The wave of democratic electoral revolutions in the Eastern Europe and post-Communist Eurasia revived one of the most appealing and at the same time disputable arguments in the theory of democratization: that is, that successful democratic breakthroughs in one of several places help to shape the timing and dynamic of transformation in others, where the regime change has yet to occur. This interconnectivity of transitions in time (and space) is described in terms such as 'contagion,' 'diffusion,' or 'demonstration effect.' Indeed, although hardly a decisive factor, the evidence that contagion played certain important role in transmitting the spirit of democracy and techiques for achieving it from Serbia in 2000 to Georgia in 2003 to Ukraine in 2004 to Kyrgyzstan in 2005 is evident. Needless to say that there is more than enough evidence that a large community of activists, policy advisors, local and international NGOs, and media, were purposefully involved in translating the experience, strategy and tactics of successful revolutions to the new territories. This often led to a feeling of deja vu once an observer saw TV scenes of yet another autocrat being ousted and a new democratic leader being installed by the people's power.

In the broader sence, contagion is definitely facilitated by the proximity of historical experiences and present-day concerns and dilemmas staying for the societies in the region: in other words, as far as they face similar problems, they audiences throughout the post-Communist world may have immediate understanding of what sort of solutions are suggested to them by the roaming revolutionaries.

But democrats and revolutionaries are not the only ones who can learn from the past and apply the knowledge to fulfill their political goals. Indeed, their antagonists appeared to have mastered the science and crafts of democratic transitions in order to stop them at their borders. What is more, they are becoming increasingly aware that, paraphrasing George W Bush's second inaugural address, 'survival of autocracy at home increasingly depends upon the failure of democracy abroad.' The first trend, learning to combat the democratic contagion, is an essential element of the new political trend in post-Communist Eurasia, defined by the author as preemptive authoritarianism. The second trend, joining efforts to combat democratic contagion, is reflected what can be defined as authoritarian international, which is rapidly emerging in the post-Soviet space.

This paper consists of three parts. The first explains the concept of preemptive authoritarianism. The second gives an overview of preemption may be done in a nearly perfect manner in the case study of Belarus, the country where it was used most extensively and proficiently. The third highlights the international dimension of preemptive authoritarianism on the example of Belarus-Russia cooperation, that increasingly spreads into the area of combatting democracy.

This paper explores the sources of both autocratic breakdown and democratization in the context of the six post-Soviet countries that emerged as competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. By 2006, two patterns had emerged. First, in stark contrast to their counterparts in central Europe, competitive authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet overwhelmingly failed to democratize. Ukraine has been the only exception. Second, while some countries - Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine - had frequent autocratic breakdowns, others - Armenia, Russia, and to a lesser extent Belarus - demonstrated high degrees of autocratic stability.

When Vladimir Putin was elected President of Russia in March 2000, the country bequeathed to him by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was an unconsolidated, often disorderly and raucous electoral democracy. Gradually though, the Russian political system under Putin came to be described as first "managed democracy" then "illiberal democracy" or "delegated democracy" and finally, by 2005, a non-democracy.

What happened? Why did the fourth wave crash on Russia's shores, and what prospects are there for external factors to play a role in bringing about a rejuvenation of democracy in Russia in the next decade? Is Russia immune to the diffusion effect of democratization that purportedly swept the East in the late 1980's and that is again moving eastward in the last 4 years? What are the implications for this apparent resistance to the fourth wave for Russia's fragile newly democratic neighbors in Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia? In this essay, I will explore these and other questions as I try to assess the internal and external factors that might help us to understand why Russia has undergone a "reverse wave" in democratization even as its smaller neighbors have apparently resisted the authoritarian tide that struck parts of the post-communist world in the late 1990s.

The state-based factor was the regime's extreme vulnerability to electoral loss or pressure: an astonishingly diverse set of indicators suggested that the government was going to lose a fair vote and that it had limited capacity or will to fix a vote decisively in its favor. This structural "'vacuum'' of state vulnerability explains much of the success of popular mobilization in Georgia. A more confident government, in particular one capable of brandishing a more credible threat of force, would have been able to deter or withstand the not very large protests.

At the same time, without substantial popular mobilization even a teetering regime might hang on and buttress itself anew. As Georgia's own slow-moving mobilization suggests, it would be a mistake to assume that regime vulnerability automatically engenders popular mobilization. A collective action problem must still be overcome - if not regarding the fear of punishment, then regarding the perceived benefits of participation. To overcome this collective action problem, the actions of a number of social actors, including the government, appear to have been necessary.

The collapse of communism did not lead smoothly or quickly to the

consolidation of liberal democracy in Europe and the former Soviet

Union. At the time of regime change, from 1989 into the first few years

of the 1990s, popular democratic movements in the three Baltic states,

Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Eastern Germany, and western Czechoslovakia

translated initial electoral victories into consolidated liberal

democracy. These quick and successful democratic breakthroughs were

the exception, however. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and eastern

Czechoslovakia (after 1992 known simply as Slovakia) failed to consolidate

liberal democracy soon after communism collapsed. Yet in time,

the gravitational force of the European Union did much to draw these

countries onto a democratic path.

Expanded version published in Russian as " Path of Postcommunist Transformation: Comparative Analysis of Democratic Breakthroughs in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine,"

in Pro et Contra, No. 2 (29) 2005, pp. 92-107