Stanford University

Corruption

Roman Badanin

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Roman Badanin is founder and editor-in-chief of Agentstvo (The Agency, in English), a collaboration of journalists who have been targeted by the Russian government for their investigative reporting into the most powerful forces in their country. 

Badanin started The Agency in the summer of 2021 after Russian authorities outlawed Proekt (The Project in English), the nonprofit investigative news organization he founded in 2018. 

The Kremlin declared Proekt an “undesirable” organization, which meant that Badanin, his colleagues, and anyone who had dealings with Proekt, including sources, could face criminal prosecution. Over the previous three years, Badanin had led his team in publishing a series of investigations into secret financial ties between major business interests and top Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin and his family. The Proekt has been recognized with several Russian and international journalism awards.  

Shortly before the designation, police had raided Badanin’s apartment as well as the apartments of his deputy and a Proekt reporter, seizing their electronic devices and work materials. Badanin left Russia and helped members of his team relocate to nearby countries and resume working on their ongoing investigations. 

As a 2022 JSK Senior International Fellow, Badanin focused on finding alternative ways to produce and distribute deep investigative reporting on Russia’s ruling elite that gets around government censorship and intimidation efforts. Agentstvo is his first effort and he envisions it as a collaborative home for Russian investigative journalists, many of whom have over the last year been declared “foreign agents” by the government. While that is a less severe action than the “undesirable” organization designation, it has led multiple journalists to quietly move their base of operations outside of the country. 

Badanin has been working as a journalist in leading independent Russian news organizations for 20 years. He previously was a deputy editor-in-chief at Gazeta.Ru, editor-in-chief at Forbes Digital (Russia), RBC news agency, and editor of Dozhd (TV Rain), an independent Russian TV channel.

Badanin created the Moscow-based Proekt during his 2018 JSK Fellowship, modeling it after the nonprofit U.S. investigative news outlet, ProPublica. It was Russia’s first nonprofit news organization.

CDDRL-JSK Visiting Fellow, 2022-23
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Pushing Back on Putin: The Fight for Democracy Within Russia

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In 1999, Lyubov Sobol was a serious eleven-year-old with aspirations to be a Sherlock Holmes-style private detective. That same year, Vladimir Putin, a small-time FSB agent and mid-level cabinet member for former Leningrad mayor Anatoly Sobchak, was abruptly placed into the national spotlight by then-president Boris Yeltsin. Never in her wildest dreams could young Lyubov have imagined that 20 years later, she would be facing off against now-President Putin and working on the front lines to investigate and expose the corruption of the most powerful people in Russia.

For the last twelve years, Sobol has been a lawyer and political activist with the Anti-Corruption Foundation of Russia (FKB), the country’s most prominent pro-democracy movement. She works closely with the group’s founder, Alexei Navalny, to push for the democratization of Russia and advocate against Putin's policies through on-the-ground and digital outreach. She is currently at Stanford as a visiting scholar with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

As the war in Ukraine continues and free speech and other rights within Russia are further curtailed, many activists, Sobol included, have had to adapt or leave the country. To help contextualize the work she and other activists are currently doing, she explains where the roots of the democracy movement in modern Russia began, and the place she hopes it will take on the global stage in the future.
 

Corruption is a foundational element of the system Vladimir Putin and his cronies built. Without removing him and his supporters from power, it will not be possible for serious reforms or the democratization of state mechanisms to take place.
Lyubov Sobol
CDDRL Visiting Scholar


Let’s start with a broad look at opposition movements and their place in modern Russia. What role have opposition movements played in Russian society since the end of the Soviet Era in the late 1980s and early 1990s?

After the attempt by the Communist Party of Russia to forcibly seize political control in the 1991 August Coup, the course towards democratic reforms was supported by the majority of the Russian population. However, the democratic politicians were divided, and they had little to no experience with public political activity or organizing participation in elections. They failed to offer a clear, intelligible  plan for reforming the country and get it across to voters.                     

With the exception of certain leaders like Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, human rights ombudsman S. Kovalev, and Deputy Prime Minister B. Nemtsov, truly democratic politicians were not widely represented in power at this time, and did not have a significant influence on state policy. Many of the politicians in power used pro-democracy ideals and the language of human rights as a mask to further their own, more selfish interests. Then with the economic crash in 1998, radical rhetoric and a revitalized communist party began to regain support.

Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.
Boris Yeltsin hands over the “presidential” copy of the Russian constitution to Vladimir Putin. (December 31, 1999) | Wikimedia Commons

Ultimately, a strong democratic party never emerged in Russia and deeply rooted democratic institutions were not built. The corruption and false promises corroded trust in democracy and undermined many Russian’s belief in liberalism. When Putin came to power in the late 90s, he took advantage of the chaos and further crushed many of the structures of the state. By the 2000s, he had tightened control over the legislature and elections and removed almost all competition from within the power system.

Today, few opposition forces survive. The leading figure is Alexei Navalny, and the goal of his movement has been to promote the idea of democratic change and the change of Putin's regime as essential prerequisite for other structural reforms in Russia. His followers were refused the right to register as an official political party under false, far-fetched pretexts, and the organization was declared by the state as an extremist organization and subjected to countless, baseless criminal charges. Like most opposition politicians, Navalny is now in prison. But these attacks only show how in the last 10 years, he has truly become a viable competitor that Vladimir Putin’s regime fears.

Alexey Navalny marches with protestors in Moscow.
Alexei Navalny, Anna Veduta, and Ilya Yashin march at a pro-democracy rally in Moscow on June 12, 2013. | WIkimedia Commons

You work with the Anti-Corruption Foundation (Фонд борьбы с коррупцией), which was founded by Alexei Navalny in 2011. What has your network’s approach been to combatting corruption and systemic issues in Russia?

Our team investigates corruption crimes and collects legal evidence that we send to various law enforcement agencies as part of our efforts to bring those responsible to justice. At the same time, we focus public attention on these problems, demonstrating the negative impact that corruption and criminal activity has on all spheres of life. It’s important for people to understand that corruption is a foundational element of the system Vladimir Putin and his cronies built. Without removing him and his supporters from power, it will not be possible for serious reforms or deep democratization of state mechanisms to take place.

We’ve actively worked to propose anti-corruption bills and support those who are trying to ratify international standards like article 20 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which criminalizes illicit enrichment. Representatives of our team have participated in elections and conducted dozens of election campaigns throughout the country at all levels of government, from municipal and regional to the presidential elections in the Russian Federation. Our team also worked with authoritative Russian economists and experts such as Sergei Guriev and Sergei Aleksashenko to develop projects for economic and political reforms.

We’ve won several elections in both city and regional parliaments, and have also developed and successfully applied the Smart Voting project to help coordinate voting in support of promising opponents of Putin's United Russia party. But all this being said, we’ve faced strong opposition from the authorities, the police, and the FSB with each victory.
 

Opposition pro-democratic forces are partners with the West. Putin can only offer the world blackmails on energy, the threats of nuclear war, and a global food crisis. We offer stable business relationships and peaceful, constructive foreign policy.
Lyubov Sobol
CDDRL Visiting Scholar

How have you and other activists had to adapt since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the further crackdowns in Russia against opposition voices and protests?

Repressions against our team began even before the attack on Ukraine. In the fall of 2020, the FSB tried to kill Alexei Navalny by poisoning him with the military-grade nerve agent Novichok. After an investigation into this poisoning and his return to Russia, he was imprisoned. Our group, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FKB) was declared an extremist group and a foreign agent by the Kremlin and liquidated. In practice, this means we are banned from participating in political work like elections and protests. This has essentially created a ban on any political opposition activity in Russia.

Under such conditions, most of our team has evacuated to neighboring countries and continues to work from exile. We still influence the minds and moods in Russia through our internet media resources, which have an audience of millions. Conducting one-time protests is currently impossible in the country due to the introduction of repressive laws, but we continue to encourage our supporters to participate in elections under the Smart Voting strategy. We stand up for increasing the number of our supporters and for the trust of the people, while increasing the political costs for Putin, reducing his personal rating, and diminishing the standing of the United Russia party.

Muscovites protest against the war in Ukraine.
Muscovites protest against the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. | Wikimedia Commons

What can supporters of democracy across the world do to help the work you and other activists from Russia are doing?

After the attack on Ukraine, the best thing the rest of the world can do is to help Ukraine to get everything it needs to win this war. Ukraine's victory is Putin's loss.

The war unleashed by Putin is criminal not only in relation to Ukraine and Ukrainians, but also to Russia. It contradicts Russia’s national interests and literally destroys its future. Putin and his regime are a common enemy for Russians, Ukrainians, and the entire democratic world.

