Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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ABSTRACT

This talk is based on the co-authors' recent paper "How Much Will the Pandemic Change Egyptian Governance and for How Long?" The Egyptian regime has reacted in an unexpected way to the global pandemic—with civilian, technocratic, and expert bodies leading the way and even some (admittedly officially patrolled) political debate being allowed to emerge. This talk examines these recent developments and evaluates whether they mark a real change in Egyptian governance, and if so, why, what kind, and will it last.

Co-Authors Bios

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Amr Hamzawy Headshot
Amr Hamzawy is currently a senior research scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He studied political science and developmental studies in Cairo, The Hague, and Berlin. He was previously an associate professor of political science at Cairo University and a professor of public policy at the American University in Cairo. Between 2016 and 2017, he served as a senior fellow in the Middle East program and the Democracy and Rule of Law program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. His research and teaching interests as well as his academic publications focus on democratization processes in Egypt, tensions between freedom and repression in the Egyptian public space, political movements and civil society in Egypt, contemporary debates in Arab political thought, and human rights and governance in the Arab world. His new book On The Habits of Neoauthoritarianism – Politics in Egypt Between 2013 and 2019appeared in Arabic in September 2019. Hamzawy is a former member of the People’s Assembly after being elected in the first Parliamentary elections in Egypt after the January 25, 2011 revolution. He is also a former member of the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights. Hamzawy contributes a weekly op-ed to the All Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

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Nathan Brown
Nathan Brown is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at The George Washington University. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at The Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and serves on the board of trustees at the American University in Cairo. His contributions span a wide range of topics, including Islamist movements, Egyptian politics, Palestinian politics, and Arab law and constitutionalism. Dr. Brown served as the president of the Middle East Studies Association between 2013 and 2015. He was previously named a Guggenheim Fellow and a Carnegie Scholar by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a former fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His previous research was funded by the United States Institute of Peace and two Fulbright fellowships. He received the Oscar and Shoshana Trachtenberg Award for Scholarship from George Washington University in 2015 and the Harry Harding teaching award from the Elliott School of International Affairs in 2014. His dissertation received the Malcolm Kerr award from the Middle East Studies Association in 1987. Dr. Brown is the author of six books, including Arguing Islam after the Revival of Arab Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), and When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). He received his B.A. in political science from the University of Chicago and his M.A. and Ph.D. in politics and Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University. 

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Amr Hamzawy Senior Research Scholar CDDRL, Stanford University
Nathan Brown Professor of Political Science and International Relations The George Washington University
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Research Scholar
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Michael Bennon is a Research Scholar at CDDRL for the Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative. Michael's research interests include infrastructure policy, project finance, public-private partnerships and institutional design in the infrastructure sector. Michael also teaches Global Project Finance to graduate students at Stanford. Prior to Stanford, Michael served as a Captain in the US Army and US Army Corps of Engineers for five years, leading Engineer units, managing projects, and planning for infrastructure development in the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan and Thailand. 

Program Manager, Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative
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[This article originally appeared in Orient XII.]

Political observers have voiced contrasting opinions about the peace treaty between Israel and the Arab Emirates. Some have seen it as a monumental betrayal, others as an historic breakthrough. Actually, the treaty changes nothing in the Middle East political equation, nor does it attenuate in any way the tragic disregard for the rights of the Palestinians which we have witnessed for so many years now. It is simply a strategic arrangement which has short-term advantages for the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States but addresses none of the basic issues.

First of all, this peace treaty cannot be regarded as an historic betrayal of Arab positions. The UAE have been working for years to normalize their relations with Israel. The two countries have established high-level contacts in capitals all over the world and have made it known to the international community by organizing their own leaks: they have also sent signals to Western and Arab public opinion. In recent months, the UAE conveyed humanitarian aid to Palestine via the Ben Gurion airport, in co-ordination with Israeli authorities rather than with their Palestinian counterparts. The peace treaty is a normal, organic stage of this process. True, from a legal point of view, it is a decision which goes counter to the Arab peace initiative of 2002. But this latter had already been abandoned just as the Arab League’s sponsorship which went along with it had already been discredited.

At the same, brutal as it may seem, this agreement does not constitute a betrayal of the Palestinians. Their rights have already been sacrificed in the face of Israel’s determination to destroy any prospect of a Palestinian State by laying siege to the Gaza Strip and by gradually annexing the West Bank. The Palestinians have understood that in the Gulf, only Kuwait and Qatar are determined to reject any US sponsored “deal of the century” unless those Israeli policies are abandoned. Though the peace treaty does contain a clause theoretically putting an end to that territorial colonization. It only stops the annexation legally and formally while backing de facto the pursuance of the illegal colonization process.

