Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, questions have arisen as to which course the United States should sail in the new international order. In this volume, some of the nation's foremost foreign policy experts present carefully crafted and bold perspectives of what America's global role should be. All contributors, leading authorities in the fields of economics, history, international relations, and political science, offer alternative viewpoints. These sharply drawn approaches permit the general reader and scholar alike to glean an understanding of the main schools of thought about American foreign policy today.

They are written in accessible prose without esoteric language or scholarly jargon. The past decade witnessed a transition from an era of bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union to a new and still-emerging epoch. Although American economic, military, and diplomatic influence stood unrivaled in the past decade, the future looks much less predictable. The unique insights represented in this volume will help inform the reader about possible courses America can navigate in uncharted seas. Rogue states, humanitarian interventions, terrorism, major and middle powers, international organizations, global trade agreements, and other political and economic developments are analyzed in the context of the policies recommended in this volume. The perspective spans the spectrum from global activism to antiglobalization.

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country; its citizens are perhaps the best educated on the continent. It is the world's sixth-largest producer of oil. Nigeria also has probably the most elaborate system of government in the region. Yet the country teeters perilously close to massive civil upheaval.

In this compelling new work, Suberu examines the profound political contradictions that make up Nigeria, a nation whose leaders have constantly tinkered with a colonial federal legacy that sought to balance the country's three major ethnic groups. He explores the evolution of Nigerian federalism through its various constitutional experiments and administrative redesigns, including those in the periods of military rule.

While acknowledging the genius of Nigerian federalism in trying to subdue ethnic and regional conflict, Suberu expertly analyzes the troubling flaws in a system that breeds corruption, prioritizes distribution over development, and encourages the country's further political fragmentation.

In the book's final chapter, Suberu outlines bold constitutional reforms that seek to promote institutional innovation in Nigerian federalism to keep pace with the country's growing demographic and ethnopolitical complexity.

What went wrong in Russias decade-old post-communist transition? A group of leading young scholars answer this question by offering assessments of five crucial political arenas during the Yeltsin era: elections, executive-legislative relations, interactions between the central state and the regions, economic reforms, and civil-military relations. All of the contributors recognize that adverse historical legacies have complicated Russian democratization. They challenge structural explanations that emphasize constraints of the pre-existing system, however, and concentrate instead on the importance of elite decisions and institution-building. The authors agree that elites failure to develop robust political institutions has been a central problem of Russias post-communist transition. The weakness of the state and its institutions has contributed to a number of serious problems threatening democratic consolidation. These include the tensions between the executive and the legislature, the frail infrastructure for successful market reform, and the absence of proper civilian control over the armed forces.

Drawn from outstanding articles published in the Journal of Democracy, The Global Divergence of Democracies follows the enthusiastically received earlier volume, The Global Resurgence of Democracy.

The tremendous momentum of democratic expansion that characterized the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s has drawn to a halt. Significantly, this halt has not yet been followed by a "reverse wave"of democratic breakdowns, and democracy remains unchallenged as a global model and ideal of governance. The values of freedom, human rights, and popular sovereignty have continued to gain strength in the world. The first section of The Global Divergence of Democracies presents a few outstanding examples of the accumulating body of argument and evidence in favor of the universality of democratic principles and their basic compatibility with diverse religious and cultural traditions.

Nonetheless, in practice, the performance of the world's newer democracies has become increasingly varied, a trend reflected in the title of this volume: The Global Divergence of Democracies. The divergence in the quality or depth of democracy is matched by a parallel divergence in progress toward the consolidation of democracy. The second section of this volume is devoted to the hotly contested debate among leading scholars of comparative democracy of the utility and meaning of the concept of consolidation.

A third section examines some of the key building blocks of successful democracy, including political party systems, elections, federalism, the rule of law, a market economy, an independent judiciary, and civilian control of the military. The volume concludes with a series of appraisals of the divergent paths that democracy is taking both among and within various regions of the world, as well as in such key countries as Russia and China. With contributions by more than thirty of the world's leading scholars of democracy, this volume presents the most comprehensive assessment available of the state of democracy in the world at the beginning of the new millennium.