But the war is not only on the battlefields and in the Ukrainian cities. This war has an economic front, and Western countries need to intensify their efforts to deprive the Kremlin of its resources to continue the war. There also needs to be much tougher personal sanctions against Putin’s officials and propagandists.
 

The outcome [of this war] will determine the vector of development for the entire world: either towards democracy or to totalitarianism. That’s why . . . this war is important not only for the people of Ukraine and Russia, but for everyone, everywhere.
Lyubov Sobol
CDDRL Visiting Fellow

Despite what the propaganda tries to portray, Russia is not homogenous and support for Putin is far from being ironclad. Putin has not won the entire information war for Russian’s attitudes. That’s why we at FKB consider it our duty to continue countering false information and tell Russians the truth about the war and Putin’s crimes.

We want the democratic community to understand how important this work is for victory in the war and the post-war reconstruction of Russia. While the physical fighting might be localized to Eastern Europe, the war will have far-reaching consequences across the globe. Its outcome will determine the vector of development for the entire world: either towards democracy or to totalitarianism. That’s why victory on the side of justice and rights in this war is important not only for the people of Ukraine and Russia, but for everyone, everywhere.
 

Liubov Sobol

Lyubov Sobol

Activist and CDDRL Visiting Scholar
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Protests demonstrate against Vladimir Putin outside a Russian-owned international investment bank in Budapest, Hungary.
Protests demonstrate against Vladimir Putin outside a Russian-owned international investment bank in Budapest, Hungary. (March 1, 2022)
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Lyubov Sobol, an activist and current visiting scholar at CDDRL, explains the roots of Russia's pro-democracy movement and the importance of its success to Russia, Ukraine, and the future stability of the global democratic community.

How to Win in Putin’s Propaganda War

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With starting the war in Ukraine Vladimir Putin started the war on information within Russia: in a couple of weeks Russian authorities shut down all the independent media, dozens of independent journalists were forced to leave the country. Russian propaganda is working really hard to convince Russians to support the war in Ukraine. Is there a chance to win in Russian propaganda war. Tikhon Dzyadko, editor in chief of TVRain, the last independent TV-station in Russia, believes that it is possible and will explain what is needed to be done in order to succeed.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Tikhon Dzyadko headshot

Tikhon Dzyadko is a Russian journalist, television presenter and media manager. He is the former editor-in-chief for TV Rain, one of the last independent television stations in Russia, and host of the Russian Television International (RTVI TV) network, a Russian-language television station based in New York.

 

 

At this time, in-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only. We continue to welcome our greater community to join virtually via Zoom.

 

This event is co-sponsored by CDDRL and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

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Tikhon Dzyadko
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Lyubov Sobol

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CDDRL Visiting Scholar, 2022
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Lyubov Sobol is a Russian political and public figure. She consistently advocates the democratization of Russia and opposes Putin's policies.

She produces the YouTube channel "Navalny Live" of Alexei Navalny (more than 2.7 million subscribers, more than 90 million views per month, of which more than 20 million unique viewers).

She participated in the election campaign for the Moscow City Duma in 2019 and the State Duma of Russia in 2021 but was illegally admitted because of her political position: opposing the actions of the current government.

In May 2018 she became a member of the Central Council of Alexei Navalny's political party Russia of the Future.

Sobol was a lawyer for the Anti-Corruption Foundation until its closure in 2021.

Sean Foster Michael

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CDDRL Honors Student, 2022-23
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Major: Economics
Minor: Political Science; Modern Languages (Spanish & German)
Hometown: Scarsdale, NY
Thesis Advisor: Chonira Aturupane

Tentative Thesis Title: Comparing the Effect of Chinese and American Aid on Corruption in Latin America

Future aspirations post-Stanford: After graduation, my plan is to work in public sector consulting, preferably at the state and local level. After that, I'd like to go to graduate school to best leverage my skills in development economics, likely in or adjacent to the public sector. 

A fun fact about yourself: My first quarter as a CDDRL Honors student will be spent in Santiago, Chile, where I’ll be doing primary source research into Chilean politics and history.

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Jose Sabau

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CDDRL Honors Student, 2021-22
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Major: Political Science   
Minor: Economics
Hometown: Cozumel, Mexico
Thesis Advisor: James Fearon

Tentative Thesis Title: Making Friends with the Enemy: A Study of Cooperation Between Drug Cartels and Local Politicians in Mexico

Future aspirations post-Stanford: After Stanford, I hope to pursue a PhD in political science focusing on Latin American politics and Economic development. My dream is to return to my home country of Mexico and help create a better future for all my fellow citizens. I am unsure whether this would be through academia, journalism, or public office, but I am excited to see what the future holds. Above all, I hope to follow the footsteps of academics and reporters who have devoted their lives to improving conditions in Latin America.