Nor is the peace treaty an historic breakthrough. The Palestinian struggle has lost much of its political importance in the eyes of the Arab masses during the last three decades. And though it is still capable of sparking an emotional response and remains apolitical issue for Arab public opinion, it generates much less solidarity that it used to do.

DECLINE OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE

This decline has taken place in several stages. The first phase began with the Oslo peace process, which obliged the Palestinians to renounce many of their rights in exchange for the vague promise of a future state, meant to be the fruition of a peace process negotiated under the auspices of the international community. The second phase began with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. By destroying a traditional Arab power, the United States opened the way for Iranian expansion, the new disruptive element in the geopolitics of the region. In the years that followed, Iran considerably extended its strategic power in the Middle East.

Iranian military expansion climaxed in 2013 with the battle of Al-Qusayr in Syria. Before the Syrian civil war began, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both members of the Sunni axis in the region, faced off against Iran in low intensity clashes in the Gulf area. Al-Qusayr inaugurated a new era in which Iranian military forces could operate openly in Arab countries and provide support for regimes that are their allies. Not only Syria and Iraq, but also Lebanon and Yemen have become arenas of confrontation, fueled as much by sectarian hyperbole as by the principles of realpolitik.

The Sunni Arab states, which form the so-called “moderate” axis in the Middle East, regard such non-governmental actors as Hezbollah, the Houthi movement in Yemen and the militias of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq as auxiliaries in the Iranian war effort. In this context, the containment of Iran comes before the defense of the Palestinians.

The third event which has relegated the Palestinians to the sidelines of regional geopolitics was the Arab Spring. This foregrounded the issues of democratic emancipation and the overthrow of authoritarianism in many countries. The uprisings showed the extent to which the major ideologies of the past, pan-Arabism or its successor, Islamism, had lost much of their emotional appeal with Arab public opinion. Thus, the Palestinian cause became less visible, except in countries hosting large numbers of Palestinian refugees, like Lebanon and Jordan.

Yet while the Palestinians no longer figure high on the foreign policy agenda of most Arab states, the Arab world is certainly not about to plunge headlong into a collective normalization of relations with Israel. The big Arab countries would be likely to meet with strong public resistance. On the other hand, Bahrain, Oman and Mauritania are prepared to follow in the footsteps of the Emirates, and a modest “bandwagon” effect is not out of the question: other Arab countries could become involved in asymmetric exchanges with Israel in order not to be left out of any future settlement and to stay in the good graces of the USA. Short of complete diplomatic recognition, these steps might include the opening of liaison offices and the authorization of bilateral tourism.

For all these reasons, the peace treaty represents neither a tragic betrayal nor an historic breakthrough. From a strategic point of view, it is a calculated move meant only to offer short-term advantages to the three parties concerned.

THE UAE AND THE PRESERVATION OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

From the UAE viewpoint, the treaty allows them to stand firm at a time when the Arab counter-revolution is in difficulty and imperils their reputation. Since the Arab Spring, the Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia, are at the forefront of the region’s countries which regard the propagation of democratic uprisings in the Middle East as an existential threat. The UAE are the leader of this counter-revolutionary front which advocates a Middle East of stable authoritarian regimes in which their petroleum resources guarantee them a decisive influence. According to this world view, electoral Islamism and political liberalism are two sides of the same coin; both represent radical changes which endanger the internal legitimacy of these regimes. It was the UAE that launched the counter-revolutionary battle and they cannot afford to lose it.

Recently, however, they have begun to lose ground. The Yemeni conflict has turned into a humanitarian disaster.

The over-confidence placed in certain factions to carry on their proxy war, as with General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, has not been repaid on the battlefield. As with the unwise embargo against Qatar, their diplomatic adventurism did not achieve its goals. Their investments in Egypt, aimed at making the Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi regime a model of the new Arab stability, have also failed to extricate the country from its political and economic stagnancy. In short, there is too much chaos and considering the initial investment, a rate of return much too low.

Considering all this, the peace treaty with Israel represents a calculated strategic consolidation. The leadership of the UAE hope to use Israel as a more powerful vector to help them achieve their geopolitical objectives, just as they used Saudi Arabia in the first phase of their counter-revolutionary thrust. The UAE are also protecting themselves against another threat: the shock wave that could result from an internal conflict in Saudi Arabia which would neutralise Mohamed Ben Salman. If this were to occur, the UAE leadership would find itself completely isolated.

