Stanford University

Conflict

A Research Agenda for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security

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Stephen Stedman joined CISAC in 1997 as a senior research scholar, and was named a senior fellow at FSI and CISAC and professor of political science (by courtesy) in 2002. He served as the center's acting co-director in 2002-03. Stedman is the former director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies and is a director of 'Managing Global Insecurity,' a joint project with Stanford, New York University and the Brookings Institution. 

Stedman's research addresses the future of international organizations and institutions, an area of study inspired by his work at the United Nations. In 2003, he was recruited to serve as the research director of the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The panel was created by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to analyze global security threats and propose far-reaching reforms to the international system. Upon completion of the panel's report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Annan asked Stedman to remain at the U.N. as an assistant secretary-general to help gain worldwide support in implementing the panel's recommendations. Following the U.N. world leaders' summit in September 2005, during which more than 175 heads of state agreed upon a global security agenda developed from the panel's work, Stedman returned to CISAC.

Before coming to Stanford, Stedman was an associate professor of African studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. In 1993, he was a Fulbright Senior Research Scholar at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa, where he studied the negotiations for a new constitution. He was an election observer in Angola in 1992 and in South Africa in 1994. He has served as a consultant to the United Nations on issues of peacekeeping in civil war, light weapons proliferation and conflict in Africa, and preventive diplomacy.

Stedman has taught courses on international conflict management, war in the 20th century, and the Rwandan genocide. In 2000, Scott Sagan and he founded the CISAC Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies. From 1997 to 2003, Stedman and his wife, Corinne Thomas, were the resident fellows in Larkin House, the second largest all-frosh residence. Stedman received his PhD in political science from Stanford in 1988.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Stephen J. Stedman

CDDRL
Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2705 (650) 724-2996
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
Stedman_Steve.jpg PhD

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Stephen J. Stedman Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) and Senior Fellow at CISAC and FSI Speaker
Seminars

The Role of Political Strategy in Lebanon's Political Crisis

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Lina Khatib is the manager and co-founder of the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. She is an expert on Middle East politics and media and has published widely on topics such as new media and Islamism, political media and conflict in the Arab world, and the political dynamics in Lebanon and Iran. She is also a Research Fellow at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School. She is currently writing a book titled Image Politics in the Middle East for IB Tauris, which examines the power struggles among states, political leaders, political parties, civil society groups, and citizens in the region. She has also recently led a research project on US public diplomacy towards the Arab world in the digital age. She is the author of two books, Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab World (2006), and Lebanese Cinema: Imagining the Civil War and Beyond (2008) and has published widely on Middle East politics. 

In this seminar, she will talk about how Lebanon reached the political crisis it is in right now, the political strategy that has led to it, and what this means for Lebanon's political future.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Lina Khatib Program Manager for the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy Speaker CDDRL
Seminars

Global Conflicts Documentary Series - The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo

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Thousands of women have suffered the unspoken casualties of the war that has been raging in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for more than a decade. Raped, tortured, defiled, these women suffer in silence and their silence is slowly destroying them and the whole nation. In this movie, these victims of rape decide to speak and unveil the atrocities they have endured at the hand of soldiers and in the name of war.


Co-Sponsors: CDDRL, FSI, Center on African Studies

Friedenrich Hall (Old Hillel)

Lectures

International Relations Theory and Cross-strait Relations

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In this special seminar event, Dr. Szu-yin Ho will examine the current Taiwan-China relations within the framework of international relations theory. He will elaborate how both sides of the Taiwan Strait perceive this relationship, what the implications for the building of new institutions are after President Ma Ying-jeou took office, and what kind of signals these new institutions have delivered. Dr. Ho will also give his concerns and predictions about the future relationship across the Taiwan Strait. In this special seminar, Professor Wei-chin Lee from Wake Forest University will comment on Dr. Ho's speech.

