Legalized Protection Payments, Taxation, and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ottoman Gaza (ca. 1519-1582).
Legalized Protection Payments, Taxation, and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ottoman Gaza (ca. 1519-1582).
Tuesday, November 18, 200812:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Haggay is interested in Middle Eastern historical and contemporary economies, as well as in labor and family economics. This year he is a post-doctoral fellow at Stanford's CDDRL, and he also teaches a course on Middle Eastern economic history at the Stanford's economics department.
During this year Haggay will examine the causes and implications of a major socio-economic transformation, which took place in the Gaza Strip during the second half of the twentieth century: The refugees who initially were less educated than the urbanites became by the 1980s better educated. Haggay suggests that the institution of the Palestinian family and ironically the refugees lack of access to credit market played a key role in the rise of the refugees to educational primacy. One plausible result of this transformation is the growth of the Hamas, whose Gazan leadership includes many highly educated men of refugee origin.
Last year, Haggay finished his Ph.D. in the economics department at the Hebrew University. His dissertation used the case of Ottoman Gaza for examining how the proximity of a semi-arid eco-system a common characteriistic of wide regions of the Middle East affected the demographic,, economic, and political development of an early modern Middle Eastern economy. His job market paper, analyzes a unique micro-dataset on protection payments, which villages made to armed nomadic tribes, for evaluating the interaction of this widespread but usually hidden institution with taxation, economic growth, and military technology. It demonstrates that strong predatory state could enhance economic development in an economy with multiple predators.