In this book noted political sociologist Larry Diamond sets forth a distinctive theoretical perspective on democratic evolution and consolidation in the late twentieth century. Rejecting theories that posit preconditions for democracy, and thus dismiss its prospects in poor countries, Diamond argues instead for a "developmental" theory of democracy. This, he explains, is one which views democracy everywhere as a work in progress that emerges piecemeal, at different rates, in different ways and forms, in different countries. Diamond begins by assessing the "third wave" of global democratization that began in 1974.

With a wealth of quantitative data and case illustrations, he shows that the third wave has come to an end, leaving a growing gap between the electoral form and the liberal substance of democracy. This underscores the hollow, fragile state of many democracies and the imperative of concolidation. He then defines the concept of democratic consolidation and identifies the conditions that foster it. These include strong political institutions, appropriate institutional designs, decentralization of power, a vibrant civil society, and improved economic and political performance.

If new and troubled democracies are to be consolidated, Diamond argues, they must become more deeply democratic, more liberal, accountable, and responsive to their citizens. Drawing on extensive public opinion research in developing and postcommunist states, he demonstrates the importance of freedom, transparency, and the rule of law for generating the broad legitimacy that is the essence of democratic consolidation. The book concludes with a hopeful view of the prospects for a fourth wave of global democratization.

Democratization in Africa examines the state of progress of democracy in Africa at the end of the 1990s. The past decade's "third wave" of democratization, the contributors argue, has been characterized by retreats as well as advances. In some cases, newly established democratic orders have devolved into pseudo-democracies while, in other cases, superficial changes have been used as a cosmetic screen for continuation of often brutal regimes. The volume makes clear, however, that political liberalization is making significant headway.

The first section of the book ("Assessing Africa's Third Wave") offers several broad analytical surveys of democratic change and electoral processes in the 48 sub-Saharan African states. Frequent abuses are noted, but several contributors find room for guarded optimism. The second section ("South Africa: An African Success?") focuses on the dramatic developments in South Africa, the most advanced democracy on the continent but one faced with enormous challenges in the aftermath of apartheid. Essays in this section examine such issues as the role of nongovernmental organizations in the new political order, the ongoing and linked problems of racial and economic division, the demographics of public opinion on democracy, and the viability of the country's new constitution. The third section of the book ("African Ambiguities") considers more closely several other African states-Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, the Gambia, and Nigeria-all at different crossroads in their progress toward democracy.

From the Introduction:

"For the past three decades, there has been no lack of reasons to be pessimistic about Africa's future. But a more balanced reading is called for . . . There is significantly greater political freedom and more space for civil society in Africa today than a decade ago. Even as some states have disintegrated, others are moving forward to reconstruction. There is also a new ideological and intellectual climate. Unlike during the false start of the first liberation that came with decolonization, Africa today evinces a new political sobriety that is hardened (and even jaundiced) by experience, but not without hope."

What are Russian foreign policy objectives? It depends on whom you ask.

In making assessments of Russia's behavior in the world, it is absolutely

critical that we recognize that Russia today is not a totalitarian state ruled by a

Communist Party with a single and clearly articulated foreign policy of expanding

world socialism and destroying world capitalism and democracy. That state

disappeared in 1991. Rather, Russia is a democratizing state - a weakly institutionalized

democracy with several deficiencies, but a democratizing state

nonetheless. Russia's foreign policy, in turn, is a product of domestic politics in

a pluralistic system.

On 17 August 1998, the Russian government took emergency measures to avert an economic meltdown, but these did little to halt the crisis. A week later, the ruble had lost two-thirds of its value vis-'a-vis the dollar. In one day, the two major economic achievements of the Boris Yeltsin era--control of inflation and a stable, transferable currency--were wiped out. The stock market all but disappeared, the ruble continued to fall, banks closed, prices soared, and stores emptied as people started to stockpile durable goods like cigarettes, sugar, and flour. Responding desperately to a desperate situation, Yeltsin fired Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko and his government and eventually nominated Yevgeny Primakov to head a coalition government of centrists, communists, liberals, and even one member from Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party. Several months after taking power, however, this new government had done little to devise a strategy for halting Russia's economic woes.

Over the next few decades East Asia is likely to be the most critical arena in the global struggle for democracy. A region of remarkable diversity that has achieved unparalleled economic growth, East Asia is viewed as a model by many developing countries in other parts of the world. Though some of its most successful countries are democratic, East Asia is also home to nondemocratic regimes that can claim enviable records of both political stability and economic growth. Some of these regimes have helped to launch a global debate about whether "Asian values" conducive to growth and stability may be incompatible with Western-style liberal democracy.

