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In his trenchant analysis, Stephen Biddle ("Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," March/April 2006) argues that the escalating violence in Iraq is not a nationalist insurgency, as was the Vietnam War, but rather a "communal civil war" and that it must therefore be addressed by pursuing a strategy different from "Vietnamization": if the United States were simply to turn over responsibility for counterinsurgency to the new Iraqi army and police forces, it would risk inflaming the communal conflict, either by empowering the Shiites and the Kurds to slaughter the Sunnis or by enabling a Trojan horse full of Sunni insurgents to penetrate the multiethnic security forces and undermine them.

Biddle is right in many respects. First, Iraq is already in the midst of a very violent civil conflict, which claims 500 to 1,000 lives or more every month. Second, this internal conflict has become primarily communal in nature; as Biddle writes, it is a fight "about group survival." It pits Sunnis against Shiites, in particular, but also Kurds against Sunnis and, more generally, group against group, with smaller minorities coming under attack on multiple fronts. Third, as Biddle warns, the current moderate-intensity communal war could descend into an all-out conflagration, with a high "risk of mass slaughter." Thus the United States cannot in good conscience withdraw from Iraq abruptly -- and doing so would not even be in the United States' national interest -- because that would remove the last significant barrier to a total conflagration.

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Foreign Affairs
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Larry Diamond
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Recently, a Russo-Turkish strategic relationship has emerged. Trade in general and energy (gas) supplies in particular play a key role in shaping ties between the two countries. But Moscow and Ankara seem to be on the same page too with regard to major regional issues as well: the Iraq war, Iran's nuclear program, security in the Black Sea-Caspian area, and "frozen conflicts" in the South Caucasus. Despite being a NATO member and an EU candidate country, Turkey appears to be much closer to Russia than to the West on all these issues.

Moreover, with the Iraq situation becoming ever more volatile in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, and the anti-Turkish sentiments on the rise in many European countries, Ankara is deeply dissatisfied with the nature of its relations with Western powers and is, therefore, seeking new strategic allies. In this context, Moscow looks like a natural and valuable partner. Russia, for its part, is also going through a rough patch in its relations with the West and is looking for prospective allies.

Interestingly, the Turkish-Russian rapprochement is accompanied by heated internal debates on Russia and Turkey's international identities and the re-emergence in both countries of Eurasianism -- the ideology that, among other things, promotes historical and cultural affinity between Russia and Turkey.

Igor Torbakov is a historian and analyst who specializes in the political affairs of the former Soviet Union. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was a Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey and writes regularly on these issues for a variety of publications.

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Igor Torbakov Historian and Journalist Specializing in the Political Affairs of the Former Soviet Union Speaker
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The reports from two CDDRL sponsored conferences held in March have now been made available. The first is from the conference called Stabilizing Iraq: Options for Democracy, Security, and Development and the second is from the conference called 2006 Mexican Elections: A Challenge for Democracy.
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In March 2006, Stanford University's Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) brought together 25 leading scholars and policymakers to discuss the political, security, and economic situation in Iraq.

The purpose of the conference was to consider what could be done to stabilize Iraq at a crucial moment after three elections and with the country in the midst of putting together a viable coalition. Participants were asked to generate candid analysis and constructive policy recommendations.

This report summarizes many of the key arguments, suggestions, thoughts and ideas that arose out of the two-day conference. It is offered in the hope of contributing to an understanding of the situation in Iraq and providing possible innovations to the country's ongoing challenges.

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James D. Fearon
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Is the conflict in Iraq a civil war or not? Debate over this question is largely political. James D. Fearon sets aside politics to explain the meaning of civil war and how it applies to Iraq.

Does the conflict in Iraq amount to a civil war? In many ways, the public debate over this question is largely political. Calling Iraq a "civil war" implies yet another failure for the Bush administration and adds force to the question of whether U.S. troops still have a constructive role to play.

Politics aside, however, the definition of civil war is not arbitrary. For some -- and perhaps especially Americans -- the term brings to mind all-out historical conflicts along the lines of the U.S. or Spanish civil wars. According to this notion, there will not be civil war in Iraq until we see mass mobilization of sectarian communities behind more or less conventional armies.

But a more standard definition is common today:

1) Civil war refers to a violent conflict between organized groups within a country that are fighting over control of the government, one side's separatist goals, or some divisive government policy.

By this measure, the war in Iraq has been a civil war not simply since the escalation of internecine killings following the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, but at least since the United States handed over formal control to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004.

Here's why: Although the insurgents target the U.S. military, they are also fighting the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government and killing large numbers of Iraqis. There is little reason to believe that if the United States were suddenly to withdraw its forces, they would not continue their battle to control or shape the government.

Political scientists who study civil war have proposed various refinements to this rough definition to deal with borderline cases. One issue concerns how much killing has to occur -- and at what rate.

2) For a conflict to qualify as a civil war, most academics use the threshold of 1,000 dead, which leads to the inclusion of a good number of low-intensity rural insurgencies.

Current estimates suggest that more than 25,000 Iraqis have been killed in fighting since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 -- a level and rate of killing that is comparable to numerous other conflicts that are commonly described as civil wars, such as those in Lebanon (1975-1990) and Sri Lanka (beginning in 1983).

The organization -- or rather, disorganization -- of the warring communities in Iraq means that a large-scale conventional conflict along the lines of the U.S. Civil War is unlikely to develop. More probable is a gradual escalation of the current "dirty war" between neighborhood militias that have loose ties to national political factions and are fighting almost as much within sectarian lines as across them.

