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In Search of Rezah Shah book cover

What kind of Iran did Reza Shah envision, and how should we understand his legacy?

From Alasht to the throne and into exile, Reza Shah’s life was intertwined with transformations that shaped Iran’s destiny. But behind the conflicting portraits of the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, what ideas, aspirations, and contradictions lay hidden?

Abbas Milani, author of The Persian Sphinx and The Shah, now sets out in search of Reza Shah. Through a fresh reading of documents, writings, travel accounts, and speeches, he examines Reza Shah’s understanding of modernity, Iranian identity, and the place of religion in society, exploring the fraught relationship between modernization and authoritarianism.

This biography seeks neither to create a faultless saint nor to perpetuate a demonic image. Milani challenges conventional narratives, setting aside preconceptions and turning to historical evidence to open a path toward understanding Reza Shah.

For readers of modern Iranian history, this book is an invitation to revisit the life of a man whose era’s questions about power, freedom, and modernity remain Iran’s questions today.




‫در جستجوی رضاشاه (جلد اول)


سفر رضاشاه از آلاشت به تخت سلطنت و از آنجا به غربتی ناخواسته، برای ایران دستاوردها و پیامدهایی فراوان داشت و هر روز هم بر شمار آثاری که به تمجید و تنقید آن دوران می‌پردازند فزونی می‌گیرد.

پس از این همه کتاب و مقاله و ده‌ها هزار فتوای سیاسی در مورد رضاشاه، چرا باید کماکان در کتابی دیگر به جستجویش رفت؟ پیش از هر چیز به این خاطر که روایات تاریخی چون یک متن ادبی‌اند. هریک را می‌توان و می‌باید به فراخور اهمیت آن دوران و شخصیتی که نقشی مهم در آن دوران داشت، هزار و یک بار بازخواند و با بازخوانی نقادانه باز نوشت. هر فرد از هر نسل و هر ملتی که به چنین بازخوانی بپردازد، هم به کشف لایه‌های تازه‌ای از تاریخ دست می‌یابد و هم به مرتبۀ نویی از خودشناسی می‌رسد. گاه هم چون من، از نارسایی‌های اندیشه و درک گذشتۀ خود شرم می‌کند. سوای نیاز دائمی به بازخوانی و بازنویسی هرچه دقیق‌تر گذشته، فرایند بازخوانی تاریخ زندگی پر فراز و نشیب رضاشاه این روزها، بیش از هر زمانی دیگر، لازم به نظر می‌رسد.

نسل‌های انقلاب سوخته‌ای که برای چهار دهه حملات سمج و گاه سخیف رژیم اسلامی علیه رضاشاه را خوانده یا شنیده‌اند، دیگر از این حملات برگذشته‌اند. با ذهنی کنجکاو و نقاد و شکاک، بازخوانی تاریخ آن دوران را خود آغازیده‌اند. جهل تاریخی ضامن تکرار تاریخ است و دانش نقادانۀ تاریخ شاید چراغی برای احتراز از خطاهای گذشته. نسل‌های جدید ایرانیان بر آنند که بار سنگین شناخت تاریخ را به رغم همۀ سختی‌ها و دشواری‌هایش، خود بر دوش بکشند و در عین حال از این راه بار دیگر بگویند محتاج و منتظر ولی و منجی نیستند.

کار تاریخ اصولا داد و ستد در احکام یقینی نیست. با شک می‌آغازد و به حقیقتی نسبی می‌انجامد. برعکس، مورخ به فروتنی می‌داند روایتش از تاریخ، عارضی، یعنی تغییرپذیر و تغییرکردنی است. وقتی معمای هویدا را جستجو می‌کردم، سایۀ شاه همیشه انکارناپذیر بود. هنگامی که به تدوین نگاهی به شاه پرداختم، رضاشاه همیشه حاضر و در عین حال به شکل تکان دهنده‌ای غایب بود. خوشبختانه در سال‌های پیش از انقلاب مجموعۀ کامل نوشته‌ها و سخنرانی‌ها و مصاحبه‌های شاه در چهارده مجلد نفیس به چاپ رسیده بود، ولی مجموعه‌ای از سخنرانی‌های رضاشاه که قاعدتا به لحاظ ایجاز همیشگی او در سخنرانی، شاید بیش از یک جلد هم نمی‌شد، هرگز منتشر نشد. حتی دو سفرنامۀ بسیار مهم رضاشاه را با تأخیر و به مناسبت جشن پنجاهمین سال سلطنت پهلوی، آن هم بیشتر به شکل متنی تبلیغاتی چاپ کردند.

در هر حال، آن سکوت طولانی و قصور زیانبار رژیم شاه در چاپ این دو کتاب را هیاهوی مستمر کسانی پر کرد که روایتشان از رضاشاه در چند واژه خلاصه می‌شد؛ «انگلیسی‌ها با به حاکمیت رساندن یک قزاق بسیار بی‌رحم، گستاخ، بی‌سواد، لات منش و بی‌ایمان به نام رضاخان کنترل ایران را در دست گرفتند و رضاخان هم با منکوب کردن علما و مرعوب کردن شدید ملت اهداف آنان را محقق کرد و در این مسیر عده‌ای روشنفکر غرب زده یا وابسته هم با رنگ روغن زدن به حکومت پلید او در جنایاتش شریک شدند.» طبعا این نه یک تحلیل تاریخی که یک روضۀ سیاسی است. نه بازخوانی، که تحریف تاریخ و تلاشی است برای تحمیق مردم.

در بازخوانی تاریخ دوران رضاشاه، باید به گمانم رسم روضۀ معمم‌ها و مکلاها را واگذاشت. به جای تلاش مکرر در «معرفی» رضاشاه باید، در راه «شناخت» او گام گذاشت. بیهقی همین اصل مهم را در چند کلام سخت زیبا خلاصه می‌کند. می‌گوید، «روا نیست در تاریخ تخسیر و تحریف و تغییر و تبذیر کردن.» به دیگر سخن، کار تاریخ قدیس بافی یا شیطان سازی نیست. ملات تاریخ نه شنیده‌های نامستند که یافته‌های مستند است.

در این کتاب می‌کوشم پاسخ هر پرسشی در مورد رضاشاه را در اسناد بجویم نه در وهمیات ایرانیت تحقیرشده یا جزمیاتی تجددستیز، و یا روایتی که به قدیس سازی از رضاشاه مشغول است.

واقعیت گریزناپذیر دیگری بر پیچیدگی کار تاریخی در ایران، به ویژه در مورد رضاشاه می‌افزاید. در هر دادگاه متجدد که هیأت منصفه‌ای هم دارد، طبعا شواهدی که مستقیم و بلاواسطه به رخداد مورد بحث مربوطند از اهمیتی بی‌بدیل برخوردارند. در یک چنین دادگاهی، دادستان و وکیل و حتی هیأت منصفه همه به تساوی از حق دسترسی به این شواهد و اسناد برخوردارند. اما در ایران، رژیم اسلامی اسناد دوران رضاشاه را بیشتر به سلاحی سیاسی بدل کرده و آن را هم در اختیار «خودی‌ها» می‌گذارد تا از آن برای محکوم کردن رضاشاه استفاده کنند. ایرانیان خارج نشینی که همسو با شعارهای رژیم نیستند به طور کلی «غیرخودی» به شمار می‌روند و از دسترسی به این اسناد محرومند.

ولی این دشواری‌ها و همۀ ابهامات و شایعات و روضه‌ها، نسل‌های تازۀ ایرانیان را از تلاش برای یافتن حقیقت تاریخی دوران رضاشاه بازنداشته است و نمی‌تواند جوازی برای کم کاری یا صرفا بازنویسی روایات گذشته باشد. به قول سهراب سپهری، «چشم‌ها را باید شست» و تاریخ آن دوران را باید باز خواند و باز نوشت. کار این بازخوانی و بازاندیشی درکمان از تاریخ بی‌شباهت به تلاش سیزیف، آن اسطورۀ کوشندگی در کاری پایان ناپذیر نیست. او دائم سنگی را به بالای کوه می‌غلتاند. به قله که می‌رسید، سنگ، به تمهید خدایان کینه توز، به پایین کوه و نقطۀ آغازین تلاش سیزیف غلت می‌خورد. ولی ما هم باید چون آلبر کامو در روایتش از سیزیف، دل خوش داریم که سنگ هرگز دقیقا به همان نقطۀ شروع برنمی‌گردد و گامی چند بالاتر از آن می‌ایستد و تلاش ما و دیگران پس از ما را می‌طلبد. رضاشاه هم گویی در لحظه‌هایی در تبعید، به روایتی سیزیف وار از تلاش‌های خود دچار شد.

