The transitions to democracy in the postcommunist region over the past decade and one-half share a common dynamic, featuring the interaction between two sets of factors. The first is the long-term development of both civil society and a liberal opposition. The second is more short-term: an expansion of international support for regime change, clear demonstration by mass publics that they reject incumbent illiberal regimes (through protests and voting), and the victory of the liberal opposition in competitive elections. Successful democratization in the postcommunist world, therefore, seems to rest upon mass mobilization, a supportive international environment, and a sharp break with the authoritarian past, rather than the model that emerged in Spain and parts of Latin America; that is, a largely domestic dynamic combining bargaining between incumbent and opposition elites and elections and policies in the early stages of transition that bridged the old and the new order.

This paper primarily deals with later postcommunist transitions to democracy. In particular, we compare the decisive turn to democratic politics in Slovakia in 1998 with a similar dramatic political turn in Serbia in 2000. Such a comparison is instructive because of the importance of the model of democratization that was developed and applied in these cases, and because of the insights these two countries offer as a consequence of variations in both political-economic context and the nature of their electoral revolutions.

When Vladimir Putin was elected President of Russia in March 2000, the country bequeathed to him by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was an unconsolidated, often disorderly and raucous electoral democracy. Gradually though, the Russian political system under Putin came to be described as first "managed democracy" then "illiberal democracy" or "delegated democracy" and finally, by 2005, a non-democracy.

What happened? Why did the fourth wave crash on Russia's shores, and what prospects are there for external factors to play a role in bringing about a rejuvenation of democracy in Russia in the next decade? Is Russia immune to the diffusion effect of democratization that purportedly swept the East in the late 1980's and that is again moving eastward in the last 4 years? What are the implications for this apparent resistance to the fourth wave for Russia's fragile newly democratic neighbors in Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia? In this essay, I will explore these and other questions as I try to assess the internal and external factors that might help us to understand why Russia has undergone a "reverse wave" in democratization even as its smaller neighbors have apparently resisted the authoritarian tide that struck parts of the post-communist world in the late 1990s.

What role did external actors and the United States in particular, play in fostering the factors that led to the Orange Revolution? An answer to this question is not only important as a factual response to the critics of the Orange Revolution. The case is also an important one to be studied by those interested in understanding how external actors can influence democratization. Tracing the causal impact of democracy assistance programs on the consolidation of liberal democracy is very difficult, since the process of liberal democratic consolidation is incremental, complex, and long-term. The Orange Revolution, however, is a defined, concrete outcome, which therefore can be more easily explained. This essay attempts to offer such an explanation, with special attention devoted to isolating the distinctive contributions to the Orange Revolution of programs funded by the U.S. Agency of International Development.

The "first" transitions from communist rule in Europe and Eurasia at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s did not resemble many of the transitions from authoritarian rule in the previous two decades. Why? Some have suggested that countries in the communist world shared distinguishing historical legacies or particular institutional configurations that made them different from the countries in Latin American and Southern Europe, which in turn had path-dependent consequences for the kind of transition they experienced. These differences are most certainly a major part of the explanation.

In addition, however, this paper argues that the configuration of the international system also played a causal role. The bipolar system of the Cold War constrained the kinds of transitions possible, both in the "East" and in the "West." By 1989, this international system no longer existed, but instead was in transition to a new global order anchored by one hegemon, the United States. This new system allowed for a wider range of transitions than the previous era. The "international system" is the missing independent variable that helps to unify theories about the "third wave" and the "fourth wave" and move us close towards a general theory of democratization.

This coming July, Mexicans will not only have the chance to democratically elect a president, but more importantly, they will have the opportunity to endorse democracy. On July of 2000, Mexico had its first democratic elections after being ruled by a single party - PRI - for seventy one years. The question is not whether Mexico has transited to democracy, but rather, whether Mexicans - the government, the politicians, the media, civil society, and the citizens in general can sustain and consolidate the new democratic system.