Political parties are one of the core institutions of democracy. But in democracies around the world -- rich and poor, Western and non-Western -- there is growing evidence of low or declining public confidence in parties. In membership, organization, and popular involvement and commitment, political parties are not what they used to be. But are they in decline, or are they simply changing their forms and functions? In contrast to authors of most previous works on political parties, which tend to focus exclusively on long-established Western democracies, the contributors to this volume cover many regions of the world. Theoretically, they consider the essential functions that political parties perform in democracy and the different types of parties. Historically, they trace the emergence of parties in Western democracies and the transformation of party cleavage in recent decades. Empirically, they analyze the changing character of parties and party systems in postcommunist Europe, Latin America, and five individual countries that have witnessed significant change: Italy, Japan, Taiwan, India, and Turkey. As the authors show, political parties are now only one of many vehicles for the representation of interests, but they remain essential for recruiting leaders, structuring electoral choice, and organizing government. To the extent that parties are weak and discredited, the health of democracy will be seriously impaired.

The authoritarian Chinese regimes governing Taiwan, Mainland China, and Hong Kong allowed limited electoral competition during the last half century. In Taiwan that process evolved over more than three decades before leading to the formation of an opposition party under martial law in late September 1986 and the blossoming of full democracy In March 2000 when that opposition party replaced the ruling party. In Mainland China and Hong Kong, limited electoral competition has only evolved over the last fifteen years or so. This volume examines why and how limited electoral competition developed in Greater China.

The editors use a typology and different concepts to analyse how the political centre in these three Chinese societies historically interacted with society and how different regime change took place. Their analysis attributes Taiwan's robust electoral competition under martial law to political breakthroughs in the political, ideological, economic, and organizational marketplaces. Without similar political breakthroughs in Mainland China and Hong Kong, their limited electoral processes are not likely to lead to the election of one or more opposition parties in Mainland China and the direct election of a Hong Kong governor and parliament.

These two authoritarian regimes have adopted different institutions, or rules, to limit electoral competition. Moreover, different changes have been taking place in their political, ideological, economic, and organizational marketplaces than occurred in Taiwan. Therefore, whether these two Chinese societies can mimic the Taiwan democratization path remains problematic. Only the passage of time will reveal whether their limited electoral competitive processes can transform into full democracy.

This article investigates the links between trade policy and economic growth in a panel of 57 countries between 1970 and 1989. It develops a new measure of trade policy openness based on the policy component of trade shares, using it in a simultaneous equations system to identify the effect of trade policy on several determinants of growth.

This paper introduces a new methodology to examine the empirical relationship

between democracy and economic growth. Democratic institutions are assumed to affect growth through a series of channels. We specify and estimate a full system of equations determining growth and the channel variables. Results suggest that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital and, less robustly, by lowering income inequality. On the other hand, democracy hinders growth by reducing the rate of physical capital accumulation and, less robustly, by raising the ratio of government consumption to GDP. Once all of these indirect effects are accounted for, the overall effect of democracy on economic growth is moderately negative. Our results indicate that democratic institutions are responsive to the demands of the poor by expanding access to education and lowering income inequality, but do so at the expense of physical capital accumulation.

A decade after the collapse of communism, Russia still lacks a robust party system. Most institutions of the state are immune from party influence. However parties play a central role in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma. Why? Why have parties been successful in organizing and influencing the work of the State Duma but enjoyed only very limited success elsewhere? This article argues that parties in Russia are weak in general because the most powerful politicians in Russia have made choices to make them weak. Cultural, historical, and socioeconomic factors play a role in impeding party emergence, but individual decisions--especially decisions about institutional design--are the more proximate and more salient causes of poor party development. The privileged position of parties in the State Duma also resulted from individual choices, but those choices had unintended consequences that did not represent the preferences of the most powerful.