روزی در موریس با اعضای خانواده‌اش صحبت می‌کرد. هریک دربارۀ آنچه از دست داده بودند چیزی می‌گفت. رضاشاه گفت، «تنها نگرانی‌ام برای این است که وضع ایران چه می‌شود. ما با هزار زحمت و جان کندن یک تکان‌هایی به ایران داده بودیم و حالا باز دومرتبه تازه برمی‌گردد به وضع قبل و باز دومرتبه بساط‌های سابق.» در موردی دیگر به همسرش ملکه عصمت گفته بود «می ترسم اوضاع کشور آشفته شود و پسرم بی‌مبالاتی کند و دوباره در کشور آخوندبازی راه بیفتد. او میانۀ خوبی با آخوندها نداشت.» از سویی پیش بینی و هراس رضاشاه درست بود. نه در زمان پسرش، که با روی کار آمدن رژیم اسلامی در سال ۱۳۵۷، سرنوشت ایران باز دومرتبه مثل «بساط‌های سابق» شد و آخوندبازی راه افتاد. ولی شاید ترس و یأس رضاشاه نتیجۀ دلتنگی‌های تبعید بود.

از منظر تاریخی، مهم‌ترین نبرد صد سال اخیر ایران در واقع میان اندیشه‌های رضاشاه و الگوی او برای تجدد از یک سو و افکار آیت الله خمینی و فکر تجددستیزی از سویی دیگر بود. بسیاری از محققان، نبرد اصلی را میان مشروطه و استبداد می‌دانند. به گمان من رضاشاه موفق شد قاجارها را براندازد و همین براندازی رویارویی و نبردی تازه را رقم زد. دو تجربۀ موفق براندازی در ایران سدۀ بیستم را دو نفر به نمایندگی از دو دیدگاه متضاد رهبری کردند. یکی در سال ۱۳۰۵ و دومی در ۱۳۵۷. رضاشاه به نوزایش ایران و ایرانیت دلبسته بود. پنجره‌ای هم به روی تجدد عرفی و ایرانی ـ جهانی گشود. می‌خواست مذهب را به عرصۀ خصوصی محدود کند. قلدری‌اش هم بیش از هر چیز در خدمت این کار و رویارویی با انواع قلدرانی بود که دشمن این نوزایش بودند. او گرچه به جنبه‌های لیبرالی یک حکومت دموکراتیک پابند نبود، ولی با تغییرات اجتماعی و اقتصادی دورانش زمینۀ ایجاد جامعه‌ای ساخته و پذیرندۀ دموکراسی لیبرالی فراهم می‌کرد. در مقابل، آیت الله خمینی دشمن این نوزایش بود. با اصلاح دین سر عناد داشت. ایرانی شریعت محور و تجددستیز می‌طلبید و پنجره را به روی ایرانیت و تجدد و اصلاح دینی می‌بست. رهروان راهی که او می‌رفت با قلدری به جنگ تجدد رفتند. امروز که صد سال از آغاز حکومت رضاشاه و حدود هشتاد سال از زمانی که در تبعید واهمه‌های تلخ تاریخی خود را به زبان آورد می‌گذرد، آیندۀ ایران، به لحاظ همان «تکان‌هایی» که او به ایران داده بود، از هر زمان به تجدد ایرانی ـجهانی مطلوب و منظور او نزدیک‌تر است. این بار به لحاظ تحولاتی که جامعه در صد سال گذشته تجربه کرده است - که یکی از مهم‌ترین آنها حضور هرچه بیشتر و فعال‌تر زنان در عرصۀ اجتماع است - شرایط بیش از هروقت دیگر برای تحقق دموکراسی، آنچنان که مراد اکثر مشروطه طلبان هم بود آماده است.

زندگی رضاشاه بیش از هر چیز و بیش و کم در همه حال، در خدمت تحقق اندیشه‌هایش بود. به گمانم زیان بارترین و نادرست‌ترین روایتی که در مورد رضاشاه در خاطرۀ تاریخی ما جا افتاده و ته نشین شده این است که او قلدری بی‌سواد و نوکر انگلیس بود. هرچه بیشتر در اسناد تأمل کردم، هرچه بیشتر نوشته‌ها و سخنرانی‌هایش را خواندم، بیشتر متقاعد شدم که این باور، اسطوره‌ای بدخیم بیش نیست.

در این کار، به این نتیجه رسیدم که زندگینامۀ تازۀ او بیش از هر چیز باید زندگینامۀ فکری او باشد. در میان رهبران سیاسی کمتر کسی در تاریخ صد سال اخیر ایران به اندازۀ او در مورد مسألۀ تجدد ایران به جد اندیشه کرده و کتاب نوشته و جزئیات نوع تجددی را که می‌خواسته و ایران را شایسته‌اش می‌دانسته برگفته و در راه تحققش کوشیده است.

داوری دربارۀ چند و چون موفقیت من در این کار سنگین و انصافم در انتخاب «داده»ها بر دوش خوانندگان و دادگاه تاریخ است.

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‫در جستجوی رضاشاه (جلد اول)

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There’s no shortage of threats facing the globe, from challenges to democracy to emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence and biotechnology, to ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and Iran, and the potential for conflict between China and Taiwan.

At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend, Colin Kahl led a conversation with a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies on some of the major challenges currently facing the globe.

Drew Endy highlighted the need to secure the biotechnology frontier, as AI makes it ever more possible for bad actors to bring bioweapons to life. Didi Kuo discussed where democracy is doing well, and what can be done to push back against authoritarianism. Abbas Milani provided personal and scholarly insights into the conflict in Iran and the country's democratic potential. Steven Pifer debunked the idea that Russia is making meaningful progress in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and outlines how the United States can be more effective as a negotiator between the two sides. And Oriana Skylar Mastro shared what people are getting wrong about competition with China, and where more nuance is needed in understanding the U.S.-China relationship. 

While each of these challenges is significant, they are not unsolvable.

“These are not inevitabilities. These are choices," reminds Colin Kahl. "We can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. We can keep the problems solvable.”

To learn more from these scholars, check out their books:


Watch the full panel discussion in the video above. A podcast version is available in the player below. If you like what you hear, be sure to follow, like and subscribe to World Class on your favorite podcast platform.

TRANSCRIPT:


Kahl: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Colin Kahl, the director of FSI.

Today I'm bringing you a discussion I had with an amazing group of FSI scholars during Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend. We surveyed many trends and threats facing the world today, including the development of bioweapons, challenges to democracy around the world, the war between Russia and Ukraine, Chinese ambitions against Taiwan, and the U.S.-Iran conflict.

These are complicated issues and the challenges to addressing them are real, but so are the opportunities for resolving them. We're going to hear from Drew Endy, a world-recognized expert on bioengineering and biosecurity; Didi Kuo, who specializes in comparative politics, democracy, and the role of political parties; Abbas Milani, a leading voice in Iranian studies and one of the most authoritative contemporary scholars on what's happening to Iranian society; Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and expert on European defense; and finally, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a scholar of the Chinese military and Indo-Pacific security.

It was a great conversation, and I hope you find it as informative as I did. Here's the panel.

[BEGIN EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: All right, so I'm going start and we're going to go down the line, and then I'll ask another round and we'll go down the line.

So, Drew, starting with you: what's one thing that the world should understand — maybe something they currently don't understand, or maybe they think they understand, but they're getting wrong — about biosecurity, biotechnology, and how it's poised to change everything.

Endy: So let's start with what we know. Somebody died in Russia of a plague. We have soldiers coming back from the front lines in Ukraine with resistant bacteria. We have Ebola in DRC; it's going to be the worst we've seen in a while, that outbreak. And I had COVID two weeks ago for the fourth or fifth time, I've lost track. It's so last decade, but it's going to kill 50,000 Americans this year, plus or minus. You know that, right? Everybody knows that.

I'm as you mentioned from bioengineering, bioengineering is the youngest engineering department at Stanford. We're twenty some years old. The second youngest is Computer Science. When I moved here to Stanford, research was being done—you know, Karl Deisseroth, who got the Nobel Prize recently—put one gene from a bacteria into neurons to use light to control neurons. That was work he did twenty years ago in bioengineering.

What do you think we've been doing? We've been getting better at bioengineering. One thing that's changing is how we manufacture. If you can encode a way of manufacturing something in the DNA, you can grow what you want where you can operate the biology.