This is roughly what happened in Lebanon and at a lower level in Turkish cities in the late 1970s. Ethnic cleansing will occur not as a systematic, centrally directed campaign (as in Bosnia), but as a result of people moving to escape danger.

And there's another twist to the terminology:

3) If the conflict in Iraq becomes purely a matter of violence between Sunni and Shiite communities driven by revenge and hatred rather than by political goals, many political scientists would say that it is something other than civil war.

Almost no one, for example, calls the Hindu-Muslim violence in India a civil war.

A civil war has to involve attempts to grab power at the center of government or in a given region, or to use violence to change some major government policy.

In Iraq's case, however, the vacuum of power at the center means that communal violence will inevitably be tied to struggles for political power and control.

A final complication concerns the nature of international involvement. Some argue, for example, that the war in Bosnia should be seen as an interstate war rather than a civil war, since the Bosnian Serb forces were armed and directed largely by Belgrade. Post-Mobutu violence in Congo is often termed a civil war, even though fighters have been closely tied to armies from neighboring states.

4) A conflict may be both a civil and an interstate war at the same time.

The Vietnam War, for instance, clearly comprised both a civil war in the South and an interstate war involving the North, the South and the United States.

Iraq may be moving in this direction. The United States and Britain are already openly involved, and such neighboring countries as Iran and Syria are more covertly involved. Not that it matters to the people dying there, but the next debate here may turn on whether what is already a civil war in Iraq should be viewed as an interstate war as well.

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External-led state building is at the forefront of international security governance; it has been called "a growth industry"; and it is, against the backdrop of the US-led intervention in Iraq, more controversial than ever. Since the end of the cold war, the UN have launched more than 60 missions in 24 countries. Whilst the primary objective of all of these missions was to monitor, keep, enforce or build peace, a second objective, which is intrinsically linked to the first, was to contribute directly or indirectly to the reestablishment of functioning state-hood. Peace-building mission have become state-building missions. There are two broad reasons for this. First, fragile states are seen as a risk to both their societies and to international security. And second, it is now broadly assumed that one vital condition for sustainable peace is that the state-apparatus has the capacity to exercise core functions of state-hood in an efficient, non-violent and legitimate way. Consequently, peace-building is more and more seen as state-building, and this evolution is reflected in both UN strategy documents, and the development aid strategies of most nation states.

It is against this background that the need for a systematic evaluation of successes and failures of external-led state building emerges. This in turn requires a framework that enables a cross-case comparison of outcomes of external-led state building efforts.

This paper has two objectives: First, I propose a framework that allows for the tracing of the absolute and the relative state-building progress of countries hosting a state-building operation. I argue that "success" should be disaggregated and measured along five dimensions: the absence of war, the reestablishment of a full monopoly over the means for violence, economic development, democracy, and institutional capacities. I discuss at some length the implications for data collection and proxying these measures of success. Secondly, I evaluate the outcome of 17 UN-led peace-building operations, using a new data set. I compare the successes and failures of state-building along these five dimensions against three hypothetical scenarios: The first one is "more is better." In this scenario, it is assumed that the more intrusive the intervention, the more successful the outcome. The second scenario can be called "less-is-more" and assumes that too intrusive missions are counterproductive, because they hinder the endogenous emergence of stable statehood. The third scenario is the "trade-off-scenario." Here, it is assumed that more intrusive interventions produce better outcome in some policy fields and worse in others. This then would point to existing trade-offs between different objectives of state building. Rather than assuming that all good things go together, in the "trade-off"-scenario the success in one dimension (for example democracy) comes at the expense of less success in another dimension (for example economic development).

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Christoph Zuercher
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The article reports that by definition Iraq is in the midst of a civil war and has been ever since the first year of the "post-war" era in 2003. Since the United Iraqi Alliance took control of the government in 2005, there has been an increase in deaths and disappearances of Iraqi Sunnis. Signs of civil war include a hollow state, political polarization, inflammatory rhetoric, irreconcilable demands, and human rights violations.

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The New Republic
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Larry Diamond
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In recent years "Muslim democracy" has emerged as a new political reality in a number of Muslim countries with open politics to define the role of Islam in democracy. Muslim democracy evokes the legacy of Christian Democratic parties of Europe in that it is an electoral platform that seeks to dominate the middle by integrating Muslim values into broader socioeconomic demands. Muslim democracy is not a platform for religious reform nor a theoretical construct, but rather the product of politics on the ground and the give-and-take of electoral politics. Muslim democracy has taken shape in the political process by Islamist parties such as Turkey's AKP, and non-religious parties such as Pakistan's PML. It provides a point of departure for discussing democratization and pragmatic change across the Muslim world, and in particular contending with outcome of recent elections in Iran, Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

Vali Nasr is Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.

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Vali Nasr Professor Speaker Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
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A former career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Barbara Bodine served as US Ambassador to Yemen from 1997-2001. Ambassador Bodine spent her 30-year diplomatic career primarily in the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula, including tours as Deputy Principal Officer in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War and Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990. In 2003 Ambassador Bodine served as coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and the central governorates of Iraq.

In addition to a number of assignments in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Ms. Bodine was the Associate Coordinator for Operations and subsequently acting overall Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, Dean of the School of Professional Studies at the Foreign Service Institute and Director of East African Affairs.

Ambassador Bodine is the recipient of a number of awards, including the Secretary's Award for Valor, the Secretary's Career Achievement Award and the Department's Distinguished Service Award.

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Ambassador Barbara K. Bodine Senior Fellow Speaker Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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LARRY DIAMOND, a Current History contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Times Books, 2005). In 2004 he served as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.

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Current History
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Larry Diamond
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