A fun fact about yourself: I am obsessed with the Nobel Prize in Literature. I can name half of the people who have won the award at the top of my head and in my free time, I always read as many laureates as I can (currently at 40 out of 117).

Institutionalized Police Brutality: Torture, the Militarization of Security, and the Reform of Inquisitorial Criminal Justice in Mexico

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How can societies restrain their coercive institutions and transition to a more humane criminal justice system? We argue that two main factors explain why torture can persist as a generalized practice even in democratic societies: weak procedural protections and the militarization of policing, which introduces strategies, equipment, and mentality that treats criminal suspects as though they were enemies in wartime. Using a large survey of the Mexican prison population and leveraging the date and place of arrest, this paper provides causal evidence about how these two explanatory variables shape police brutality. Our paper offers a grim picture of the survival of authoritarian policing practices in democracies. It also provides novel evidence of the extent to which the abolition of inquisitorial criminal justice institutions—a remnant of colonial legacies and a common trend in the region—has worked to restrain police brutality.

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American Political Science Review
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Beatriz Magaloni
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Issue 4

How Authoritarians Win When They Lose

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What happens when authoritarian populist parties lose elections despite a tilted playing field? Postelection capture might be their new tool: Confronted with losses in the 2016 and 2019 local elections, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) set about undoing the results by dismissing over 150 democratically elected mayors—mostly in predominantly Kurdish cities—and replaced them with state-appointed trustees or kayyums. These political captures expand the AKP’s patronage networks through what we call forced clientelism and further polarization, thereby undermining the formation of a stronger prodemocratic coalition.

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Journal of Democracy
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Ayça Alemdaroğlu
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Number 4

Oleksiy Honcharuk

616 Jane Stanford Way,

Encina Hall,

Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow, 2021
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Ukraine’s 17th Prime Minister (August 2019 – March 2020). In just 5 months Mr. Honcharuk initiated important changes that other Ukrainian politicians had not dared to do for years (launched of large and small privatization processes, started of land market implementation, conducted Naftogaz unbundling, started combating shade markets –– illegal gambling houses and petrol stations were closed, launched of Anti-Raider (illegal seizure of business or property) Office that would react within just 24 hours to any cases of such illegal seizure, etc).

Before he served as a Deputy Head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine and was a member of the National Reforms Council under the President of Ukraine. Previously for more than ten years, Mr. Honcharuk has been working in the legal sphere. He has established a reputation as a strong professional and qualified specialist. Mr. Honcharuk is also known as a strong fighter for business community rights. 2005-2008, he worked as a lawyer at PRIOR-Invest investment company and later on headed its legal department. During 2008-2015, he worked as an arbitration manager and managing partner at Constructive Lawyers, a law firm he had founded, which provided legal services in the field of investment and financing real estate construction.

From 2015-2019, Oleksiy Honcharuk headed Better Regulation Delivery Office non-governmental organization (BRDO). Among his achievements as the head of the BRDO was the cancellation of around 1000 Government acts and adoption of more than 50 decisions, facilitating activity of business in Ukraine. Oleksiy Honcharuk also served as an external advisor to the First Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine.

Oleksiy Honcharuk has a degree in law from Interregional Academy of Personal Management and in Public Administration from National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine. He was born on July 7, 1984, in Zhmerynka, Vinnytsia region.

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Marisa Kellam

Encina Hall

616 Jane Stanford Way

Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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CDDRL Visiting Scholar, 2021-23
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Marisa Kellam researches the quality of democracy with a focus on Latin America and a growing interest in East Asia. Her research links institutional analysis to various governance outcomes in democracies along three lines of inquiry: political parties and coalitional politics; mass electoral behavior and party system change; and democratic accountability and media freedom. She has published her research in various peer-reviewed journals, including The British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and Political Communication. Originally from Santa Rosa, California, Marisa Kellam earned her Ph.D. in political science from UCLA and spent several years as an assistant professor at Texas A&M University. Since 2013, she has been Associate Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, where she also served as Director of the English-based degree programs for the School of Political Science & Economics. Currently she is a steering committee member for the V-Dem Regional Center for East Asia.

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