When you leave this room, take a look at a leaf on a tree and think about it from an engineer's perspective. It's a solar panel that makes itself and recycles itself. It's pulling 120 terawatts of net energy on the surface of the earth. We have a capability in front of us to change how we make most of the things we need. We had an internet over the last fifty years that got built for communication resilience. We're going to have a “bio net”: download and grow — download DNA code, grow what you want, you can get it encoded where you are, for manufacturing resilience.

I was flying back from Washington on Wednesday. I was on seat 20A in United, window seat exit row, and I decided to design a genome. And so I opened up Claude on my laptop and I started feeding it PDF files of different genetic sequences and we started dancing. And before I landed at SFO and before my battery went to zero, I had designed a synthetic genome for a bacteria. 

What people are sleeping on a little bit is we're making biology engineerable for good reasons. I don't wake up in the morning thinking about how am I gonna make a WMD? But it's a domain that's becoming engineerable and it's a domain we haven't secured yet. And so it's like, hmm.

In so many different dimensions, we are on this journey of profound, profound change.

Kahl: Speaking of things that are radioactive, Didi, our politics. What's one thing that the folks in this room should understand that maybe they aren't currently tracking?

Kuo: So I actually think Americans and Stanford alum really do understand what's going on. Well over 70 to 80% of Americans are concerned about the state of democracy, both at home and abroad. They're concerned about levels of corruption, about attacks on freedom of speech, on attacks on election integrity, sometimes for very different reasons. But I guess I would yes and that sentiment.

First, this is not an American story. This is happening globally. We are almost entering our twentieth year of what our colleague Larry Diamond calls the global democratic recession, which means a lot of the democratization and optimism of the 1990s has either become stagnant or even been undone.

And that is a problem because even in places that were once thought immune from problems of democracy, we see leaders pursuing the same strategies: going after their opponents, weaponizing the state, repressing civil society. So you know that people are unhappy with their governments, which is often why they elect radical leaders in the first place.

But the second thing that I would say — in addition to understanding that this is global and that that's something we need to kind of drill down and investigate — is that there are actually signs of hope from around the world.

We know that democratic backsliding can be reversed. And we've seen some of those strategies be very successful abroad. And I think we've seen signs of them start to be successful here.

First, we know that massive collective action, civil resistance, and nonviolent protest can really work to bring attention to the things that Americans care about and to stop the worst kinds of violence and repression.

The second thing is institutional defenses, when people who are suddenly finding their jobs politicized or trying to be eradicated or undone, and they try to safeguard their jobs and their roles in various positions, whether they're bureaucrats or judges, tax officers, people who work at universities, law firms, et cetera. That also has a huge effect on stopping democratic erosion. 

But the number one thing is to vote in elections. The number one antidote to democratic backsliding is baked into our very system, and that is democracy itself.

We know that leaders often try to attack elections, but that you can actually create these pro-democracy coalitions across people with very different ideological and policy values and alignments and say, we're actually going to protect this fundamental process of democracy so that we can live to fight another day in the future and try to get all of our policy issues sorted out then.

And I think that we've seen the signs of that here in Minnesota earlier this year, and certainly a lot of mobilization and excitement about the midterm elections and about elections happening in Israel and Brazil and in other places around the world, France, are going to have democracy on the line. But people, when they are threatened, will work to protect democracy.

Kahl: All right. Abbas. Few people, seriously, in the world understand the dynamics inside Iran and Iran's impact on the region in the world better than you. What is one thing we could better understand about the conflict in the Middle East or Iran more generally?

Milani: One thing you can understand is that according to some in the Iranian regime, World War Three has already started. It is between Iran and Israel and the United States, and that Iran is winning. That's their version of the reality.

What I think the world doesn't get about Iran is that it is indeed a very paradoxical society. She talked about democratic backsliding. Iran has been a democratically forward sliding society in the last twenty five years.

I would seriously say, and I've written about this several places, that Iran at the societal level is right now arguably the most democratic society in the Muslim Middle East. And every day people are more and more fighting for democracy, from women to minorities to men who are siding with women. Iran has had — in spite of having the most misogynist set of laws on the books — I think arguably has the most active, progressive, prudent women's movement. in the last thirty years.

The Life Women Liberty movement is remarkable. So I think only comparable to the African American movement for civil rights in sixties and seventies in terms of its success.

So you have a paradoxical society, a profoundly despotic society, every day becoming more organized in its despotism. Today we have virtually a military dictatorship in Iran, but at the societal level it is a very dynamic society that wants democracy, women who wants equality.

There are two Irans: the Iran of the Iranian people and the Iran of this regime. And the world policy, U.S. policy doesn't seem to get this very important schism that is at the heart of the Iranian society, the paradox that exists.

Kahl: Steve, unfortunately there's also the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. There's been a lot of news on Ukraine. There is always every week, but it seems like the last week has been pretty newsworthy. What should we be understanding more about the current war?

Pifer: Well, I would say Russia is not winning the war on the battlefield in Ukraine, and the campaign now is shifting to target Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine's pretty much stabilized the battlefront.

As they developed over the last two years, drones that can strike more deeply into Russia, they focused on Russian oil refineries. And they've probably . . . I think the IAES estimate was about thirty percent of Russian refining capability now has been taken offline. Now the Russians rebuild it, the Ukrainians attack it again. But that's a legitimate military target.

I mean, those fuels go to power the drones, they go to power the planes, they go to power the Russian tanks. It hasn't yet pushed the Russians to the point where the Russians have begun to negotiate in any more serious way, but it was increasing economic pressure on Russia.

Over the last nine and a half months since January 1st, Russia's gained a net total of about a hundred square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. For perspective, that's less than the size of the city of San Francisco. Ukraine is the size of Texas.

And to do that, the Russians are paying an enormous cost. Thirty to forty thousand Russian soldiers are either killed or severely wounded every single month. And given that failure on the battlefield, what you see is that the Russians are now shifting the campaign to Ukrainian cities. And the hope is that they can weaponize winter, winter's cold against the Ukrainians and break their will. So they target electric power plants, they target large steam facilities that heat the major cities, they target water facilities.

And they do a lot that's simply harassment. So I have on my phone here when I was in Kyiv about two years ago, I downloaded an air raid app. In the last several weeks for Kyiv, they're getting six to ten air raids every single day. And when that goes off at four o'clock in the morning, somebody has to say, do I drag my family down to the bomb shelter for the third time tonight, or do I tell them to sleep and we play the odds?

Now it's going to be a difficult winner for Ukraine. But I think Ukrainians have shown they're resilient. I think the Russian effort's going to fail, and this war unfortunately is going to continue well into 2027.

And the unfortunate thing here is that President Trump has significant leverage that he could use to push the Russians to negotiate a settlement to this war. And he has chosen not to use it. In fact, we've seen even last night by waiving new sanctions on Russia, he's actually gone over to the Russian side. And I think that's going to be a very dark stain on Americans' global reputation.

Kahl: There's conflict of instability in the Middle East, horrible events in Europe. For years, folks in Washington have wanted to pivot to Asia or the Indo-Pacific to focus on the emerging challenges there.

Oriana, what could we better understand about the storm clouds that might be gathering (or not) in the Indo-Pacific, especially across the Taiwan Strait?

Mastro: So I'm gonna cheat a little bit and say everything. I do a lot of research and writing about China, Taiwan, about the Indo-Pacific security, and China is such a complex place. And we have to have nuanced understandings about what is happening there, what is happening across the Taiwan Strait. And in most of the public debate, you either get an extremely dovish view or an extremely hawkish view, and the reality is somewhere in the middle.

For example, it is true that the United States is now distracted with wars in Ukraine and Iran and elsewhere. We have spent 147% of China's full military budget on those conflicts already. So it's very hard to compete with China conventionally in the military sphere when we are being less disciplined about how we're spending our time and effort.

At the same token, it is not the case that because we are distracted today, China has a higher likelihood of taking Taiwan by force. What convinces the Chinese whether to do that or not is not so much whether the United States is distracted in another part of the world, but on their own military competency.

Xi Jinping just did a huge purge of the most senior military leaders there that are currently either missing or at house arrest. So it's not the case that they're waiting for a moment, a window of opportunity.

It's the same thing when you look at China and Russia and what that means for Taiwan. Should we be concerned about China-Russia? Of course we should, but not because these two countries are going to fight a war together. That kind of misses the mark.

Instead, they help each other in peacetime build up their militaries in ways that makes it really hard for us to deter China from using force and if there's a conflict to compel China to stop fighting. I think we see that already in Ukraine; a little bit of Chinese support can go a really long way.