Szu-yin Ho is Professor of Political Science at the National Chengchi University. He received his BA degree (1978) in English Literature from National Taiwan University, MA (1983) and Ph.D. (1986) in Political Science from the University of California at Santa Barbara. After receiving doctoral degree, Professor Ho first joined the Academia Sinica, then moved to the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. He later served as the Deputy Director of the Institute from 1994 to 1999 and the Director from 1999-2003. From 2003 to 2008 he served as the Director of International Affairs of the KMT, Taiwan's current ruling party. After the presidential election in 2008, he moved to become the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council in the Presidential Office, overseeing the country's foreign affairs. After two years of service in government, Mr. Ho went back to academia. Professor Ho specializes on international relations, comparative political economy, sampling survey, and Chinese politics. He had published books and articles, in both Chinese and English, along these lines of research.

Wei-chin Lee received his Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Oregon. He is Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University in North Carolina. He has published several books, including the latest edited volume on Taiwan's Politics in the 21th Century (2010). His articles have appeared in various scholarly journals. His teaching and research interests include foreign policy and domestic politics of China and Taiwan, US policy toward East Asia, international security, and international institutions. He is currently serving as an advisor to the Taiwan Benevolent Association of America.

This is a special event cosponsored by CDDRL and Taiwan Benevolent Association of  America.

Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center

Szu-yin Ho Professor Speaker National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Larry Diamond

CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C147
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 724-6448 (650) 723-1928
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Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology
diamond_encina_hall.png MA, PhD

Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.

Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad.  A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).

During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.

Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World; Will China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

Former Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Faculty Chair, Jan Koum Israel Studies Program
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Larry Diamond Director Moderator CDDRL
Wei-chin Lee Professor Commentator Wake Forest University
Conferences

The Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire

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The catastrophe unfolding in the Ivory Coast is due to the fact that the committed backers of both candidates are unwilling to accept anything other than complete vindication and victory by their man.  A substantial portion of the ordinary population would just like a resolution of the issue and peace, but because this is all tied to questions of land ownership, government support to different regions, and competing elite claims tied into increasingly strong ethnic and regional identities, a substantial portion also feel that it would be a disaster if their man were not president.  It is pretty obvious that Mr. Ouattara won, and that Mr. Gbagbo has been devious, even dishonest, for a long time. But simply giving the presidency to Mr. Ouattara would hardly solve the country's problem.  There has to be power sharing with various regions getting a cut of government programs, and a good bit of local autonomy if any kind of peace is to be achieved. 

Even if Gbagbo goes, some of those around him have to have a share of power.  The same is true for those who back Ouattara.  I think that personally Ouattara is a better man, but many of those around him are no better than those around Gbagbo.  There are local warlords in various parts of the north, for example, who are just as frightening as the "young patriots" who do the killing for Gbagbo in Abidjan.  To understand the difficulties facing this country requires some background to explain what happened when civil war broke out in 2002, and a discussion of why just making either Mr. Gbagbo or Mr. Ouattara president is not an ideal solution. 

An electoral victory by Mr. Ouattara was bound to produce a backlash by those who will not accept a northern Muslim president and who are afraid to lose everything if Mr.  Gbagbo goes.  Standing on legalisms and claiming that either side is cl!  early right gets us nowhere.  None of the contending political forces in this country have clean hands, including Mr. Bedie, the former president who threw his support to Mr. Ouattara in the second round of the election after coming in third in the first round. 

In some ways, even though it takes very specific local knowledge to understand what is happening, the tragedy in this country resembles the situation in quite a few other African cases as well.  Decades of poor governance and corruption have exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, and too few of the leading politicians are willing to act for the greater good rather than for their own and their supporters' narrow interests.

Daniel Chirot, Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington, has authored books about social change, ethnic conflict, Eastern Europe, and tyranny.  His most recent works are the co-authored Why Not Kill Them All?  about political mass murder (Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, 2010), and a short text on ethnic conflicts, Contentious Identities (Routledge, 2011).   He has edited or co-edited books on Leninism's decline, on entrepreneurial ethnic minorities, on ethnopolitical warfare, and on the economic history of Eastern Europe.  He founded the journal East European Politics and Societies and has received help in his research and writing from the US State Department, the Guggenheim, Rockefeller, and Mellon Foundations.  He has done some work for, among others, the US Government, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Ford Foundation.  In 2003, 2004, and 2006 he did some consulting for CARE in Cote d'Ivoire.  He has also worked in Niger and elsewhere in West Africa.  In 2004/05 he was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace working on the study of African conflicts.  He has a BA from Harvard and a PhD in Sociology from Columbia.

