Few dispute that Russia has become more autocratic during the almost eight years during which Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia. Explanations for this political process differ, but agreement about the trend is now widespread. Real debate continues, however, over whether growing autocracy in Russia is good or bad for other valued outcomes, including economic growth, political stability, and the emergence of a capable state, effective at home and respected abroad. On the relationship between regime type and growth in Russia, there is a correlation between democracy and economic depression in the 1990s and then autocracy and growth in this decade. Under the administration of Vladimir Putin, popular perception has been that Russia is more stable and that Russians are happier and better governed than under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Often, Putin's high public opinion ratings are used as evidence of citizen content with the administration. Analysts in Russia and the West also credit Putin with ending anarchy and restoring Russia as a great power.

But this growing myth of authoritarian governing competence in Russia needs to be exposed. The Russian economy has grown in parallel to growing autocracy, but these two processes have little, if anything, to do with each other. Moreover, since Putin's ascendance to the Russian presidency, the country has been governed less well, not better. Across a variety of sources and measures, Russians have clearly become less secure as evidenced by a steady increase in murder rates, theft and burglary and terrorist attacks at the same time that the state has become more corrupt. When these negative governance trends are factored into predictions about long-term stability, Putin's governing legacy may not be as positive as assumed. If governance measures remain low under Putin's successor, and in the absence of Putin's personal prestige in the presidency, Russia may yet witness another period of political instability.