And the last example I will give about this nuanced balance is about the economy. It is true that the Chinese economy is not doing well. But there's no evidence to suggest that that convinces the Communist Party that they have to do some sort of wag-the-dog maneuver to use force in a Taiwan contingency to distract the public. If anything, their strategic culture goes the opposite way; when they have problems at home, they focus inward.

So all of this is to say I'm very vocal about my concerns about the likelihood of conflict over the Taiwan Strait. I think the Chinese have been very clear that they're preparing, they're building their military, they don't want to wait forever to solve this issue. And it's an issue that cannot be solved without force.

But not for all the reasons that potentially we hear in the news for why we should be concerned.

Kahl: Thank you very much. I think one of the things, the common threads across is the urgency around all of these issues. Dynamics in Washington may change a bit, but the reality is whether one loves President Trump or doesn't particularly like what he's doing, he's the president for the next two years. And a lot of really important decisions that impact the world will happen in that two year period.

So, Drew: if you had five minutes with the president on your issue, what would you try to get the president to do that he's maybe not doing enough of, or get him to stop doing what he's doing too much of?

Endy: A couple of things I'd like him to do, but on on this topic today, I'd say, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We could actually know what airborne viruses are in this room right now. We'd need a little machine with a box about the size of that podium and we'd be running it and doing air sampling. Now's the time to secure biology.

I'd pick on his statement from the UNGA over a year ago, where in the middle of a speech he declared that all nations should stand together to end the scourge of bioweapons. I'll take that.

I'd like the president of China and the President of the United States to duet. If I had the magic teleprompter, they should be saying that together, because that by itself will be insufficient. We need to get a duty to notify in place, a hotline for bio threats. If you have the emergence of a pandemic potential outbreak, we talk to each other. Never again do we have the Wuhan ambiguity. And we probably need that biodefense hotline with Moscow as well.

What does that look like operationally? With nuclear security, we've got the NNSA, the National Nuclear Security Agency Administration. $30 billion dollars a year. That, through the weapons lab, gets our nuclear force ready to go.

I'd argue we should have an NBSA: a National Biosecurity Agency. It would be about $10 billion dollars a year. It's not going to run on the high side. We don't put it in the weapons lab, because that'd be really bad. We do it in the public to the greatest extent possible.

So, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We can do it. It can be an enduring legacy. The returns are amazing. I have some other things I need him to do, but like on this topic, we can secure biology.

Kahl: All right. Didi, five minutes with the president.

Kuo: I doubt I would have any impact, but I would make appeals to two things that seem to matter to him. One is money. Okay. So he really likes to make money off of public office. That's called corruption.

But putting that aside, I would probably say something like capitalism is a source of American entrepreneurialism and growth, and that slowing down the rate of democracy, undermining the impartiality and rule of law, and undermining our administrative state, not funding science, stopping immigration of talented PhD students are going to be bad for American capitalism in the long run.

We know that democracy and capitalism flourish and do well when they go together. And I'm not sure that that would have an impact, But I would say that the rise in patrimonialism, transactionalism, and wheeling and dealing that we see around the world is one that's going to make the world inherently less safe. There will be far less inclusive growth and rising inequality is just going to lead to massive instability around the world, as we've already seen.

The second thing I would appeal to, like Drew, is legacy. I would actually say go focus on the arch and on the ballroom because liberal democracy is the single greatest achievement of this American project over the past 250 years. Liberal democracy is historically very hard won and rare. Most people have lived and died under something like empires.

Second of all, it's the result of massive decades, if not centuries, of popular mobilization of the kind we are now seeing in Iran.

And third, it has provided tremendous hope and inspiration to people around the world who want to live in freedom and try to secure it. That is what makes America great.

We have adapted and been flexible about what our democratic values are over time to expand to become a truly multiracial democracy. And he is messing it up a little bit.

And so I would say, sir, please go golf, go enjoy your life. And your legacy can be a positive one if you just stop attacking the thing that makes us the best country in the world.

Kahl: Play more golf and it makes America great again. Abbas, five minutes with the president on Iran.

Milani: I would say that you might think you can solve other problems instinctively with the instincts of a gambler. With Iran you can't. It is an old, complicated problem. Every administration has tried to solve this problem for the last forty-five years and it is not that simple. You can't bomb your way out of Iran's nuclear problem. You cannot bomb your way into a democracy in Iran. Iranian democracy has to be made by the people of Iran.

Don't threaten to destroy the civilization of Iran, which is one of the greatest civilizations in the world. If you destroy Iranian civilization, you are destroying part of the greatest legacy that we have, which is wisdom, which is prudence, which is philosophy. So these kinds of threats work against the people of Iran ridding themselves of this regime.

The only way we are going to have peace in the Middle East is if we understand how powerful that desire for democracy, the desire for amity with the United States is amongst the people of Iran. These kinds of politics, these kind of rhetorics, placing the decisions about this into hands that know nothing about this area, who are financially involved in this area. And they are dealing with people who know all too well how to use financial weaknesses of leaders to get what they want.

Look at what that kind of money has done to soccer.

That same thing is happening to American foreign policy. That is a dead end, Mr. President. Allow the processes that have made this country what this country is, work. Otherwise, that legacy is going to be that you'd fought a regime, you brought a lot of destruction, but you left a regime that is weaker domestically, but regionally has much more power

It controls two of the choke points of the world economy: Bob al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz. You went in there without thinking that they would close the Strait of Hormuz. Every indication was that they would do that if you attacked them. And particularly attack killing the top leadership. They were on record that they were going to close the Strait of Hormuz.

I would have told them, read what other administrations have done. Read what Colin Kahl probably told the president when somebody suggested to Biden that they should attack. I wouldn't be surprised if Colin was in the room and said, “Don't do it.”

I would say that you can truly leave a historic legacy if you can bring about the Abrahamic Accord. But to bring about the Abrahamic Accord, you need to convince the Israelis that Palestinians also have a right to a state. Without that, the Abrahamic Accord won't happen. With Abrahamic Accord, I think you will move the needle historically in the Middle East.

Kahl: I will just say: Abbas and I have talked about this a lot. We as Americans, we are a very powerful country and we are also problem solvers and we like to believe that we can solve world problems. We often cannot. It's also the case that some problems are not solvable in the near term. You have to muddle through and manage, which is super unsatisfying. The historical record is that pretty much everything that has happened was not only predictable, it was predicted, which is I think the most unfortunate aspect around a lot of this stuff.

Steve, two years ago, Trump said if he's elected he would solve the Ukraine war in twenty four hours. So we're twenty four months since the last election. If you had five minutes with the president on the Russia Ukraine conflict, what would your advice be?

Pifer: Well, I've written a lot over the last eighteen months about the Trump policy towards Russia-Ukraine. Polls show like eighty-five percent of Americans do not trust, do not like, do not respect Putin. Polls show that Americans support Ukraine. And I think if you actually took a poll in Congress, you would find most in Congress share those views. And I would tell the president, Mr. President, your policy in terms of buying diesel from Russia, not putting more pressure on Russia, and now turning it against Ukraine by cutting off some of the intelligence sharing: it’s wrong.

It's wrong morally. It's wrong strategically. And it's wrong in terms of your effort, your proclaimed desire to try to mediate it into this war. It's wrong morally because Russia is clearly the aggressor. It was Russia that seized Crimea with military force in 2014 and then went on to get involved in fighting in Donbas. It was Russia that launched the invasion in 2022. Ukraine is the victim.

It's wrong strategically, because if Russia prevails in this war, either they win on the battlefield, or perhaps they benefit from a bad peace deal. That's going to embolden Vladimir Putin. And that means a greater Russian threat to Europe and to vital American national security interests. I don't think Mr. Trump understands that at all.

But it's also wrong in terms of his effort to try to mediate a solution. But if you look over the past year, the Ukrainians have indicated readiness to make some pretty painful concessions to achieve peace, including perhaps accepting the de facto loss of a lot of territory. The Russian position has not budged.

Recently Russian officials have said there's been no change in the Russian position since 2024. And part of the problem is Mr. Trump's failure to use his leverage to push the Russians to negotiate. And this is why the decision to start buying diesel fuel from Russia is so bad. We're now basically sending American dollars that are going to feed part of that Russian military machine by releasing some of the financial pressure on Russia that might force them otherwise to adopt a different course.

And what I worry about that is: of course it's bad implications for Russia-Ukraine, but in other places where they look at this, not only in Moscow, but in Beijing, other capitals where they see us as the adversary, they're looking at this as not a sign of American strength. They're seeing it as a sign of American weakness and they're looking at saying, “Gee, look how well people like Putin can play Trump.” That's not good for our foreign policy.

