s influence. Democracies must also work to correct knowledge asymmetries and think of innovative ways to get information about China and its role into the wider world. On the proactive front, democracies must defend their own values and the intrinsic benefit of a democratic system.

Deliberative Polling®, a process pioneered by Stanford’s Deliberative Democracy Lab (DDL), housed within the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, has been used successfully for the second time to help change the Constitution of Mongolia.

Following a 2015 city-wide Deliberative Poll for the Capital City Ulaanbataar, conducted with support from DDL (then called the Center for Deliberative Democracy), the national Parliament in Mongolia decided to pass the “Law on Deliberative Polling.” This law, approved in 2017, requires that deliberative polling be conducted on potential amendments to the Mongolian Constitution before they can be considered by the Parliament.

The first national Deliberative Poll following the new law was convened in 2017. After extensive parliamentary debate, Mongolia amended its constitution by a two-thirds vote on November 14, 2019. Gombojavyn Zandanshatar, Chairman of the State Great Khural (the Parliament of Mongolia) and a 2014-16 visiting scholar at CDDRL, noted in a letter to Professor James Fishkin, Director of the Deliberative Democracy Lab, that Deliberative Polling “was a critical part of the process of consultation and discourse that helped shape the final amendments. You will see that most of the major changes made in these latest amendments can be traced back to the key issues the citizens discussed during the Deliberative Poll.”

In February of 2023, a new national sample of nearly 800 people — a stratified random sample of citizens from throughout the country — gathered in the Government Palace (the seat of government in Ulaanbaatar) for a long weekend to deliberate about proposed amendment topics. The new sample was selected by the National Statistical Office, the governmental body also responsible for conducting Mongolia’s National Census. The topics were gathered from nearly 1,100 suggestions from experts, the public, civil society, and professional organizations around the country. They were then screened by the Deliberative Council, an independent non-partisan body required by the “Law on Deliberative Polling.”

A method of public opinion-gathering developed by a Stanford communication professor has been adopted by the Mongolian government, which now requires that “deliberative polling” be conducted prior to amending the country’s constitution.

Janet M. Peck Professor of International Communication James Fishkin created deliberative polling three decades ago. His in-depth technique involves gathering randomly sampled members of a population together to discuss an issue in small groups with moderators. Polling participants are guided through balanced briefings and can also ask questions of experts on hand. The process, which generally spans two days, seeks to gauge more informed views than would normally be possible.

Read the full article in The Stanford Daily.

What is driving the current democratic recession? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, Vanderbilt University Political Scientist Larry Bartels argued that democratic erosion in Europe has been driven primarily by elite behavior, not shifting popular sentiments. Bartels presented findings from his latest book, Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe, published in 2023 by Princeton University Press. The book challenges the view that public opinion drives democratic endurance and erosion.

According to conventional wisdom, social tensions and backlash against globalization and immigration have led to an explosion in populism in democratic societies. This populism, coupled with falling confidence in politicians and government, is posing a serious threat to the future of democracy.

Bartels argued that the data suggests otherwise. In fact, ordinary European political attitudes have changed little over the past 20 years. Using data from 9 rounds of a European social survey running between 2002 and 2019 across 23 countries, Bartels finds public attitudes commonly associated with right-wing populism have remained stable. Favorability toward immigrants, support for European integration, ideological polarization, trust in politicians, and satisfaction with democracy have not seen any significant change during the same period. 

What accounts for the apparent surge in right-wing populists? Bartels explained that right-wing populism is not surging in a new wave. Rather, it is drawing from an old reservoir. 

According to Bartels, claims of a populist wave are unjustified. While populism has increased moderately across Europe, the successes of right-wing populists have been overblown by the press, with far more attention on their political victories than their failures. Additionally, variation in support for populist parties reflects a variation in “supply” rather than in “demand.” In other words, change has been driven by a transformation in the behavior of political elites rather than in public opinion. 

In looking at the correlation between political attitudes and party support, Bartels finds that support for right-wing populists tracks with conservative ideology, anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-EU sentiment, political distrust, and economic disaffection. However, he noted, the relationship between party support and economic disaffection is rather weak. 

Although analysis of public attitudes shows that there remains a group of people susceptible to right-wing populists, this group has not been voting for populist candidates. This suggests these politicians have not yet successfully mobilized right-wing populist sentiments.

In discussing the experiences of Poland and Hungary, Bartels indicated that in both cases, the populist turn was overwhelmingly driven by the political elites. Voters did not choose dictatorship. They were passive and unable to mobilize in defense of democracy. In fact, prior to election, support for populist parties closely resembled that of an ordinary conservative party. Once in power, these parties began abusing their power and undermining democratic institutions.