Introduction and Contribution

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) continue to deepen their decades-long authoritarian control over Turkish politics, economy, and society. Indeed, repressive tactics once reserved for Turkey’s marginalized Kurdish community have increasingly been applied to AKP’s opponents more generally, including journalists, business elites, and mayors. Key among these opponents is Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, viewed as the face of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). İmamoğlu, seen as the frontrunner to challenge Erdoğan’s presidency in 2028, was arrested in March 2025 on spurious charges of terrorism and corruption.

At the same time, Turkey’s opposition is finding ways to resist Erdoğan’s autocratization. CHP — which traces its roots to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his vision for a secular Turkish nation — learned from its disappointing loss in Turkey’s 2023 national elections. By transforming its electoral strategy for the 2024 local elections, the CHP not only bested AKP’s vote share but also won in many areas that are historically AKP strongholds, which are often populated by conservative voters. What explains the CHP’s significant local turnaround under the constraints of Turkey’s ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime? 

In “Turkey's Hard Road to Democratic Renewal,” Ayça Alemdaroğlu, Toygar Sinan Baykan, Ladin Bayurgil, and Aytuğ Şaşmaz caution against the received wisdom that broad, national-level coalitions offer the best hope of undermining authoritarian power. Such coalitions are difficult to sustain in countries like Turkey or Hungary, where authoritarian leaders control major political institutions and the public purse while muzzling their opponents and the media. Instead, the authors point to the surprising benefits of building alternatives to authoritarianism at the local level.

Argument

At first glance, the control of local governments in authoritarian political systems does not seem especially advantageous in terms of autonomy and influence. However, Turkish mayors control many of the policy domains that directly affect ordinary citizens, including transportation, sanitation, and housing. When local services and infrastructure are poor, voters may be willing to switch their partisan allegiance, even in places where the incumbent party works to distribute patronage and to propagandize them. Local governance enables opposition politicians to gain visibility and public support, as well as to demonstrate their administrative competence. 

How exactly did the CHP pull off its impressive local showing in 2024? As noted above, the opposition built a national-level coalition in 2023, fractured by ideological divisions and disputes over its presidential candidate against Erdoğan, ultimately collapsing after the election. It was no match for Erdoğan’s unified messaging around threats to Turkey’s national security — portraying Kurds at home and in Syria as threats — and on nationalist pride in Turkey’s indigenous defense industry.

In 2024, by contrast, the CHP’s campaign strategy emerged from the bottom up: it employed electoral strategists and pollsters across Turkish municipalities, conducted fieldwork in competitive areas, selected mayoral candidates who could win, created local coalitions across ideological lines, and fine-tuned its messaging around service provision. Its flexible and pragmatic strategy appealed to both Turkey’s Sunni majority as well as its minority Alevis and Kurds. Meanwhile, the AKP was highly centralized in its reliance on Erdoğan’s popularity, failing to adapt to the demands of local residents whose support it believed was guaranteed.
 

Unpacking the CHP’s Victory

To understand how the CHP won and how it consolidated its electoral gains, the authors conducted interviews with newly elected mayors and vice mayors, CHP party officials, activists, journalists, and political observers. Interviewees were selected from six municipal districts where no opposition-controlled mayor had won an election for at least two decades and where the CHP improved its vote share by five or more points between 2019 and 2024. In these traditional AKP strongholds, voters complained a great deal about the high cost of living in Erdoğan’s Turkey. At the same time, they were becoming less religiously conservative and less supportive of a “majoritarian” style of politics.
 

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Table 1: Six Turkish districts in brief
 

During the campaign, the CHP worked to reverse its image as a party committed to Atatürk’s “aggressive” secularism, sometimes nominating conservative Sunni candidates in otherwise divided districts. It focused not on ideology but on service delivery and other issues that appealed across ethnic and sectarian lines. Incumbent CHP mayors advised prospective mayors, creating intra-party relationships that were complemented by the work of CHP grassroots organizations. 

The authors introduce a number of the CHP’s successful mayoral candidates. Some of them were well-known national-level politicians who realized the benefits they could accrue by leaving Turkey’s toothless parliament and applying their skills to local government. Multiple mayors were of Kurdish and/or Alevi background, but they used these identities to appeal both inside and outside of their in-groups, for example, by attending Friday prayers with their Sunni constituents. One Alevi candidate gave municipal assembly list spots to conservative Sunnis and Kurds. By contrast, the AKP’s mayoral candidates — mainly nominated on the basis of their loyalty to Erdoğan — were perceived by their constituents as corrupt, aloof, and inefficient.