Kahl: So twice this year already, President Trump has met with Xi Jinping. Once in China, once here in the United States, they're likely to meet again at some point this year. Despite all the competition and rhetoric, there does appear to be an effort between the two leaders to have a detente or a pause, a timeout on some of the rougher edges of the relationship. If you had five minutes with the president on China issues or Taiwan issues or China Taiwan issues, what would your recommendations be?

Mastro: This is one area where I think we oversimplify. We think that China's policies are because of Xi Jinping. And that if we had a different leader in China, everything would just be rosy again. But Xi Jinping is a product of the system. So for me, it's not the case that if Xi Jinping left, the next leader would be like, you know what? I think it's better for China to just do everything the United States demands of it and be number two in the world.

I would tell the president that U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China. But that power is actually bestowed upon either country by the rest of the world. Whether or not the United States is a great power, whether or not China is a great power, largely depends on how the rest of the world sees these two countries and sees the benefit, or the costs, of one of them having more power than the other.

Now, the United States as a global superpower, this is largely beneficial for many countries in the system. But first, we have to be honest that it's not the best system for everybody. To Didi's point, there's a lot of autocracies out there that would prefer that it wasn't the United States that is in charge.

But secondly, there's a whole part of the world—the majority of the world, the developing world—that the United States has ignored for decades and decades and decades. And that Trump has gone even a step farther by reducing what I would say the little amount of development aid, soft power that we had in this part of the world.

Now, I can tell you one thing for sure: this is a number one priority in China. Xi Jinping wants to be the leader of the developing world. So, are the Chinese wrong or are the Americans wrong to basically decide the value? But I can say in terms of a business sense, this is the area where you're gonna have the most returns.

Now, from my own biases, I am—not here on this stage—but still in the military. I've been in the military for seventeen years. I believe in the effectiveness of the use of force at international politics. Otherwise, I wouldn't dedicate so much of my life to serving uniform.

But that being said, diplomacy, soft power, developmental assistance, all these other things that the United States used to do more of . . . having a U.S. information service . . . these make a huge difference.

And so I would tell him to invest so much more in the other tools of power. China lists twelve types of tools of power, which military power is only one of them. And they're just as serious about the other ones.

And as much as the allies and partners periodically can be annoying about stuff, they are the source of U.S. power. In many respects, the U.S. military cannot project power without them. And so this isn't a favor that the rest of the world is doing for us that over a hundred countries allow U.S. access, bases, and overflight. This is something that the United States needs to maintain its position and to protect its interests abroad.

So don't only meet with Xi Jinping and shake hands and roll out the red carpet and say, “Okay, since I met with him and we have now a comfortably tense relationship, everything is going well.”

Take a look at the rest of the world and figure out how to maintain what has historically been U.S. dominance of the international system, a U.S. led liberal order. How do we go back to being sure that that is something that my kids are going to enjoy afterwards?

Kahl: I want to ask our last lightning questions. Everybody in this room is super committed to Stanford in all sorts of ways. What do you think Stanford could be doing more of, maybe could be doing better to help the world understand or address these issues? Abbas?

Milani: I think we are in one of the most remarkable moments in history. We are in the process of not just gradual incremental change or historic change. We're in the process of what can only be called epochal change. The changes we are about to witness and are witnessing are only, in my view, comparable to Renaissance, where everything about everything changed. We are in the process of experiencing that.

In that first phase of modernity, America, I think, is the most successful example of a democratic secular society. Going into this new phase, that model needs to be saved. American democracy needs to be saved. American democracy can only be saved if it has a more global view, a more inclusive view, and a more tolerant view. We need to begin this at Stanford. We need to teach the culture of tolerance in classes.

It is increasingly difficult to discuss difficult topics in class. I'm not talking about bioengineering. You can get away with anything in bioengineering. But try to have that level of discussion about the Arab Israeli problem, the Iranian problem, American democracy problem, race problem, gender problem. You get into serious difficulties. We need to defend that. Democracy requires defending.

I come from a place that went from an authoritarian regime to a pseudo-totalitarian regime. I came from Iran in 1986, a country that was literally at war with the United States. And twenty-two years, ago I became head of the Iranian studies program at Stanford. That would not be possible anywhere else in the world. I know the value of democracy, and I don't think at Stanford we're doing enough to defend this most valuable cherished gift that we have.

We need to cultivate, strengthen that culture.

Kahl: Didi.

Kuo: Every morning when you wake up and read the news, it can be a bummer. And I will say coming to work makes me feel better. And that's because FSI is a really special place where the approach to these topics is scholarly.

Therefore, we understand, you know, this is a kind of unique historical time, but it's one that we can really try to understand with an interdisciplinary lens and an understanding that our goal is to take academic knowledge and get it out into the world: use it to try to improve outcomes, provide policy recommendations, engage with the media or with thought leaders and people who can actually shape the public understanding of these issues.

And that is something I see creating a lot of purpose among my colleagues and creating special places outside of academic disciplines for those of us who care about engaging with the world to really unite academic knowledge with public understanding.

But the second thing is also focused on students. In California, we are super far from Washington, D.C. So if you go to Georgetown, for example, you have a lot of students who know what government is, they're going to get an internship. Over here, sometimes all the students know is Silicon Valley's over there. They're going to solve the world's problems through the private sector. I don't know, man. We have governments for a reason. AI, climate change, all of these issues are going to need to be tackled through regulation, not just through the moral binds or whatever that the president thinks that we can regulate AI with.

So I think that any way of encouraging public service and engagement with government—whether that's local, national, or international, going to other countries—is super important. And once students get a taste and a flavor of that public service, they get really into it. It's just that it's far for us, geographically, to engage. And I therefore think it's really important to encourage those kinds of opportunities.

Kahl: Amen. Steve?

Pifer: Yeah, well let me start with I some things I think that Stanford does and FSI do well. I think we do a good job on Russia-Ukraine of explaining to students what's going on, why it matters. And it's not just Stanford speakers, but we bring a lot of people in.

So on Wednesday, we had an American and a Ukrainian who are based in Kyiv. They came to talk for an hour and a half on Ukraine's innovative defense culture, where under the pressure of war they're just doing incredible changes in terms of how fast they react to things and get new weapons into the field.

There's a lot of . . . I won't list everybody, but a lot [of us] write, speak, do media on this to try to educate the broader public. We have a law school professor who organized a group of his students to track down and identify American law firms that are helping Russian oligarchs hide their wealth in the United States. And that was part of a broader effort that Stanford was running with the International Working Group on Sanctions, where we did about twenty-six papers advising on how sanctions on Russians could be tightened. So I think there's a lot of things that are being done that are good.

The more difficult challenge I think we have is how do we talk to the U.S. government? When people like Colin were in during the Biden administration, I think we had a lot of access. The administration didn't agree with everything we asked them to do, but there was a dialogue there.

I'm not sure anybody FSI has on the Russia Ukraine thing any kind of contact with people who matter in the Trump administration. So it's difficult to have the kind of conversation where you might suggest here are some ways to move forward. But I think that's going to be one of the real challenges is how can we affect government policy directly?

Kahl: And I think this is a really important point because I think this can be interpreted as basically saying, well, okay, when Democrats are in, people can have access. But it's not actually about partisan politics. It's about this particular administration's approach to outside expertise and which voices they tend to listen to. One can agree with it or disagree with it. It's it just is a thing, which is traditionally places like universities and think tanks and other sources of analysis outside of government are just not prioritized in this

Pifer: After I left the government in 2004, we had lots of access as outsiders to the Bush administration. They welcomed that dialogue. I don't think this administration does.

Kahl: Oriana.

Mastro: That's a perfect segue to what I wanted to say about policy impact about how do we talk to the U.S. government? It's not only the U.S. government. As someone who works on China, the amount of which professors and students are engaging with China is less and less over time because all of these things have become politically difficult.

And to me, Stanford is an environment in which you should be able to take those risks. This is a place where you can have dialogues with the Chinese. This is a place where policy, political officials should feel like they can come and talk and engage with these issues.

And so to try to have that kind of interconnectivity in May, I launched this policy lab on the Indo-Pacific. I call it “policy-guided.” What that means is instead of sort of doing all this research and then writing an op-ed and hoping someone reads it and then maybe it has some impact, I identify the decision makers that have influence on that research area early on in the process, and I engage with them throughout the whole process so that they have a stake in making sure that they're getting the information they need when they need it.

