Just as political comparativists have tended to screen out international factors, international relations theorists and international lawyers concentrate on international outcomes and have been under-prepared to research causal linkages between international agents and domestic actors. Researching external dimensions of democratization, moreover, must involve the insights of both academics and practitioners. Yet the separation between the two worlds remains profound. In attempting to explain exogenous influences on domestic political developments, academics have tended to gravitate towards history (often going back several centuries) (Moore 166; Tilly 1975, 1990; Greif 2005; 2006) rather than grapple with the messy history of the present. For their part, practitioners borrow few insights from academics, and the two groups are generally "engaged in dissimilar enterprises" (Carothers 1999: 94).

The forces that attempted to create democracy in Iran a hundred years ago are have only grown and become more experienced in the language and logic of democracy. The hitherto unrealized dream of democracy lives on. The abducted revolution of 1979 has only delayed the quest for democracy, but not destroyed it. International forces, acting with prudence and patience can be a crucial ally of Iranian democrats in what has so far seemed like a Sisyphean struggle. 

Before the democracy promotion efforts of Iraq or Afghanistan in the early 21st century, there was the Soviet Union in the late 20th century. For much longer, and with much greater capacity than Saddam Hussein’s regime or the Taliban, the Soviet regime threatened the United States. The destruction of the Soviet regime and the construction of a pro-Western, democratic regime in its place, therefore, was a major objective of American foreign policy. Some presidents pursued this goal more vigorously than others: Nixon cared less, Reagan rather more. Yet, even during the height of Nixonian realism, Senator Jackson and Congressman Vanik made sure that the human rights of Soviet citizens were not ignored. Containment of Soviet power always remained a primary objective of U.S. policy, but democratic change inside the USSR survived as a hope, if not a policy goal for most of this period. Some administrations even devoted real resources and strategic thinking to the issue. Perhaps most boldly, President Reagan launched his strategic defense initiative in part to push the Soviet regime into bankruptcy.

(Excerpt) In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic showed promise as a modern liberator. The former Yugoslav communist apparatchik turned national protagonist rose to power swiftly, enjoyed immense initial support and ultimately retained the authority he achieved with violence, xenophobic propaganda, patronage and misappropriation of the country's wealth as his popularity declined. He ruled as Yugoslavia's constituent republics devolved into separate nations, through four wars and a NATO bombing campaign that pitted his regime against the West. The stirring electoral victory of his opposition and subsequent protests that removed Milosevic on October 5, 2000 came after more than a decade during which the autocrat often seemed unassailable, invulnerable and incorrigible. His fall was hailed inside and outside of Serbia as a decisive moment of revolutionary democratic change.

Few of the players critical in the dramaturgy of the electoral breakthrough of 2000 characterize the ouster of Milosevic as revolutionary today, however. Much of the architecture of the regime's judicial, security and intelligence apparatus remain intact. National chauvinism, distrust of pluralist politics, poor relations with the West, endemic corruption, and economic stagnation persist. It is not always the case that a successful breakthrough also triggers a gradual, evolutionary process of consolidating liberal democracy. Instead, successful cases can degenerate into partially consolidated democracies and sometimes slip back into authoritarian rule.

The intended focus of this study, however, is not democratic consolidation. Nor is it post- conflict stabilization or gradual liberalization. The subject is specifically the set of factors that produce democratic breakthrough (in this case within Serbia), factors that may be quite different from those that contribute to other kinds of democratic change.

The post-World War II fabric of global security, designed and maintained by the United States, has dangerously frayed. Built for a different age, current international institutions are ill-equipped to address today's most pressing global security challenges, ranging from climate change and nuclear proliferation to civil strife and terrorism.

Revitalizing the institutions of cooperation will require a new conceptual foundation for global security. The "national sovereignty" of the twentieth century must give way to "responsible sovereignty"-a principle requiring nations not only to protect their own people, but also to cooperate across borders to safeguard common resources and tackle common threats. Achieving this will require American leadership and commitment to a rule-based international order.

In Power and Responsibility Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen Stedman provide the conceptual underpinnings for a new approach to sovereignty and cooperation. They present ideas for the new U.S. administration, working with other global powers, to promote together what they cannot produce apart-peace and stability. Recommendations follow more than a year of consultations with policymakers and experts all over the world. They reflect the guidance of the Managing Global Insecurity Project Advisory Group, composed of prominent figures from the United States and abroad. They call for the new president and key partners to launch a 2009 campaign to revitalize international cooperation and rejuvenate international institutions.

As Washington prepares for a presidential transition, the time has arrived for a serious rethinking of American policy. For the United States, this is no time to go it alone.