This volume of essays by leading North American and Asian scholars provides a comprehensive look at key themes relating to democracy in East Asia today. The contributors explore the "Asian values" debate, East Asia's democratic experience, the effort to consolidate East Asia's new democracies, and prospects for democratic transitions among the region's remaining authoritarian regimes.

Contributors: Frederick Z. Brown, Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Joseph Chan, Yun-han Chu, Gerald L. Curtis, Wm. Theodore de Bary, Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Makoto Iokibe, Bilahari Kausikan, Byung-Kook Kim, R. William Liddle, Gordon P. Means, Margaret Ng, Tatsumi Okabe, Parichart Chotiya, Minxin Pei, Marc F. Plattner, Robert Scalapino.

In December 1993, for the first time since the formation of Russia's anti-communist movement in the late 1980s, advocates of radical economic and political reform -- represented in this election by the electoral bloc Russia's Choice -- were rejected by Russia voters. The results shocked Russia's radical reformers. Although public opinion polls suggested that Russia's Choice might capture as high as 40 percent of the popular vote, this proreform and pro-Yeltsin electoral bloc won only 15.5 percent, well behind the 23 percent garnered by Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia ( LDPR) and not much higher than the 12 percent won by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). This dismal showing was especially surprising considering that President Boris Yeltsin--the leader and symbol of Russia's radical reform movement--had just won majority approval ratings for both his performance as president and his economic reform plan in a nationwide referendum held in April 1993, just eight months before the December parliamentary elections.

"For the first time in several years, politicians across the spectrum-liberals, communists, and nationalists alike-have begun to speak about the specter of Russian fascism should the current economic and political crises continue. Others, including even President Yeltsin, have warned of coup plots aimed at toppling Russia's fragile democracy. What went wrong, so quickly?"

Russia appears to have made tremendous progress in becoming a democracy in recent years. In December 1995, Russian citizens voted in parliamentary elections. In two rounds of voting in June and July in 1996, they then elected a president, the first time ever that Russian voters directly selected their head of state. Despite calls for delay and postponement, these two elections were held on time and under law - law drafted and approved through a democratic procedure by elected officials. Large majorities participated in both of these elections: 65% of all eligible voters in 1995, and nearly 70% in both rounds of the presidential vote. While electoral violations tainted both elections, especially the presidential vote, all participants - winners and losers - accepted the election results. After Boris Yeltsin's inauguration, the Communist-dominated parliament approved his candidate for prime minister - Viktor Chernomyrdin - by an overwhelming majority. This too was a first, as Russia's elected parliament had never approved the executive's choice for prime minister under the procedures outlined in a popularly-ratified constitution. Finally, from the fall of 1996 to the spring of 1998, over sixty gubernatorial elections were held throughout Russia. Although there was evidence that results were falsified in some races, the vast majority were recognized as free and fair by all major participants.

Throughout the history of the modern world, domestic regime change- be it democratization, autocratization, decolonization, decommunization, federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions- has often triggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from the ancien regime compete with new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguous ways. This uncertain text provides opportunities for political actors, both old and new, to pursue new strategies for achieving their objectives, including belligerent policies against both domestic and international foes. In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefited from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strike out against their enemies as means to shore up their domestic legitimacy. In the name of democracy, independence, the revolution, or the nation, the beneficiaries of regime change also can resort to violence against both domestic and international opponents to secure their new gains.

Although Africa has been one of the least democratic regions of the world, it has been experiencing widespread pressures for democratic change since 1990. Although pressure-from both domestic civil societies and international donors-has failed to bring about a transition to democracy in most cases, it has succeeded in many. Today, about a third of all African countries are at least electoral democracies, and virtually all regimes in sub-Saharan Africa have at least legalized opposition parties. Conventional political science theories view Africa's democratic prospects as grim because of its extreme poverty and deep ethnic divisions. This essay takes a more hopeful and "developmental" view. It argues that democratic change can occur in Africa and must if it is to develop economically. But this will inevitably involve a long-term process of political and social change and, in particular, institution building. African countries need new, more appropriate, and more effective institutions to control corruption, provide a market-oriented enabling environment for economic growth, and generate incentives for political parties to craft broad multiethnic appeals and constituencies. If institutions of governance, electoral politics, and civil society can be strengthened and innovatively designed, there is hope for democracy in Africa. But this will also require heavy international conditionality and pressure for more responsible policies and more effective institutions, as well as greater international support for those African regimes that appear serious about democracy and good governance. African societies are ready for a new democratic beginning, but they require the right institutional frameworks at home and vigorous engagement of the international community if deeply entrenched patterns of statism, corruption, repression, ethnic exclusion, and violence are to be overcome.