And part of that is educating students not only on the substance on Indo-Pacific, but also skill sets. So part of that is we just launched something called the Commander Series, where I bring combatant commanders—so these are four-star generals who are in charge of every region of the world—to campus every quarter. They give a big public talk, which again, given the political environment, given everything, did come with some convincing. We now have three lined up for this year. But it's possible. It's possible to continue to engage. And then in addition to the public talks, ask them to do private master classes with the students.

Like having that exposure to students to do kind of the real world work and to have that direct policy impact, is it harder? Yes. Is it still possible at a place like Stanford? Absolutely.

Kahl: I want to really foot stomp something because at the intersection of what Oriana and Steve just said: yes, there's a degree to which we're not as plugged into Washington as maybe in previous administrations. But the flip side of that is, actually, Stanford is a safer space for conversations among those parts of Washington that want to have conversations outside of Washington because we are further away.

We are seen as less ideological. We're not seen as particularly partisan. We're seen as a font of technical knowledge because Silicon Valley plays its own role in the current ecosystem for better or worse. So that's also an opportunity, not just a constraint.

Endy: I love this question. We heard that we're in a moment of epochal change not seen since the Renaissance. That's stunning. I'm going to carry that for a long time.

I wonder what Mr. and Mrs. Stanford think of us. If they appeared today and saw what we are now, how would they react? One of the things I go back and read is the purpose they wrote in the charter of the university. And there's a sentence, this really interesting sentence. It says: “to have an influence in behalf of humanity.”

And the first time I read it, I thought it was a typo. I thought it was supposed to be “on” behalf of humanity. But it says “in behalf of,” which really means out there doing stuff. And I think we could do a lot better in that regard.

I think we're pretty good at being Stanford. I think we could do a lot better in behalf of humanity. And FSI and CISAC is very much about that. But what does that look like? And and so I'll check some things out that may seem adjacent, but I think they're important. Number one.

I used to be chair of undergraduate admissions and financial aid for the university. We're not need-blind for international applicants. We are for domestic, but not for international. We could do it, but we always manage to not do it. This would be a good year to do it.

The second thing I think we need to do is we need to bring Stanford out into the United States. I used to teach a version of Introduction to Bioengineering to five hundred high school students in Title I high schools. And they were registered as Stanford students as high school students in low income high schools throughout the country.

I think we could have a service requirement for undergraduates where they're teaching fellows in high schools as upperclassmen helping with this. We could have five thousand extra students a year as high school students. So I think there's some macro moves the university could make that would amplify what FSI and other places are doing, and we need to get on with it.

Kahl: This is such a great place to end because the panel today was global threats and essentially what we can do about them. And I think what you heard, and frankly, where I think FSI is unique, not only at Stanford, but in the world in many respects, is that so many of the things that we read about or that we watch on YouTube are at the cross currents of these huge geopolitical changes, these world changing technological developments, and contentious domestic politics in the future of democracy here and around the world. Like these are the things that all of us care about.

Just as people as Americans, we are deeply invested at FSI. And I think what you've heard is like we can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. 

These are choices. These are not inevitabilities. These are choices. And I think at FSI, we believe we can help empower the right choices, especially by empowering our students. The thing that keeps me most optimistic when we have conversations like this — I think everybody up here would agree — is how awesome our students are, and how much more incredible they are at, you know, as twenty-year-olds than we were as twenty year olds.

And what I often say is smart and incredible as all these people on stage and all the other people you encounter, all the people in this room are, we're not going to solve the world's problems.

The best we can do is keep the problems solvable and empower our students to solve our problems. And the good news is our students are completely capable of doing that.

So thank you very much, and thanks again to our panelists.

[END EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

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At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming, a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute discussed challenges to democracy, the potential and dangers of biotechnology, the Russia-Ukraine and U.S.-Iran conflicts, and the U.S.-China relationship.

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At a moment marked by war, regional fragmentation, and mounting uncertainty across the Middle East, the Program on Arab Reform and Development (ARD) at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law hosted a wide-ranging conversation between historian and Middle East scholar Joel Beinin and Hesham Sallam, CDDRL Senior Research Scholar and ARD Associate Director.

The discussion explored how the region’s current crises fit within longer historical trajectories, and what they may signal for the future of political order, state power, and social movements in the Arab world.

Throughout the conversation, Beinin situated contemporary wars and political ruptures within broader histories of authoritarianism, imperial intervention, and the erosion of regional political cohesion. The discussion ranged from the legacies of the post-9/11 era to the fragmentation of the Arab regional order, the failures of democratization, and the global rise of the far right.

Here are five major takeaways from the discussion:

1. The current moment is not simply another regional crisis — it reflects the fragmentation of the Arab order itself.


One of the central themes of the discussion was that today’s regional turmoil differs fundamentally from earlier periods of instability. Beinin argued that while the Arab world has long experienced cycles of war, authoritarianism, and external intervention, the current period is distinctive because the very idea of a coherent “Arab world” has weakened dramatically.

As Beinin put it, “A quarter of a century ago, you could still talk about the Arab world with a certain sense of unity… and today, increasingly, it doesn’t.” He stressed that this fragmentation is not merely geopolitical but also political and ideological. Regional powers now pursue sharply divergent agendas, while many traditional centers of Arab political and cultural influence have declined.

Egypt occupied a central place in this analysis. Beinin argued that Egypt, historically viewed as a political and cultural anchor of the Arab world, can no longer plausibly play a regional leadership role. He described the Egyptian regime as deeply constrained by debt crises, Gulf dependency, and intensifying authoritarian rule. Meanwhile, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) increasingly shape regional politics, albeit without the broader political legitimacy or cultural influence once associated with Cairo.

The result, according to Beinin, is a region characterized less by shared political trajectories than by fragmentation, competing alignments, and increasingly localized struggles for survival and authority.

2. The legacies of the post-9/11 era continue to shape U.S. policy toward the Middle East.


Early in the conversation, Sallam read aloud a passage from President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, warning that the United States “will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Sallam then revealed that the quotation was not from President Donald Trump, but from Bush in the lead-up to the Iraq War.

The exchange set up one of the discussion’s recurring themes: the persistence of interventionist frameworks in American political discourse on the Middle East.

Beinin argued that much of contemporary U.S. rhetoric surrounding Iran reproduces assumptions and narratives that shaped the run-up to the Iraq War. “None of it was true when they said it about Iraq,” he remarked, “and none of it is true when they’re saying it about Iran.”

More broadly, he suggested that the post-9/11 political climate fundamentally reshaped how the United States discussed the region. Reflecting on the years after the September 11 attacks, Beinin described g a political atmosphere in which attempts to contextualize regional dynamics were frequently dismissed as apologetics for extremism.

The conversation repeatedly returned to the dangers of reducing regional politics to moral binaries or civilizational narratives. Instead, Beinin emphasized the importance of historically grounded analysis attentive to state interests, political economy, and international power relations.

3. The authoritarian restoration after the Arab uprisings has become deeper and more punitive.


Another major takeaway concerned the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 and the broader trajectory of authoritarianism in the region.

Beinin argued that states such as Egypt and Tunisia have emerged from the post-uprising period with harsher and more consolidated forms of authoritarian rule than existed prior to 2011. “Any kind of political, civil, even to some degree cultural resistance has been stamped out,” he said, citing the expansion of surveillance, imprisonment, and repression.

Yet the discussion also rejected the simplistic notion that the Arab uprisings were meaningless failures. Beinin pointed to later protest waves in Sudan and Algeria during 2019–2020 as evidence that activists and civil movements had absorbed important lessons from the earlier uprisings.

In Sudan in particular, he argued, protest movements understood that “the army is not on the side of the people,” reflecting a deeper awareness of how military institutions could derail revolutionary transitions. At the same time, Beinin stressed that regional interventions by Gulf powers played a major role in undermining these movements. He described how competing regional actors backed rival military factions, contributing to fragmentation and ultimately overwhelming civilian political forces.

The broader implication was that authoritarian resilience in the Arab world cannot be understood solely through domestic dynamics. Regional rivalries, external funding networks, and transnational counterrevolutionary alliances all play a central role in shaping political outcomes.

4. The Middle East’s crises are increasingly tied to a broader global rightward shift.


While much of the conversation focused specifically on the Arab world, Beinin consistently situated regional developments within broader international trends.

He argued that the current moment reflects not only regional disarray but also the rise of increasingly exclusionary and authoritarian political currents globally. Beinin pointed to “a hard lurch to the right” in multiple countries, including Israel, India, and parts of Europe.

This international dimension, he suggested, has profound implications for the Middle East. The rise of nationalist and authoritarian politics globally has helped normalize more extreme forms of militarism, ethnonationalism, and state violence. It has also weakened many of the international norms and institutions that once constrained state behavior, however imperfectly.