Co-sponsored by The Center on African Studies

CISAC Conference Room

Daniel Chirot Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor of International Studies Speaker The University of Washington
Seminars

Larry Diamond on Tunisia's uncertain transition

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Larry Diamond
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The toppling of a brutal, corrupt, and long-ruling dictator, Zine el Abidine ben Ali, is an extraordinary achievement for the diverse elements of Tunisian society who came out into the streets in recent weeks to demand change. Ben Ali's startling fall is another reminder of how suddenly political change can come in authoritarian regimes that substitute force, fear, and fraud for legitimacy. Such regimes may appear stable for very long periods of time, but when the people lose their fear and the army refuses to fire on the people, they can unravel very quickly.

Unfortunately, the demise of a dictator does not guarantee the rise of a democracy in its place.  Historically, most authoritarian regimes have given way to a new (and often only slightly reconstituted) autocracy. This has been the principle pattern not only in the successor states to the Soviet Union, but in much of Africa since independence, and in numerous states in Asia and Latin America historically as well. In the Middle East, the odds against a successful democratic transition are particularly long, since there have hardly been any (outside Turkey and Israel) since the end of colonial rule. In Iran in 1979, a popular uprising against a long-serving dictator led not to democracy but rather to an even more odious and murderous form of oppression.

 If Tunisia is to defy the odds, it will need a significant period of time to reform the corrupt rules and institutions of the authoritarian regime and create an open, pluralistic society and party system that is capable of structuring democratic competition. Even if elections for a successor government are pushed out to six months, rather than sixty days, it is highly unlikely that this will provide sufficient time to create even a minimally fair and functional democratic playing field. 

Think of the many components of a democratic election, and Tunisia today is far from having them in place. After decades of fixed and phony elections, Tunisia needs a complete overhaul of its electoral machinery: a new and impartial electoral administration, a new electoral register, and perhaps as well a new electoral system. An energetic program of civic education should help Tunisians understand not only the mechanics of a democratic electoral process but also the underlying norms, rights, and responsibilities of democratic citizenship. This is a long process, but from Poland to Chile to South Africa, civil society organizations have shown that much can be accomplished to lay the foundations for popular democratic awareness and capacity if the models, materials, and resources are made available, and if there is a decent interval of time and political space to do the work. Doing this work-and enabling political parties and candidates to convey their messages-also requires a new and more pluralistic media environment. State control of the electronic and print media must be radically refashioned.  Privately owned media must be allowed to form and function, and critics of the old order must be allowed to enter the arena of ownership.

An effective democratic election requires not just freedom of opposition parties to organize, but time, resources, and training for them to form-or reform-and develop some ability to perform the essential functions of modern parties:  to establish what they stand for, to develop programmatic agendas, to elect leaders and recruit candidates, to forge ties with constituencies, and to survey public opinion and respond with appropriate messages. Trade unions, business chambers, and other civic groups need time as well to purge themselves of corrupting ties to the old order, or form anew, cultivate their natural constituencies, and build an authentic civil society.  Independent think tanks and public opinion surveys can also help to structure and enrich an emergent democratic process, but they as well need time and resources to function effectively.

Free and fair elections-especially in a context where they have never taken place before-also require extensive preparations for domestic monitoring and international observation, so that fraud can be detected and deterred, honest mistakes can be exposed and corrected, and public confidence can be generated in the new procedures.

Many of these tasks are ongoing after a successful transition to democracy, and setting too ambitious an agenda for reform could risk waiting indefinitely and squandering the opportunity for democratic change. But one of the most common reasons for failed transitions is a rush to early national elections and a failure to prepare the ground adequately for a fair and meaningful contest. Two common consequences of hurried elections are chaos or renewed autocracy, as some portions of the old order rally behind a new figure or old party and win by hook or crook. 

