NATO's Collateral Damage in Russia
Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.
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Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.
The Clinton Administration was right to reject Slobodan Milosevic's cease-fire proposal -- entering into negotiations now with Serbia, which has largely achieved its military goals in Kosovo before NATO has achieved much of anything, would be an admission of defeat.
Only a few weeks ago, Russia was one of the most downtrodden and detested countries in the eyes of Washington's elite. One could not utter the word "Russia" without adding adjectives such as "crime- ridden," "collapsing" or "corrupt." Russia was considered a basket case of a country that had failed at capitalism and democracy and was soon to fail as a state. Russia's reputation in the United States was so bad that Russian businesspeople began courting American public relations firms to help rectify Russia's image.
The "who lost Russia" debate reveals more about US electoral politics than it does about Russian realities. Russia is midstream in a social revolution. In only a few short years, the borders of the state, the nature of the economic system, and the organization of the polity have undergone fundamental, simultaneous change. Our current focus on Russian corruption obscures our understanding of this triple transition.
With the United States fixated on crime and corruption in Russia, Russians obsess about two other dramas: upcoming parliamentary elections and the war in the Caucasus region. The first drama might well have a happy ending, rare for Russian dramas these days. The second is almost certainly a tragedy in the making. Worse, the war in the Caucasus may eventually subsume elections altogether, resulting in their cancellation, civil resistance and even civil war. Before such a scenario gains more momentum, U.S. officials should look beyond Russian corruption and do what they can to lower the probability of democratic collapse in Russia.
According to conventional wisdom, the United States "lost" Russia in the 1990s. This
assessment can be found on the pages of The Nation, The Washington Times, The New
York Times magazine, or foreign policy issue papers prepared for presidential candidate
George W. Bush. These attacks fall into two contradictory categories. One school holds
that the policies pursued by the United States over the last decade have failed to establish capitalism and democracy in Russia, and instead have fueled corruption, crime, and ill will towards the United States. The other school argues that the United States was wrong to try to engineer domestic change within Russia in the first place.
Like almost every discussion about Russia in the last ten years (and the Soviet Union during the preceding seven decades), the debate about Russias upcoming parliamentary election is polarized simplistically between "optimists" and "pessimists." Optimists believe that the election is a "good thing." People are voting, parties are participating, and everyone is happy. Pessimists believe that the election is a "bad thing." People do not care, parties dont matter, and everyone is sad.
To the Editor:
You quote President Clinton as saying that ''Russia and China, where the shackles of state socialism once choked off enterprise, are moving to join the thriving community of free democracies'' (news article, May 19). Both are moving to join the community of market economies, but only Russia has taken steps to become a free democracy.
Although flawed in many ways, Russia is an electoral democracy. China is an authoritarian regime. In Russia, leaders are elected, people can assemble, worship and travel freely, and the press can criticize the Government. In China, none of these freedoms exist.
Perhaps Mr. Clinton made a slip of the tongue. But for those who worry that he too often ignores violations of democratic rights in pursuit of market opportunities, this did not look so innocent.
When presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin meet in Moscow next month, issues such as
START II, NATO expansion, trade with Iran and Iraq, and Russia's new draconian law on
religion are likely to dominate the agenda. To historians of US-Soviet relations, this agenda
should sound familiar as arms control, European security, regional conflicts, and human rights were the main components of most summit agendas between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This old agenda suggests that the promise of a new post-communist strategic partnership between the United States and Russia has not been realized. Especially as Russia continues to struggle in reforming its economy, many in the US have now concluded that engagement with this "basket case" is not worth the trouble--better to walk away from the failing project of internal reform and prepare instead to contain future external aggression.
U.S.-Russian relations offer one bright counter to the otherwise gloomy and complex set of issues facing American foreign policy makers after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to speak directly to President Bush to express his condolences and offer his support for the American response. He followed these rhetorical pledges with concrete policies, including military and humanitarian support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and Russian acquiescence to American troops in Central Asia.