Thus, the alliance with Israel offers the UAE some degree of protection in view of their common interests. Both countries share a deep hostility towards Iran and reject the nuclear agreement signed by former US President Obama. Both are equally disappointed by President Trump’s refusal to launch a large-scale military campaign against the Iranian forces. The lack of Trump’s military response in July 2019 after the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities was seen as highly significant. And besides, Israel harbors a silent aversion to the democratization of Arab countries.

ISRAEL SAVES FACE

For Israel, the real advantage of this treaty is not economic. The Emirati leadership will make flashy investments in Israel, if only to show the Palestinians what they missed by turning down the “deal of the century”. But at the end of the day, the financial advantages for Israel will be slender. Trade with the UAE will be overshadowed by the existing exchanges with the USA and the West in general, while conversely the oil-rich UAE have no particular need of Israeli investments.

But Israel benefits from the agreement in other ways. First of all, it adds a little more legitimacy to its role in the regional order of the Middle East, even though it does run the risk of being sucked into the impulsive counter-revolutionary actions of its new peace partner.

Above all, however, Israel can go on pulling the strings in the Palestinians situation. Despite the passing mention in the treaty of a halt to the West Bank annexation process, the Netanyahu government considers this to be merely a temporary pause. The “deal of the century,” drawn up by Donald Trump’s entourage having bogged down this year, in view of the international condemnation of the annexation of the Jordan Valley, this new peace treaty provides an ideal opportunity to save face. Actually, no Israeli colony has been dismantled and no land has been returned to the Palestinians. Yet since the annexation plans have been officially suspended, the Palestinian Authority must remain operative as a political player, which preserves the fiction of a peace process in a bilateral framework.

A PUBLICITY OPERATION FOR TRUMP

A treaty like this is grist to the American mill because it is an excellent PR operation at a time when the presidential campaign is in full swing. The agreement can be passed off as a victory for the Trump administration, and the President can score some points as a successful negotiator. The fulfilment of the White House dream of hosting a peace treaty between Israel and an Arab country provides Trump with an excellent diversion to make voters forget his many governance failings in such areas as the coronavirus pandemic, race relations and other domestic issues.

The peace treaty also serves to hide the fiasco of the “deal of the century.” By claiming to have blocked the controversial annexation plans, the US will try to revive this moribund framework. At the same time, it helps Trump prop up his reputation with certain portions of his electorate. It enables the administration to recover a degree of credibility among liberal Jews who aspire to a collective peace in the Middle East while at the same time reassuring rabid Zionists that Israel’s claims to the West Bank are still on the table.

TOWARDS A “PALESTINIAN SPRING”?

In the last analysis, the real losers here are, as usual, the Palestinians. They will keep up their struggle to obtain the constituent elements of a viable state which include the right of return, a capital in East Jerusalem, and the end of Israel’s illegal occupation of their land. While the UAE, Israel and the USA may derive some short-term advantages from this treaty, the long-term future of the Palestinians is still up in the air.

Left at the periphery of the regional power play, the Palestinian struggle needs a fresh uprising. It is to be hoped that it will not take the form of yet another Intifada but rather that of a Palestinian version of the Arab Spring. This would require a rejuvenation of the Palestinian political establishment, the rise to power of a more responsible and better representative leadership, backed by united resistance on the part of Palestinian society as a whole.

This would also require that the Palestinians appeal to the whole rest of the world, not just the Middle East, because international support for a Palestinian State is still extremely high. Today the recovery of their rights by the people of Palestine is probably not linked to the two-state solution which is indeed no longer a viable option but must be sought henceforth in the framework of a single state.

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Sponsored by the Stanford China Program and the Stanford Center at Peking University.
 

International institutions established after WWII and shaped by the Cold War facilitated attainment of unprecedented peace and prosperity.  But what worked well in the past may no longer be adequate to address the challenges and opportunities in the world these institutions helped to create.  Should legacy institutions be reformed, replaced, or supplemented by new mechanisms to manage new global challenges?  This program will examine whether existing institutions of global governance are adequate, and if not, why changing them will be difficult.

 

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Dr. Thomas Fingar
Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009. From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar's most recent books are The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020).

 

Dr. Stephen J. StedmanStephen Stedman is a Freeman Spogli senior fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and FSI, an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. 

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance. In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.  His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

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Thomas Fingar Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University
Stephen Stedman Deputy Director, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
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About this Event:  This book offers a novel theory of the nuances in relationships between business and political elites in three authoritarian regimes in developing Asia: Indonesia under Suharto’s New Order, Malaysia under the Barisan Nasional (BN), and China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). How did business-state relations in all three regimes come to be seen as “crony,” and why do some crony arrangements generate growth and political stability and others stagnation or crisis? The book develops conceptual models of state-business relations (mutual alignment and mutual endangerment) and explains their genesis. I argue that the main factors explaining why one pattern dominates over the other are the political status of capitalists, determined during regime formation, and the political management of the financial system. The research draws on extensive archival and interview sources as well as novel datasets on corporate filings in each country.