The discussion of Israel occupied a particularly important place here. Beinin linked Israel’s rightward shift to broader transformations in global politics. At several points, the conversation underscored how the wars in Gaza and Lebanon cannot be understood in isolation from these wider ideological and geopolitical currents.

Rather than treating the Middle East as uniquely unstable or exceptional, Beinin repeatedly encouraged the audience to see the region as deeply connected to broader crises of democracy, inequality, nationalism, and authoritarianism unfolding globally.

5. Historical perspective remains essential in moments of upheaval.


Perhaps the most important theme running through the conversation was methodological rather than purely political: the insistence on historical perspective in moments of crisis.

At the outset of the event, Sallam emphasized that the purpose of the discussion was “not to chase after the headlines,” but rather to “take the long view” and place contemporary developments “in conversation with scholarly research and debates.”

Throughout the conversation, Beinin repeatedly cautioned against analyses driven solely by immediate events, media cycles, or simplistic geopolitical narratives. Instead, he urged audiences to understand contemporary wars and political transformations as products of longer histories involving colonial legacies, state formation, authoritarian restructuring, social movements, and international intervention.

The discussion ultimately offered no easy optimism about the region’s future. Yet it also rejected fatalistic portrayals of the Arab world as uniquely doomed to instability. Instead, the conversation highlighted the importance of historical memory, critical scholarship, and political analysis capable of connecting contemporary crises to deeper structural processes.

A full recording of the conversation can be viewed below:

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Six Takeaways on the War and the Arab World

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Hesham Sallam speaks at a podium with panelists Samia Errazzouki and Joel Beinin
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The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026, at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which conveys about 20% of the world's oil and gas, has mostly come to a halt after the joint U.S.-Israeli war with Iran that began on February 28. | Getty Images
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In a discussion convened by the Program on Arab Reform and Development, Stanford scholars situate regional upheaval within longer trajectories of imperial intervention, authoritarian rule, and global political shifts.

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How War is Reshaping the Arab World
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In Brief
  • Stanford scholars Joel Beinin and Hesham Sallam examined the state of conflict and fragmentation in the Arab world, arguing that the current moment differs fundamentally from past instability in the region.
  • Beinin connected current U.S. rhetoric on Iran to post-9/11 interventionism while analyzing deepening authoritarianism following the Arab uprisings.
  • The discussion situated the Middle East upheaval within global rightward shifts, emphasizing historical perspective over headline-driven analysis of regional crises.
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US President Donald Trump’s Iran strategy rests on the premise that economic and military force will eventually compel the regime to back down. But such approaches tend to backfire in societies where preservation of honor and reputation dictates defiance.

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Michele Gelfand
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As the U.S.-Israel war with Iran escalates, Arab governments find themselves navigating one of the most difficult and delicate security challenges in decades. At a recent panel hosted by the Program on Arab Reform and Development at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), scholars examined how Arab states are responding to the conflict and what it reveals about the evolving regional order.

The panel brought together Sean Yom, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University and Senior Fellow at Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN), Lisa Blaydes, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and Hesham Sallam, Senior Research Scholar and Associate Director for Research at CDDRL and Associate Director of its Program on Arab Reform and Development, who reflected on the geopolitical, economic, and institutional consequences of the war. Their discussion converged on six key takeaways about how the conflict is reshaping the political landscape of the Arab world.

1. The War Reflects a Long Pattern of U.S. Intervention in the Region


From the perspective of many governments in the Arab world, the confrontation with Iran fits into a long-standing pattern of American military intervention in the region.

“This is the fifth decade in a row,” Yom observed, “where the United States at some point has tried to overthrow some sovereign government in the Middle East and North Africa.”

From Libya in the 1980s to Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s and Libya again in the 2010s, the region has repeatedly been drawn into cycles of U.S. military involvement.

The persistence of great-power intervention means that Arab states must constantly navigate the risks of aligning with global power politics.

This is the fifth decade in a row where the United States at some point has tried to overthrow some sovereign government in the Middle East and North Africa.
Sean Yom
Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University and Senior Fellow at Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN)

2. U.S. Security Partnerships Can Make Arab States Targets


Yom highlighted a paradox shaping the strategic environment of Arab states: the closer their security ties with the United States, the more vulnerable they may become in a regional confrontation.

“For the most part,” Yom explained, “the intensity of Iranian counterstrikes and retaliation on Arab states covaries with the degree of their relationship with the United States.”

States hosting American military bases or deeply integrated into U.S. security strategy are more likely to find themselves on the frontlines of Iranian retaliation.

“The more of a client state they are, the more troops they host, the deeper their foreign policies are tied to the demands of American grand strategy — then the more likely they are going to be struck.”

This dynamic creates a fundamental strategic dilemma.

For decades, small and medium-sized states in the region have relied on alliances with Washington to enhance their security. The current conflict illustrates how those same alliances can also increase their exposure to regional escalation.

3. Arab Governments Are Trying to Avoid Being Seen as Participants in the War


Arab governments today face a difficult balancing act: responding to Iranian attacks while avoiding the perception that they are fighting alongside the United States and Israel. Many Arab governments must navigate public opinion that is deeply skeptical of Israel and wary of Western military intervention in the region.

As Sallam put it, these governments are trying to avoid creating “the impression that they are fighting alongside the United States and Israel in this war.”

The result is a diplomatic tightrope: condemning attacks on their territory without being drawn into the broader conflict.

Suddenly, when you have a conflict that disrupts the flow of investments, tourism, and even trading routes in places like the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea, this shakes the foundations of these projects.
Hesham Sallam
Senior Research Scholar and Associate Director for Research at CDDRL, Associate Director of the Program on Arab Reform and Development

4. A Regional War Threatens the Gulf’s Economic Transformation Projects


A fourth major takeaway concerns the economic stakes of regional stability.

Blaydes emphasized that wars can have far-reaching political economy consequences. Major conflicts reshape investment patterns, redirect state resources toward security priorities, and increase global perceptions of risk.

When governments must divert resources toward defense spending and crisis management, economic diversification plans can quickly lose momentum.

For Gulf regimes that have tied their political projects to visions of economic modernization, prolonged regional instability therefore represents a serious political challenge.

“Suddenly, when you have a conflict that disrupts the flow of investments, tourism, and even trading routes in places like the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea,” Sallam observed, “this shakes the foundations of these projects.”

5. The War Is Occurring Amid Deep Divisions Among Regional Powers


The discussion highlighted that the war with Iran is unfolding against the backdrop of a significant regional rift.

According to Sallam, one emerging divide involves different visions for managing instability in fragile states. Some regional actors — including the UAE and Israel — have tacitly or directly promoted fragmentation of political authority in places like Sudan, Yemen, and Gaza.

Others, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, have tended to favor more traditional models of centralized authoritarian stability.

These competing strategic preferences have already clashed in multiple regional conflicts, most recently in Sudan and Yemen.

Thus, Iran’s potential neutralization as a regional power player as a result of the war, Sallam noted, will not necessarily result in regional stability. It will simply intensify these rivalries among the remaining powers.

The constant violence is not productive for the promotion of democracy, development, or the rule of law. Having a constant stream of weapons, conflict, violence, post-conflict reconciliation, [and] regional rivalries…undermines all three.
Lisa Blaydes
Senior Fellow at FSI and Professor of Political Science

6. War Strengthens Authoritarian Politics and Weakens the Prospect for Reform and Development


The panel highlighted the negative ramifications of regional conflict for reform and development.

“The constant violence is not productive for the promotion of democracy, development, or the rule of law,” Blaydes noted. “Having a constant stream of weapons, conflict, violence, post-conflict reconciliation, [and] regional rivalries…undermines all three.”

“Anytime a regional conflict breaks out,” Yom argued, “it’s always bad for democratic struggle on the home front.”

The war, according to Sallam, could result in outcomes that would be “catastrophic not only for the people and society of Iran, but also the people and societies of the region at large.”

A full recording of the March 3 panel can be viewed below:

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Scholars convened by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Program on Arab Reform and Development identify six ways the conflict is testing the limits of Arab states' alliances, economic ambitions, and prospects for reform.

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War and the Arab World: Regional Responses and Consequences

What does the U.S.–Israel war with Iran mean for the Arab world? How are Arab states responding, and what political, economic, and humanitarian consequences might emerge from a prolonged conflict?

The Program on Arab Reform and Development convenes a panel of scholars — Sean Yom, Lisa Blaydes, and Hesham Sallam — to examine the regional implications of the war, situating current developments within broader historical and geopolitical transformations shaping the region today.