Unfortunately, there are also risks in waiting too long. Democratic energy in society can dissipate.  If (putative) democratic forces enter into a broad-based transitional government, as is now happening in Tunisia, they risk being corrupted or tainted with the stench of the old order if they hang around for too long, sharing some authority and stature but no real power. A prolonged transitional period can also give authoritarian forces time to regroup, purge the worst elements, present cosmetic changes, divide and confuse the opposition, and return to power under the guise of a pseudo-democracy. That is why it is important that opposition figures in Tunisia insist on a serious program of institutional and possibly constitutional reform during the transitional period, with extensive public dialogue and broad popular participation, so that interim rule is not a stagnant pause but rather a dynamic historical moment that engages and mobilizes public opinion for real democratic change. The risks of delay could also be reduced if a non-partisan, technocratic figure, not associated with the Ben Ali's political machine, could be tapped to lead the interim government, and if the political opposition could unify to negotiate strong conditions for the period of interim rule, including basic freedoms, an end to censorship, and removal of Ben Ali loyalists from the cabinet.

There is an important role for international actors at this seminal moment in Tunisian history. Like peoples throughout the Middle East and other post-colonial spaces, Tunisians are understandably wary of foreign intervention. After a quarter-century of lavish Western (especially French) aid and political comfort to Ben Ali, Tunisians will no doubt cast a suspicious eye on grants, statements and actions that purport to now, suddenly, want to build democracy in Tunisia. But Tunisians may welcome limited and specific steps if they are transparent and taken in careful consultation with diverse elements of Tunisia's civil society and historic opposition. 

Fortunately, Tunisia has many liberal and democratic figures in business, intellectual, cultural, and civic life who understand what liberal democracy is and would like to see it emerge in Tunisia. And it has other distinct advantages. It is a relatively small country in size and population, which makes some of the tasks of institution building and promotion of democratic norms a bit easier. Educational levels are relatively high, and there is a significant infrastructure of a middle class society. The security forces seem to be divided, and it appears the army refused to fire on peaceful protestors-a very positive precedent. Without blood on its hands from the recent violence, the army is better poised than other elements of state security to guarantee a process of democratic change, if its leadership comes down in favor of it (for whatever reason). And in contrast to Algeria, Egypt, or Jordan, Islamists do not seem to have strong public support. Thus, it is difficult for the forces of the ancien regime to manipulate public fears of radical Islam (or of disorder that the old elites themselves covertly generate) in order to discredit liberalism as naïve and ride back to power. 

It is vital that Europe and the United States not fall again for the specter of disorder or an Islamist surge, but rather insist on genuine democratic reforms, and tie future aid and geopolitical support to this. The US and EU should hold forth the prospect of Tunisia achieving a special and potentially transformative status in economic relations if it negotiates the path to become the first Arab democracy of this era. At the same time, they should threaten to institute targeted travel and financial sanctions against diehard defenders of the old order who frustrate or sabotage a democratic transition, or who use violence against peaceful demonstrators.  These kinds of prospective inducements, positive and negative, can help to tip the balance in the calculations of a lot of elites from outside the Ben Ali "family" but who were part of the Ben Ali regime and must now be wondering where their own interests lie. To complement the necessary private messages, the US ambassador (and others representing democracies in Tunis) should stand up publicly for democratic reforms, embrace democratic reformers, support new democratic initiatives with small grants, and warn old regime elites against repression.

In the coming weeks and months, American and European democracy foundations and aid organizations, along with the United Nations and its political assistance programs in the UNDP, can do a lot-transparently, and in consultation with Tunisian society-to train and support the emerging infrastructure of democracy in the state administration, political parties, and civil society. The funding required to make a difference is not large in absolute terms, and it should be a priority. Time is of the essence, and more flexible instruments, like USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, should be tapped to activate assistance quickly.        

History-and the grim realities of pervasive authoritarianism in what is known in the political science discipline as a "bad neighborhood"-do not justify a high degree of optimism about the prospects for democracy in Tunisia. Yet the third wave of global democratization is replete with instances of successful democratization in even more unlikely circumstances. The speed with which the Tunisian protests mushroomed in a few weeks from a lone act of self-sacrifice to a national uprising, and the intensity with which this uprising has resonated in nearby countries, shows the pent-up demand for democratic change in the Arab world. If that demand can be directed toward pursuit of concrete institutional reform, with timely international support, the Jasmine Revolution could surprise again, by giving birth to the first Arab democracy of our time.

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