Challenges

Erdoğan’s opponents will likely struggle to reap the benefits of local governance, let alone to mount an effective challenge to AKP rule at the national level. These challenges will be heightened by AKP’s efforts to repress and arrest those whom it finds threatening. What’s more, CHP constituents expect not only the delivery of effective public services, but also patronage, especially public sector jobs, in exchange for their continued support. The AKP recognizes the challenge posed by its mayoral opponents and has responded by slashing municipal budgets. But the CHP is becoming more unified in the face of these common hardships posed by the AKP.

Ultimately, the growth of local-level CHP power opens up possibilities for democratic alternatives to AKP. The authors offer a novel perspective on how pragmatic local election campaigns, centered on service delivery, can serve as a means of undermining the influence of authoritarian leaders.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

The results show dramatic opinion shifts and notable consensus-building across party lines. Most notably, dissatisfaction with American democracy dropped 21 points overall—from 75% to 54%—with Republicans, Democrats, and independents all showing significant improvement in democratic confidence at the end of the weekend.

"When Pennsylvanians were given the space for informed, civil conversation, they consistently depolarized on issues that dominate cable news narratives as hopeless partisan battles," said James Fishkin, Director of Stanford's Deliberative Democracy Lab. "This experiment proves that America's political divisions and opinions are not as intractable as they might seem. Voters, when presented with balanced information and the opportunity to listen to one another, emerged with considered judgments about what needed to be done as well as greater respect for those they disagree with. The results offer a look at what really matters to voters when they think in depth about the issues. In my view, it also offers an inspiring picture of how democracy could actually work better.”
 

Key findings:
 

• Immigration: Support for increasing visas for low-skilled workers doubled from 25% to 50%, with Democrats moving from 41% to 69% support and Republicans increasing from 9% to 30%. State-level DACA protections gained significant Republican backing, rising from 18% to 38%.
• Voting Rights: Support for broad voter enfranchisement jumped to 96% (up from 83%), with Republicans increasing their support by 22 points. Democrats increased their support for voter ID requirements, increasing from 48% to 57%.
• Election Integrity: An overwhelming majority of participants supported increases in election integrity, with 77% supporting random ballot audits, and 87% supporting criminal penalties for voter intimidation.
• Healthcare: Rural healthcare initiatives achieved near-unanimous support, with 94% backing loan forgiveness for healthcare workers in underserved areas and 88% supporting tax credits for rural facilities.
• Foreign policy: Support for providing military support to Taiwan in case of Chinese invasion doubled from 35% to 69%, with massive bipartisan increases among both Democrats (40-point jump) and Republicans (30-point jump).
• Education: While trade school subsidies gained overwhelming support (81%), free college tuition support dropped from 59% to 47% as participants weighed budget realities.
• Transformed relationships & Understanding: Perhaps most significantly, 91% of participants reported respecting opposing political viewpoints (up from 72%) following their experience at America in One Room: Pennsylvania and 90% expressed willingness to compromise with political opponents (up from 80%). As a whole, 97% of participants reported that A1R: PA was valuable in helping them clarify their positions on key public policy issues debated.

America in One Room: Pennsylvania is the fifth Deliberative Polling® event organized by Helena in collaboration with Stanford’s Deliberative Democracy Lab. Public Opinion Strategies conducted outreach, selected the representative samples, and administered the questionnaires.

Full results and executive summary are available below:

The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

What is the most exciting or impactful finding from your research, and why do you think it matters for democracy, development, or the rule of law?

My current research examines the question of how opposition movements survive in authoritarian contexts, with a focus on recent local elections in Turkey, where conservative incumbents were defeated for the first time in decades. We found that the opposition successfully built bottom-up alliances at the local level, which may be more successful than parties trying to form coalitions at the national level. 

This is because top-down alliances, as were attempted to be formed in Turkey in 2023, tend to be fragile and lack sufficient power to win elections. Top-down efforts involve convincing leaders of ideologically opposed parties to join together, which often isn’t effective in convincing their base to join suit. 

On the other hand, bottom-up local action can be much more powerful, with alliances in municipalities formed through an intimate knowledge of how resources and power are distributed among groups. These opposition coalitions, bound together by substantive ideas and community knowledge, tend to be more persuasive. 