SPEAKERS

Sean Yom

Sean Yom

Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University and Senior Fellow at Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN)

Sean Yom is Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University and Senior Fellow at Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN). His research explores the dynamics of authoritarian institutions, economic development, and US foreign policy in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf. His most recent books include Jordan: Politics in an Accidental Crucible (Oxford University Press, 2025) and The Political Science of the Middle East: Theory and Research since the Arab Uprisings (co-edited with Marc Lynch and Jillian Schwedler; Oxford University Press, 2022).; Oxford University Press, 2022). He sits on the editorial board of the International Journal of Middle East Studies and the editorial committee of Middle East Report. He is also a former Stanford CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow (2009-10). AB, Brown University (2003); PhD, Harvard University (2009).

Lisa Blaydes

Lisa Blaydes

Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
Lisa's full bio

Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018) and Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

Portrait of Hesham Sallam

Hesham Sallam

Senior Research Scholar and Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Associate Director of the Program on Arab Reform and Development
Hesham's full bio

Hesham Sallam is a Senior Research Scholar at CDDRL, where he serves as Associate Director for Research. He is also Associate Director of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. Sallam is co-editor of Jadaliyya ezine and a former program specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace. His research focuses on political and social development in the Arab World. Sallam’s research has previously received the support of the Social Science Research Council and the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is author of Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt (Columbia University Press, 2022), co-editor of Struggles for Political Change in the Arab World (University of Michigan Press, 2022), and editor of Egypt's Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012: A Critical Guide to a Changing Political Arena (Tadween Publishing, 2013). Sallam received a Ph.D. in Government (2015) and an M.A. in Arab Studies (2006) from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh (2003).

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Sean Yom finished his Ph.D. at the Department of Government at Harvard University in June 2009, with a dissertation entitled "Iron Fists in Silk Gloves: Building Political Regimes in the Middle East." His primary research explores the origins and durability of authoritarian regimes in this region. His work contends that initial social conflicts driven by strategic Western interventions shaped the social coalitions constructed by autocratic incumbents to consolidate power in the mid-twentieth century--early choices that ultimately shaped the institutional carapaces and political fates of these governments. While at CDDRL, he will revise the dissertation in preparation for book publication, with a focus on expanding the theory to cover other post-colonial regions and states. His other research interests encompass contemporary political reforms in the Arab world, the historical architecture of Persian Gulf security, and US democracy promotion in the Middle East. Recent publications include articles in the Journal of Democracy, Middle East Report, Arab Studies Quarterly, and Arab Studies Journal.

Sean Yom

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Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018) and Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

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Hesham Sallam is a Senior Research Scholar at CDDRL, where he serves as Associate Director for Research. He is also Associate Director of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. Sallam is co-editor of Jadaliyya ezine and a former program specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace. His research focuses on political and social development in the Arab World. Sallam’s research has previously received the support of the Social Science Research Council and the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is author of Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt (Columbia University Press, 2022), co-editor of Struggles for Political Change in the Arab World (University of Michigan Press, 2022), and editor of Egypt's Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012: A Critical Guide to a Changing Political Arena (Tadween Publishing, 2013). Sallam received a Ph.D. in Government (2015) and an M.A. in Arab Studies (2006) from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh (2003).

 

Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Associate Director, Program on Arab Reform and Development
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The January 28, 2026, Israel Insights Webinar hosted by the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program and moderated by Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies Or Rabinowitz featured security experts Sima Shine and Raz Zimmt. Analyzing the growing likelihood of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, they said that despite Iran’s proxy strategy's failure to prevent escalation and rising domestic pressure, Tehran remains committed to rebuilding Hezbollah and other allied groups. Shine and Zimmt said that a future war—likely more expansive than previous exchanges—could involve strikes on leadership, economic, and symbolic targets. They discussed Israel’s desire for U.S. leadership in any major military action against Iran and Gulf states’ strong opposition to war and instability and preference for a negotiated U.S.–Iran agreement. Skeptical that external military action will yield rapid democratic change in Iran, they argued a more viable transformation likely requires gradual emergence within the regime.

A full recording of the webinar can be viewed above.

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In a conversation with Or Rabinowitz, Sima Shine, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), and Rax Zimmt, Director of the Iran and the Shiite Axis research program at INSS, discussed escalation, regional actors, and regime change.

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In July 2015, General Qasem Soleimani, former commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, secretly traveled to Moscow to discuss an emergency plan to rescue the Assad regime in Syria, which had lost control of roughly 80 percent of Syrian territory in four years of civil war. Russia had just helped broker the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Soleimani’s trip, disclosed three months later, took place in defiance of UN travel sanctions tied to Iran’s nuclear program and threatened to undermine it. Yet the meeting would initiate a decadelong evolution of the Iranian-Russian relationship, from tactical cooperation in Syria to close partnership today, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in January 2025.

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This book is premised on the understanding that women’s inclusion in constitutional politics is critical for our equality. In the present political context, particularly Muslim contexts, it is imperative to promote women’s equality both in law and in practice, so that women can move closer towards equality. Utilising a feminist constitutionalist approach, this book highlights the impact of women’s historical underrepresentation in constitutional drafting processes and discussions across the globe, as well as recent feminist interventions to address legislative processes that consider women’s needs and interests. It reflects on the role of Islam in politics and governance, and the varied ways in which Muslim-majority countries, as well as Muslim-minority countries, have sought to define women’s citizenship rights, personal freedoms, and human rights from within or outside of a religious framework. Recognising the importance of Constitutions for the recognition, enforcement and protection of women’s rights, this book explores how women seek justice, equality, and political inclusion in their diverse Muslim contexts.

The book advocates for more inclusive constitutional drafting processes that also consider diverse cultural contexts, political history, and legal and institutional developments from a gendered lens. Tracing the ways in which women are empowered and exercise agency, insist on inclusion and representation in politics and seek to enshrine their rights, the contributing authors present case studies of Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Iran, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. Positioned at the crossroads of secular and religious legal forces, the book situates women’s rights at the centre of debates surrounding constitutional rights guarantees, gender equality, and religious rules and norms. The contributors offer a range of disciplinary approaches and perspectives that illustrate the richness and complexity of this field. The dominant emergent themes that each contributor tackles in considering how women’s rights impact, and are, in turn, impacted by Constitutions, are those of critical junctures such as revolutions or regime change which provide the impetus and opportunity for women’s rights advocates to push for greater equality; the tension between religion and women’s rights, where women’s legal disadvantage is justified in the name of religion, and finally, the recognition of the important role women’s movements play in advocating and organizing for equality. While much has been written about the constitutional processes of the past decade across the Muslim world as a result of pro-democratic uprisings, revolutions, and even regime change, most of such analyses lack a gendered lens, disregard women’s perspectives and fail adequately to acknowledge the significant role of women in constitutional moments. Even less has been written about the importance of constitutionalizing women’s equality rights in Muslim contexts. This edited volume is an effort to fill this gap in the literature. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars, students and activists in the areas of Muslim constitutionalism, feminist constitutionalism, Muslim law and society, gender studies, anthropology, and political science, religious studies and area studies.

EDITORS:

Dr. Vrinda Narain is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, McGill University, Canada, and Research Fellow, Research Directorate, University of the Free State, South Africa. Professor Narain’s research and teaching focus on constitutional law, social diversity and feminist legal theory. She is the author of two books: Reclaiming the Nation: Muslim Women and the Law in India (University of Toronto Press, 2008) and Gender and Community: Muslim Women's Rights in India (University of Toronto Press, 2001). She was Associate Dean, Academic, at the Faculty of Law from 2016 to 2019. She is a Board Member of the transnational research and solidarity network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), Member of the National Steering Committee of the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), Canada, and the President of the South Asian Women’s Community Centre (SAWCC) in Montreal.

Mona Tajali is a scholar of gender and politics in Muslim countries, with a focus on Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. She is the author of Women’s Political Representation in Iran and Turkey: Demanding a Seat at the Table (EUP 2022), and co-author of Electoral Politics: Making Quotas Work for Women (WLUML 2011) with Homa Hoodfar. She serves as executive board member of the transnational feminist solidarity network Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), and is currently the director of research of WLUML’s multi-sited Women and Politics project and its Transformative Feminist Leadership Institute. She is an associate professor of International Relations and Women’s Studies at Agnes Scott College, where she helped found the Middle East Studies Program and directed the Human Rights Program. She is currently researching institutionalization of women’s rights in Iran and Afghanistan at Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law (CDDRL) as a visiting scholar.

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