 

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Meg Rithmere
About the Speaker:  Meg Rithmire is F. Warren MacFarlan associate professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy Unit. Professor Rithmire holds a PhD in Government from Harvard University, and her primary expertise is in the comparative political economy of development with a focus on China and Asia. Her first book, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015), examines the role of land politics, urban governments, and local property rights regimes in the Chinese economic reforms. A new project, for which Meg conducted fieldwork in Asia 2016-2017, investigates the relationship between capital and the state and globalization in Asia. The project focuses on a comparison of China, Malaysia, and Indonesia from the early 1980s to the present. The research has two components; first, examining how governments attempt to discipline business and when those efforts succeed and, second, how business adapts to different methods of state control. 

 

 

 

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Meg Rithmire F. Warren MacFarlan associate professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy Unit
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About the Event:   As we enter the stretch run of the 2020 US election campaign, join us for an inside look at how public policy is formulated on political campaigns, and the key policy debates animating the election.

 

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Lanhee Chen
About the Speaker:  Lanhee J. Chen, Ph.D. is the David and Diane Steffy Fellow in American Public Policy Studies at the Hoover Institution; Director of Domestic Policy Studies and Lecturer in the Public Policy Program at Stanford University; and an affiliated faculty member of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute. 

A veteran of several high-profile political campaigns, Chen has worked in government, the private sector, and academia. 

Chen has advised numerous major campaigns, including four presidential efforts.  In 2012, he was policy director of the Romney-Ryan campaign, serving as Governor Mitt Romney’s chief policy adviser and a senior strategist on the campaign.  Chen also advised Florida Senator Marco Rubio’s 2016 bid; Romney’s 2008 effort; and the Bush-Cheney reelection campaign in 2004.  In the 2014 and 2018 campaign cycles, he was the Senior Adviser on Policy to the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). 

He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science, A.M. in Political Science, J.D. cum laude, and A.B. magna cum laude in Government, all from Harvard University.   

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the David and Diane Steffy Fellow in American Public Policy Studies at the Hoover Institution; Director of Domestic Policy Studies and Lecturer in the Public Policy Program at Stanford University
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This event is being live-streamed on Zoom. Registration is required: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_PTnI4nwGRLCERCHdP-cogw

On August 9, 2020, Belarus held a presidential election, which Alexander Lukashenko — Belarus' president of 26 years — claimed to have won with 80 percent of the vote. Exit polling, however, demonstrated that the opposition leader, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, actually garnered wide popular support. Since the election, Belarusians have taken to the streets to demand a new election and/or that Lukashenko step down. But the regime appears intent on remaining in power and has used force against peaceful protesters. Workers in key factories have since gone on strike, and widespread protests continue. 

Join us for a special zoom seminar on Wednesday, August 19 from 11:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. PDT with Michael A. McFaul, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute and former US Ambassador to Russia; Anna Grzymala-Busse, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the director of The Europe Center; and Francis Fukuyama, Senior Fellow and Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program at FSI in a session on the events in Belarus that will be moderated by Kathryn Stoner, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute.

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About the Event: How does the widespread frustration that often accompanies democratic transitions shape the political cleavages underlying the party systems that emerge from them? Nine years after the 2010–11 uprising, Tunisia’s 2019 elections took place against a backdrop of widespread frustration with the party system that emerged during the ensuing transition. The elections presented opportunities to a diverse set of outsiders, many of whom brandished antiparty system messages, including unapologetic boosters of the former ruling party, a would-be plutocrat jailed on charges of corruption, and a broad set of antiparty independents. Drawing upon campaign materials and a nationally representative postelection survey, this presentation will describe the differences in the antiparty system messages and the ways that nostalgia underlies them. Through this analysis, I will consider a set of theoretical propositions arising from the literature on the dynamics of political cleavages in party systems in new democracies. 


About the Speaker: 

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Nathan Grubman
Nate Grubman is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. In the fall, he will receive his PhD in political science from Yale University. His dissertation uses the case of postuprising Tunisia to explore the question of why party systems in many new democracies furnish few economic policy choices, as well as the consequences of this absence of choice. More broadly, his research focuses on political nostalgia, ideology, corruption, and authoritarian legacies in new democracies. 

