Russia's invasion of Georgia last month seriously undermined peace and security in Europe for the first time in years. Russia's military actions and subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states also represent a fundamental challenge to the norms and rules that help to promote order in the international system.

The initial skirmishes between Ossetian and Georgian forces that first sparked this conflict in early August 2008 should have been contained. Had the international community – led by an attentive and proactive American government – engaged both the Russian and Georgian governments in an effort to first stop the violence immediately, and then more ambitiously, to mediate a permanent solution to Georgia’s border disputes, this war might have been avoided. It still remains unclear what sequence of events turned skirmishes into war -- an international investigation should be conducted to shed light on this question. Irrespective of who moved first to escalate, the Georgian government’s decision to use military force to reassert its sovereignty over South Ossetia, which included sending its forces into the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was short-sighted and ill-considered. Nonetheless, Georgian military action within its borders can in no way be equated with or cited as an excuse for Russia’s invasion and then dismemberment of a sovereign country. Russia’s actions were disproportionate and illegal. The tragic loss of life – soldiers and civilians alike – on all sides was regrettable, unnecessary and avoidable.

Because Georgia is a democracy, Georgian voters will someday judge the decisions of their government last month. But let’s not confuse that discussion with a clear-headed understanding of Russian motivations. Russia’s military actions last month and continued illegal occupation of Georgian territory today were not a mere defensive reaction to Georgian military actions in South Ossetia. On the contrary, the Kremlin’s moves represent the latest and boldest moves in a long-term strategy to undermine Georgian sovereignty, cripple the Georgian economy, and ultimately overthrow the democratically-elected government of Georgia. Moreover, Russia’s government actions in Georgia constitute just one front of a comprehensive campaign to reassert Russian dominance in the region through both coercive and cooperative instruments.

This paper analyzes international influences on the transition to democracy in November 1983.

It is our contention that the Turkish military intervention did not face significant opposition from the United States and the European states and institutions. We support this argument with in-depth interviews of American, European, and Turkish officials, with available memoirs and books written by state officials and Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren, with foreign newspaper articles published on Turkey between 1980 and 1983, and with official government documents from the US and Europe. These resources show that there were no substantial international sanctions against the Turkish military regime, even though the European Community and some European countries suspended aid to Turkey. Yet, we argue that international actors still played important roles in the democratic transition despite the lack of sanctions against the Turkish military.

During the aftermath of the coup, the US continued to grant aid to the military while the Europeans cautiously expressed concern for the suspension of democracy. The international community did not attempt to empower domestic opposition forces that could have challenged military rule. Thus, it seemed that international actors supported authoritarianism, rather than democracy in Turkey.  However, continuing assistance to the Turkish Armed Forces produced a counterintuitive result, as the American and European actors actually anticipated. The Turkish military was successful in restoring order and repressing opposition forces. This, in turn, gave the military generals confidence that they achieved their initial goals when they first planned the intervention, and therefore, they can lead a transition to democracy. The military’s own persuasion that it should return to its barracks and the fact that the international community believed they would do so were critical factors in determining the continuing support from external actors.

U.S. foreign assistance—the rationale behind it, the amount we give, its orientation and organization—has changed dramatically in the last decade. These changes have challenged its efficacy but have also created new opportunities to modernize U.S. foreign assistance. The importance of supporting development and reducing poverty abroad are understood now as never before to be both moral imperatives and prerequisites for sustained U.S. national security.

Since its origins after World War II, U.S. foreign assistance has served our national interests in three fundamental ways: enhancing national security, expanding global economic opportunities, and promoting American values. These interests are mutually reinforcing, and when the U.S. pursues them each strategically and in tandem it positions itself as a pragmatic and principled world leader.

The international and domestic challenges of the 21st century— including transnational threats such as economic instability, terrorism, climate change, and disease—cannot be met with a foreign assistance apparatus created to confront the challenges of the 20th century. America’s reputation abroad cannot be restored without a fresh, smart approach to U.S. foreign policy and engagement in the world. Our defense and diplomatic tools must be strengthened and modernized, and they must be complemented by equally robust tools for development. U.S. global leadership is based not only on our military clout or economic power, but on our moral stature, which derives from helping others improve their lives and those of their communities and societies.