With the intent of shedding some light on this question, Mexicanos at Stanford University, the John S. Knight Fellowships for Professional Journalists, and Yost House organized the conference "2006 Mexican Elections: A Challenge for Democracy." The event took place on Saturday March 11, 2006 in Stanford's Kresge auditorium.

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, The Charles F. Riddell Fund - Yost House, the Center for Latin American Studies, VPUE/DOSA - New Student Initiatives, Bechtel International Center, El Guiding Concilio - El Centro Chicano, Camacho Fund, ASSU Speakers Bureau, and United Airlines were co-sponsors of the conference.

The 2006 Mexican Elections conference proved to be wonderfully enriching for anyone with an interest in Mexican politics and/or in democratic consolidation. The conference consisted of three sections: a) a roundtable that discussed the role of the media in the 2006 electoral process; b) a keynote address given by one of the most respected figures in Mexican academia, the historian and essayist Enrique Krauze, on the progress that Mexico has achieved in the political arena in the last decade, and on the challenges that Mexicans will face in the coming 2006 presidential election; and, c) a political debate between representatives of the three main political parties in Mexico - PRI, PAN and PRD.

This report provides a brief summary of the main arguments addressed by each speaker, the most important themes and points of discussion that arose in each panel, a brief analysis of each section, and a conclusion.

In March 2006, Stanford University's Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) brought together 25 leading scholars and policymakers to discuss the political, security, and economic situation in Iraq.

The purpose of the conference was to consider what could be done to stabilize Iraq at a crucial moment after three elections and with the country in the midst of putting together a viable coalition. Participants were asked to generate candid analysis and constructive policy recommendations.

This report summarizes many of the key arguments, suggestions, thoughts and ideas that arose out of the two-day conference. It is offered in the hope of contributing to an understanding of the situation in Iraq and providing possible innovations to the country's ongoing challenges.

In order to facilitate a subsequent operationalization of civil liberty, the paper attempts to define and ground civil liberty on the basis of liberal political philosophy/theory as this tradition provides fruitful conceptual distinctions and specifications and offers some interesting motivations for taking civil liberties into deeper consideration. Different clusters of perspectives are found in the literature and one these is identified as key to understand the character of civil liberty and the relationship between civil liberty and democracy. Thereafter, to specify was is plausibly meant by civil liberties, I introduce three historically significant forms of rights codifications, that is, agreements about rights put down in peace treatises on the background of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants; national declarations and constitutional provisions connected to the revolutions in the seventeenth century England and the late eighteenth century USA and France; and international conventions on human rights. As one cannot settle the question of the plausibility of civil liberties just by reference to their legal recognition, I turn to some of the justifications offered by liberal philosophers that are briefly confronted with some general critiques.

The paper concludes that there are good reasons to respect civil liberties and to narrow the focus to (modern, negative) liberal freedom understood as absence of state interference in certain personal exertion rights. On this background, five rights are selected to constitute the core of a civil liberty measure: freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of recourse to independent courts.

This paper elaborates a coherent conceptual framework - a necessary step prior to

the development of specific theories and the deduction of hypotheses. Based on previous work on regime changes, it identifies what should be regarded central,

peripheral, and distinct regarding political regime and affiliated concepts and rejects

several alternative perspectives.

The paper suggests how we can systematize our research on regime changes

by distinguishing between different phases and outcomes. Institutional perspectives

that focus on both formal and informal institutions and that addresses the complex

connection between rules, behaviour and attitudes are found to be the most plausible.

The regime definition based on this insight points out four defining principles -

character of rulers, access to power, vertical power limitations, and horizontal power

limitations. Moreover, the political-institutional perspective put forward enables researchers to draw systematic distinctions between three crucial dimensions (the rule

dimension, the behavioural dimension, and the attitudinal dimension) as well as different phases (transition, installation, and operation) and outcomes of regime

changes.