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Scholar, 2020-21
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I am a teaching fellow in Civic, Liberal, and Global Education (COLLEGE) at Stanford University. I teach courses focused on democracy, citizenship, and the politics of development. My research focuses on party systems, ideology, nostalgia, and corruption during transitions from authoritarian rule, especially in North Africa. My book manuscript focuses on the question of why democratization in Tunisia failed to address the social and economic grievances that precipitated it. My work has appeared in the Journal of Democracy, MERIP Middle East Report Online, and Washington Post Monkey Cage

I received my PhD in political science (with specialties in comparative politics, quantitative methods, and political economy) from Yale University in December 2020. I have a BA in international relations from Tufts University, an MS in applied economics from Johns Hopkins University, and an MA and MPhil in political science from Yale. I have spent more than three years living in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. My CV is available here.

Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University.
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Can intergroup contact build social cohesion after war? I randomly assigned Iraqi Christians displaced by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to an all-Christian soccer team or to a team mixed with Muslims. The intervention improved behaviors toward Muslim peers: Christians with Muslim teammates were more likely to vote for a Muslim (not on their team) to receive a sportsmanship award, register for a mixed team next season, and train with Muslims 6 months after the intervention. The intervention did not substantially affect behaviors in other social contexts, such as patronizing a restaurant in Muslim-dominated Mosul or attending a mixed social event, nor did it yield consistent effects on intergroup attitudes. Although contact can build tolerant behaviors toward peers within an intervention, building broader social cohesion outside of it is more challenging.

 

About the Speaker:

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mousa
Salma Mousa is an Egyptian scholar of migration, conflict, and social cohesion.  Prior to joining CDDRL, Salma held fellowships at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Stanford's Immigration Policy Lab, the Freeman Spogli Institute, the Stanford Center for International Conflict and Negotiation, the McCoy Center for Ethics in Society, and the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society.  Her research is forthcoming as a cover article in Science, and has been covered by The Economist, the BBC, and Der Spiegel, and featured on the front page of the Times of London and PBS NOVA.  Salma received a PhD in Political Science from Stanford in 2020.

 
 

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Scholar, 2020-21
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An Egyptian-Canadian raised in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Canada, Salma Mousa received her PhD in Political Science from Stanford University in 2020. A scholar of comparative politics, her research focuses on migration, conflict, and social cohesion.  Salma's dissertation investigates strategies for building trust and tolerance after war. Leveraging field experiments among Iraqis displaced by ISIS,  American schoolchildren, and British soccer fans, she shows how intergroup contact can change real-world behaviors — even if underlying prejudice remains unchanged.   A secondary research agenda tackles the challenge of integrating refugees in the United States. Combining a meta-analytic review, ethnographic fieldwork, and field experiments with resettlement agencies, this project identifies risk factors and promising policies for new arrivals.  Salma has held fellowships at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Stanford’s Immigration Policy Lab, the Freeman Spogli Institute, the Stanford Center for International Conflict and Negotiation, the McCoy Center for Ethics in Society, and the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society. Her work has been supported by the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL), the Innovations for Poverty Action Lab (IPA), the King Center on Global Development, the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRiSS), the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD), and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies. Her research has been featured by The Economist, BBC, and Der Spiegel,  on the front page of the Times of London and on PBS NOVA.

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Scholar
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About the Event:

What are the costs of the Chinese regime's fixation on quelling dissent in the name of political order, or “stability”? Using novel datasets and a variety of methodologies, Welfare for Autocrats shows how China has reshaped its major social assistance program, Dibao, around this preoccupation, turning an effort to alleviate poverty into a tool of surveillance and repression. This distortion of Dibao damages perceptions of government competence and legitimacy and can trigger unrest among those denied benefits. Welfare for Autocrats traces how China's approach to enforcing order transformed at the turn of the 21st century and identifies the phenomenon of seepage whereby one policy—in this case, quelling dissent—alters the allocation of resources and goals of unrelated areas of government. These findings challenge the view that concessions and repression are distinct strategies in authoritarian regimes and departs from the assumption that all tools of repression were originally designed as such.

 

About the Speaker:

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JenPan
Jennifer Pan is an Assistant Professor of Communication, and an Assistant Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University. Her research resides at the intersection political communication and authoritarian politics, showing how authoritarian governments try to control society, how the public responds, and when and why each is successful. Her work has appeared in peer-reviewed publications such as the American Political Science ReviewAmerican Journal of Political ScienceComparative Political StudiesJournal of Politics, and Science.

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Jennifer Pan Assistant Professor of Communication, and an Assistant Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University
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