New democracies all over the world are finding themselves haunted by the old demons of clientelism, corruption, arbitrariness, and the abuse of powerleading to a growing awareness that, in addition to elections, democracy requires checks and balances. Democratic governments must be accountable to the electorate; but they must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. It is not enough that citizens control the state. The state must control itself.

This collection explores how new democracies can achieve that goal. Focusing on electoral administration, judicial systems, corruption control, and central banks, the authors consider such issues as how governments can establish effective agencies of restraint, why they should accept them, and what those agencies can do to achieve credibility.

Five years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a new political and economic system has evolved in Russia. Russia After Communism provides an overall assessment of what has been accomplished and what has failed to date, and where Russia is heading. In a unique collaborative effort, the book features chapters on major issues written by pairs of leading Russian and American scholars.

Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov analyze the Russian elections since 1989 and assess voting behavior. Scott Bruckner and Lilia Shevtsova address the question of whether Russia has become a stable pluralist society. Martha Brill Olcott and Valery Tishkov focus on the nature of the Russian nation as well as regional relations. Russia has become a market economy, but what kind of capitalism is being formed? Anders Aslund and Mikhail Dmitriev examine the continuing challenge of economic reform. Sherman Garnett and Dmitri Trenin analyze Russia's relations with its nearest neighbor. Stephen Sestanovich examines Russia's place in the world.

The most surprising outcome of Russia's recent financial meltdown has been the demonstration of democracy's resilience, not its weakness. Most major political actors are preparing for the upcoming elections, not planning to seize power on their own.

In December 1993, a new political order began in Russia. Often called the Second Russian Republic, this political order is ruled by two central, if somewhat contradictory, principles. First, the Russian political system was to be dominated by one central decision-maker, the president. Having defeated his enemies in a violent confrontation in October 1993, Boris Yeltsin and his assistants drafted a constitution that served his immediate interests. The new basic law accorded the president's office inordinate political power and subordinated the other branches of the national government to lesser roles. In addition, the 1993 constitution specified that direct elections would be the only legitimate mechanism for assuming national political office. Even the president would be subjected to the uncertainties of the electoral process. In vesting the office of the presidency with greater powers, the new constitution also made the office directly accountable to the people.

In December 1993, for the first time since the formation of Russia's anti-communist movement in the late 1980s, advocates of radical economic and political reform -- represented in this election by the electoral bloc Russia's Choice -- were rejected by Russia voters. The results shocked Russia's radical reformers. Although public opinion polls suggested that Russia's Choice might capture as high as 40 percent of the popular vote, this proreform and pro-Yeltsin electoral bloc won only 15.5 percent, well behind the 23 percent garnered by Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia ( LDPR) and not much higher than the 12 percent won by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). This dismal showing was especially surprising considering that President Boris Yeltsin--the leader and symbol of Russia's radical reform movement--had just won majority approval ratings for both his performance as president and his economic reform plan in a nationwide referendum held in April 1993, just eight months before the December parliamentary elections.

Russia appears to have made tremendous progress in becoming a democracy in recent years. In December 1995, Russian citizens voted in parliamentary elections. In two rounds of voting in June and July in 1996, they then elected a president, the first time ever that Russian voters directly selected their head of state. Despite calls for delay and postponement, these two elections were held on time and under law - law drafted and approved through a democratic procedure by elected officials. Large majorities participated in both of these elections: 65% of all eligible voters in 1995, and nearly 70% in both rounds of the presidential vote. While electoral violations tainted both elections, especially the presidential vote, all participants - winners and losers - accepted the election results. After Boris Yeltsin's inauguration, the Communist-dominated parliament approved his candidate for prime minister - Viktor Chernomyrdin - by an overwhelming majority. This too was a first, as Russia's elected parliament had never approved the executive's choice for prime minister under the procedures outlined in a popularly-ratified constitution. Finally, from the fall of 1996 to the spring of 1998, over sixty gubernatorial elections were held throughout Russia. Although there was evidence that results were falsified in some races, the vast majority were recognized as free and fair by all major participants.

At first glance, the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Russia - and the postcommunist world in general - seems similar to that in other countries that are part of the "third wave" of democratization. The descriptive discourse of "transitology" efficiently identifies the actors, actions, and accidents of postcommunist regime transformations. Scholars already have successfully used concepts from Latin America and Southern Europe such as liberalization, "hard-liners vs. soft-liners," "reforma vs. ruptura," pacts, and founding elections to describe communist regime change. These developments have brought the study of the former communist world into the mainstream, if not the cutting edge, of comparative politics.

The 1996 presidential election marked the end of polarized politics in Russia. If between 1990 and 1996 electoral politics have been contests between "communists" and "democrats," the next national elections will have a different logic. The threat of communist restoration died in the ballot box in 1996, but so, too, did anti-communism.

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Last week, two critical elections took place, one for governor in Nizhny Novgorod and one for mayor in Samara. These elections took on much greater significance than a typical regional election in that they filled offices vacated by two new deputy ministers in the current government: First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sysuyev. Since both Nemtsov and Sysuyev are considered leaders of Russia's "second liberal revolution," elections in Nizhny and Samara effectively served as referenda on the present government. Consequently, supporters and opponents of the current regime devoted inordinate amounts of time, organizational resources and money to their campaigns.

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A new conventional wisdom is emerging among analysts, journalists, and even some government officials in the West who see former Security Council chairman Alexander Lebed as the last great hope for Russian reform. No one doubts that if free and fair elections were held in the immediate future, Lebed would be the obvious front runner. What is troubling, however, is how Lebed's front-runner status in the polls and opposition stance against the current regime has translated into rather uncritical thinking about what his election might mean for the future of Russian markets and Russian democracy.

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On 17 December 1995, Russian voters elected representatives to the Duma, the lower house of parliament. For the first time in the thousand-year history of Russia, these elections were held under law, as scheduled, and without serious fraud or falsification. Though the balloting occurred in the dead of winter, was only for one house of the parliament, did not include a presidential election, and was confused by the participation of 43 parties, nonetheless an amazing 65 percent of eligible voters turned out. In historical perspective, the conduct of this election must be seen as a positive step toward democratic consolidation in Russia. But while the process was encouraging for democracy, the results were not. Parties with questionable democratic and reformist credentials made significant gains in the Duma.