“Emerging democracies must demonstrate
that they can solve governance problems
and meet citizens’ expectations for freedom,
justice, a better life, and a fairer society.”
If the big global story of the 1980s and
1990s was the remarkable expansion of democracy, the
bad news of this decade is that democracy is slipping
into recession. In the two decades following the
Portuguese revolution in 1974, the number of democracies
tripled (from 40 to 120) and the percentage of
the world’s states that are at least electoral democracies
more than doubled (to about 60 percent). Since the late
1990s however, there has been little if any net progress
in democracy. To be sure, significant new transitions
to democracy took place in countries like Mexico,
Indonesia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. But globally,
the democratic wave has been neutralized and is now at
risk of being overtaken by an authoritarian undertow,
which has extinguished democracy in such states as
Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Bangladesh and
Kenya. In fact, two-thirds (15) of all the reversals of
democracy (23) since 1974 have taken place just in
the last eight years, since the October 1999 military
coup in Pakistan.
Fortunately, breakdowns of democracy do not always
persist for long. Pakistan held remarkably vibrant
parliamentary elections in February 2008, in which
the party of the autocratic, unelected president, Pervez
Musharraf, was crushed. Should the legitimate parties
succeed in curtailing Musharraf’s power or forcing him
from office, a transition back to democracy could be
completed. Thailand has made a similar cycle of return,
Bangladesh figures to do so this year, and Nepal is trying
to do so. The remote mountain kingdom of Bhutan has
quickly gone from absolute to constitutional monarchy,
and Mauritania, a desert-poor Muslim-majority country,
has also made a democratic transition. But many of the
new democracies of recent decades are shallow and in
trouble. And freedom has been lurching backwards. By
the ratings of Freedom House, last year was the worst
year for freedom since the end of the Cold War, with
38 countries declining in their levels of political rights
and civil liberties and only 10 improving.
Two other negative trends are important to note.
One is the implosion of democratic openings in the
Arab world. Under pressure from the George W. Bush administration beginning in 2003, several authoritarian
Arab regimes liberalized political life and held competitive,
multiparty elections. Then, Islamist political forces
made dramatic gains in Egypt and Lebanon and won a
majority of seats in Palestine and Iraq — and suddenly the
Bush Administration got cold feet. Arab democrats who
had surfaced and mobilized felt abandoned and betrayed.
The liberal secular politician Ayman Nour, who had
the temerity to challenge President Hosni Mubarak in
Egypt’s first contested presidential election, languishes in
prison three years later. The country’s political opening
is now frozen, while more than a billion dollars in
American aid continues to flow to the regime.
The second negative trend is that authoritarian states
have, unfortunately, learned some of the lessons of
democratic breakthroughs of the past decade, particularly
the color revolutions that brought down neocommunist
autocracies in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
As a result, they have closed political space, swallowed
up or arrested independent media, crushed independent
political opposition, sabotaged or shut down innovative
uses of the Internet, and sought to block or sever external
flows of democratic assistance. Vladimir Putin’s Russia
(with its sinister cabal of savvy Kremlin “political
technologists”) has blazed the trail in this authoritarian
pushback, but China, Belarus, Iran, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, and other “post” communist and Middle
Eastern dictatorships have followed suit. To make
matters worse, China and Russia have drawn together
with the Central Asian dictatorships in a new club, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to formalize and
advance their authoritarian pushback.
To renew democratic progress in the world, we must
understand the reasons for the democratic recession.
Authoritarian learning is one. Another has been the
inconsistent and often unilateralist policies of the United
States. Although President
Bush has done much to
put democracy promotion
at the center of American
foreign policy and has
substantially increased
funding for U.S. democracy
assistance programs,
he has also alienated
potential allies in the effort
to advance democracy
globally by associating democracy promotion with the
use of (largely unilateral) force, as in Iraq; by promoting
democracy with a tone that was often self-righteous
and a style that was too often poorly coordinated with
our democratic allies; and then by failing to sustain
pressure for democratic change when the going got
rough in the Middle East.
Structural factors have also driven the recession of
democracy. One has had to do with the global political
economy. As the price of oil has gone up, the prospects
for democracy have receded. Russia, Nigeria, and
Venezuela have all seen their democracies slip back into
authoritarianism as oil prices have skyrocketed, sending
huge new infusions of discretionary revenue into the
hands of autocratic leaders, which they have used to buy
off opponents and strengthen their security apparatuses.
In Iran and Azerbaijan, surging oil revenues have shored
up authoritarian states that once seemed vulnerable.
A second and more pervasive factor has had to do
with the performance of the new democracies. Some
new democracies are holding their own (like Mali) and
even making progress (like Brazil and Indonesia) in the
face of enormous accumulated problems and challenges.
But the general reality, even in these countries, is that
democracy often does not work for average citizens.
Rather, it is blighted by multiple forms of bad governance:
abusive police and security forces, domineering
local oligarchies, inept and indifferent state bureaucracies,
corrupt and pliant judiciaries, and ruling elites who
routinely shred the rule of law in the quest to get rich
in office. As a result, citizens grow alienated from
democracy and become susceptible to the patronage
crumbs of corrupt political bosses and the demagogic
appeals of authoritarian populists like Putin in Russia
and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.
“If democracies do not work better to
contain crime and corruption, generate
economic growth, relieve economic
inequality, and secure freedom and a rule
of law, people will eventually lose faith
and turn to authoritarian alternatives.”Before democracy can spread further, it must take
deeper root where it has already sprouted. Emerging
democracies must demonstrate that they can solve
governance problems and meet citizens’ expectations
for freedom, justice, a better life, and a fairer society.
If democracies do not work better to contain crime and
corruption, generate economic growth, relieve economic
inequality, and secure freedom and a rule of law, people
will eventually lose faith and turn to authoritarian alternatives.
Struggling democracies must be consolidated,
so that all levels of society become enduringly committed
to democracy as the best form of government and to the country’s constitutional norms and restraints. Western
governments and international aid donors can assist
in this process by making most foreign aid contingent
on key principles of good governance: a free press, an
independent judiciary, and vigorous, independently led
institutions to control corruption. International donors
also need to expand their efforts to assist these institutions
of horizontal accountability as well as initiatives
in civil society that monitor the conduct of government
and press for institutional reform.
The only way to stem the democratic recession is to
show that democracy really is the best form of government
— that it can not only provide political freedom
but also improve social justice and human welfare.