This research demonstrates the power of local government and how opposition can be strengthened through numerous bottom-up alliances, as opposed to a weak, top-down national approach. Still, there are difficulties in preventing authoritarian backlash as a response to oppositional successes. After the loss of many governing party candidates in Turkey recently, there has been a new wave of coercion against municipal leaders, such as the Istanbul mayor being jailed after running as a presidential candidate. Several other newly elected mayors have been in jail for months without even an indictment.

How does the increased authoritarianism in Turkey fit into the context of global democratic recession? Are these patterns of oppositional gains in local elections a sign of a more optimistic future for Turkey, or is it still in a state of democratic decline?

I believe our research suggests that the opposition is more effectively contesting the governing party; however, it is too early to say whether this could serve as a model for a broader shift. Despite being embedded in European organizations and experiencing a moment of democratization in the 2000s, Turkey has become increasingly authoritarian, becoming one of the earliest cases of modern democratic decline. Also, global influences are harming Turkey’s trajectory, such as the presence of a more undemocratic leader in the U.S.
 

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change?

When starting research, I don’t think of writing policy as my main goal. Instead, it’s to understand big questions or add more nuance to a discussion about a phenomenon. My research today on local power dynamics and bottom-up coalition building continues to have real-world relevance in the battle against authoritarian regimes.

Returning to your research on Turkey and particularly the plight of the Kurdish minority, how can states mitigate the effects of ethnic fractionalism on development?

In Turkey, I think of democratization as being possible through the recognition of the cultural and political rights of the Kurds. The opening of systems to those who have been historically excluded would benefit not only democratic development but also economic development. This is because ethnically inclusive states are more prosperous, as otherwise, ethnic conflict hinders development, with national security concerns scaring off investment.

Amidst increasing authoritarianism, have situations for minorities like the Kurds worsened or improved over time?

While there have been gestures of peace with the Kurds, when those efforts fail, the Turkish government often strengthens authoritarian measures. This is exemplified by the peace negotiations from 2013 to 2015, which initially resulted in the Kurds amassing more political power. This caused the regime to fear being undermined and become more coercive toward the minority group in the long run.

Overall, improvements for the Kurds have not been linear. Peace negotiations are currently underway, though many believe them to be insincere. When looking at the regime’s other policies towards opposition, journalists, and students, it’s easy to be pessimistic. 

What gaps do you feel need to be addressed in your research field, and what do you anticipate you will study more in the future?

In the intellectual circles I have been a part of, academics tend to come from a political science background. I’m more interested in bringing in cultural and sociological perspectives, such as through discussions of social class or different ethnic groups. My research will continue to unite multi-disciplinary ideas to gain a deeper understanding of authoritarian regimes.

Could you elaborate further on your research into youth participation?

Currently, I’m working on a project comparing the U.S. and Turkey to better understand youth political behavior. In the recent elections in both countries, there was a lot of emphasis on the youth voice as a counter-authoritarian force, but this prediction did not necessarily hold true. In the US, many were persuaded by Trump’s agenda, especially young men. It’s important not to generalize too much when studying youth, as they are as diverse as the rest of the population. Still, there are notable trends among young people to monitor, like the Turkish youth’s growing secularism and how that might impact the Islamist parties’ power. 

You’ve discussed the importance of recognizing the impact of class when conducting research. How do you think politicians have capitalized on class to maintain power in Turkey, and is the opposition or current regime more supported by the working class?

The Islamist parties have been most known to garner support from lower economic groups. While the main opposition party is relearning how to succeed among the working class, it would be an overstatement to assume this shift has significantly expanded beyond the local level at this point.

President Erdogan was able to amass power by garnering support from the poor, going door-to-door and engaging in bottom-up efforts to get their votes. Now, opposition leaders appear to be learning from these strategies, leading to improved outcomes so far.
 

Lastly, what books would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field?

I may be expected to recommend political science books, but it is American sociologist Richard Sennett who especially influenced me early in my career. He focuses on how big social changes affect individuals. His book, The Hidden Injuries of Class, shaped my understanding of how social class is not just a reflection of an individual’s position in society, but also influences one’s sense of self. He also wrote Respect in a World of Inequality about how changes in the economy and labor market influence individuals. Sennet’s work successfully approaches issues in a humane, historical, and power-conscious way.